2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
128 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
132 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
133 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
134 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
137 switch (st->hand_state) {
141 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
143 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
144 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
146 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
147 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
152 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
159 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
166 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
167 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
170 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
171 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
177 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
178 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
179 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
185 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
186 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
191 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
192 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
193 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
199 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
200 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
201 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
205 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
208 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
209 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
215 /* No valid transition found */
220 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
221 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
222 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
223 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
225 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
226 * (transition not allowed)
228 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
230 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
234 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
235 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
237 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
238 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
243 switch (st->hand_state) {
247 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
253 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
254 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
255 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
259 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
260 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
266 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
268 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
269 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
273 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
274 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
278 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
279 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
281 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
282 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
283 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
284 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
286 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
287 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
288 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
289 * the server is resuming.
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
294 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
295 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
301 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
302 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
304 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
305 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
306 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
310 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
311 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
312 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
314 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
315 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
324 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
325 * |ext.status_expected| is set
327 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
333 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
334 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
335 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
336 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
337 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
338 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
339 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
346 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
347 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
348 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
356 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
357 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
358 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
363 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
364 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
365 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
366 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
369 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
370 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
375 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
376 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
377 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
382 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
383 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
384 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
390 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
392 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
393 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
396 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
397 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
400 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
401 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
404 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
405 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
412 /* No valid transition found */
413 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
414 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
419 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
420 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
423 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
425 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
428 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
429 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
430 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
432 switch (st->hand_state) {
434 /* Shouldn't happen */
435 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
437 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
438 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
439 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
441 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
442 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
446 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
447 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
452 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
453 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
454 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
456 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
461 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
462 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
463 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
468 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
469 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
470 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
471 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
476 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
477 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
480 /* Try to read from the server instead */
481 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
486 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
487 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
489 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
491 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
494 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
495 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
499 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
501 switch (st->hand_state) {
503 /* Shouldn't happen */
504 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
507 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
509 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
510 * actually selected a version yet.
512 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
514 if (!s->renegotiate) {
516 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
517 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
519 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
521 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
523 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
524 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
526 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
527 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
529 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
530 * actually selected a version yet.
532 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
533 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
534 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
537 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
540 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
542 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
544 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
546 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
547 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
551 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
554 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
555 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
557 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
559 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
560 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
563 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
564 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
565 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
566 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
568 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
573 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
578 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
583 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
586 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
587 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
593 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
594 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
595 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
596 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
601 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
602 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
603 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
608 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
610 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
611 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
614 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
620 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
623 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
624 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
625 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
626 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
632 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
633 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
638 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
639 * the client to the server.
641 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
643 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
645 switch (st->hand_state) {
647 /* No pre work to be done */
650 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
652 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
653 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
654 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
655 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
661 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
662 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
665 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
666 * messages unless we need to.
670 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
671 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
672 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
678 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
681 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
685 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
686 * client to the server.
688 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
690 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
694 switch (st->hand_state) {
696 /* No post work to be done */
699 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
700 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
703 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
704 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
708 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
709 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
711 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
712 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
713 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
715 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
716 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
721 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
722 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
726 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
727 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
728 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
729 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
731 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
732 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
734 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
736 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
739 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
740 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
743 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
744 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
747 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
750 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
755 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
759 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
760 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
761 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
763 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
766 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
770 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
773 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
774 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
775 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
780 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
781 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
783 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
788 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
792 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
795 * Valid return values are:
799 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
800 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
802 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
804 switch (st->hand_state) {
806 /* Shouldn't happen */
809 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
811 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
813 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
814 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
817 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
818 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
819 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
823 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
824 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
827 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
828 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
829 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
832 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
833 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
834 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
837 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
838 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
839 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
848 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
849 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
850 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
858 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
859 * reading. Excludes the message header.
861 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
863 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
865 switch (st->hand_state) {
867 /* Shouldn't happen */
870 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
871 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
873 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
874 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
876 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
877 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
880 return s->max_cert_list;
882 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
883 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
885 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
886 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
888 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
889 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
891 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
893 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
894 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
895 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
897 return s->max_cert_list;
899 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
900 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
902 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
903 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
905 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
907 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
908 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
910 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
911 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
913 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
914 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
916 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
917 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
922 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
924 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
926 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
928 switch (st->hand_state) {
930 /* Shouldn't happen */
931 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
933 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
934 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
936 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
937 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
939 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
940 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
943 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
945 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
946 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
948 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
949 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
951 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
952 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
954 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
955 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
957 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
958 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
960 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
961 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
963 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
964 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
966 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
967 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
970 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
972 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
973 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
975 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
976 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
981 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
984 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
986 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
988 switch (st->hand_state) {
990 /* Shouldn't happen */
993 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
994 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
997 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
998 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
999 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
1000 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1001 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1002 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1003 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1004 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1007 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1008 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1013 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1018 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1022 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1024 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1025 /* Should not happen */
1026 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1030 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1031 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1032 if (protverr != 0) {
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1037 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
1039 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1040 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1042 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
1043 (sess->not_resumable)) {
1044 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1047 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1049 p = s->s3->client_random;
1052 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1053 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1055 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1058 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1067 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1071 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1072 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1073 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1074 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1075 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1076 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1077 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1078 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1081 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1082 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1083 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1084 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1085 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1086 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1087 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1088 * know that is maximum server supports.
1089 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1090 * containing version 1.0.
1092 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1093 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1094 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1095 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1096 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1097 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1098 * the negotiated version.
1100 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1101 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1103 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1104 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1105 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1110 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1113 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1114 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1115 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1116 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1118 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1124 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1125 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1126 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1127 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1128 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1133 /* Ciphers supported */
1134 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1138 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1139 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1141 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1142 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1152 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1153 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1154 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1155 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1156 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1157 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1158 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1165 /* Add the NULL method */
1166 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1171 /* TLS extensions */
1172 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1173 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1174 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1187 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1188 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1189 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1194 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1195 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1196 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1197 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1201 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1202 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1203 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1206 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1208 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1210 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1211 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1212 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1215 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1217 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1218 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1219 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1220 size_t session_id_len;
1221 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1222 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1223 unsigned int compression;
1224 unsigned int sversion;
1225 unsigned int context;
1227 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1232 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1233 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1238 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1239 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1240 if (protverr != 0) {
1241 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1242 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1246 /* load the server hello data */
1247 /* load the server random */
1248 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1249 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1254 /* Get the session-id. */
1255 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1256 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1257 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1261 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1262 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1263 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1264 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1266 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1270 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1274 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1276 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1280 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1281 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1282 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1283 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1290 /* TLS extensions */
1291 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1292 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1293 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1294 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1299 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1300 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1301 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1306 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1307 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1308 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1309 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1310 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1314 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1315 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1316 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1317 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1318 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1319 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1320 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1321 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1322 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1323 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1325 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1326 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1327 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1329 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1330 * backwards compat reasons
1332 int master_key_length;
1333 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1334 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1337 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1338 && master_key_length > 0) {
1339 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1340 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1341 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1344 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1349 if (session_id_len != 0
1350 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1351 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1352 session_id_len) == 0)
1357 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1358 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1359 /* actually a client application bug */
1360 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1362 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1367 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1368 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1369 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1370 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1371 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1373 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1375 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1376 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1377 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1378 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1383 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1384 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1385 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1386 if (session_id_len > 0)
1387 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1391 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1392 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1393 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1396 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1400 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1402 /* unknown cipher */
1403 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1408 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1411 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1412 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1414 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1415 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1417 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1418 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1423 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1424 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1426 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1427 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1433 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1434 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1435 * set and use it for comparison.
1437 if (s->session->cipher)
1438 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1439 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1440 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1442 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1445 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1447 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1448 if (compression != 0) {
1449 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1450 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1451 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1455 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1456 * using compression.
1458 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1463 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1464 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1465 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1466 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1469 if (compression == 0)
1471 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1472 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1476 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1479 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1480 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1482 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1485 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1489 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1492 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1493 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1494 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1495 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1498 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1501 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1502 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1504 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1505 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1507 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1510 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1511 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1512 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1517 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1518 * we're done with this message
1521 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1522 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1523 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1524 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1525 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1526 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1531 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1532 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1534 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1535 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1536 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1537 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1540 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1542 unsigned int sversion;
1544 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1548 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1549 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1554 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1556 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1557 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1558 if (errorcode != 0) {
1559 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1564 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1565 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1566 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1570 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1571 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1572 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1573 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1576 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1578 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1580 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1581 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1582 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1583 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1586 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1588 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1589 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1591 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1592 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1593 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1595 unsigned int context = 0;
1597 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1602 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1604 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1605 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1606 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1607 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1610 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1611 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1612 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1613 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1614 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1615 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1619 certstart = certbytes;
1620 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1622 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1626 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1627 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1629 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1633 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1634 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1637 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1638 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1642 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1643 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1644 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1645 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1646 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1649 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1652 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1653 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1659 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1661 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1662 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1663 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1664 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1665 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1666 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1667 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1668 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1669 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1670 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1671 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1672 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1674 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1675 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1677 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1680 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1682 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1683 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1687 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1689 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1690 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1692 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1695 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1698 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1700 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1704 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1708 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1713 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1717 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1718 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1721 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1722 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1723 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1724 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1725 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1726 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1728 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1730 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1734 s->session->peer_type = i;
1736 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1738 s->session->peer = x;
1739 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1742 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1744 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1745 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1746 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1747 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1752 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1756 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1758 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1761 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1765 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1768 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1770 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1772 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1773 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1774 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1779 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1780 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1781 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1784 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1785 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1790 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1791 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1792 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1793 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1794 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1795 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1802 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1807 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1809 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1810 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1812 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1813 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1814 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1815 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1816 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1821 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1823 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1824 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1826 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1827 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1829 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1830 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1832 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1833 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1834 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1839 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1840 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1841 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1845 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1846 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1847 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1852 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1857 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1859 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1860 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1861 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1864 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1868 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1869 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1870 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1871 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1872 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1876 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1879 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1880 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1885 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1886 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1887 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1889 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1890 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1891 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1892 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1897 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1898 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1899 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1904 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1905 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1906 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1911 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1912 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1917 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1918 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1919 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1924 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1925 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1930 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1931 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1936 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1939 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1940 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1942 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1943 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1944 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1953 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1957 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1958 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1963 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1965 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1967 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1969 unsigned int curve_flags;
1970 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1973 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1974 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1975 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1977 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1978 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1983 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1984 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1986 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1992 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1994 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1995 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1997 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2001 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2002 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2004 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2005 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2006 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2010 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2012 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2013 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2015 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2016 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2017 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2018 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2020 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2023 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2027 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2028 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2033 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2034 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2035 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2036 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2042 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2043 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2046 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2047 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2048 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2049 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2050 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2055 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2060 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2064 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2065 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2066 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2067 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2069 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2071 save_param_start = *pkt;
2073 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2074 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2075 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2078 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2079 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2083 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2084 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2085 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2086 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2088 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2089 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2091 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2092 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2095 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2100 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2104 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2107 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2108 * equals the length of the parameters.
2110 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2111 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2112 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2113 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2118 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2119 unsigned int sigalg;
2122 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2123 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2127 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2129 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2131 } else if (rv == 0) {
2132 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2136 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2138 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2143 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2145 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2146 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2147 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2151 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2153 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2159 * Check signature length
2161 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2162 /* wrong packet length */
2163 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2164 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2165 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2169 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2170 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2171 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2176 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2177 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2178 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2181 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2182 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2183 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2184 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2185 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2186 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2190 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2191 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2192 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2193 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2194 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2195 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2196 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2197 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2200 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2201 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2203 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2204 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2207 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2210 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2211 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2212 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2213 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2214 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2215 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2216 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2217 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2219 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 /* still data left over */
2224 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2225 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2226 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2231 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2234 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2235 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2236 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2237 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2240 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2242 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2243 unsigned int i, name_len;
2244 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2245 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2246 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2249 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2250 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2254 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2257 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2258 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2259 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2260 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2261 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2262 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2264 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2270 /* get the certificate types */
2271 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2272 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2274 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2278 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2284 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2287 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2288 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2290 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2294 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2295 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2296 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2297 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2298 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2299 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2300 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2303 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2304 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2305 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2310 /* get the CA RDNs */
2311 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2312 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2313 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2317 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2318 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2319 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2320 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2321 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2322 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2326 namestart = namebytes;
2328 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2329 name_len)) == NULL) {
2330 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2331 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2335 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2336 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2338 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2341 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2347 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2348 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2351 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
2352 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2354 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2359 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2360 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2365 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2366 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2367 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2368 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2371 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2374 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2377 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2381 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2383 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2386 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2388 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2389 unsigned int ticklen;
2390 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2391 unsigned int sess_len;
2392 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2394 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2395 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2396 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2397 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2399 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2405 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2406 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2407 * be 0 here in that instance
2410 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2412 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2413 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2414 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2415 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2417 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2420 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2422 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2424 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2427 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2428 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2433 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2434 s->session = new_sess;
2438 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2439 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2441 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2443 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2444 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2445 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2447 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2448 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2452 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2453 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2458 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2459 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2460 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2462 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2465 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2466 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2467 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2469 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2470 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2477 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2478 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2479 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2480 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2481 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2482 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2483 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2484 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2485 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2488 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2489 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2491 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2492 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2493 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2494 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2497 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2499 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2500 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2502 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2503 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2506 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2508 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2510 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2512 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2516 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2517 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2518 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2520 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2525 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2526 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2527 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2529 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2532 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2533 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2534 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2538 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2539 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2540 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2544 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2545 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2549 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2555 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2559 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2560 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2561 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2562 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2565 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2569 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2570 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2571 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2574 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2577 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2580 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2581 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2586 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2587 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2588 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2590 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2591 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2592 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2595 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2597 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2601 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2603 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2607 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2608 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2609 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2610 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2611 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2620 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2622 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2624 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2625 /* should contain no data */
2626 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2631 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2632 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2640 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2642 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2645 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2646 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2647 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2648 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2649 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2652 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2655 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2656 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2657 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2660 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2662 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2665 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2666 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2669 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2670 size_t identitylen = 0;
2671 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2672 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2673 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2676 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2678 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2682 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2684 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2685 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2688 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2690 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2692 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2694 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2695 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2699 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2700 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2702 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2706 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2707 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2708 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2710 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2714 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2715 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2716 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2718 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2719 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2722 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2724 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2731 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2732 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2733 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2734 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2738 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2739 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2744 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2746 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2747 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2748 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2749 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2751 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2754 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2756 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2763 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2768 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2769 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2772 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2776 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2777 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2778 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2779 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2783 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2784 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2788 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2789 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2790 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2794 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2795 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2799 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2802 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2803 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2808 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2809 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2811 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2812 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2817 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2818 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2823 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2828 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2832 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2833 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2834 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2836 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2840 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2844 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2846 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2849 /* send off the data */
2850 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2851 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2854 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2855 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2859 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2862 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2866 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2868 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2869 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2870 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2871 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2874 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2880 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2886 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2891 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2892 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2894 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2899 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2900 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2906 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2907 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2911 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2916 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2918 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2919 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2920 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2923 unsigned int md_len;
2924 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2925 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2926 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2927 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2930 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2931 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2934 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2936 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2938 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2939 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2940 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2944 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2945 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2946 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2951 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2952 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2953 * certificate key for key exchange
2956 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2958 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2960 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2961 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2965 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2966 /* Generate session key
2967 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2969 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2970 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2975 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2978 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2979 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2980 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2981 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2982 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2983 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2984 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2985 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2986 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2990 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2992 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2993 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2994 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2995 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2998 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3000 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3003 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3004 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3009 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3010 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3011 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3012 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3017 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3018 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3019 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3023 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3024 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3025 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3029 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3034 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3037 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3039 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3040 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3042 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3045 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3047 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3048 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3049 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3062 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3064 unsigned long alg_k;
3067 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3069 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3070 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3073 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3074 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3076 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3077 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3079 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3080 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3082 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3083 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3085 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3086 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3088 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3090 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3097 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3098 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3099 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3100 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3101 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3102 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3107 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3109 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3112 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3113 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3115 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3117 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3118 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3120 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3127 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3132 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3133 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3134 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3135 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3144 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3145 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3146 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3149 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3152 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3153 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3155 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3156 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3157 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3160 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3161 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3167 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3168 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3173 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3174 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3175 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3177 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3179 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3180 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3183 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3184 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3186 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3187 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3192 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3195 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3198 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3199 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3200 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3201 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3203 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3207 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3208 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3211 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3213 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3214 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3216 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3220 /* We need to get a client cert */
3221 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3223 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3224 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3226 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3228 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3231 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3232 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3233 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3235 } else if (i == 1) {
3237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3238 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3242 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3243 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3246 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3247 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3248 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3249 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3251 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3252 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3253 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3254 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3260 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3263 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3267 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3269 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3272 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3275 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3276 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3277 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3280 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3281 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3288 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3290 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3297 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3298 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3300 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3301 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3303 /* we don't have a certificate */
3304 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3307 /* This is the passed certificate */
3309 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3310 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3311 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3312 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3319 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3321 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3325 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3326 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3328 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3329 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3331 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3334 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3335 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3336 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3337 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3341 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3342 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3343 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3345 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3349 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3350 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3351 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3359 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3363 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3364 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3366 size_t len, padding_len;
3367 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3369 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3370 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3372 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3373 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3378 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3382 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3387 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3389 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3390 /* should contain no data */
3391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3392 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3393 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3394 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3398 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3399 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3400 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3401 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3402 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3407 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3409 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3412 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3414 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3416 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3418 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3419 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3420 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3424 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3425 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3426 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3427 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3430 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3431 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3434 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3435 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3436 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3437 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3440 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3443 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3444 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3445 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3446 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3447 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3452 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3453 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3457 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3460 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3461 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3462 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3463 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3468 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3469 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3470 # error Max cipher length too short
3473 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3474 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3477 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3478 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3481 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3484 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3486 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3489 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3490 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3492 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3493 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3494 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3497 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3506 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3511 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3512 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3513 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3515 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3520 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3521 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3522 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3524 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3525 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);