2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
72 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
78 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
80 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
81 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
82 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
83 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
90 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
96 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
98 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
101 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
102 * ciphersuite or for SRP
104 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
113 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
114 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
115 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
116 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
118 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
119 * (transition not allowed)
121 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
123 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
126 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
127 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
128 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
131 switch (st->hand_state) {
135 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
137 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
138 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
147 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
148 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
153 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
160 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
161 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
164 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
165 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
171 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
172 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
173 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
179 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
180 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
185 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
186 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
187 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
193 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
194 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
197 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
198 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
204 /* No valid transition found */
209 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
210 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
211 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
212 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
214 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
215 * (transition not allowed)
217 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
219 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
223 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
224 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
226 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
227 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
232 switch (st->hand_state) {
236 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
237 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
238 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
242 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
243 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
244 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
248 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
249 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
255 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
257 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
258 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
261 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
262 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
265 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
266 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
271 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
273 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
274 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
275 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
278 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
279 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
283 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
284 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
286 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
287 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
288 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
289 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
291 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
292 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
293 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
294 * the server is resuming.
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
299 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
300 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
301 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
306 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
307 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
309 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
310 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
311 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
312 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
315 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
316 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
317 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
319 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
329 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
330 * |ext.status_expected| is set
332 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
333 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
338 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
339 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
340 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
341 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
342 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
343 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
352 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
353 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
354 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
361 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
362 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
363 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
368 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
369 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
370 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
371 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
374 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
375 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
380 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
381 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
382 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
387 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
388 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
389 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
395 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
403 /* No valid transition found */
404 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
405 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
410 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
411 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
414 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
416 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
419 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
420 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
421 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
423 switch (st->hand_state) {
425 /* Shouldn't happen */
426 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
428 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
429 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
430 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
432 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
433 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
434 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
436 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
437 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
438 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
439 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
441 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
442 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
445 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
446 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
447 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
448 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
453 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
454 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
455 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
458 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
459 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
460 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
464 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
465 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
467 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
468 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
469 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
470 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
474 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
475 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
476 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
478 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
481 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
482 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
483 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
486 /* Try to read from the server instead */
487 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
492 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
493 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
495 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
497 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
500 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
501 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
505 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
507 switch (st->hand_state) {
509 /* Shouldn't happen */
510 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
513 if (!s->renegotiate) {
515 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
516 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
518 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
520 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
523 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
525 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
526 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
528 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
529 * actually selected a version yet.
531 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
532 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
535 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
538 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
540 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
541 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
543 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
544 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
545 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
547 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
548 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
551 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
552 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
555 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
556 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
558 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
560 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
561 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
564 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
565 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
566 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
567 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
569 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
570 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
572 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
574 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
577 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
580 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
581 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
583 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
584 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
586 hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
588 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
591 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
595 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
596 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
597 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
601 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
603 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
604 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
609 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
611 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
612 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
614 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
615 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
618 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
620 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
623 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
624 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
625 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
626 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
628 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
629 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
631 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
632 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
637 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
638 * the client to the server.
640 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
642 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
644 switch (st->hand_state) {
646 /* No pre work to be done */
649 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
651 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
652 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
653 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
654 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
660 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
661 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
664 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
665 * messages unless we need to.
669 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
670 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
671 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
676 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
678 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
679 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
680 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
682 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
683 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
684 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
687 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
689 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
692 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
696 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
697 * client to the server.
699 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
701 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
705 switch (st->hand_state) {
707 /* No post work to be done */
710 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
711 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
714 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
715 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
719 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
720 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
722 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
723 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
724 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
726 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
727 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
732 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
734 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
735 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
737 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
738 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
741 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
742 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
746 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
747 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
748 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
749 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
751 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
752 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
754 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
756 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
759 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
760 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
763 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
764 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
767 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
770 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
775 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
779 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
781 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
783 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
786 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
790 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
793 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
794 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
795 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
800 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
801 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
803 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
808 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
812 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
815 * Valid return values are:
819 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
820 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
822 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
824 switch (st->hand_state) {
826 /* Shouldn't happen */
829 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
831 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
833 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
834 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
837 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
838 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
839 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
842 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
843 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
844 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
847 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
853 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
854 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
857 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
858 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
859 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
862 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
863 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
864 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
867 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
868 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
869 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
870 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
873 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
874 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
875 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
878 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
879 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
880 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
888 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
889 * reading. Excludes the message header.
891 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
893 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
895 switch (st->hand_state) {
897 /* Shouldn't happen */
900 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
901 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
903 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
904 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
906 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
907 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
910 return s->max_cert_list;
912 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
913 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
915 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
916 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
918 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
919 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
921 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
923 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
924 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
925 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
927 return s->max_cert_list;
929 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
930 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
932 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
933 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
935 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
937 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
938 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
940 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
941 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
943 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
944 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
946 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
947 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
952 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
954 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
956 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
958 switch (st->hand_state) {
960 /* Shouldn't happen */
961 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
963 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
964 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
966 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
967 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
969 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
970 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
973 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
975 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
976 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
978 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
979 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
981 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
982 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
984 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
985 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
987 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
988 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
990 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
991 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
993 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
994 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
996 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
997 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
999 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1000 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1002 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1003 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1005 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1006 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1011 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1014 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1016 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1018 switch (st->hand_state) {
1020 /* Shouldn't happen */
1023 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1024 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1028 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1033 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1037 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1039 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1040 /* Should not happen */
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1045 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1046 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1047 if (protverr != 0) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1052 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
1054 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1055 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1057 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
1058 (sess->not_resumable)) {
1059 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1062 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1064 p = s->s3->client_random;
1067 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1068 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1070 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1073 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1082 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1083 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0)
1087 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1088 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1089 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1090 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1091 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1092 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1093 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1094 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1097 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1098 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1099 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1100 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1101 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1102 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1103 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1104 * know that is maximum server supports.
1105 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1106 * containing version 1.0.
1108 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1109 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1110 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1111 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1112 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1113 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1114 * the negotiated version.
1116 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1117 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1119 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1120 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1121 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1129 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1130 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1131 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1132 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1134 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1140 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1141 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1142 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1143 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1149 /* Ciphers supported */
1150 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1151 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1155 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1157 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1163 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1168 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1169 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1170 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1171 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1172 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1173 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1174 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1181 /* Add the NULL method */
1182 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1187 /* TLS extensions */
1188 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1189 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1190 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1197 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1203 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1204 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1205 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1210 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1211 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1212 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1217 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1218 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1219 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1222 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1224 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1226 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1227 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1228 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1231 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1233 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1234 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1237 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1239 /* unknown cipher */
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1244 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1245 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1247 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1252 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1253 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1255 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1256 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1260 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1261 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1262 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1263 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1268 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1269 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1270 * set and use it for comparison.
1272 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1273 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1274 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1275 SSLerr(SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1276 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1279 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1284 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1286 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1287 size_t session_id_len;
1288 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1289 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1290 unsigned int compression;
1291 unsigned int sversion;
1292 unsigned int context;
1294 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1295 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1299 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1300 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1305 /* load the server random */
1306 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1307 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1313 * We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in.
1314 * Must be done after reading the random data so we can check for the
1315 * TLSv1.3 downgrade sentinels
1317 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 1, &al);
1318 if (protverr != 0) {
1319 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1324 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of the
1325 * message must be on a record boundary.
1327 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1328 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1329 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1333 /* Get the session-id. */
1334 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1335 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1336 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1340 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1341 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1342 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1343 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1344 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1345 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1349 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1353 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1354 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1355 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1359 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1360 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1361 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1362 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1369 /* TLS extensions */
1370 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1371 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1372 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1373 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1374 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1378 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1379 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1380 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1385 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1386 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1387 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1388 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1389 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1393 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1394 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1395 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1396 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1397 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1398 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1399 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1400 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1401 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1402 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1404 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1405 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1406 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1408 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1409 * backwards compat reasons
1411 int master_key_length;
1412 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1413 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1416 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1417 && master_key_length > 0) {
1418 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1419 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1420 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1422 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1423 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1428 if (session_id_len != 0
1429 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1430 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1431 session_id_len) == 0)
1436 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1437 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1438 /* actually a client application bug */
1439 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1440 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1441 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1446 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1447 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1448 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1449 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1450 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1452 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1454 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1455 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1456 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1457 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1462 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1463 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1464 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1465 if (session_id_len > 0)
1466 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1470 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1471 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1472 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1475 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1479 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1482 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1483 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1485 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1486 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1490 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1491 if (compression != 0) {
1492 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1493 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1494 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1498 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1499 * using compression.
1501 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1502 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1506 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1507 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1508 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1509 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1512 if (compression == 0)
1514 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1515 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1519 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1522 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1523 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1525 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1528 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1532 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1535 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1536 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1537 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1538 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1541 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1544 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1545 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1547 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1548 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1550 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1553 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1554 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1555 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1560 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1561 * we're done with this message
1564 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1565 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1566 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1567 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1572 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1573 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1575 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1576 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1577 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1578 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1581 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1583 unsigned int sversion;
1585 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1586 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1590 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1591 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1596 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1598 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1599 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, 0, &al);
1600 if (errorcode != 0) {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1605 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1607 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1611 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1612 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1616 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1617 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1622 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1623 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1624 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1625 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1628 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1631 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1632 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1634 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1635 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1640 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1641 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1642 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1645 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1646 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1647 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1652 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1654 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1655 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1656 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1657 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1660 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1662 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1663 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1665 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1666 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1667 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1669 unsigned int context = 0;
1671 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1676 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1678 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1679 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1680 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1681 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1684 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1685 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1686 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1687 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1689 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1693 certstart = certbytes;
1694 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1696 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1700 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1701 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1702 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1703 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1707 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1708 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1711 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1712 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1713 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1716 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1717 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1719 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1720 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1721 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1724 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1727 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1728 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1734 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1736 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1737 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1738 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1739 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1740 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1741 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1742 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1743 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1744 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1745 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1746 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1747 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1749 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1750 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1751 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1752 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1755 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1757 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1758 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1762 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1764 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1765 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1767 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1770 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1773 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1775 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1779 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1783 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1788 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1792 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1793 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1796 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1797 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1798 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1799 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1800 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1801 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1803 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1804 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1805 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1809 s->session->peer_type = i;
1811 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1813 s->session->peer = x;
1814 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1817 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1819 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1820 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1821 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1822 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1823 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1827 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1831 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1833 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1836 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1840 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1842 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1843 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1845 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1847 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1848 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1854 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1855 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1856 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1859 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1860 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1865 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1866 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1867 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1868 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1869 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1870 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1877 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1882 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1885 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1887 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1888 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1889 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1890 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1891 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1896 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1898 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1899 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1901 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1902 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1904 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1905 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1907 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1908 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1909 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1914 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1915 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1916 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1920 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1921 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1922 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1927 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1932 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1934 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1935 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1936 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1939 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1943 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1944 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1945 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1946 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1951 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1954 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1955 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1960 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1961 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1962 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1964 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1965 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1966 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1967 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1968 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1972 /* test non-zero pubkey */
1973 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1974 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1979 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1980 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1981 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1986 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1987 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1992 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1993 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1999 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2000 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2005 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2006 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2007 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2011 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2014 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2015 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2017 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2018 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2019 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2028 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2033 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2038 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
2040 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2042 const unsigned char *ecparams;
2044 unsigned int curve_flags;
2045 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2048 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2049 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
2050 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2052 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
2053 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2058 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
2059 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
2061 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
2062 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
2067 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
2069 if (curve_nid == 0) {
2070 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2072 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2076 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
2077 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
2079 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2080 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2081 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2085 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2087 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2088 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2090 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2091 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2092 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2093 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2094 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2095 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2098 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2102 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2103 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2108 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2109 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2110 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2112 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2117 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2118 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2121 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2122 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2123 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2124 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2125 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2130 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2135 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2139 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2140 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2141 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2142 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2144 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2146 save_param_start = *pkt;
2148 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2149 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2150 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2153 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2154 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2158 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2159 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2160 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2161 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2163 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2164 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2166 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2167 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2170 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2171 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2175 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2179 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2182 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2183 * equals the length of the parameters.
2185 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2186 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2187 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2188 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2189 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2193 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2194 unsigned int sigalg;
2197 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2198 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2202 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2204 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2206 } else if (rv == 0) {
2207 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2211 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2213 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2214 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2218 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2220 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2221 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2222 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2223 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2226 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2228 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2234 * Check signature length
2236 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2237 /* wrong packet length */
2238 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2240 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2244 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2245 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2246 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2247 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2251 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2252 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2256 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2257 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2258 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2259 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2260 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2265 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2266 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2267 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2268 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2269 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2270 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2271 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2275 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2276 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2278 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2282 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2285 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2286 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2287 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2288 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2289 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2290 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2291 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2292 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2294 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2298 /* still data left over */
2299 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2300 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2306 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2309 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2310 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2311 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2312 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2315 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2317 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2318 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2321 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2322 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2323 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2325 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2326 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2327 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2329 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2330 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2331 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2332 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2334 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2335 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2336 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2337 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2341 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2342 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
2345 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2346 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2347 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
2348 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2349 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2350 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2353 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2354 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2355 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2362 /* get the certificate types */
2363 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2365 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2369 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2370 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2371 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2375 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2378 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2379 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2380 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2384 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2385 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2386 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2389 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2390 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2392 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2397 /* get the CA RDNs */
2398 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, &al))
2402 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2407 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2408 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2410 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2413 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2414 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2419 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2421 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2422 unsigned int ticklen;
2423 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2424 unsigned int sess_len;
2425 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2427 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2428 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2429 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2430 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2432 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2438 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2439 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2440 * be 0 here in that instance
2443 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2445 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2446 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2447 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2449 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2452 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2454 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2456 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2459 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2460 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2461 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2465 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2466 s->session = new_sess;
2470 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2471 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2473 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2475 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2476 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2477 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2479 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2480 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2481 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2484 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2485 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2486 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2490 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2491 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2492 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2494 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2497 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2498 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2499 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2501 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2502 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2503 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2504 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2510 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2511 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2512 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2513 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2514 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2515 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2516 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2517 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2518 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2521 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2522 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2524 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2525 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2526 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2527 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2530 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2532 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2533 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2535 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2536 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2539 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2541 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2543 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2545 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2549 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2550 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2551 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2553 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2558 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2559 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2560 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2562 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2565 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2566 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2567 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2571 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2572 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2573 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2574 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2577 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2578 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2582 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2588 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2592 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2593 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2594 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2595 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2598 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2602 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2603 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2604 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2607 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2610 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2613 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2614 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2619 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2620 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2621 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2623 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2624 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2625 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2628 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2629 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2630 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2634 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2635 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2636 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2641 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2642 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2643 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2644 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2653 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2655 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2657 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2658 /* should contain no data */
2659 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2663 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2664 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2665 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2666 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2673 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2675 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2678 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2681 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2682 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2683 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2686 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2688 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2691 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2692 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2695 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2696 size_t identitylen = 0;
2697 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2698 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2699 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2702 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2703 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2704 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2708 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2710 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2711 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2714 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2716 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2718 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2719 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2720 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2721 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2725 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2726 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2727 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2728 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2732 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2733 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2734 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2736 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2740 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2741 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2742 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2744 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2745 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2748 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2749 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2750 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2757 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2758 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2759 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2760 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2765 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2770 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2772 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2773 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2774 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2775 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2777 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2780 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2782 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2788 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2789 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2790 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2795 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2797 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2798 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2802 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2803 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2804 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2805 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2809 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2810 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2811 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2814 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2815 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2816 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2820 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2821 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2822 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2825 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2828 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2829 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2834 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2835 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2838 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2839 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2843 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2844 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2848 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2849 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2854 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2856 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2858 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2859 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2860 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2862 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2866 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2870 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2872 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2875 /* send off the data */
2876 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2877 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2880 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2881 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2885 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2887 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2888 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2892 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2894 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2895 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2896 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2897 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2900 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2902 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2906 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2912 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2917 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2918 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2920 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2925 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2926 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2932 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2933 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2936 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2937 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2942 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2944 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2945 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2946 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2949 unsigned int md_len;
2950 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2951 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2952 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2953 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2956 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2957 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2960 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2962 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2964 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2966 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2970 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2971 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2972 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2973 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2977 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2978 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2979 * certificate key for key exchange
2982 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2984 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2986 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2987 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2991 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2992 /* Generate session key
2993 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2995 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2996 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3001 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3004 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3005 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3006 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3007 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3008 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3009 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3010 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3011 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3012 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3013 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3016 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3018 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3019 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3020 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3024 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3026 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3029 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3030 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3035 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3036 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3037 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3038 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3039 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3043 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3044 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3045 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3049 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3050 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3051 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3054 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3055 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3060 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3062 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3063 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3065 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3066 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3068 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3071 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3073 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3074 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3075 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3082 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3083 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3088 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3090 unsigned long alg_k;
3093 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3095 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3096 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3099 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3100 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3102 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3103 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3105 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3106 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3108 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3109 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3111 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3112 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3114 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3115 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3123 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3124 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3125 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3127 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3128 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3133 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3135 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3138 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3139 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3143 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3144 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3145 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3146 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3153 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3154 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3158 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3159 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3161 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3170 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3171 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3172 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3175 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3178 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3179 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3181 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3182 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3183 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3186 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3187 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3193 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3194 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3199 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3200 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3201 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3203 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3205 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3206 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3209 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3210 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3212 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3213 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3218 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3221 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3224 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3225 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3226 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3227 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3229 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3233 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3234 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3237 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3239 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3240 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3242 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3246 /* We need to get a client cert */
3247 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3249 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3250 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3252 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3254 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3257 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3258 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3259 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3261 } else if (i == 1) {
3263 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3264 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3268 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3269 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3272 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3273 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3274 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3275 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3277 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3278 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3279 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3280 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3286 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3289 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3293 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3295 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3298 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3301 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3302 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3303 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3306 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3311 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3312 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3313 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3314 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3315 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3321 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3325 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3327 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3330 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3334 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3335 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3337 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3338 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3340 /* we don't have a certificate */
3341 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3344 /* This is the passed certificate */
3346 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3347 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3348 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3349 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3356 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3358 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3362 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3363 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3365 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3366 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3367 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3368 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3371 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3372 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3374 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3379 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3380 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3382 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3387 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3388 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3396 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3400 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3401 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3403 size_t len, padding_len;
3404 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3406 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3407 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3409 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3410 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3411 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3415 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3419 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3424 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3426 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3427 /* should contain no data */
3428 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3429 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3430 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3431 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3435 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3436 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3437 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3438 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3439 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3444 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3446 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3449 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3451 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3453 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3455 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3456 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3457 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3461 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3462 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3464 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3465 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3468 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3469 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3472 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3473 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3474 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3475 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3478 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3482 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3483 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3484 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3485 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3490 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3491 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3495 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3498 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3499 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3500 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3501 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3506 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3507 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3508 # error Max cipher length too short
3511 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3512 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3515 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3516 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3519 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3522 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3524 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3527 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3528 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3530 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3531 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3532 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3535 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3540 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3542 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3543 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3544 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3547 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3548 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3556 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3557 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3560 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3567 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3568 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3569 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3571 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3576 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3577 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3578 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3580 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3590 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3592 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3593 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3594 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3595 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3599 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;