2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
52 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
53 #include "statem_locl.h"
54 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
55 #include <openssl/rand.h>
56 #include <openssl/objects.h>
57 #include <openssl/evp.h>
58 #include <openssl/md5.h>
59 #include <openssl/dh.h>
60 #include <openssl/bn.h>
61 #include <openssl/engine.h>
63 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
66 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
67 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
68 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
69 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
73 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
79 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
81 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
82 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
83 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
84 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
91 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
97 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
99 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
102 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
103 * ciphersuite or for SRP
105 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
114 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
115 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
116 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
117 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
119 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
120 * (transition not allowed)
122 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
124 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
127 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
128 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
129 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
132 switch (st->hand_state) {
136 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
138 * This must a ClientHello following a HelloRetryRequest, so the only
139 * thing we can get now is a ServerHello.
141 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
142 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
147 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
154 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
156 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
157 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
161 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
162 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
172 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
173 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
174 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
180 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
181 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY;
186 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
187 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
188 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
194 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING
195 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
196 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
199 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
200 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
203 if (mt == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
204 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE;
210 /* No valid transition found */
215 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
216 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
217 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
218 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
220 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
221 * (transition not allowed)
223 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
225 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
229 * Note that after writing the first ClientHello we don't know what version
230 * we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later.
232 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
233 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
238 switch (st->hand_state) {
242 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
243 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
244 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
248 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
249 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
254 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
255 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
261 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
263 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
264 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
265 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
268 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
269 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
273 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
274 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
276 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
277 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL
278 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
279 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
281 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
282 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
283 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
284 * the server is resuming.
287 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
289 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
290 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
291 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
292 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
296 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
297 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
299 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
300 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
301 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
302 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
305 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
306 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
307 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
309 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
310 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
319 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
320 * |ext.status_expected| is set
322 if (s->ext.status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
323 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
328 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
329 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
330 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
331 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
332 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
333 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
334 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
341 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
342 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
343 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
344 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
351 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
352 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
353 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
358 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
359 if (s->ext.ticket_expected) {
360 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
361 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
364 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
365 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
370 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
371 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
372 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
377 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
378 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
379 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
385 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
387 * We've not actually selected TLSv1.3 yet, but we have sent early
388 * data. The only thing allowed now is a ServerHello or a
391 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
392 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
395 if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
396 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST;
399 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) {
400 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ;
407 /* No valid transition found */
408 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
409 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
414 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
415 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
418 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
420 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
423 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE because we haven't negotiated
424 * TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are handled by
425 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
427 switch (st->hand_state) {
429 /* Shouldn't happen */
430 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
432 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
433 /* We only hit this in the case of HelloRetryRequest */
434 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
436 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
437 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
438 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
440 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
441 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
442 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
443 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
446 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
447 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
448 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
449 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
451 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
452 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
453 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
455 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
456 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
457 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
458 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
462 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
463 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
464 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
465 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
466 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
467 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
470 if (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) {
471 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE;
472 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
475 /* Try to read from the server instead */
476 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
481 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
482 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
484 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
486 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
489 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
490 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
494 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
496 switch (st->hand_state) {
498 /* Shouldn't happen */
499 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
502 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) {
504 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
505 * actually selected a version yet.
507 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
509 if (!s->renegotiate) {
511 * We haven't requested a renegotiation ourselves so we must have
512 * received a message from the server. Better read it.
514 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
516 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
518 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
519 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
521 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
522 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING) {
524 * We are assuming this is a TLSv1.3 connection, although we haven't
525 * actually selected a version yet.
527 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
528 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
529 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
532 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
535 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
537 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
538 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
539 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
541 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
542 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
543 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
545 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
546 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
549 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
550 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
552 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
554 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
555 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
558 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
559 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
560 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
561 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
563 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
564 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
566 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
568 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
569 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
571 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
573 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
574 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
575 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
577 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
578 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
579 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
581 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->npn_seen)
582 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
584 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
586 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
588 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
589 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
590 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
591 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
594 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
596 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
597 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
598 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
600 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
603 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
605 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
606 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
608 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
609 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
610 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
613 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
615 * If we can renegotiate now then do so, otherwise wait for a more
618 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 1)) {
619 if (!tls_setup_handshake(s)) {
620 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
621 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
623 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
624 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
626 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
627 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
628 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
633 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
634 * the client to the server.
636 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
638 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
640 switch (st->hand_state) {
642 /* No pre work to be done */
645 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
647 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
648 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
649 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
650 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
656 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
657 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
660 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
661 * messages unless we need to.
665 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
666 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
667 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
673 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst, 1);
676 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
680 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
681 * client to the server.
683 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
685 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
689 switch (st->hand_state) {
691 /* No post work to be done */
694 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
695 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
698 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
699 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
703 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
704 && s->max_early_data > 0) {
706 * We haven't selected TLSv1.3 yet so we don't call the change
707 * cipher state function associated with the SSL_METHOD. Instead
708 * we call tls13_change_cipher_state() directly.
710 if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
711 SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
716 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
717 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
721 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
722 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
723 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
724 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
726 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
727 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
729 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
731 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
734 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
735 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
738 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
739 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
742 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
745 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
750 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
754 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
755 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
756 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
758 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
761 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
765 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
768 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
769 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
770 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
775 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
776 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
778 if (!tls13_update_key(s, 1))
783 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
787 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
790 * Valid return values are:
794 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
795 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
797 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
799 switch (st->hand_state) {
801 /* Shouldn't happen */
804 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
806 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
808 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
809 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
812 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
813 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
814 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
818 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
819 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
822 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
823 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
824 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
827 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
828 *confunc = tls_construct_cert_verify;
829 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
832 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
833 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
834 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
835 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
838 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
839 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
840 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
843 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE:
844 *confunc = tls_construct_key_update;
845 *mt = SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE;
853 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
854 * reading. Excludes the message header.
856 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
858 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
860 switch (st->hand_state) {
862 /* Shouldn't happen */
865 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
866 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
868 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
869 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
871 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
872 return HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
875 return s->max_cert_list;
877 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
878 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
880 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
881 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
883 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
884 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
886 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
888 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
889 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
890 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
892 return s->max_cert_list;
894 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
895 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
897 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
898 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
900 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
902 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
903 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
905 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
906 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
908 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
909 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
911 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
912 return KEY_UPDATE_MAX_LENGTH;
917 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
919 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
921 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
923 switch (st->hand_state) {
925 /* Shouldn't happen */
926 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
928 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
929 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
931 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
932 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
934 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST:
935 return tls_process_hello_retry_request(s, pkt);
938 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
940 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY:
941 return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt);
943 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
944 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
946 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
947 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
949 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
950 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
952 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
953 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
955 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
956 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
958 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
959 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
961 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
962 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
964 case TLS_ST_CR_HELLO_REQ:
965 return tls_process_hello_req(s, pkt);
967 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
968 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
970 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_UPDATE:
971 return tls_process_key_update(s, pkt);
976 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
979 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
981 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
983 switch (st->hand_state) {
985 /* Shouldn't happen */
988 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
989 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
991 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
992 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
993 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
994 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
995 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
996 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
997 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
998 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
999 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
1002 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
1003 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
1008 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
1013 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1014 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1017 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
1019 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
1020 /* Should not happen */
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1025 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
1026 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
1027 if (protverr != 0) {
1028 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
1032 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
1034 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
1035 * "ticket" without a session ID.
1037 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->ext.tick) ||
1038 (sess->not_resumable)) {
1039 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
1042 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
1044 p = s->s3->client_random;
1047 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
1048 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
1050 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1053 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
1062 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
1066 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
1067 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
1068 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
1069 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
1070 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
1071 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
1072 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
1073 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
1076 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
1077 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
1078 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
1079 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
1080 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
1081 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
1082 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
1083 * know that is maximum server supports.
1084 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
1085 * containing version 1.0.
1087 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
1088 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
1089 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
1090 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
1091 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
1092 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
1093 * the negotiated version.
1095 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
1096 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
1098 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
1099 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1100 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1105 if (s->new_session || s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
1108 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
1109 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
1110 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1111 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
1113 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1118 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
1119 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1120 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
1121 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
1122 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
1123 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1128 /* Ciphers supported */
1129 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1133 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
1134 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
1136 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1142 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
1143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1146 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1147 if (ssl_allow_compression(s)
1148 && s->ctx->comp_methods
1149 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || s->s3->tmp.max_ver < TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
1150 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1151 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
1152 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1153 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1154 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1160 /* Add the NULL method */
1161 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1162 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1166 /* TLS extensions */
1167 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1168 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1169 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1176 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1182 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1183 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1184 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1189 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1190 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1191 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1192 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1196 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1197 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1201 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1203 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1205 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1206 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1207 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1210 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1212 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1213 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1214 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1215 size_t session_id_len;
1216 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1217 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1218 unsigned int compression;
1219 unsigned int sversion;
1220 unsigned int context;
1222 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1227 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1228 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1229 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1233 /* We do this immediately so we know what format the ServerHello is in */
1234 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1235 if (protverr != 0) {
1236 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1237 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1241 /* load the server hello data */
1242 /* load the server random */
1243 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1244 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1249 /* Get the session-id. */
1250 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1251 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1252 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1256 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1257 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1258 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1259 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1260 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1261 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1265 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1269 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1270 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1271 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1275 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1276 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1278 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1285 /* TLS extensions */
1286 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1287 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1288 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1289 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1294 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1295 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1296 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al, NULL))
1301 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1302 /* This will set s->hit if we are resuming */
1303 if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_psk,
1304 EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO,
1305 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1309 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared
1310 * secret. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1311 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1312 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1313 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1314 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether
1315 * EAP-FAST servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session
1316 * ID alone is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we
1317 * first check if we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake
1318 * message to see if the server wants to resume.
1320 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
1321 && s->ext.session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->ext.tick) {
1322 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1324 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1325 * backwards compat reasons
1327 int master_key_length;
1328 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1329 if (s->ext.session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1332 s->ext.session_secret_cb_arg)
1333 && master_key_length > 0) {
1334 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1335 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1336 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1338 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1339 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1344 if (session_id_len != 0
1345 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1346 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1347 session_id_len) == 0)
1352 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1353 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1354 /* actually a client application bug */
1355 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1357 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1362 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1363 * didn't resume, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1364 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1365 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1366 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1368 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0
1370 && s->session->ext.tick_identity
1371 != TLSEXT_PSK_BAD_IDENTITY)) {
1372 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1373 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1378 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1379 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1380 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1381 if (session_id_len > 0)
1382 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1386 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1387 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1388 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1390 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1391 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1395 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars, 0);
1397 /* unknown cipher */
1398 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1403 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1406 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1407 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1409 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1410 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1412 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1413 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1418 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1419 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1421 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1422 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1428 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1429 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1430 * set and use it for comparison.
1432 if (s->session->cipher)
1433 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1434 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1435 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1437 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1440 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1442 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1443 if (compression != 0) {
1444 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1445 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1446 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1450 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1451 * using compression.
1453 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1458 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1459 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1461 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1464 if (compression == 0)
1466 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1467 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1468 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1471 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1474 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1475 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1476 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1477 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1480 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1484 if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1487 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1488 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1489 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1490 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1493 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1496 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1497 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1499 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1500 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1502 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1505 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1506 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1507 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1512 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1513 * we're done with this message
1516 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1517 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1518 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1519 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1520 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1521 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1522 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1526 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1527 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1529 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1530 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1531 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1532 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1535 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_retry_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1537 unsigned int sversion;
1539 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1543 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1544 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1545 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1549 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
1551 /* This will fail if it doesn't choose TLSv1.3+ */
1552 errorcode = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1553 if (errorcode != 0) {
1554 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1555 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, errorcode);
1559 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1560 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1561 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1565 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1566 &extensions, &al, NULL)
1567 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
1568 extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1571 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1573 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1575 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1576 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1577 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1578 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1581 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1583 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1584 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1586 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1587 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1588 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1590 unsigned int context = 0;
1592 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1593 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1597 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1599 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1600 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1601 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1605 for (chainidx = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chainidx++) {
1606 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1607 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1608 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1610 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1614 certstart = certbytes;
1615 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1617 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1621 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1622 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1623 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1624 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1628 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1629 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1632 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1633 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1634 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1637 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1638 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
1639 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1640 rawexts, x, chainidx, &al)) {
1641 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1644 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
1647 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1648 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1654 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1656 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1657 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1658 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1659 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1660 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1661 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1662 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1663 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1664 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1665 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1666 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1667 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1669 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1670 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1672 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1675 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1678 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1682 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1684 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1685 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1687 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1690 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1693 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1695 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1698 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1699 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1703 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1708 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1712 * Check certificate type is consistent with ciphersuite. For TLS 1.3
1713 * skip check since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any certificate
1716 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1717 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1718 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1719 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1720 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1721 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1723 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1725 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1729 s->session->peer_type = i;
1731 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1733 s->session->peer = x;
1734 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1737 /* Save the current hash state for when we receive the CertificateVerify */
1739 && !ssl_handshake_hash(s, s->cert_verify_hash,
1740 sizeof(s->cert_verify_hash),
1741 &s->cert_verify_hash_len)) {
1742 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1747 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1751 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1753 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1756 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1760 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1762 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1763 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1765 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1767 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1768 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1769 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1774 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1775 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1776 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1779 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1780 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1785 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1786 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1787 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1788 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1789 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1790 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1796 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1797 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1802 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1804 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1805 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1807 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1808 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1809 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1810 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1811 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1816 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1818 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1819 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1821 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1822 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1824 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1825 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1827 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1828 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1829 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1834 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1835 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1840 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1841 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1842 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1847 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1852 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1854 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1855 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1856 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1859 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1863 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1864 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1865 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1866 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1871 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1874 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1875 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1876 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1880 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1881 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1882 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1884 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1885 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1886 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1887 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1892 /* test non-zero pupkey */
1893 if (BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1894 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1899 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1900 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1901 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1906 if (DH_check_params(dh, &check_bits) == 0 || check_bits != 0) {
1907 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1908 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1912 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1913 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1914 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1919 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1920 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1925 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1926 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1927 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1931 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1934 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1935 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1937 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1938 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1939 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1948 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1953 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1958 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1960 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1962 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1964 unsigned int curve_flags;
1965 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1968 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1969 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1970 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1972 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1973 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1974 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1978 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1979 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1981 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1982 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1987 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1989 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1990 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1992 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1996 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1997 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1999 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
2000 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2005 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
2007 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
2008 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
2010 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
2011 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
2012 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
2013 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2014 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2015 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2018 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2022 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
2023 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2024 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2028 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
2029 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
2030 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
2031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2032 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
2037 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
2038 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
2041 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
2042 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2043 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
2044 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2045 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
2049 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2050 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2055 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2059 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2060 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
2061 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2062 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
2064 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2066 save_param_start = *pkt;
2068 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
2069 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
2070 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
2073 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2074 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2078 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
2079 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2080 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2081 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2083 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2084 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2086 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2087 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
2090 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2095 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
2099 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2102 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
2103 * equals the length of the parameters.
2105 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
2106 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
2107 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
2108 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2109 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2113 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2114 unsigned int sigalg;
2117 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) {
2118 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
2122 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey);
2124 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2126 } else if (rv == 0) {
2127 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2131 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2133 } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
2134 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2138 md = ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash_idx);
2140 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
2141 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2142 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2143 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2146 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2148 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2149 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2154 * Check signature length
2156 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
2157 /* wrong packet length */
2158 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2159 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2160 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
2164 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2165 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
2166 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2171 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
2172 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2173 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2176 if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) {
2177 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0
2178 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx,
2179 RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) {
2180 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2181 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2185 if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2186 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2187 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2188 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2189 || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
2190 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
2191 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2192 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2195 if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
2196 PACKET_remaining(&signature)) <= 0) {
2198 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2202 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2205 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
2206 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
2207 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
2208 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
2209 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2210 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
2211 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2212 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2214 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2218 /* still data left over */
2219 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2220 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2221 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
2226 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2229 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2230 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2231 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
2232 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2235 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2237 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2238 unsigned int i, name_len;
2239 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
2240 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
2241 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
2244 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2249 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2252 /* Free and zero certificate types: it is not present in TLS 1.3 */
2253 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype);
2254 s->s3->tmp.ctype = NULL;
2255 s->s3->tmp.ctype_len = 0;
2256 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to process request context, for now ignore */
2257 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &reqctx)) {
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2259 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2265 /* get the certificate types */
2266 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ctypes)) {
2267 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2268 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2269 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2273 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ctypes, &s->s3->tmp.ctype, &s->s3->tmp.ctype_len)) {
2274 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2279 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2282 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sigalgs)) {
2283 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2284 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2285 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2289 /* Clear certificate validity flags */
2290 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
2291 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2292 if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &sigalgs)) {
2293 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2294 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2295 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2298 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2299 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2300 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2305 /* get the CA RDNs */
2306 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) {
2307 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2312 while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) {
2313 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len)
2314 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2315 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2317 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2321 namestart = namebytes;
2323 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2324 name_len)) == NULL) {
2325 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2330 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2333 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2336 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2337 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2342 /* TODO(TLS1.3) need to parse and process extensions, for now ignore */
2343 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2346 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &reqexts)) {
2347 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2348 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2349 SSL_R_EXT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2354 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
2355 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2360 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2361 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2362 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2363 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2366 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2369 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2372 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2376 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2378 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2381 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2383 int al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2384 unsigned int ticklen;
2385 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint, age_add = 0;
2386 unsigned int sess_len;
2387 RAW_EXTENSION *exts = NULL;
2389 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2390 || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &age_add))
2391 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2392 || (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen)
2394 && (ticklen == 0 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) < ticklen))) {
2395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2400 * Server is allowed to change its mind (in <=TLSv1.2) and send an empty
2401 * ticket. We already checked this TLSv1.3 case above, so it should never
2402 * be 0 here in that instance
2405 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2407 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Is this a suitable test for TLS1.3? */
2408 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2409 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2410 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2412 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2415 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2417 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2419 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2422 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2423 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2424 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2428 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2429 s->session = new_sess;
2433 * Technically the cast to long here is not guaranteed by the C standard -
2434 * but we use it elsewhere, so this should be ok.
2436 s->session->time = (long)time(NULL);
2438 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.tick);
2439 s->session->ext.tick = NULL;
2440 s->session->ext.ticklen = 0;
2442 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2443 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
2444 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2447 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
2448 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2453 s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2454 s->session->ext.tick_age_add = age_add;
2455 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
2457 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2460 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)
2461 || !tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt,
2462 EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2464 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
2465 exts, NULL, 0, &al)) {
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
2472 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2473 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2474 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2475 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2476 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2477 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2478 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2479 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2480 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2483 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2484 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2486 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->ext.tick, ticklen,
2487 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2488 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2492 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2494 /* This is a standalone message in TLSv1.3, so there is no more to read */
2495 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
2497 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
2498 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2501 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2503 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2505 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2507 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2511 * In TLSv1.3 this is called from the extensions code, otherwise it is used to
2512 * parse a separate message. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. On failure
2513 * |*al| is populated with a suitable alert code.
2515 int tls_process_cert_status_body(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
2520 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2521 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2522 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY,
2524 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2527 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2528 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2529 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2533 s->ext.ocsp.resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2534 if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL) {
2535 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2539 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.ocsp.resp, resplen)) {
2540 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS_BODY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2544 s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = resplen;
2550 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2554 if (!tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt, &al)) {
2555 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2556 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2557 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2560 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2564 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2565 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2566 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2569 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2572 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2575 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2576 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2581 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |ext.ocsp.resp| and
2582 * |ext.ocsp.resp_len| values will be set if we actually received a status
2583 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2585 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2586 && s->ctx->ext.status_cb != NULL) {
2587 int ret = s->ctx->ext.status_cb(s, s->ctx->ext.status_arg);
2590 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2591 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2592 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2596 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2598 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2602 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2603 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2604 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2605 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2606 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2615 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2617 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2619 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2620 /* should contain no data */
2621 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2622 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2625 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2626 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2627 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2628 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2635 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2637 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2640 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2641 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2642 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2643 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2644 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2647 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2650 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2651 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2652 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2655 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2657 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2660 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2661 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2664 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2665 size_t identitylen = 0;
2666 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2667 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2668 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2671 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2672 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2673 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2677 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2679 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2680 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2683 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2685 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2687 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2688 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2689 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2690 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2694 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2695 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2697 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2701 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2702 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2703 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2704 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2705 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2709 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2710 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2711 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2713 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2714 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2717 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2718 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2719 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2726 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2727 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2728 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2729 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2733 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2734 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2739 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2741 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2742 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2743 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2744 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2746 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2749 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2751 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2753 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2757 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2758 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2759 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2763 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2764 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2767 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2771 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2772 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2773 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2774 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2778 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2779 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2783 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2784 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2785 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2786 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2789 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2790 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2791 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2794 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2797 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2798 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2803 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2804 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2806 /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */
2807 if (!ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(s, encdata, enclen, pms, pmslen))
2812 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2813 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2817 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2818 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2823 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2825 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2827 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2828 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2829 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2831 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2835 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2839 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2841 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2844 /* send off the data */
2845 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2846 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2849 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2850 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2854 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2857 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2861 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2864 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2865 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2866 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2869 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2871 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2875 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2881 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2886 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2887 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2889 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2890 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2894 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2895 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2901 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2902 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2905 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2906 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2911 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2913 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2914 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2915 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2918 unsigned int md_len;
2919 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2920 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2921 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2922 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2925 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2926 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2929 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2931 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2933 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2935 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2939 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2940 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2941 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2946 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2947 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2948 * certificate key for key exchange
2951 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2953 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2955 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2960 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2961 /* Generate session key
2962 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2964 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2965 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2970 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2973 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2974 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2975 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2976 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2977 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2978 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2979 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2980 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2981 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2982 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2985 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2987 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2988 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2989 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2990 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2993 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2995 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2998 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2999 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3000 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
3004 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
3005 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
3006 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
3007 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3008 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3012 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3013 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
3014 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
3018 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
3019 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3020 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
3023 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3024 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3029 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
3031 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3032 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
3034 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
3035 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3040 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
3042 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
3043 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
3044 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
3045 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3052 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3057 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3059 unsigned long alg_k;
3062 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3064 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
3065 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
3068 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
3069 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
3071 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
3072 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
3074 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
3075 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
3077 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
3078 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
3080 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
3081 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
3083 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
3084 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3092 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3093 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
3094 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3095 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
3096 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
3097 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
3102 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
3104 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
3107 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
3108 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
3110 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3112 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3113 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
3115 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3122 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
3123 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3124 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3127 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
3128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3129 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3130 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
3138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
3139 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
3140 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
3141 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
3144 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
3147 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
3148 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
3150 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
3151 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
3152 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
3155 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
3156 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
3162 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
3163 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
3168 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3169 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3170 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3172 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3174 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3175 if (!tls_choose_sigalg(s, NULL) || s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL)
3178 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3179 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3181 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3182 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3187 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
3190 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3193 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
3194 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3195 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3196 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3198 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3202 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3203 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3206 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3208 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3209 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3211 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
3215 /* We need to get a client cert */
3216 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
3218 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3219 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3221 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3223 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3226 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3227 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3228 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3230 } else if (i == 1) {
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3233 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3237 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3238 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3241 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3242 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3243 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3244 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3246 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3247 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3248 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3249 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3255 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3258 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3262 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3264 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3267 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3270 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3271 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3272 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3276 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3283 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3285 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3288 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3292 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3293 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3295 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3296 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3298 /* we don't have a certificate */
3299 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3302 /* This is the passed certificate */
3304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3305 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3306 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3307 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3314 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3315 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3316 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3320 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3321 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3323 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3324 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3326 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3330 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3332 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3336 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3337 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3338 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3340 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3344 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3345 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3346 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3354 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3358 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3359 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3361 size_t len, padding_len;
3362 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3364 len = s->ext.npn_len;
3365 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3367 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->ext.npn, len)
3368 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3369 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3373 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3377 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3382 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_hello_req(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3384 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
3385 /* should contain no data */
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_HELLO_REQ, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3387 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
3388 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3389 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3393 * This is a historical discrepancy (not in the RFC) maintained for
3394 * compatibility reasons. If a TLS client receives a HelloRequest it will
3395 * attempt an abbreviated handshake. However if a DTLS client receives a
3396 * HelloRequest it will do a full handshake. Either behaviour is reasonable
3397 * but doing one for TLS and another for DTLS is odd.
3402 SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(s);
3404 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
3407 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3409 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3411 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3413 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3414 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3415 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3419 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3420 &rawexts, &al, NULL)
3421 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3422 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3425 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3426 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3429 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3430 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3431 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3432 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3435 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3438 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3439 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3440 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3441 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3442 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3447 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3448 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3452 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3455 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3456 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3457 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3458 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3463 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3464 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3465 # error Max cipher length too short
3468 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3469 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3472 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3473 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3476 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3479 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3481 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3484 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3485 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3487 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3488 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3489 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3492 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3501 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3506 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3507 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3508 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3510 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3511 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3515 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3516 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3517 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3519 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3520 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);