2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
210 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
211 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
217 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
219 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
220 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
223 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
224 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
233 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
235 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
236 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
237 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
240 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
245 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
246 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
248 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
249 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
250 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
251 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
253 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
254 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
255 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
256 * the server is resuming.
259 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
261 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
262 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
263 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
264 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
268 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
269 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
271 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
272 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
273 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
277 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
278 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
282 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
291 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
292 * |ext.status_expected| is set
294 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
295 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
300 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
303 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
304 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
306 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
313 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
314 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
315 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
323 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
324 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
325 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
330 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
331 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
332 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
336 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
342 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
349 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
350 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
351 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
365 /* No valid transition found */
366 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
367 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
368 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
373 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
374 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
377 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
379 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
382 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
383 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
384 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
386 switch (st->hand_state) {
388 /* Shouldn't happen */
389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
390 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
391 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
392 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
394 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
395 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
396 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
398 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
399 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
400 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
403 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
404 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
408 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
409 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
414 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
415 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
416 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
417 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
421 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
422 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
425 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
426 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
427 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
429 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
430 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
431 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
432 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
437 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
438 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
440 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
443 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
444 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
445 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
448 /* Try to read from the server instead */
449 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
454 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
455 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
457 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
459 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
462 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
463 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
467 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
469 switch (st->hand_state) {
471 /* Shouldn't happen */
472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
473 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
474 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
475 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
478 if (!s->renegotiate) {
480 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
481 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
483 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
488 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
489 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
491 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
492 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
494 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
495 * actually selected a version yet.
497 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
498 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
501 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
504 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
506 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
508 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
510 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
513 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
515 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
517 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
518 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
519 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
521 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
522 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
526 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
528 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
530 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
531 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
534 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
535 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
536 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
537 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
539 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
540 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
542 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
544 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
547 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
553 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
554 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
556 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
558 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
559 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
561 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
563 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
565 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
566 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
567 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
568 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
571 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
573 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
579 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
585 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
588 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
590 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
593 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
594 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
595 /* SSLfatal() already called */
596 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
598 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
599 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
602 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
607 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
608 * the client to the server.
610 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
612 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
614 switch (st->hand_state) {
616 /* No pre work to be done */
619 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
621 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
622 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
623 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
624 /* SSLfatal() already called */
630 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
631 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
634 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
635 * messages unless we need to.
639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
640 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
641 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
642 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
648 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
650 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
651 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
652 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
654 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
655 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
656 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
659 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
661 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
662 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
665 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
669 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
670 * client to the server.
672 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
674 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
678 switch (st->hand_state) {
680 /* No post work to be done */
683 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
684 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
687 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
688 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
692 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
693 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
695 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
696 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
697 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
699 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
700 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
707 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
709 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
710 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
712 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
713 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
716 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
717 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
718 /* SSLfatal() already called */
723 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
724 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
725 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
726 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
728 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
729 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
731 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
733 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
734 /* SSLfatal() already called */
738 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
739 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
744 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
745 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
748 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
751 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
756 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
760 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
761 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
762 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
764 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
767 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
771 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
774 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
775 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
776 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
777 /* SSLfatal() already called */
783 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
784 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
786 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
787 /* SSLfatal() already called */
793 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
797 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
800 * Valid return values are:
804 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
805 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
807 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
809 switch (st->hand_state) {
811 /* Shouldn't happen */
812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
813 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
814 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
817 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
819 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
821 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
822 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
825 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
826 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
827 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
830 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
831 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
832 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
835 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
841 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
842 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
845 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
846 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
847 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
850 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
851 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
852 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
855 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
856 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
857 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
858 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
861 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
862 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
863 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
866 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
867 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
868 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
876 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
877 * reading. Excludes the message header.
879 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
881 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
883 switch (st->hand_state) {
885 /* Shouldn't happen */
888 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
889 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
891 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
892 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
894 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
895 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
898 return s->max_cert_list;
900 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
901 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
903 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
904 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
907 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
909 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
911 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
912 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
913 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
915 return s->max_cert_list;
917 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
918 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
920 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
921 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
923 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
925 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
926 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
928 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
929 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
931 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
932 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
934 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
935 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
940 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
942 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
944 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
946 switch (st->hand_state) {
948 /* Shouldn't happen */
949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
950 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
951 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
952 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
954 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
955 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
957 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
958 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
961 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
964 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
966 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
967 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
970 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
972 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
973 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
976 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
978 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
979 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
982 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
984 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
985 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
987 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
988 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
990 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
991 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
993 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
994 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
996 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
997 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1002 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1005 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1007 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1009 switch (st->hand_state) {
1011 /* Shouldn't happen */
1012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1013 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1014 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1017 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1018 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1022 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1027 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1030 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1032 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1033 /* Should not happen */
1034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1035 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1039 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1040 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1041 if (protverr != 0) {
1042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1048 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1049 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1050 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1051 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1055 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1057 p = s->s3->client_random;
1060 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1061 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1063 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1066 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1073 i = s->hello_retry_request == 0;
1076 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1077 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1079 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1084 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1085 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1086 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1087 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1088 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1089 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1090 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1091 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1094 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1095 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1096 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1097 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1098 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1099 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1100 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1101 * know that is maximum server supports.
1102 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1103 * containing version 1.0.
1105 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1106 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1107 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1108 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1109 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1110 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1111 * the negotiated version.
1113 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1114 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1116 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1117 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1118 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1119 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1124 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1127 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1128 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1129 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1130 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1132 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1138 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1139 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1140 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1141 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1142 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1143 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1149 /* Ciphers supported */
1150 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1152 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1157 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1160 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1162 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1173 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1174 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1175 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1176 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1177 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1178 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1179 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1181 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1182 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1188 /* Add the NULL method */
1189 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1195 /* TLS extensions */
1196 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1197 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1204 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1209 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1210 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1211 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1212 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1213 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1216 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1217 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1219 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1220 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1223 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1225 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1226 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1228 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1230 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1233 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1235 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1236 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1239 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1241 /* unknown cipher */
1242 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1243 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1247 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1248 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1250 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1252 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1256 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1257 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1259 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1261 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1265 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1266 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1267 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1269 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1274 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1275 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1276 * set and use it for comparison.
1278 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1279 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1280 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1281 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1283 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1284 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1286 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1287 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1289 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1290 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1295 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1299 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1303 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1308 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1310 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1311 size_t session_id_len;
1312 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1313 unsigned int compression;
1314 unsigned int sversion;
1315 unsigned int context;
1317 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1322 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1324 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1328 /* load the server random */
1329 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1331 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1335 /* Get the session-id. */
1336 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1337 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1338 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1341 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1342 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1343 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1344 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1345 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1349 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1351 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1355 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1357 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1361 /* TLS extensions */
1362 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1363 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1364 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1365 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1366 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1371 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1372 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1373 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1374 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1375 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1379 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1380 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1385 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1386 * are appropriate for this version.
1388 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1389 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1390 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1392 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1397 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1398 * message must be on a record boundary.
1400 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1401 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1402 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1406 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && compression != 0) {
1407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1408 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1414 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1415 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1416 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1417 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1418 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1419 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1424 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1425 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1426 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1427 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1428 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1429 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1430 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1431 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1432 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1433 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1435 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1436 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1437 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1439 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1440 * backwards compat reasons
1442 int master_key_length;
1443 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1444 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1447 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1448 && master_key_length > 0) {
1449 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1450 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1451 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1454 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1459 if (session_id_len != 0
1460 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1461 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1462 session_id_len) == 0)
1467 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1468 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1469 /* actually a client application bug */
1470 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1471 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1472 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1477 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1478 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1479 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1480 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1481 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1483 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1485 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1486 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1487 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1488 s->session_ctx->lock);
1489 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1490 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1495 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1496 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1497 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1498 if (session_id_len > 0)
1499 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1503 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1504 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1506 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1510 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1513 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1514 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1516 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1517 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1521 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1522 if (compression != 0) {
1523 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1524 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1528 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1529 * using compression.
1531 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1532 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1533 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1537 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1539 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1542 if (compression == 0)
1544 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1546 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1549 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1552 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1554 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1557 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1561 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1562 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1566 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1567 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1568 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1569 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1572 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1575 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1576 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1578 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1579 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1581 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1582 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1583 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1587 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1588 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1589 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1594 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1595 * we're done with this message
1598 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1599 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1600 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1601 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1605 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1606 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1608 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1609 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1612 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1614 unsigned int sversion;
1615 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1616 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1619 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1621 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1625 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT clause before release */
1626 if (sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION && sversion != TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT) {
1627 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
1628 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1629 SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
1633 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1636 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1637 * should not be used.
1639 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1640 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1642 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1644 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1648 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1653 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1654 /* Must have a non-empty extensions block */
1655 || PACKET_remaining(&extpkt) == 0
1656 /* Must be no trailing data after extensions */
1657 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1663 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1664 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1665 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1666 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1667 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1671 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1674 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1675 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1676 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1680 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1681 * ClientHello will not change
1683 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1684 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1685 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1690 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1691 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1693 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1699 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1700 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1701 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1704 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1705 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1706 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1710 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1712 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1713 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1716 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1719 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1720 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1722 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1723 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1724 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1725 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1726 unsigned int context = 0;
1727 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1729 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1730 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1731 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1735 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1737 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1738 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1739 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1741 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1744 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1745 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1746 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1748 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1749 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1753 certstart = certbytes;
1754 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1756 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1757 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1760 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1762 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1763 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1767 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1768 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1771 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1773 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1777 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1778 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1779 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1780 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1781 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1782 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1783 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1784 /* SSLfatal already called */
1787 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1790 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1792 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1793 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1799 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1801 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1802 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1803 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1804 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1805 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1806 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1807 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1808 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1809 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1810 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1811 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1812 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1814 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1815 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
1816 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1817 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1820 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1823 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1827 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1829 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1830 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1832 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1835 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1837 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1840 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1844 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1847 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1848 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1852 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1853 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1856 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1857 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1859 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1860 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1861 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1865 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1867 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1869 s->session->peer = x;
1870 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1873 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1875 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1876 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1877 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1878 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1882 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1886 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1890 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1892 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1893 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1895 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1897 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1898 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1899 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1904 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1905 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1906 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1909 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1911 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1912 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1916 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1917 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1918 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1919 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1920 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1921 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1922 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1928 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1929 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1934 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1936 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1937 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1939 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1940 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1941 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1942 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
1944 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1948 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1950 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1951 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1953 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1954 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1956 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1957 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1959 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1960 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
1966 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
1967 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1971 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1972 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1973 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
1978 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1983 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1985 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1986 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1987 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1990 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1994 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1995 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1996 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1997 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
1998 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2002 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2005 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2006 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2007 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2011 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2012 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2013 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2015 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2016 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2017 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2023 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2024 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2025 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2026 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2030 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2037 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2039 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2043 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2044 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2050 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2051 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2052 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2056 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2062 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2065 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2066 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2068 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2069 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2070 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2079 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2083 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2084 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2089 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2091 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2093 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2096 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2097 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2098 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2100 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2102 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2106 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2107 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2109 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2110 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2115 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2116 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2117 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2121 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2123 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2127 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2128 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2129 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2130 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2136 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2137 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2140 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2141 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2142 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2143 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2144 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2154 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2157 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2158 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2159 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2160 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2162 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2164 save_param_start = *pkt;
2166 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2167 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2168 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2171 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2172 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2173 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2178 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2179 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2180 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2181 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2182 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2185 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2186 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2187 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2190 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2191 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2192 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2197 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2201 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2205 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2211 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2212 * equals the length of the parameters.
2214 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2215 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2216 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2218 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2222 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2223 unsigned int sigalg;
2225 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2226 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2227 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2230 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2231 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2235 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2237 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2239 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2243 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2244 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2245 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2249 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2250 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2252 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2255 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2257 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2258 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2263 * Check signature length
2265 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2266 /* wrong packet length */
2267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2268 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2272 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2273 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2274 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2275 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2279 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2284 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2285 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2286 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2287 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2288 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2289 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2293 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2294 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2296 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2300 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2301 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2304 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2305 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2308 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2311 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2312 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2313 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2314 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2315 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2316 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2322 /* still data left over */
2323 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2324 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2325 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2330 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2332 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2333 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2336 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2340 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2341 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2342 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2344 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2345 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2346 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2348 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2349 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2350 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2351 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2353 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2354 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2356 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2357 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2358 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2361 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2362 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2363 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2365 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2367 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2368 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2370 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2371 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2372 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2373 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2374 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2376 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2377 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2379 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2381 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2386 /* get the certificate types */
2387 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2389 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2390 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2391 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2394 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2396 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2397 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2398 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2401 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2404 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2406 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2407 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2408 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2411 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2413 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2414 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2415 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2417 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2418 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2419 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2420 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2421 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2425 /* get the CA RDNs */
2426 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2427 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2428 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2432 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2433 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2434 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2435 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2436 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2439 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2440 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2442 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2445 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2447 unsigned int ticklen;
2448 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2449 unsigned int sess_len;
2450 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2453 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2455 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2456 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2457 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2458 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2459 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2460 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2462 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2464 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2469 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2470 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2471 * be 0 here in that instance
2474 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2477 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2478 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2479 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2480 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2481 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2484 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2485 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2486 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2488 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2491 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2493 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2494 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2498 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2500 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2502 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2505 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2506 s->session = new_sess;
2510 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2511 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2513 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2515 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2516 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2517 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2519 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2520 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2522 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2525 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2527 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2531 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2532 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2533 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2535 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2538 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2539 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2540 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2541 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2543 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2544 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2545 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2546 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2552 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2553 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2554 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2555 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2556 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2557 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2558 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2559 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2560 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2563 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2564 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2566 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2567 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2568 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2573 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2575 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2576 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2578 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2579 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2582 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2585 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2589 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2590 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2592 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2597 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2598 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2599 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2600 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2603 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2604 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2606 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2609 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2610 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2612 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2615 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2616 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2617 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2620 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2626 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2628 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2629 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2630 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2633 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2637 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2638 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2639 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2642 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2645 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2648 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2649 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2654 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2655 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2656 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2658 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2659 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2660 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2664 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2665 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2670 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2671 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2675 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2676 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2677 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2678 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2679 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2688 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2690 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2691 /* should contain no data */
2692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2693 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2694 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2696 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2697 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2698 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2701 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2706 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2707 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2708 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2711 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2714 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2719 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2720 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2723 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2724 size_t identitylen = 0;
2725 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2726 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2727 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2730 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2731 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2732 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2736 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2738 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2739 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2742 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2744 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2746 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2747 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2748 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2749 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2753 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2754 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2755 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2756 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2760 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2761 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2762 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2764 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2768 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2769 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2770 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2772 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2773 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2776 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2778 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2785 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2786 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2787 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2788 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2793 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2798 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2800 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2801 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2802 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2803 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2805 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2808 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2810 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2817 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2818 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2819 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2820 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2824 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2825 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2828 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2832 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2833 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2834 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2835 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2836 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2837 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2841 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2842 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2844 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2847 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2848 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2849 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2850 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2854 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2855 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2857 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2860 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2863 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2864 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2865 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2866 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2871 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2872 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2876 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2877 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2881 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2882 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2886 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2887 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2892 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2896 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2897 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2898 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2900 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2902 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2903 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2907 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2910 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2914 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2916 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2917 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2918 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2922 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2923 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2927 /* send off the data */
2928 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2929 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
2931 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2932 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2936 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2937 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2941 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2945 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2950 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2952 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2953 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2954 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2955 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2958 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
2961 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2965 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
2968 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2972 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2973 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2977 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2978 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2980 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2981 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
2986 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2987 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
2988 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2994 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2995 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
2999 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3004 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3006 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3007 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3008 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3011 unsigned int md_len;
3012 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3013 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3014 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3015 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3018 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3019 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3022 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3024 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3026 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3027 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3031 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3032 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3033 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3034 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3038 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3039 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3040 * certificate key for key exchange
3043 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3045 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3048 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3052 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3053 /* Generate session key
3054 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3056 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3058 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3062 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3065 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3066 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3067 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3068 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3069 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3070 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3071 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3072 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3073 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3074 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3077 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3079 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3080 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3085 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3087 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3090 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3096 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3097 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3098 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3099 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3100 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3104 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3105 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3106 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3110 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3111 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3112 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3116 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3121 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3123 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3124 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3126 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3127 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3129 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3130 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3133 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3135 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3136 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3137 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3139 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3145 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3146 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3151 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3153 unsigned long alg_k;
3155 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3158 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3159 * no need to do so here.
3161 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3162 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3165 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3166 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3168 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3169 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3171 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3172 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3174 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3175 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3177 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3178 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3180 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3182 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3188 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3189 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3190 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3191 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3192 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3197 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3199 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3202 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3203 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3207 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3208 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3209 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3216 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3218 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3221 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3222 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3223 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3232 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3233 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3234 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3237 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3240 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3241 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3243 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3244 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3245 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3247 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3248 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3252 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3253 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3259 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3260 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3265 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3266 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3267 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3269 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3271 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3272 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3275 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3276 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3278 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3279 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3284 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3287 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3290 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3291 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3292 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3293 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3295 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3299 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3300 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3301 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3304 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3306 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3307 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3309 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3313 /* We need to get a client cert */
3314 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3316 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3317 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3319 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3321 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3324 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3325 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3326 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3328 } else if (i == 1) {
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3331 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3335 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3336 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3339 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3340 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3341 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3342 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3344 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3345 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3346 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3352 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3355 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3356 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3357 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3361 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3364 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3367 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3368 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3369 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3372 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3373 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3375 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3380 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3381 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3382 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3384 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3385 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3387 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3388 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3395 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3397 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3401 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3402 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3404 /* we don't have a certificate */
3405 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3408 /* This is the passed certificate */
3409 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3411 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3412 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3414 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3415 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3420 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3421 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3423 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3424 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3428 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3429 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3431 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3432 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3436 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3437 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3439 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3447 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3448 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3450 size_t len, padding_len;
3451 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3453 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3454 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3456 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3457 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3459 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3463 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3469 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3471 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3472 /* should contain no data */
3473 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3474 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3475 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3478 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3479 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3480 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3484 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3485 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3486 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3487 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3488 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3493 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3495 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3498 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3501 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3503 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3504 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3505 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3506 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3510 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3511 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3513 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3514 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3515 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3519 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3520 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3523 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3524 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3527 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3531 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3532 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3533 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3534 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3539 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3540 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3544 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3547 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3548 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3549 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3550 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3554 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3558 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3559 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3560 # error Max cipher length too short
3563 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3564 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3567 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3568 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3571 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3574 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3576 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3579 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3580 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3582 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3583 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3584 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3587 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3588 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3589 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3593 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3595 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3596 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3597 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3600 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3601 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3609 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3611 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3614 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3621 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3622 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3623 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3625 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3627 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3631 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3632 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3633 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3635 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3636 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3637 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3646 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3648 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3649 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3651 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3652 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3656 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;