2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
212 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
214 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
215 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
224 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
226 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
231 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
236 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
237 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
239 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
240 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
241 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
242 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
244 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
245 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
246 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
247 * the server is resuming.
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
252 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
253 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
259 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
260 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
262 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
263 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
269 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
272 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
282 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
283 * |ext.status_expected| is set
285 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
291 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
292 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
293 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
294 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
295 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
306 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
315 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
321 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
322 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
327 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
333 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
334 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
335 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
340 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
341 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
342 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
356 /* No valid transition found */
357 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
358 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
359 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
364 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
368 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
370 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
373 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
374 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
375 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
377 switch (st->hand_state) {
379 /* Shouldn't happen */
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
381 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
386 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
387 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
389 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
390 && !s->hello_retry_request)
391 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
393 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
397 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
398 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
404 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
405 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
406 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
407 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
411 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
412 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
413 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
421 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
428 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
429 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 /* Try to read from the server instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
445 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
446 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
448 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
450 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
453 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
454 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
458 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
460 switch (st->hand_state) {
462 /* Shouldn't happen */
463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
464 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
469 if (!s->renegotiate) {
471 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
472 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
483 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
485 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
486 * actually selected a version yet.
488 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
500 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
501 /* We only get here in TLSv1.3 */
502 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
503 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
506 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
508 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
509 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
510 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
512 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
513 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
514 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
523 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
525 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
526 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
529 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
530 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
531 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
532 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
534 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
535 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
537 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
539 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
540 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
542 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
544 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
548 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
549 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
550 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
552 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
555 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
556 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
561 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
563 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
564 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
565 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
566 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
569 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
571 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
572 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
574 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
577 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
580 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
583 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
586 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
588 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
591 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
592 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
593 /* SSLfatal() already called */
594 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
597 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
599 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
605 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
606 * the client to the server.
608 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
610 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
612 switch (st->hand_state) {
614 /* No pre work to be done */
617 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
619 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
620 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
621 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
622 /* SSLfatal() already called */
628 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
632 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
633 * messages unless we need to.
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
638 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
639 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
640 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
646 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
648 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
649 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
650 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
652 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
653 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
654 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
657 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
659 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
660 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
663 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
667 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
668 * client to the server.
670 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
672 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
676 switch (st->hand_state) {
678 /* No post work to be done */
681 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
682 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
685 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
686 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
690 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
691 && s->max_early_data > 0
692 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
694 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
695 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
696 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
698 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
699 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
700 /* SSLfatal() already called */
706 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
708 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
709 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
711 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
712 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
715 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
716 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
717 /* SSLfatal() already called */
722 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
725 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
726 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
728 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
729 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
730 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
732 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
733 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
737 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
738 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
739 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
741 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
742 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
744 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
746 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
747 /* SSLfatal() already called */
751 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
752 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
753 /* SSLfatal() already called */
757 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
758 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
761 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
764 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
769 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
773 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
774 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
775 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
777 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
780 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
784 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
787 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
788 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
789 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
790 /* SSLfatal() already called */
796 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
797 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
799 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
800 /* SSLfatal() already called */
806 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
810 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
813 * Valid return values are:
817 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
818 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
820 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
822 switch (st->hand_state) {
824 /* Shouldn't happen */
825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
826 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
827 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
830 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
832 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
834 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
835 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
838 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
839 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
848 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
854 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
855 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
858 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
859 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
860 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
863 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
864 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
865 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
868 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
869 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
870 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
871 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
874 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
875 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
876 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
879 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
880 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
881 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
889 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
890 * reading. Excludes the message header.
892 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
894 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
896 switch (st->hand_state) {
898 /* Shouldn't happen */
901 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
902 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
904 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
905 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
908 return s->max_cert_list;
910 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
911 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
913 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
914 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
916 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
917 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
919 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
921 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
922 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
923 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
925 return s->max_cert_list;
927 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
928 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
930 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
931 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
933 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
935 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
936 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
938 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
939 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
941 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
942 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
944 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
945 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
950 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
952 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
954 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
956 switch (st->hand_state) {
958 /* Shouldn't happen */
959 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
960 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
961 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
962 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
964 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
965 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
967 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
968 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
971 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
973 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
974 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
976 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
977 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
979 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
980 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
982 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
983 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
985 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
986 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
989 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
991 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
992 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
994 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
995 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
997 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
998 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1001 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1004 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1009 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1012 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1014 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1016 switch (st->hand_state) {
1018 /* Shouldn't happen */
1019 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1020 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1021 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1024 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1025 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1029 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1037 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1038 unsigned char *session_id;
1040 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1041 /* Should not happen */
1042 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1043 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1047 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1048 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1049 if (protverr != 0) {
1050 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1056 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1057 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1058 if (!s->hello_retry_request && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1059 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1063 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1065 p = s->s3->client_random;
1068 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1069 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1071 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1074 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1081 i = s->hello_retry_request == 0;
1084 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1085 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1086 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1087 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1092 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1093 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1094 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1095 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1096 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1097 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1098 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1099 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1102 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1103 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1104 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1105 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1106 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1107 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1108 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1109 * know that is maximum server supports.
1110 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1111 * containing version 1.0.
1113 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1114 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1115 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1116 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1117 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1118 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1119 * the negotiated version.
1121 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1122 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1124 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1125 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1126 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1127 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1132 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1133 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1134 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1135 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1136 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1137 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1138 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1139 if (!s->hello_retry_request
1140 && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id,
1141 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1143 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1144 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1152 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1153 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1154 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1157 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1158 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1159 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1161 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1162 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1163 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1168 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1169 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1170 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1171 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1173 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 /* Ciphers supported */
1179 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1181 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1185 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1186 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1189 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1190 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1191 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1196 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1197 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1198 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1202 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1203 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1204 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1205 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1206 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1207 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1208 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1209 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1210 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1211 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 /* Add the NULL method */
1218 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1219 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1220 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1224 /* TLS extensions */
1225 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1226 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1233 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1238 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1239 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1240 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1241 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1242 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1245 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1246 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1248 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1249 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1252 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1254 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1255 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1257 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1259 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1262 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1264 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1265 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1268 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1270 /* unknown cipher */
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1272 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1276 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1277 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1279 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1281 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1285 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1286 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1288 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1290 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1294 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1295 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1296 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1298 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1303 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1304 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1305 * set and use it for comparison.
1307 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1308 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1309 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1310 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1312 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1313 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1315 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1316 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1317 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1318 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1319 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1324 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1327 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1328 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1332 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1337 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1339 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1340 size_t session_id_len;
1341 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1343 unsigned int compression;
1344 unsigned int sversion;
1345 unsigned int context;
1347 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1348 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1352 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1354 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1358 /* load the server random */
1359 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1360 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1361 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1362 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1363 s->hello_retry_request = hrr = 1;
1364 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1365 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1366 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1370 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1372 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1377 /* Get the session-id. */
1378 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1379 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1380 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1383 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1384 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1385 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1386 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1387 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1391 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1392 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1393 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1397 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1398 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1399 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1403 /* TLS extensions */
1404 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1405 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1406 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1407 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1414 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1415 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1416 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1417 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1418 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1422 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1423 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1428 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1429 if (compression != 0) {
1430 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1431 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1432 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1436 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1437 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1438 session_id_len) != 0) {
1439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1440 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1446 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1447 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1451 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1455 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1456 * are appropriate for this version.
1458 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1459 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1460 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1461 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1462 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1468 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1470 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1471 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1473 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1475 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1476 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1480 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1481 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1482 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1483 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1484 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1489 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1490 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1491 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1492 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1493 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1494 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1495 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1496 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1497 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1498 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1500 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1501 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1502 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1504 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1505 * backwards compat reasons
1507 int master_key_length;
1508 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1509 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1512 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1513 && master_key_length > 0) {
1514 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1515 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1516 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1518 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1519 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 if (session_id_len != 0
1525 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1526 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1527 session_id_len) == 0)
1532 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1533 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1534 /* actually a client application bug */
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1536 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1537 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1542 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1543 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1544 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1545 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1546 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1548 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1550 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1551 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1552 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1553 s->session_ctx->lock);
1554 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1555 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1560 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1562 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1563 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1564 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1565 * used for resumption.
1567 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1568 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1569 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1570 if (session_id_len > 0)
1571 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1576 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1577 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1578 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1579 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1583 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1586 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1587 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1589 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1590 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1594 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1595 if (compression != 0) {
1596 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1597 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1601 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1602 * using compression.
1604 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1605 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1606 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1610 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1611 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1612 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1615 if (compression == 0)
1617 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1618 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1619 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1622 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1625 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1627 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1630 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1634 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1635 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1639 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1640 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1641 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1642 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1645 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1648 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1649 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1651 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1652 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1654 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1655 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1656 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1660 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1661 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1662 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1667 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1668 * we're done with this message
1671 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1672 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1673 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1674 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1678 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1679 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1681 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1682 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1685 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1688 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1691 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1692 * should not be used.
1694 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1695 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1697 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1698 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1699 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1700 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1701 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1705 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1708 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1709 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1710 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1714 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1715 * ClientHello will not change
1717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1718 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1719 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1724 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1725 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1727 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1728 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1733 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1734 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1735 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1738 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1739 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1740 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1744 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1746 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1747 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1750 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1753 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1754 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1756 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1757 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1758 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1759 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1760 unsigned int context = 0;
1761 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1763 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1765 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1769 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1771 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1772 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1773 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1774 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1775 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1778 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1779 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1780 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1782 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1783 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1787 certstart = certbytes;
1788 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1790 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1791 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1794 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1796 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1797 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1801 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1802 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1805 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1807 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1811 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1812 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1813 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1814 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1815 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1816 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1817 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1818 /* SSLfatal already called */
1821 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1824 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1825 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1826 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1827 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1833 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1835 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1836 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1837 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1838 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1839 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1840 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1841 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1842 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1843 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1844 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1845 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1846 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1848 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1849 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
1850 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1851 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1854 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1856 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1857 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1861 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1863 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1864 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1866 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1869 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1871 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1874 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1878 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1881 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1882 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1886 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1887 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1890 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1891 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1893 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1894 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1895 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1899 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1901 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1903 s->session->peer = x;
1904 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1907 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1909 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1910 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1911 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1912 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1916 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1920 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1924 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1926 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1927 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1929 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1931 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1932 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1933 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1938 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1939 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1940 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1943 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1944 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1945 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1946 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1950 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1951 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1952 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1953 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1954 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1956 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1962 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1963 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1968 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1970 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1971 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1973 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1974 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1975 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1976 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1977 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
1978 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1982 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1984 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1985 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1987 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1988 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1990 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1991 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1993 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1994 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2000 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2001 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2005 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2006 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2007 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2012 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2017 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2020 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2021 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2024 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2028 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2029 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2030 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2031 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2032 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2036 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2039 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2040 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2041 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2045 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2046 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2047 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2049 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2050 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2051 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2057 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2058 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2060 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2064 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2071 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2072 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2073 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2077 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2078 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2084 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2085 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2086 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2090 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2096 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2099 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2100 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2102 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2103 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2104 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2113 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2118 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2123 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2125 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2127 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2130 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2131 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2132 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2134 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2135 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2136 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2140 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2141 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2143 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2144 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2149 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2151 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2155 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2156 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2157 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2161 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2162 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2163 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2170 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2171 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2174 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2175 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2176 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2177 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2178 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2182 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2183 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2188 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2191 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2192 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2193 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2194 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2196 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2198 save_param_start = *pkt;
2200 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2201 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2202 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2205 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2206 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2207 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2212 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2213 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2214 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2215 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2216 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2219 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2220 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2221 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2224 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2225 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2226 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2230 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2231 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2235 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2239 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2245 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2246 * equals the length of the parameters.
2248 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2249 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2250 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2252 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2256 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2257 unsigned int sigalg;
2259 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2260 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2261 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2264 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2265 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2269 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2271 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2272 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2273 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2277 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2278 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2279 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2283 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2284 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2285 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2286 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2289 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2291 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2292 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2297 * Check signature length
2299 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2300 /* wrong packet length */
2301 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2302 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2306 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2307 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2309 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2313 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2314 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2318 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2319 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2320 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2321 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2322 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2323 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2327 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2328 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2330 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2334 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2335 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2338 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2339 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2342 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2345 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2346 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2347 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2348 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2349 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2353 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2356 /* still data left over */
2357 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2359 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2364 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2366 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2367 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2370 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2374 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2375 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2376 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2378 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2379 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2380 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2382 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2383 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2384 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2385 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2387 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2388 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2389 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2390 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2391 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2392 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2395 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2397 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2399 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2401 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2402 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2404 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2405 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2406 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2407 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2408 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2410 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2411 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2413 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2415 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2420 /* get the certificate types */
2421 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2422 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2423 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2424 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2425 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2428 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2430 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2431 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2435 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2438 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2440 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2441 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2442 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2445 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2447 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2448 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2449 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2451 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2452 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2453 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2454 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2455 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2459 /* get the CA RDNs */
2460 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2461 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2462 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2466 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2467 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2468 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2469 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2470 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2473 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2474 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2476 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2479 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2481 unsigned int ticklen;
2482 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2483 unsigned int sess_len;
2484 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2487 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2489 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2490 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2491 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2492 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2493 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2494 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2496 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2497 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2498 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2503 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2504 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2505 * be 0 here in that instance
2508 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2511 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2512 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2513 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2514 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2515 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2518 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2519 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2520 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2522 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2525 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2526 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2527 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2528 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2532 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2534 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2536 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2539 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2540 s->session = new_sess;
2544 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2545 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2547 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2549 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2550 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2551 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2553 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2554 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2555 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2556 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2559 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2560 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2561 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2565 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2566 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2567 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2569 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2572 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2573 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2574 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2575 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2577 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2578 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2579 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2580 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2586 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2587 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2588 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2589 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2590 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2591 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2592 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2593 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2594 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2597 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2598 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2600 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2601 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2602 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2607 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2609 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2610 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2612 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2613 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2616 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2619 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2623 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2624 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2626 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2631 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2632 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2633 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2634 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2637 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2638 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2640 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2643 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2644 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2645 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2646 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2649 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2651 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2654 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2660 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2662 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2663 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2664 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2667 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2671 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2672 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2673 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2676 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2679 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2682 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2683 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2688 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2689 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2690 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2692 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2693 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2694 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2697 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2698 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2699 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2703 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2704 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2705 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2709 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2710 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2711 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2712 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2713 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2722 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2724 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2725 /* should contain no data */
2726 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2727 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2728 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2730 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2731 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2732 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2735 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2740 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2741 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2742 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2745 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2748 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2750 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2753 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2754 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2757 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2758 size_t identitylen = 0;
2759 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2760 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2761 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2764 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2765 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2766 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2770 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2772 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2773 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2776 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2777 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2778 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2780 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2782 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2783 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2787 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2788 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2790 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2795 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2796 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2798 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2802 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2803 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2804 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2806 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2807 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2810 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2811 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2812 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2819 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2820 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2821 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2822 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2827 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2832 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2834 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2835 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2836 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2837 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2839 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2842 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2844 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2847 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2851 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2852 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2853 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2854 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2858 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2859 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2861 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2862 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2866 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2867 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2868 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2869 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2871 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2875 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2876 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2878 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2881 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2882 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2883 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2884 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2888 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2889 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2891 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2894 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2897 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2898 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2904 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2905 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2906 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2910 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2911 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2915 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2916 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2926 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2928 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2930 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2931 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2932 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2934 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2936 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2937 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2941 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2943 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2944 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2948 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2950 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2951 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2952 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2956 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2957 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2961 /* send off the data */
2962 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2963 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
2965 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2966 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2970 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2971 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2975 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2978 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2979 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2984 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2987 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2988 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2989 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2992 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
2995 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2999 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3001 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3002 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3006 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3007 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3011 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3012 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3014 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3015 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3020 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3021 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3022 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3028 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3029 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3033 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3038 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3041 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3042 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3045 unsigned int md_len;
3046 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3047 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3048 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3049 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3052 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3053 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3056 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3058 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3060 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3061 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3065 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3066 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3067 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3068 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3072 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3073 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3074 * certificate key for key exchange
3077 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3079 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3081 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3082 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3086 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3087 /* Generate session key
3088 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3090 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3091 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3092 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3096 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3099 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3100 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3101 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3102 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3103 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3104 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3105 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3106 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3107 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3108 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3111 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3113 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3114 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3119 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3121 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3124 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3130 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3131 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3132 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3133 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3134 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3138 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3139 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3140 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3144 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3145 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3146 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3149 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3150 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3155 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3157 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3158 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3160 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3161 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3163 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3164 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3167 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3169 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3170 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3171 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3172 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3173 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3179 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3180 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3185 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3187 unsigned long alg_k;
3189 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3192 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3193 * no need to do so here.
3195 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3196 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3199 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3200 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3202 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3203 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3205 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3206 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3208 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3209 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3211 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3212 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3214 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3215 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3216 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3222 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3223 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3225 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3226 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3231 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3233 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3236 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3237 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3241 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3242 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3243 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3250 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3252 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3255 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3256 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3257 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3265 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3266 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3267 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3268 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3271 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3274 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3275 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3277 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3278 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3279 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3280 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3281 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3282 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3286 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3287 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3293 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3294 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3299 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3300 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3301 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3303 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3305 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3306 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3309 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3310 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3312 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3313 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3318 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3321 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3324 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3325 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3326 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3327 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3329 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3334 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3335 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3338 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3340 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3341 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3343 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3347 /* We need to get a client cert */
3348 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3350 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3351 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3353 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3355 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3358 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3359 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3360 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3362 } else if (i == 1) {
3364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3365 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3369 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3370 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3373 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3374 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3375 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3376 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3378 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3379 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3380 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3386 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3389 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3390 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3391 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3395 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3398 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3401 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3403 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3406 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3407 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3409 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3414 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3415 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3416 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3418 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3419 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3421 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3422 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3429 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3431 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3435 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3436 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3438 /* we don't have a certificate */
3439 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3442 /* This is the passed certificate */
3443 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3445 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3446 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3448 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3449 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3453 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3454 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3455 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3457 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3458 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3462 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3463 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3465 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3466 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3471 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3472 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3473 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3482 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3484 size_t len, padding_len;
3485 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3487 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3488 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3490 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3491 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3492 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3493 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3497 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3503 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3505 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3506 /* should contain no data */
3507 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3508 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3509 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3512 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3513 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3514 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3518 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3519 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3520 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3521 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3522 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3527 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3529 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3532 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3535 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3537 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3538 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3540 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3544 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3545 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3547 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3548 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3549 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3553 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3554 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3557 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3558 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3561 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3565 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3566 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3567 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3568 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3573 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3574 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3578 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3581 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3582 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3583 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3584 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3587 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3588 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3592 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3593 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3594 # error Max cipher length too short
3597 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3598 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3601 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3602 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3605 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3608 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3610 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3613 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3614 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3616 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3617 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3618 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3621 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3623 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3627 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3630 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3631 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3634 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3635 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3643 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3644 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3645 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3648 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3655 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3656 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3657 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3659 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3660 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3661 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3665 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3666 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3667 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3669 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3670 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3671 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3680 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3682 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3683 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3684 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3685 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3686 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3690 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;