2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
4 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
6 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
15 #include "statem_locl.h"
16 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
17 #include <openssl/rand.h>
18 #include <openssl/objects.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/md5.h>
21 #include <openssl/dh.h>
22 #include <openssl/bn.h>
23 #include <openssl/engine.h>
25 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
26 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
28 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
29 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
30 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
34 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
40 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
42 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
43 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
44 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
45 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
52 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
58 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
60 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
63 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
64 * ciphersuite or for SRP
66 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
75 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
76 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
77 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
78 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
80 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
81 * (transition not allowed)
83 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
85 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
88 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
89 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
90 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
93 switch (st->hand_state) {
97 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
99 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
100 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
102 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
103 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
108 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
109 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
110 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
115 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
117 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
118 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
122 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
123 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
126 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
127 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
133 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
134 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
135 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
155 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
156 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
159 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
160 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
166 /* No valid transition found */
171 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
172 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
173 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
174 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
176 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
177 * (transition not allowed)
179 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
181 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
185 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
186 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
188 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
189 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
194 switch (st->hand_state) {
198 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
204 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
205 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
206 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
212 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
214 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
215 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
218 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
219 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
224 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
226 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
227 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
228 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
231 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
232 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
236 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
237 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
239 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
240 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
241 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
242 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
244 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
245 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
246 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
247 * the server is resuming.
250 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
252 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
253 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
259 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
260 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
262 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
263 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
269 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
270 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
272 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
273 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
282 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
283 * |ext.status_expected| is set
285 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
291 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
292 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
293 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
294 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
295 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
296 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
297 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
305 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
306 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
314 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
315 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
316 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
321 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
322 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
323 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
324 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
327 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
328 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
333 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
334 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
335 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
340 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
341 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
342 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
348 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
349 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
356 /* No valid transition found */
357 SSLfatal(s, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
358 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION,
359 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
364 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
365 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
368 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
370 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
373 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
374 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
375 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
377 switch (st->hand_state) {
379 /* Shouldn't happen */
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
381 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT13_WRITE_TRANSITION,
382 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
385 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
386 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
387 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
388 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END;
389 else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
390 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
391 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
393 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
397 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
398 if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) {
399 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
400 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
404 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
405 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
406 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
407 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
408 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
411 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
412 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
413 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
414 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
416 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
417 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
418 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
420 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
421 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
422 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
423 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
427 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
428 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
429 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
430 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
431 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
434 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
435 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
436 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
439 /* Try to read from the server instead */
440 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
445 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
446 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
448 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
450 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
453 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
454 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
458 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
460 switch (st->hand_state) {
462 /* Shouldn't happen */
463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
464 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_WRITE_TRANSITION,
465 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
466 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
469 if (!s->renegotiate) {
471 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
472 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
474 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
479 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
480 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
482 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
483 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
485 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
486 * actually selected a version yet.
488 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0)
489 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
491 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
492 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
495 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
498 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
500 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
502 * We only get here in TLSv1.3. We just received an HRR, so issue a
503 * CCS unless middlebox compat mode is off, or we already issued one
504 * because we did early data.
506 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0
507 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
508 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
510 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
513 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
514 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
516 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
517 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
518 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
520 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
521 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
522 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
524 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
525 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
528 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
531 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
533 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
534 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
537 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
538 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
539 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
540 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
542 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
547 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
548 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
550 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
552 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
553 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
554 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
556 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
557 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
558 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
559 } else if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
560 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA;
562 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
563 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
565 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
568 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
574 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
575 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
576 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
579 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
581 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
582 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
584 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
587 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
589 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
590 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
592 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
593 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
596 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
598 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
601 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
602 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
603 /* SSLfatal() already called */
604 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
606 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
607 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
609 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
615 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
616 * the client to the server.
618 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
620 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
622 switch (st->hand_state) {
624 /* No pre work to be done */
627 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
629 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
630 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
631 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
632 /* SSLfatal() already called */
638 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
639 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
642 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
643 * messages unless we need to.
647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
648 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) {
649 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
650 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
656 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
658 * If we've been called by SSL_do_handshake()/SSL_write(), or we did not
659 * attempt to write early data before calling SSL_read() then we press
660 * on with the handshake. Otherwise we pause here.
662 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
663 || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE)
664 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
667 case TLS_ST_EARLY_DATA:
669 /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
670 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
673 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
677 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
678 * client to the server.
680 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
682 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
686 switch (st->hand_state) {
688 /* No post work to be done */
691 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
692 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
693 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
695 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
696 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
697 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
699 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) == 0) {
700 if (!statem_flush(s))
702 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
703 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
704 /* SSLfatal() already called */
708 /* else we're in compat mode so we delay flushing until after CCS */
709 } else if (!statem_flush(s)) {
713 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
714 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
719 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
721 * We set the enc_write_ctx back to NULL because we may end up writing
722 * in cleartext again if we get a HelloRetryRequest from the server.
724 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
725 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
728 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
729 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0) {
730 /* SSLfatal() already called */
735 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
736 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
738 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
739 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
740 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
743 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
744 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
745 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
747 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
748 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
752 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
753 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
754 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
756 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
757 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
759 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
761 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
762 /* SSLfatal() already called */
766 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
767 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
768 /* SSLfatal() already called */
772 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
773 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
776 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
779 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
784 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
788 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
789 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
790 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
792 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
795 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
799 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
802 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
803 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
804 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) {
805 /* SSLfatal() already called */
811 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
812 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
814 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1)) {
815 /* SSLfatal() already called */
821 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
825 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
828 * Valid return values are:
832 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
833 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
835 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
837 switch (st->hand_state) {
839 /* Shouldn't happen */
840 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
841 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_CONSTRUCT_MESSAGE,
842 SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_STATE);
845 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
847 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
849 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
850 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
853 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
854 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
855 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
858 case TLS_ST_CW_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
859 *confunc = tls_construct_end_of_early_data;
860 *mt = SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA;
863 case TLS_ST_PENDING_EARLY_DATA_END:
869 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
870 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
873 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
874 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
875 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
878 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
879 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
880 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
883 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
884 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
885 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
886 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
889 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
890 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
891 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
894 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
895 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
896 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
904 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
905 * reading. Excludes the message header.
907 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
909 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
911 switch (st->hand_state) {
913 /* Shouldn't happen */
916 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
917 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
919 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
920 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
923 return s->max_cert_list;
925 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
926 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
928 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
929 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
931 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
932 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
934 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
936 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
937 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
938 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
940 return s->max_cert_list;
942 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
943 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
945 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
946 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
948 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
950 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
951 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
953 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
954 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
956 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
957 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
959 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
960 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
965 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
967 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
969 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
971 switch (st->hand_state) {
973 /* Shouldn't happen */
974 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
975 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
976 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
977 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
979 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
980 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
982 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
983 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
986 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
989 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
991 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
992 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
994 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
995 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
997 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
998 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
1000 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
1001 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
1003 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
1004 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
1006 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
1007 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
1009 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
1010 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
1012 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
1013 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
1015 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
1016 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
1018 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
1019 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
1024 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
1027 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
1029 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
1031 switch (st->hand_state) {
1033 /* Shouldn't happen */
1034 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1035 SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_POST_PROCESS_MESSAGE,
1036 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1039 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
1040 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
1044 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1049 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1052 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1053 unsigned char *session_id;
1055 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1056 /* Should not happen */
1057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1058 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1062 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1063 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1064 if (protverr != 0) {
1065 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1071 || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version)
1072 || !SSL_SESSION_is_resumable(sess)) {
1073 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1074 && !ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1075 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1079 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1081 p = s->s3->client_random;
1084 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1085 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1087 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1090 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1097 i = (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE);
1100 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random),
1101 DOWNGRADE_NONE) <= 0) {
1102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1103 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1108 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1109 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1110 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1111 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1112 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1113 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1114 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1115 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1118 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1119 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1120 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1121 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1122 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1123 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1124 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1125 * know that is maximum server supports.
1126 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1127 * containing version 1.0.
1129 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1130 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1131 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1132 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1133 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1134 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1135 * the negotiated version.
1137 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1138 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1140 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1141 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1143 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1148 session_id = s->session->session_id;
1149 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1150 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1151 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) {
1152 sess_id_len = sizeof(s->tmp_session_id);
1153 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1154 session_id = s->tmp_session_id;
1155 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE
1156 && ssl_randbytes(s, s->tmp_session_id,
1157 sess_id_len) <= 0) {
1158 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1159 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1160 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1167 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1168 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1169 s->tmp_session_id_len = sess_id_len;
1170 memcpy(s->tmp_session_id, s->session->session_id, sess_id_len);
1173 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1174 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1175 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, session_id,
1177 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1179 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1183 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1184 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1185 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1186 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1187 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1188 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1189 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1194 /* Ciphers supported */
1195 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1197 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1201 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt)) {
1202 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1205 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1207 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1212 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1214 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1217 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1218 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1219 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1220 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1221 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1222 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1223 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1224 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1225 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1226 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1227 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 /* Add the NULL method */
1234 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1235 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO,
1236 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1240 /* TLS extensions */
1241 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0)) {
1242 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1249 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1254 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1255 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1256 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1257 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1258 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1261 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1262 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1263 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1264 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1265 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1268 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1269 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY,
1270 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1271 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1273 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1275 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1278 static int set_client_ciphersuite(SSL *s, const unsigned char *cipherchars)
1280 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1281 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1284 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1286 /* unknown cipher */
1287 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1288 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1292 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1293 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1295 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK, 1)) {
1296 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1297 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1301 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1302 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1304 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1306 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1310 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher != NULL
1311 && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id != c->id) {
1312 /* ServerHello selected a different ciphersuite to that in the HRR */
1313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1314 SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1319 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1320 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1321 * set and use it for comparison.
1323 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
1324 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1325 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1326 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1328 * In TLSv1.3 it is valid for the server to select a different
1329 * ciphersuite as long as the hash is the same.
1331 if (ssl_md(c->algorithm2)
1332 != ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2)) {
1333 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1334 SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1335 SSL_R_CIPHERSUITE_DIGEST_HAS_CHANGED);
1340 * Prior to TLSv1.3 resuming a session always meant using the same
1343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SET_CLIENT_CIPHERSUITE,
1344 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1348 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1353 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1355 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1356 size_t session_id_len;
1357 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1359 unsigned int compression;
1360 unsigned int sversion;
1361 unsigned int context;
1363 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1364 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1368 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1369 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1370 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1374 /* load the server random */
1375 if (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION
1376 && sversion == TLS1_2_VERSION
1377 && PACKET_remaining(pkt) >= SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
1378 && memcmp(hrrrandom, PACKET_data(pkt), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
1379 s->hello_retry_request = SSL_HRR_PENDING;
1381 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1382 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1383 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1387 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1389 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1394 /* Get the session-id. */
1395 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1397 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1400 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1401 if (session_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1402 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1404 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1408 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1409 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1410 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1414 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1416 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1420 /* TLS extensions */
1421 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0 && !hrr) {
1422 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1423 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
1424 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1431 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
1432 SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO
1433 | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1434 &extensions, NULL, 1)) {
1435 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1439 if (!ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion, extensions)) {
1440 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1445 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || hrr) {
1446 if (compression != 0) {
1447 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1448 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1449 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1453 if (session_id_len != s->tmp_session_id_len
1454 || memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->tmp_session_id,
1455 session_id_len) != 0) {
1456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1457 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_SESSION_ID);
1463 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1464 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1468 return tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(s, &extpkt);
1472 * Now we have chosen the version we need to check again that the extensions
1473 * are appropriate for this version.
1475 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1476 : SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1477 if (!tls_validate_all_contexts(s, context, extensions)) {
1478 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1479 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1485 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1487 * In TLSv1.3 a ServerHello message signals a key change so the end of
1488 * the message must be on a record boundary.
1490 if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
1491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
1492 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1493 SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY);
1497 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1498 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1499 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1500 extensions, NULL, 0)) {
1501 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1506 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1507 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1508 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1509 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1510 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1511 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1512 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1513 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1514 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1515 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1517 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1518 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1519 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1521 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1522 * backwards compat reasons
1524 int master_key_length;
1525 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1526 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1529 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1530 && master_key_length > 0) {
1531 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1532 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1533 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1535 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1536 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1541 if (session_id_len != 0
1542 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1543 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1544 session_id_len) == 0)
1549 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1550 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1551 /* actually a client application bug */
1552 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1553 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1554 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1559 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1560 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1561 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1562 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1563 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1565 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1567 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1568 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1569 CRYPTO_atomic_add(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss, 1, &discard,
1570 s->session_ctx->lock);
1571 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1572 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1577 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1579 * In TLSv1.2 and below we save the session id we were sent so we can
1580 * resume it later. In TLSv1.3 the session id we were sent is just an
1581 * echo of what we originally sent in the ClientHello and should not be
1582 * used for resumption.
1584 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1585 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1586 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1587 if (session_id_len > 0)
1588 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1593 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1594 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1596 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1600 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1603 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1604 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1606 if (!set_client_ciphersuite(s, cipherchars)) {
1607 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1611 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1612 if (compression != 0) {
1613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1614 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1618 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1619 * using compression.
1621 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1622 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1623 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1627 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1628 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1629 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1632 if (compression == 0)
1634 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1635 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1636 SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1639 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1642 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1643 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1644 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1647 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1651 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1652 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1656 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1657 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1658 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1659 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1662 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1665 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1666 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1668 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1669 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1671 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
1672 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1673 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1677 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1678 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1679 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1684 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1685 * we're done with this message
1688 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1689 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1690 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1691 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1695 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1696 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1698 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1699 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1702 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_as_hello_retry_request(SSL *s,
1705 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1708 * If we were sending early_data then the enc_write_ctx is now invalid and
1709 * should not be used.
1711 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx);
1712 s->enc_write_ctx = NULL;
1714 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, extpkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1715 &extensions, NULL, 1)
1716 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1717 extensions, NULL, 0, 1)) {
1718 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1722 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1725 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0
1726 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1727 && s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL
1731 * We didn't receive a cookie or a new key_share so the next
1732 * ClientHello will not change
1734 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1735 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_AS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1736 SSL_R_NO_CHANGE_FOLLOWING_HRR);
1741 * Re-initialise the Transcript Hash. We're going to prepopulate it with
1742 * a synthetic message_hash in place of ClientHello1.
1744 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s)) {
1745 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1750 * Add this message to the Transcript Hash. Normally this is done
1751 * automatically prior to the message processing stage. However due to the
1752 * need to create the synthetic message hash, we defer that step until now
1755 if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1756 s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
1757 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1761 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1763 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1764 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1767 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1770 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1771 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1773 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1774 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1775 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1776 size_t chainidx, certidx;
1777 unsigned int context = 0;
1778 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
1780 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1781 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1782 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1786 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1788 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1789 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len
1790 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1791 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1792 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1795 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1796 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1797 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1799 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1800 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1804 certstart = certbytes;
1805 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE,
1808 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1811 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1813 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1814 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1818 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1819 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1822 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1823 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1824 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1828 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
1829 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, &rawexts,
1830 NULL, chainidx == 0)
1831 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1832 rawexts, x, chainidx,
1833 PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
1834 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1835 /* SSLfatal already called */
1838 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1841 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1842 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1843 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1844 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1850 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1852 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1853 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1854 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1855 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1856 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1857 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1858 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1859 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1860 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1861 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1862 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1863 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1865 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1866 SSLfatal(s, ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result),
1867 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1868 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1871 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1874 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1878 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1880 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1881 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1883 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1886 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1888 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1890 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1891 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1895 if ((clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, &certidx)) == NULL) {
1897 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1898 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1899 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1903 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1904 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1907 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1908 if ((clu->amask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth) == 0) {
1910 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1911 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1912 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1916 s->session->peer_type = certidx;
1918 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1920 s->session->peer = x;
1921 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1924 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1926 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1927 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1928 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1929 /* SSLfatal() already called */;
1933 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1937 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1941 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1943 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1944 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1946 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1948 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1949 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1950 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1955 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1956 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1957 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1960 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1961 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
1962 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1963 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1967 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1968 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1969 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1970 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1971 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1972 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1973 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1979 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
1980 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1985 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
1987 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1988 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1990 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1991 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1992 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1993 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1994 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
1995 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1999 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
2001 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
2002 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
2004 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
2005 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
2007 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
2008 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
2010 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
2011 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
2012 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2017 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s)) {
2018 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2022 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
2023 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2024 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2028 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP,
2029 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2034 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2036 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2037 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
2038 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
2041 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
2045 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
2046 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
2047 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
2048 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2049 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2053 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
2056 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
2057 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2058 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2062 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
2063 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
2064 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
2066 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
2067 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
2068 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
2069 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2074 /* test non-zero pubkey */
2075 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
2076 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2077 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2081 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
2082 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2088 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
2089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2090 SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
2094 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
2095 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2101 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
2102 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2103 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
2107 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
2108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2113 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
2116 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
2117 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
2119 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
2120 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2121 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2130 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
2134 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE,
2135 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2140 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
2142 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2144 unsigned int curve_type, curve_id;
2147 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
2148 * public key. We only support named (not generic) curves and
2149 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
2151 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &curve_type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &curve_id)) {
2152 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2153 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2157 * Check curve is named curve type and one of our preferences, if not
2158 * server has sent an invalid curve.
2160 if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || !tls1_check_group_id(s, curve_id)) {
2161 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2166 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(curve_id)) == NULL) {
2167 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2168 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
2172 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2173 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2174 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2178 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2179 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2180 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2181 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2187 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2188 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2191 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2192 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2193 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2194 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2195 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2199 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
2200 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2205 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2208 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2209 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2210 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2211 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2213 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2215 save_param_start = *pkt;
2217 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2218 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2219 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2222 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2223 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt)) {
2224 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2229 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2230 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2231 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2232 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2233 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2236 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2237 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2238 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2241 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2242 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey)) {
2243 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2247 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2248 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2252 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2256 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2262 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2263 * equals the length of the parameters.
2265 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2266 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2267 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2269 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2273 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2274 unsigned int sigalg;
2276 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2277 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2278 SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2281 if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <=0) {
2282 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2286 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2288 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2290 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2294 if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) {
2295 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2296 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2300 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2301 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2302 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2303 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2306 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2309 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2314 * Check signature length
2316 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2317 /* wrong packet length */
2318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2319 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2323 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2324 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2325 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2326 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2330 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2331 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2335 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2336 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2337 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2338 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2339 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2340 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2344 tbslen = construct_key_exchange_tbs(s, &tbs, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2345 PACKET_remaining(¶ms));
2347 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2351 rv = EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2352 PACKET_remaining(&signature), tbs, tbslen);
2355 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2356 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2359 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2362 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2363 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2364 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2365 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2366 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2370 /* else this shouldn't happen, SSLfatal() already called */
2373 /* still data left over */
2374 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2375 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2376 SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2381 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2383 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2384 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2387 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2391 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2392 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2393 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2395 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2396 PACKET reqctx, extensions;
2397 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
2399 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2400 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2401 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2402 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2404 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2405 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2406 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2407 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2408 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2409 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2412 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
2413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2414 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2416 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2418 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
2419 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2421 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2422 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2423 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2424 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2425 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2427 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
2428 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2429 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2430 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2437 /* get the certificate types */
2438 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2439 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
2440 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2441 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2442 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2445 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2446 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2447 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2448 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2449 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2452 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2455 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2456 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2457 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2458 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2459 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2462 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2463 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2464 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2465 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2466 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2468 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2469 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2470 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2471 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2472 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2476 /* get the CA RDNs */
2477 if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt)) {
2478 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2479 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2483 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2484 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2485 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2486 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2487 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2490 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2491 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2493 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2496 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2498 unsigned int ticklen;
2499 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2500 unsigned int sess_len;
2501 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2504 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2506 && (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add)
2507 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &nonce)
2508 || !PACKET_memdup(&nonce, &s->session->ext.tick_nonce,
2509 &s->session->ext.tick_nonce_len)))
2510 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2511 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2513 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2514 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2515 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2520 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2521 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2522 * be 0 here in that instance
2525 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2528 * Sessions must be immutable once they go into the session cache. Otherwise
2529 * we can get multi-thread problems. Therefore we don't "update" sessions,
2530 * we replace them with a duplicate. In TLSv1.3 we need to do this every
2531 * time a NewSessionTicket arrives because those messages arrive
2532 * post-handshake and the session may have already gone into the session
2535 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2536 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2537 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2539 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2542 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2543 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2544 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2545 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2549 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2551 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2553 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2556 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2557 s->session = new_sess;
2561 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2562 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2564 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2566 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2567 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2568 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2570 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2571 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2572 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2573 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2576 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2577 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2578 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2582 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2583 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2584 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2586 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2589 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2590 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
2591 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2592 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2594 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s,
2595 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2596 exts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
2597 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2603 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2604 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2605 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2606 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2607 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2608 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2609 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2610 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2611 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2614 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2615 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2617 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2618 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2619 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2624 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2626 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2627 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2629 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2630 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2633 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2636 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2640 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2641 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure
2643 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2648 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2649 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2650 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2651 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2654 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2655 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2657 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2660 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2661 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2663 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2666 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2667 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2668 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2671 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2677 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2679 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
2680 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2681 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2684 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2688 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2689 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2690 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2693 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s)
2696 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2699 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2700 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2705 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2706 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2707 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2709 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2710 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2711 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2714 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE,
2715 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2716 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
2721 SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2722 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2726 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2727 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2728 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2729 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2730 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2739 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2741 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2742 /* should contain no data */
2743 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2744 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2745 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2747 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2748 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2749 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE,
2752 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2757 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) {
2758 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2759 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2762 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2765 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2767 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2770 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2771 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2774 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2775 size_t identitylen = 0;
2776 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2777 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2778 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2781 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2783 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2787 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2789 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2790 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2793 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2795 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2797 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
2799 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2800 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2804 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2805 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2807 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2811 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2812 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2813 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2815 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2819 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2820 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2821 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2823 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2824 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2827 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2828 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2829 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2836 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2837 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2838 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2839 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2843 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2844 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2849 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2852 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2853 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2854 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2856 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2859 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2861 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2864 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2868 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2869 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2870 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2871 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2875 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2876 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2878 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2879 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2883 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2884 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2885 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2886 if (ssl_randbytes(s, pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2888 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2892 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2893 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2895 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2898 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2899 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2900 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2901 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2905 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2906 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2907 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2908 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2911 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2914 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2915 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2916 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2917 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2921 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2922 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen)) {
2923 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2927 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2928 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2932 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2933 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2937 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA,
2938 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2943 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2947 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2948 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2949 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2951 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2953 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2954 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2958 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2960 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2961 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2965 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2967 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2968 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2969 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2973 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2974 /* SSLfatal() already called */
2978 /* send off the data */
2979 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2980 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key),
2982 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2983 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2987 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2988 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2992 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2995 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE,
2996 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3001 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3003 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3004 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
3005 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
3006 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
3009 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
3011 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3012 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3016 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
3018 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3019 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3023 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
3024 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3028 /* Generate encoding of client key */
3029 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
3031 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
3032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3037 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
3038 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3039 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3045 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3046 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
3049 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE,
3050 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3055 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
3058 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
3059 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
3062 unsigned int md_len;
3063 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
3064 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
3065 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
3066 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3069 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
3070 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
3073 * Get server certificate PKEY and create ctx from it
3075 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
3077 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3078 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
3082 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
3083 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
3084 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3085 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3089 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
3090 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
3091 * certificate key for key exchange
3094 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
3096 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
3098 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3099 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3103 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
3104 /* Generate session key
3105 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
3107 || ssl_randbytes(s, pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
3108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3109 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3113 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
3116 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
3117 if (ukm_hash == NULL
3118 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
3119 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
3120 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3121 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
3122 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
3123 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
3124 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3128 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3130 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
3131 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
3132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3136 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
3138 * Encapsulate it into sequence
3141 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
3142 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3147 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3148 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3149 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3150 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3151 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3155 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3156 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3157 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3161 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3162 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3163 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3166 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
3167 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3172 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3174 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3175 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3177 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3178 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3180 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3181 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3184 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3186 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3187 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3188 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3189 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3190 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3196 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP,
3197 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3202 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3204 unsigned long alg_k;
3206 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3209 * All of the construct functions below call SSLfatal() if necessary so
3210 * no need to do so here.
3212 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3213 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt))
3216 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3217 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt))
3219 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3220 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt))
3222 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3223 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt))
3225 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3226 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt))
3228 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3229 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt))
3231 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3232 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3233 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3239 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3240 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3241 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3242 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3243 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3248 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3250 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3253 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3254 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3256 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3258 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3259 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3260 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3267 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3268 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3269 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3272 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3273 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3274 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3282 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3283 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3284 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3285 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3288 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3291 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3292 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3294 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3295 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3296 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
3297 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3298 SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3299 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3303 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3304 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3310 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3311 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3316 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3317 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3318 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3320 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3322 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3323 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, 0) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3326 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3327 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3329 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3330 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3335 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3338 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3341 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3342 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3343 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3344 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3346 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3351 SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3352 SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED);
3355 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3357 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3358 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3360 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3364 /* We need to get a client cert */
3365 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3367 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3368 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3370 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3372 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3375 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3376 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3377 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3379 } else if (i == 1) {
3381 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3382 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3386 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3387 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3390 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3391 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3392 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3393 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3395 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3396 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3397 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3403 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3406 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3407 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3408 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3412 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3415 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3418 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)) {
3419 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3420 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3423 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3424 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3426 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3431 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)
3432 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
3433 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {
3435 * This is a fatal error, which leaves enc_write_ctx in an inconsistent
3436 * state and thus ssl3_send_alert may crash.
3438 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3439 SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
3446 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3448 const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *clu;
3452 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3453 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3455 /* we don't have a certificate */
3456 if (!(alg_a & SSL_aCERT))
3459 /* This is the passed certificate */
3460 clu = ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer), &idx);
3462 /* Check certificate is recognised and suitable for cipher */
3463 if (clu == NULL || (alg_a & clu->amask) == 0) {
3464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3465 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3466 SSL_R_MISSING_SIGNING_CERT);
3470 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3471 if (clu->amask & SSL_aECDSA) {
3472 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s))
3474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3475 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3479 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3480 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) && idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
3481 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE,
3482 SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3483 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3488 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3489 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3490 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3498 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3499 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3501 size_t len, padding_len;
3502 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3504 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3505 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3507 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3508 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO,
3510 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3514 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3520 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3522 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3523 /* should contain no data */
3524 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ,
3525 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3526 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3529 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) {
3530 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
3531 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3535 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3536 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3537 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3538 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3539 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3544 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3546 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3549 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3552 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3554 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)
3555 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
3556 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3557 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3561 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions,
3562 SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, &rawexts,
3564 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3565 rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) {
3566 /* SSLfatal() already called */
3570 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3571 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3574 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3575 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3578 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3581 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3582 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3583 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3584 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3585 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3590 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3591 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3595 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3598 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen, maxverok = 0;
3599 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3600 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3601 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3604 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3605 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3609 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3610 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3611 # error Max cipher length too short
3614 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3615 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3618 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3619 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3622 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3625 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3627 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3630 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3631 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3633 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3634 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3635 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0))
3638 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3640 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3644 /* Sanity check that the maximum version we offer has ciphers enabled */
3646 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3647 if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3648 && DTLS_VERSION_LE(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver))
3651 if (c->max_tls >= s->s3->tmp.max_ver
3652 && c->min_tls <= s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
3660 if (totlen == 0 || !maxverok) {
3661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES,
3662 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3665 ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported "
3672 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3673 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3674 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3676 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3678 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3682 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3683 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3684 0, NULL, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3686 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3688 SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3697 int tls_construct_end_of_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3699 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
3700 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
3701 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
3702 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
3703 ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
3707 s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING;