2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
212 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
214 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
215 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
224 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
226 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
231 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
236 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
237 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
239 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
240 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
241 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
242 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
244 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
245 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
246 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
247 * the server is resuming.
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
252 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
253 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
259 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
260 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
262 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
263 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
269 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
272 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
282 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
283 * |ext.status_expected| is set
285 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
291 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
292 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
293 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
294 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
295 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
306 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
315 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
321 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
322 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
327 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
333 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
334 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
335 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
340 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
341 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
342 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
356 /* No valid transition found */
357 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
358 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
359 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
364 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
368 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
370 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
373 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
374 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
375 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
377 switch (st->hand_state) {
379 /* Shouldn't happen */
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
381 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
386 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
387 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
389 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
390 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
391 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
393 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
397 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
398 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
404 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
405 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
406 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
407 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
411 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
412 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
413 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
421 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
428 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
429 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 /* Try to read from the server instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
445 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
446 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
448 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
450 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
453 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
454 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
458 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
460 switch (st->hand_state) {
462 /* Shouldn't happen */
463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
464 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
469 if (!s->renegotiate) {
471 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
472 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
483 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
485 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
486 * actually selected a version yet.
488 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
500 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
501 /* We only get here in TLSv1.3 */
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
506 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
508 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
512 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
513 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
523 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
525 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
526 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
529 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
530 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
531 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
532 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
534 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
539 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
540 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
549 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
552 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
555 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
563 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
564 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
577 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
588 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
591 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
592 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
593 /* SSLfatal() already called */
594 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
606 * the client to the server.
608 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
610 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
612 switch (st->hand_state) {
614 /* No pre work to be done */
617 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
619 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
620 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
621 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
622 /* SSLfatal() already called */
628 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
632 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
633 * messages unless we need to.
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
638 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
639 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
640 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
646 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
648 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
649 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
650 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
652 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
653 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
654 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
657 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
659 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
660 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
663 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
667 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
668 * client to the server.
670 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
672 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
676 switch (st->hand_state) {
678 /* No post work to be done */
681 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
682 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
683 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
685 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
686 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
687 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
689 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
690 if (!statem_flush(s))
692 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
693 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
694 /* SSLfatal() already called */
698 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
699 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
704 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
709 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
711 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
712 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
714 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
715 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
718 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
719 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
720 /* SSLfatal() already called */
725 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
728 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
729 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
730 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
733 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
734 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
735 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
737 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
738 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
742 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
743 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
744 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
746 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
747 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
749 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
751 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
752 /* SSLfatal() already called */
756 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
757 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
758 /* SSLfatal() already called */
762 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
763 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
766 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
769 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
774 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
778 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
779 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
780 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
782 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
785 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
789 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
792 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
793 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
794 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
795 /* SSLfatal() already called */
801 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
802 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
804 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
811 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
815 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
818 * Valid return values are:
822 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
823 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
825 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
827 switch (st->hand_state) {
829 /* Shouldn't happen */
830 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
831 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
832 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
835 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
837 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
839 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
848 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
849 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
850 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
853 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
859 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
860 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
863 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
864 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
865 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
868 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
869 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
870 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
873 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
874 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
875 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
876 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
879 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
880 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
881 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
884 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
885 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
886 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
894 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
895 * reading. Excludes the message header.
897 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
899 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
901 switch (st->hand_state) {
903 /* Shouldn't happen */
906 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
907 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
909 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
910 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
913 return s->max_cert_list;
915 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
916 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
918 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
919 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
921 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
922 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
924 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
926 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
927 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
928 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
930 return s->max_cert_list;
932 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
933 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
935 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
936 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
938 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
940 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
941 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
943 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
944 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
946 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
947 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
949 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
950 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
955 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
957 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
959 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
961 switch (st->hand_state) {
963 /* Shouldn't happen */
964 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
965 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
966 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
969 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
970 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
972 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
973 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
976 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
978 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
979 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
981 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
982 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
984 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
985 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
987 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
988 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
990 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
991 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
993 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
994 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
996 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
997 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
999 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1000 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1002 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1003 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1005 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1006 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1008 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1009 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1014 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1017 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1019 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1021 switch (st->hand_state) {
1023 /* Shouldn't happen */
1024 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1025 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1026 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1029 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1030 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1034 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1039 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1042 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1043 unsigned char *session_id;
1045 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1046 /* Should not happen */
1047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1048 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1052 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1053 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1054 if (protverr != 0) {
1055 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1061 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1062 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1063 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1064 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1065 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1069 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1071 p = s->s3->client_random;
1074 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1075 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1077 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1080 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1087 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1090 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1091 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1093 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1098 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1099 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1100 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1101 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1102 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1103 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1104 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1105 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1108 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1109 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1110 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1111 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1112 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1113 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1114 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1115 * know that is maximum server supports.
1116 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1117 * containing version 1.0.
1119 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1120 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1121 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1122 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1123 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1124 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1125 * the negotiated version.
1127 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1128 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1130 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1131 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1133 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1138 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1139 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1140 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1141 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1142 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1143 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1144 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1145 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1146 && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id,
1147 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1149 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1150 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1157 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1158 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1159 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1160 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1163 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1164 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1165 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1167 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1168 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1169 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1174 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1175 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1176 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1177 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1184 /* Ciphers supported */
1185 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1191 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1192 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1195 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1197 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1202 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1203 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1204 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1208 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1209 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1210 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1211 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1212 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1213 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1214 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1216 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1217 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1223 /* Add the NULL method */
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1226 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1230 /* TLS extensions */
1231 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1232 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1239 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1244 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1245 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1247 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1248 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1251 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1252 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1254 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1255 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1258 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1260 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1261 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1263 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1265 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1268 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1270 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1271 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1274 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1276 /* unknown cipher */
1277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1278 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1282 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1283 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1285 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1287 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1291 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1292 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1294 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1296 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1300 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1301 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1302 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1303 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1304 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1309 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1310 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1311 * set and use it for comparison.
1313 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1314 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1315 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1316 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1318 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1319 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1321 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1322 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1323 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1324 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1325 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1330 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1334 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1338 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1343 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1345 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1346 size_t session_id_len;
1347 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1349 unsigned int compression;
1350 unsigned int sversion;
1351 unsigned int context;
1353 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1354 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1358 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1359 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1360 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1364 /* load the server random */
1365 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1366 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1367 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1368 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1369 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1371 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1373 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1377 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1379 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1384 /* Get the session-id. */
1385 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1387 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1390 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1391 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1392 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1394 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1398 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1399 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1400 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1404 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1405 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1406 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1410 /* TLS extensions */
1411 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1412 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1413 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1414 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1421 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1422 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1423 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1424 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1425 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1429 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1430 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1435 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1436 if (compression != 0) {
1437 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1438 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1439 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1443 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1444 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1445 session_id_len) != 0) {
1446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1447 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1453 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1454 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1458 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1462 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1463 * are appropriate for this version.
1465 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1466 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1467 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1469 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1475 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1477 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1478 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1480 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1482 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1483 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1487 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1488 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1489 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1490 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1491 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1496 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1497 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1498 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1499 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1500 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1501 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1502 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1503 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1504 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1505 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1507 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1508 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1509 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1511 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1512 * backwards compat reasons
1514 int master_key_length;
1515 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1516 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1519 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1520 && master_key_length > 0) {
1521 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1522 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1523 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1526 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1531 if (session_id_len != 0
1532 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1533 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1534 session_id_len) == 0)
1539 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1540 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1541 /* actually a client application bug */
1542 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1543 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1544 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1549 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1550 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1551 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1552 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1553 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1555 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1557 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1558 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1559 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1560 s->session_ctx->lock);
1561 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1562 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1567 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1569 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1570 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1571 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1572 * used for resumption.
1574 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1575 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1576 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1577 if (session_id_len > 0)
1578 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1583 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1584 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1585 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1586 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1590 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1593 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1594 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1596 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1597 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1601 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1602 if (compression != 0) {
1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1604 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1608 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1609 * using compression.
1611 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1612 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1613 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1617 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1619 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1622 if (compression == 0)
1624 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1626 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1629 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1632 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1634 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1637 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1641 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1642 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1646 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1647 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1648 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1649 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1652 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1655 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1656 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1658 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1659 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1661 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1663 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1667 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1668 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1669 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1674 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1675 * we're done with this message
1678 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1679 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1680 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1681 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1685 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1686 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1688 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1689 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1692 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1695 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1698 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1699 * should not be used.
1701 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1702 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1704 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1705 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1706 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1707 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1708 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1712 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1715 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1716 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1717 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1721 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1722 * ClientHello will not change
1724 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1725 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1726 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1731 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1732 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1734 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1735 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1740 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1741 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1742 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1745 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1746 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1751 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1753 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1754 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1757 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1760 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1761 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1763 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1764 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1765 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1766 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1767 unsigned int context = 0;
1768 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1770 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1771 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1772 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1776 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1778 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1779 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1780 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1782 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1785 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1786 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1787 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1789 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1790 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1794 certstart = certbytes;
1795 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1798 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1801 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1802 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1803 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1804 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1808 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1809 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1812 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1814 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1818 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1819 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1820 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1821 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1822 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1823 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1824 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1825 /* SSLfatal already called */
1828 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1831 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1832 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1833 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1834 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1840 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1842 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1843 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1844 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1845 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1846 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1847 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1848 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1849 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1850 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1851 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1852 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1853 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1855 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1856 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
1857 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1858 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1861 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1864 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1868 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1870 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1871 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1873 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1876 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1878 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1881 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1885 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1888 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1889 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1893 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1894 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1897 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1898 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1900 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1901 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1902 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1906 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1908 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1910 s->session->peer = x;
1911 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1914 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1916 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1917 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1918 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1919 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1923 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1927 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1931 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1933 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1934 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1936 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1938 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1939 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1940 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1945 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1946 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1947 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1950 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1952 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1953 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1957 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1958 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1959 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1960 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1961 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1963 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1969 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1970 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1975 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1978 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1980 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1981 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1982 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1983 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1984 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
1985 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1989 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1991 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1992 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1994 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1995 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1997 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1998 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2000 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2001 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2002 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2007 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2008 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2012 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2013 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2014 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2019 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2024 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2026 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2027 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2028 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2031 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2035 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2036 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2037 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2039 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2043 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2046 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2047 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2048 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2052 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2053 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2054 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2056 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2057 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2058 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2064 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2065 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2066 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2067 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2071 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2078 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2079 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2080 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2084 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2091 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2092 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2093 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2097 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2103 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2106 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2107 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2109 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2110 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2111 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2120 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2130 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2132 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2134 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2137 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2138 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2139 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2141 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2143 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2147 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2148 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2150 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2151 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2156 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2157 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2158 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2162 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2164 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2168 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2169 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2170 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2171 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2177 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2178 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2181 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2182 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2183 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2184 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2185 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2190 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2195 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2198 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2199 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2200 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2201 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2203 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2205 save_param_start = *pkt;
2207 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2208 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2209 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2212 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2213 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2214 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2219 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2220 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2221 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2222 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2223 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2226 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2227 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2228 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2231 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2232 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2233 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2237 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2238 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2242 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2246 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2252 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2253 * equals the length of the parameters.
2255 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2256 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2257 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2259 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2263 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2264 unsigned int sigalg;
2266 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2267 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2268 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2271 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2272 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2276 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2278 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2279 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2280 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2284 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2286 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2290 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2291 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2293 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2296 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2298 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2299 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2304 * Check signature length
2306 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2307 /* wrong packet length */
2308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2309 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2313 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2314 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2315 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2316 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2320 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2321 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2325 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2326 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2327 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2328 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2329 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2330 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2334 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2335 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2337 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2341 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2342 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2345 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2346 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2349 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2352 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2353 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2354 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2355 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2356 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2357 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2360 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2363 /* still data left over */
2364 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2366 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2371 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2373 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2374 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2377 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2381 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2382 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2383 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2385 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2386 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2387 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2389 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2390 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2391 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2392 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2394 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2395 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2397 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2398 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2399 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2402 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2404 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2406 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2408 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2409 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2411 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2412 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2413 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2414 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2415 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2417 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2418 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2420 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2422 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2427 /* get the certificate types */
2428 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2430 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2431 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2435 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2436 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2437 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2438 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2439 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2442 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2445 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2447 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2448 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2449 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2452 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2454 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2455 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2456 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2458 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2459 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2460 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2461 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2466 /* get the CA RDNs */
2467 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2468 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2469 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2473 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2475 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2476 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2477 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2480 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2481 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2483 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2486 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2488 unsigned int ticklen;
2489 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2490 unsigned int sess_len;
2491 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2494 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2496 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2497 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2498 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2499 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2500 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2501 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2503 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2504 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2505 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2510 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2511 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2512 * be 0 here in that instance
2515 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2518 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2519 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2520 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2521 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2522 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2525 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2526 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2527 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2529 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2532 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2533 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2534 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2535 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2539 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2541 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2543 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2546 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2547 s->session = new_sess;
2551 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2552 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2554 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2556 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2557 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2558 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2560 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2561 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2562 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2563 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2566 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2567 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2568 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2572 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2573 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2574 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2576 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2579 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2580 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2581 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2582 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2584 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2585 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2586 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2587 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2593 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2594 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2595 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2596 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2597 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2598 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2599 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2600 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2601 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2604 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2605 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2607 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2608 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2609 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2610 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2614 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2616 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2617 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2619 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2620 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2623 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2626 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2630 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2631 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2633 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2638 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2639 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2641 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2644 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2645 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2646 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2647 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2650 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2651 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2653 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2656 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2657 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2658 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2661 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2667 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2669 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2670 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2671 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2674 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2678 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2679 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2680 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2683 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2686 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2689 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2690 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2695 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2696 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2697 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2699 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2700 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2701 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2704 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2705 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2706 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2711 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2712 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2716 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2717 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2718 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2719 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2720 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2729 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2731 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2732 /* should contain no data */
2733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2734 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2735 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2737 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2738 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2739 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2742 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2747 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2748 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2749 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2752 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2755 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2757 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2760 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2761 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2764 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2765 size_t identitylen = 0;
2766 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2767 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2768 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2771 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2773 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2777 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2779 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2780 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2783 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2784 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2785 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2787 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2789 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2790 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2794 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2795 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2796 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2797 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2801 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2802 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2803 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2804 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2805 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2809 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2810 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2811 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2813 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2814 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2817 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2819 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2826 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2827 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2828 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2829 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2834 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2839 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2841 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2842 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2843 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2844 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2846 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2849 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2851 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2854 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2858 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2859 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2860 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2861 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2865 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2866 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2868 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2869 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2873 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2874 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2875 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2876 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2878 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2882 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2883 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2885 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2888 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2889 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2890 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2895 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2896 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2898 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2901 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2904 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2905 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2906 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2907 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2911 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2912 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2913 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2917 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2918 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2922 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2923 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2927 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2928 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2933 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2935 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2937 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2938 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2939 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2941 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2944 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2948 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2950 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2951 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2955 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2957 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2959 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2963 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2964 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2968 /* send off the data */
2969 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2970 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
2972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2977 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2978 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2982 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2985 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2986 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2991 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2993 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2994 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2995 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2996 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2999 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3002 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3006 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3008 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3009 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3013 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3014 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3018 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3019 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3021 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3027 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3035 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3036 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3039 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3040 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3045 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3047 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3048 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3049 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3052 unsigned int md_len;
3053 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3054 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3055 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3056 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3059 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3060 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3063 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3065 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3068 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3072 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3073 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3075 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3079 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3080 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3081 * certificate key for key exchange
3084 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3086 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3089 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3093 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3094 /* Generate session key
3095 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3097 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3099 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3103 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3106 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3107 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3108 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3109 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3110 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3111 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3112 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3113 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3114 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3115 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3118 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3120 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3121 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3122 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3126 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3128 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3131 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3137 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3138 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3139 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3141 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3145 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3146 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3147 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3151 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3152 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3153 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3157 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3162 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3165 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3167 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3168 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3170 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3171 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3174 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3176 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3177 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3178 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3180 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3186 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3187 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3192 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3194 unsigned long alg_k;
3196 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3199 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3200 * no need to do so here.
3202 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3203 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3206 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3207 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3209 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3210 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3212 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3213 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3215 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3216 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3218 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3219 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3221 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3222 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3223 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3229 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3230 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3231 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3232 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3233 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3238 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3240 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3243 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3244 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3246 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3248 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3249 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3250 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3257 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3258 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3259 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3262 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3263 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3264 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3272 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3274 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3275 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3278 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3281 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3282 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3284 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3285 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3286 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3288 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3289 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3293 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3294 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3300 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3301 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3306 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3307 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3308 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3310 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3312 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3313 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3316 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3317 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3319 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3320 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3325 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3328 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3331 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3332 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3333 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3334 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3336 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3340 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3341 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3342 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3345 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3347 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3348 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3350 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3354 /* We need to get a client cert */
3355 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3357 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3358 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3360 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3362 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3365 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3366 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3367 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3369 } else if (i == 1) {
3371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3372 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3376 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3377 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3380 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3381 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3382 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3383 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3385 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3386 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3387 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3393 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3396 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3397 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3398 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3402 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3405 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3408 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3410 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3413 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3414 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3416 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3421 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3422 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3423 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3425 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3426 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3428 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3429 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3436 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3438 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3443 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3445 /* we don't have a certificate */
3446 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3449 /* This is the passed certificate */
3450 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3452 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3453 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3454 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3455 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3456 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3460 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3461 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3462 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3465 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3469 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3470 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3471 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3472 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3473 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3478 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3479 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3480 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3488 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3489 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3491 size_t len, padding_len;
3492 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3494 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3495 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3497 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3498 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3499 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3500 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3504 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3510 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3512 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3513 /* should contain no data */
3514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3515 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3516 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3519 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3520 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3521 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3525 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3526 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3527 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3528 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3529 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3534 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3536 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3539 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3542 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3544 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3545 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3547 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3551 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3552 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3554 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3555 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3556 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3560 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3561 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3564 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3565 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3568 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3571 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3572 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3573 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3574 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3575 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3580 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3581 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3585 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3588 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3589 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3590 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3591 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3594 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3595 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3599 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3600 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3601 # error Max cipher length too short
3604 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3605 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3608 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3609 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3612 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3615 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3617 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3620 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3621 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3623 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3624 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3625 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3628 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3629 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3630 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3634 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3636 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3637 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3638 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3641 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3642 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3650 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3651 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3652 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3655 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3662 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3663 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3664 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3666 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3668 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3672 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3673 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3674 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3676 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3678 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3687 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3689 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3690 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3691 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3692 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3693 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3697 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;