2 * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 /* ====================================================================
11 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
13 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
14 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
16 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
17 * license provided above.
19 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
20 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
23 /* ====================================================================
24 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
26 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
27 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
30 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
31 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
32 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
34 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
35 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
36 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
38 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
39 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
40 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
41 * to make use of the Contribution.
43 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
44 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
45 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
46 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
51 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
52 #include "statem_locl.h"
53 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
54 #include <openssl/rand.h>
55 #include <openssl/objects.h>
56 #include <openssl/evp.h>
57 #include <openssl/md5.h>
58 #include <openssl/dh.h>
59 #include <openssl/bn.h>
60 #include <openssl/engine.h>
62 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt);
64 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s);
65 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s);
66 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
67 static int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,
71 * Is a CertificateRequest message allowed at the moment or not?
77 static ossl_inline int cert_req_allowed(SSL *s)
79 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
80 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION
81 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
82 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK)))
89 * Should we expect the ServerKeyExchange message or not?
95 static int key_exchange_expected(SSL *s)
97 long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
100 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
101 * ciphersuite or for SRP
103 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK
112 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
113 * handshake state transitions when a TLS1.3 client is reading messages from the
114 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
115 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
117 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
118 * (transition not allowed)
120 static int ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
122 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
125 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
126 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
130 * Note: There is no case for TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO, because we haven't
131 * yet negotiated TLSv1.3 at that point so that is handled by
132 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition()
135 switch (st->hand_state) {
139 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
140 if (mt == SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) {
141 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS;
146 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
148 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
149 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
153 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
154 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
157 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
158 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
164 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
165 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
166 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
173 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
174 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
176 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
177 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
182 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
183 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
184 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
191 /* No valid transition found */
196 * ossl_statem_client_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed
197 * handshake state transitions when the client is reading messages from the
198 * server. The message type that the server has sent is provided in |mt|. The
199 * current state is in |s->statem.hand_state|.
201 * Return values are 1 for success (transition allowed) and 0 on error
202 * (transition not allowed)
204 int ossl_statem_client_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt)
206 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
210 * Note that after a ClientHello we don't know what version we are going
211 * to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until later
213 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
214 if (!ossl_statem_client13_read_transition(s, mt))
219 switch (st->hand_state) {
223 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
224 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
225 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO;
229 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
230 if (mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
231 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
237 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
239 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
240 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
241 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
244 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
245 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
249 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && mt == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
250 st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST;
252 } else if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION
253 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL
254 && s->session->tlsext_tick != NULL
255 && mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
257 * Normally, we can tell if the server is resuming the session
258 * from the session ID. EAP-FAST (RFC 4851), however, relies on
259 * the next server message after the ServerHello to determine if
260 * the server is resuming.
263 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
265 } else if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth
266 & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
267 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
268 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT;
272 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
273 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
275 || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
276 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
277 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
278 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
281 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST
282 && cert_req_allowed(s)) {
283 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
285 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
286 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
295 * The CertificateStatus message is optional even if
296 * |tlsext_status_expected| is set
298 if (s->tlsext_status_expected && mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
299 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS;
304 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
305 ske_expected = key_exchange_expected(s);
306 /* SKE is optional for some PSK ciphersuites */
307 if (ske_expected || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)
308 && mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE)) {
309 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
310 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH;
317 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
318 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
319 if (cert_req_allowed(s)) {
320 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ;
327 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
328 if (mt == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
329 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE;
334 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
335 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
336 if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
337 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET;
340 } else if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
341 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
346 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
347 if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
348 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE;
353 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
354 if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
355 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED;
362 /* No valid transition found */
363 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
364 SSLerr(SSL_F_OSSL_STATEM_CLIENT_READ_TRANSITION, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
369 * ossl_statem_client13_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
370 * move to next when the TLSv1.3 client is writing messages to be sent to the
373 static WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(SSL *s)
375 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
378 * TODO(TLS1.3): This is still based on the TLSv1.2 state machine. Over time
379 * we will update this to look more like real TLSv1.3
383 * Note: There are no cases for TLS_ST_BEFORE or TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO,
384 * because we haven't negotiated TLSv1.3 yet at that point. They are
385 * handled by ossl_statem_client_write_transition().
387 switch (st->hand_state) {
389 /* Shouldn't happen */
390 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
392 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
393 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req != 0) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT
394 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
395 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
398 /* If a non-empty Certificate we also send CertificateVerify */
399 st->hand_state = (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ? TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY
400 : TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
401 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
403 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
404 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
405 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
407 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
408 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
409 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
410 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
415 * ossl_statem_client_write_transition() works out what handshake state to
416 * move to next when the client is writing messages to be sent to the server.
418 WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_client_write_transition(SSL *s)
420 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
423 * Note that immediately before/after a ClientHello we don't know what
424 * version we are going to negotiate yet, so we don't take this branch until
428 return ossl_statem_client13_write_transition(s);
430 switch (st->hand_state) {
432 /* Shouldn't happen */
433 return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR;
436 /* Renegotiation - fall through */
438 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
439 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
441 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
443 * No transition at the end of writing because we don't know what
446 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
448 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
449 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO;
450 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
452 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
453 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
454 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT;
456 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
457 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
460 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH;
461 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
463 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
465 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
466 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
469 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
470 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
471 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
472 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
474 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
475 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY;
477 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
479 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
480 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
482 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
484 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
485 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
486 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
488 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
489 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
490 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
492 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
493 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO;
495 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
497 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
499 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
500 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
501 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED;
502 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
505 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
507 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
508 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
509 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
511 return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED;
514 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
516 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE;
517 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
519 st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK;
520 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0);
521 return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE;
527 * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from
528 * the client to the server.
530 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
532 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
534 switch (st->hand_state) {
536 /* No pre work to be done */
539 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
541 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
542 /* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
543 if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) {
544 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
550 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
551 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
554 * We're into the last flight so we don't retransmit these
555 * messages unless we need to.
559 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
560 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
561 return dtls_wait_for_dry(s);
567 return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst);
570 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
574 * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the
575 * client to the server.
577 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
579 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
583 switch (st->hand_state) {
585 /* No post work to be done */
588 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
589 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && statem_flush(s) != 1)
592 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
593 /* Treat the next message as the first packet */
598 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
599 if (tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(s) == 0)
603 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
604 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
605 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
606 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
608 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
609 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
611 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
613 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
616 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
617 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
620 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
621 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
624 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
627 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
632 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE);
636 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
637 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
638 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A && SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit == 0) {
640 * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
643 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY,
647 if (statem_flush(s) != 1)
650 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
651 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
652 SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
658 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
662 * Get the message construction function and message type for sending from the
665 * Valid return values are:
669 int ossl_statem_client_construct_message(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
670 confunc_f *confunc, int *mt)
672 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
674 switch (st->hand_state) {
676 /* Shouldn't happen */
679 case TLS_ST_CW_CHANGE:
681 *confunc = dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
683 *confunc = tls_construct_change_cipher_spec;
684 *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
687 case TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO:
688 *confunc = tls_construct_client_hello;
689 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO;
693 *confunc = tls_construct_client_certificate;
694 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE;
697 case TLS_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH:
698 *confunc = tls_construct_client_key_exchange;
699 *mt = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
702 case TLS_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY:
703 *confunc = tls_construct_client_verify;
704 *mt = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
707 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
708 case TLS_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO:
709 *confunc = tls_construct_next_proto;
710 *mt = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
713 case TLS_ST_CW_FINISHED:
714 *confunc = tls_construct_finished;
715 *mt = SSL3_MT_FINISHED;
723 * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are
724 * reading. Excludes the message header.
726 size_t ossl_statem_client_max_message_size(SSL *s)
728 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
730 switch (st->hand_state) {
732 /* Shouldn't happen */
735 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
736 return SERVER_HELLO_MAX_LENGTH;
738 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
739 return HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH;
742 return s->max_cert_list;
744 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
745 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
747 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
748 return SERVER_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH;
750 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
752 * Set to s->max_cert_list for compatibility with previous releases. In
753 * practice these messages can get quite long if servers are configured
754 * to provide a long list of acceptable CAs
756 return s->max_cert_list;
758 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
759 return SERVER_HELLO_DONE_MAX_LENGTH;
761 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
762 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
764 return CCS_MAX_LENGTH;
766 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
767 return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
769 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
770 return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH;
772 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
773 return ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS_MAX_LENGTH;
778 * Process a message that the client has been received from the server.
780 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_client_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
782 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
784 switch (st->hand_state) {
786 /* Shouldn't happen */
787 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
789 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO:
790 return tls_process_server_hello(s, pkt);
792 case DTLS_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST:
793 return dtls_process_hello_verify(s, pkt);
796 return tls_process_server_certificate(s, pkt);
798 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS:
799 return tls_process_cert_status(s, pkt);
801 case TLS_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH:
802 return tls_process_key_exchange(s, pkt);
804 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
805 return tls_process_certificate_request(s, pkt);
807 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
808 return tls_process_server_done(s, pkt);
810 case TLS_ST_CR_CHANGE:
811 return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt);
813 case TLS_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET:
814 return tls_process_new_session_ticket(s, pkt);
816 case TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED:
817 return tls_process_finished(s, pkt);
819 case TLS_ST_CR_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
820 return tls_process_encrypted_extensions(s, pkt);
825 * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message
828 WORK_STATE ossl_statem_client_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
830 OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem;
832 switch (st->hand_state) {
834 /* Shouldn't happen */
837 case TLS_ST_CR_CERT_REQ:
838 return tls_prepare_client_certificate(s, wst);
840 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
841 case TLS_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE:
842 /* We only get here if we are using SCTP and we are renegotiating */
843 if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
844 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
845 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
846 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
847 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
848 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
851 ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
852 return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
857 int tls_construct_client_hello(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
862 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
863 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
866 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
868 if (!WPACKET_set_max_size(pkt, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
869 /* Should not happen */
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
874 /* Work out what SSL/TLS/DTLS version to use */
875 protverr = ssl_set_client_hello_version(s);
877 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr);
881 if ((sess == NULL) || !ssl_version_supported(s, sess->ssl_version) ||
883 * In the case of EAP-FAST, we can have a pre-shared
884 * "ticket" without a session ID.
886 (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) ||
887 (sess->not_resumable)) {
888 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
891 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
893 p = s->s3->client_random;
896 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
897 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
899 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
902 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
911 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
915 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
916 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
917 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
918 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
919 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
920 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
921 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
922 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
925 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
926 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
927 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
928 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
929 * 4. Handshake proceeds using TLS 1.0.
930 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
931 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
932 * know that is maximum server supports.
933 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
934 * containing version 1.0.
936 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
937 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
938 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
939 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
940 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
941 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
942 * the negotiated version.
944 * For TLS 1.3 we always set the ClientHello version to 1.2 and rely on the
945 * supported_versions extension for the real supported versions.
947 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->client_version)
948 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
957 sess_id_len = s->session->session_id_length;
958 if (sess_id_len > sizeof(s->session->session_id)
959 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
960 || (sess_id_len != 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->session->session_id,
962 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
967 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
968 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
969 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)
970 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->d1->cookie,
971 s->d1->cookie_len)) {
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
977 /* Ciphers supported */
978 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
979 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
982 /* ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes() raises SSLerr if appropriate */
983 if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), pkt))
985 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
986 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
991 if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
995 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
996 if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
997 int compnum = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
998 for (i = 0; i < compnum; i++) {
999 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
1000 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, comp->id)) {
1001 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1007 /* Add the NULL method */
1008 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1009 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1013 /* TLS extensions */
1014 if (!tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_CLIENT_HELLO, NULL, 0, &al)) {
1015 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1016 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1023 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN dtls_process_hello_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1029 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, 2)
1030 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookiepkt)) {
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1036 cookie_len = PACKET_remaining(&cookiepkt);
1037 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
1038 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1039 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1043 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&cookiepkt, s->d1->cookie, cookie_len)) {
1044 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1045 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_PROCESS_HELLO_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1048 s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
1050 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
1052 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1053 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1054 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1057 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1059 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1060 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
1061 PACKET session_id, extpkt;
1062 size_t session_id_len;
1063 const unsigned char *cipherchars;
1064 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1065 unsigned int compression;
1066 unsigned int sversion;
1067 unsigned int context;
1069 RAW_EXTENSION *extensions = NULL;
1070 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1074 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sversion)) {
1075 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1080 protverr = ssl_choose_client_version(s, sversion);
1081 if (protverr != 0) {
1082 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1083 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, protverr);
1087 /* load the server hello data */
1088 /* load the server random */
1089 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)) {
1090 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1097 /* Get the session-id. */
1098 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1099 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
1100 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1101 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1104 session_id_len = PACKET_remaining(&session_id);
1105 if (session_id_len > sizeof s->session->session_id
1106 || session_id_len > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
1107 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1109 SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
1113 PACKET_null_init(&session_id);
1117 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &cipherchars, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) {
1118 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1119 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1124 * Check if we can resume the session based on external pre-shared secret.
1125 * EAP-FAST (RFC 4851) supports two types of session resumption.
1126 * Resumption based on server-side state works with session IDs.
1127 * Resumption based on pre-shared Protected Access Credentials (PACs)
1128 * works by overriding the SessionTicket extension at the application
1129 * layer, and does not send a session ID. (We do not know whether EAP-FAST
1130 * servers would honour the session ID.) Therefore, the session ID alone
1131 * is not a reliable indicator of session resumption, so we first check if
1132 * we can resume, and later peek at the next handshake message to see if the
1133 * server wants to resume.
1135 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
1136 && s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL && s->session->tlsext_tick) {
1137 const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1139 * s->session->master_key_length is a size_t, but this is an int for
1140 * backwards compat reasons
1142 int master_key_length;
1143 master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1144 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1147 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)
1148 && master_key_length > 0) {
1149 s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
1150 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
1151 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1154 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1159 if (session_id_len != 0 && session_id_len == s->session->session_id_length
1160 && memcmp(PACKET_data(&session_id), s->session->session_id,
1161 session_id_len) == 0) {
1162 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
1163 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
1164 /* actually a client application bug */
1165 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1166 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1167 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
1173 * If we were trying for session-id reuse but the server
1174 * didn't echo the ID, make a new SSL_SESSION.
1175 * In the case of EAP-FAST and PAC, we do not send a session ID,
1176 * so the PAC-based session secret is always preserved. It'll be
1177 * overwritten if the server refuses resumption.
1179 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
1180 s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
1181 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
1186 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1187 s->session->session_id_length = session_id_len;
1188 /* session_id_len could be 0 */
1189 if (session_id_len > 0)
1190 memcpy(s->session->session_id, PACKET_data(&session_id),
1194 /* Session version and negotiated protocol version should match */
1195 if (s->version != s->session->ssl_version) {
1196 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1198 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1199 SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_VERSION_MISMATCH);
1203 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, cipherchars);
1205 /* unknown cipher */
1206 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1207 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1211 * Now that we know the version, update the check to see if it's an allowed
1214 s->s3->tmp.min_ver = s->version;
1215 s->s3->tmp.max_ver = s->version;
1217 * If it is a disabled cipher we either didn't send it in client hello,
1218 * or it's not allowed for the selected protocol. So we return an error.
1220 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1221 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1226 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1227 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1229 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1230 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1231 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1236 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1237 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1238 * set and use it for comparison.
1240 if (s->session->cipher)
1241 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1242 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1243 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1244 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1245 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1248 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1249 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1251 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1252 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &compression)) {
1253 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1254 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1261 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1262 if (compression != 0) {
1263 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1264 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1265 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1269 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1270 * using compression.
1272 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1277 if (s->hit && compression != s->session->compress_meth) {
1278 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1280 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1283 if (compression == 0)
1285 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1286 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1287 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1290 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, compression);
1293 if (compression != 0 && comp == NULL) {
1294 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1295 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO,
1296 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1299 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1303 /* TLS extensions */
1304 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0) {
1305 PACKET_null_init(&extpkt);
1306 } else if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extpkt)) {
1307 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1312 context = SSL_IS_TLS13(s) ? EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO
1313 : EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO;
1314 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extpkt, context, &extensions, &al)
1315 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, context, extensions, NULL, 0, &al))
1318 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1319 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) {
1320 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
1321 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
1324 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if
1327 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
1328 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
1330 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
1331 sizeof(sctpauthkey),
1333 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
1336 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s),
1337 BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
1338 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
1343 * In TLSv1.3 we have some post-processing to change cipher state, otherwise
1344 * we're done with this message
1347 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)
1348 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1349 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)
1350 || !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
1351 SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ))) {
1352 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
1357 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1358 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1360 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1361 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1362 OPENSSL_free(extensions);
1363 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1366 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1368 int al, i, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR, exp_idx;
1369 unsigned long cert_list_len, cert_len;
1371 const unsigned char *certstart, *certbytes;
1372 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1373 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1375 unsigned int context = 0;
1377 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1382 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &context))
1384 || !PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_list_len)
1385 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_list_len) {
1386 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1387 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1390 for (chain = 0; PACKET_remaining(pkt); chain++) {
1391 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len)
1392 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &certbytes, cert_len)) {
1393 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1395 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1399 certstart = certbytes;
1400 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, cert_len);
1402 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1403 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1406 if (certbytes != (certstart + cert_len)) {
1407 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1408 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1409 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1413 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1414 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
1417 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
1418 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1419 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1422 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1424 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE,
1425 rawexts, x, chain, &al))
1429 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1436 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1438 * The documented interface is that SSL_VERIFY_PEER should be set in order
1439 * for client side verification of the server certificate to take place.
1440 * However, historically the code has only checked that *any* flag is set
1441 * to cause server verification to take place. Use of the other flags makes
1442 * no sense in client mode. An attempt to clean up the semantics was
1443 * reverted because at least one application *only* set
1444 * SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT. Prior to the clean up this still caused
1445 * server verification to take place, after the clean up it silently did
1446 * nothing. SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() cannot validate the flags
1447 * sent to them because they are void functions. Therefore, we now use the
1448 * (less clean) historic behaviour of performing validation if any flag is
1449 * set. The *documented* interface remains the same.
1451 if (s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && i <= 0) {
1452 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1453 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1454 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1457 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1460 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1464 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
1466 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1467 * which we don't include in statem_srvr.c
1469 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1472 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1475 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
1477 if (pkey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) {
1480 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1481 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1485 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1489 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1490 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1494 exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1495 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx
1496 && (exp_idx != SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC ||
1497 (i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256
1498 && i != SSL_PKEY_GOST01))) {
1500 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1501 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1502 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1505 s->session->peer_type = i;
1507 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1509 s->session->peer = x;
1510 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1513 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1517 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1519 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1522 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1526 static int tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
1528 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1529 PACKET psk_identity_hint;
1531 /* PSK ciphersuites are preceded by an identity hint */
1533 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity_hint)) {
1534 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1535 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1540 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1541 * tls_construct_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1542 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1545 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1546 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1551 if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity_hint) == 0) {
1552 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
1553 s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1554 } else if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity_hint,
1555 &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) {
1556 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1562 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1563 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1568 static int tls_process_ske_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1570 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1571 PACKET prime, generator, salt, server_pub;
1573 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1574 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1575 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &salt)
1576 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &server_pub)) {
1577 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1582 /* TODO(size_t): Convert BN_bin2bn() calls */
1584 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime),
1585 (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL)) == NULL
1587 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator),
1588 (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator), NULL)) == NULL
1590 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&salt),
1591 (int)PACKET_remaining(&salt), NULL)) == NULL
1593 BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&server_pub),
1594 (int)PACKET_remaining(&server_pub), NULL)) == NULL) {
1595 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1596 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1600 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, al)) {
1601 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1606 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1607 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1608 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1613 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1618 static int tls_process_ske_dhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1620 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1621 PACKET prime, generator, pub_key;
1622 EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp = NULL;
1625 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL, *bnpub_key = NULL;
1627 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &prime)
1628 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &generator)
1629 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &pub_key)) {
1630 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1635 peer_tmp = EVP_PKEY_new();
1638 if (peer_tmp == NULL || dh == NULL) {
1639 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1640 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1644 /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */
1645 p = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&prime), (int)PACKET_remaining(&prime), NULL);
1646 g = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&generator), (int)PACKET_remaining(&generator),
1648 bnpub_key = BN_bin2bn(PACKET_data(&pub_key),
1649 (int)PACKET_remaining(&pub_key), NULL);
1650 if (p == NULL || g == NULL || bnpub_key == NULL) {
1651 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1656 if (BN_is_zero(p) || BN_is_zero(g) || BN_is_zero(bnpub_key)) {
1657 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1658 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_VALUE);
1662 if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, NULL, g)) {
1663 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1664 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1669 if (!DH_set0_key(dh, bnpub_key, NULL)) {
1670 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1676 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1677 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1682 if (EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(peer_tmp, dh) == 0) {
1683 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1688 s->s3->peer_tmp = peer_tmp;
1691 * FIXME: This makes assumptions about which ciphersuites come with
1692 * public keys. We should have a less ad-hoc way of doing this
1694 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS))
1695 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1696 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1705 EVP_PKEY_free(peer_tmp);
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1710 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1715 static int tls_process_ske_ecdhe(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **pkey, int *al)
1717 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1719 const unsigned char *ecparams;
1721 unsigned int curve_flags;
1722 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
1725 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1726 * public key. For now we only support named (not generic) curves and
1727 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes.
1729 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &ecparams, 3)) {
1730 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1731 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1735 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1736 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1738 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, ecparams, 3)) {
1739 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1740 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1744 curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(ecparams + 2), &curve_flags);
1746 if (curve_nid == 0) {
1747 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE,
1749 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1753 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
1754 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
1756 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, curve_nid)) {
1757 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1762 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
1764 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
1765 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
1767 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
1768 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, curve_nid) <= 0
1769 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
1770 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1772 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1775 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
1779 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &encoded_pt)) {
1780 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1781 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1785 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
1786 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1787 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
1788 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1789 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1794 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1795 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1798 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA)
1799 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1800 else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aRSA)
1801 *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1802 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1806 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1807 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1812 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1816 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1817 PACKET save_param_start, signature;
1819 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1821 save_param_start = *pkt;
1823 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
1824 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp);
1825 s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL;
1828 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
1829 if (!tls_process_ske_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
1833 /* Nothing else to do for plain PSK or RSAPSK */
1834 if (alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1835 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1836 if (!tls_process_ske_srp(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1838 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1839 if (!tls_process_ske_dhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1841 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1842 if (!tls_process_ske_ecdhe(s, pkt, &pkey, &al))
1845 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1846 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1850 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1854 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1858 * |pkt| now points to the beginning of the signature, so the difference
1859 * equals the length of the parameters.
1861 if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(&save_param_start, ¶ms,
1862 PACKET_remaining(&save_param_start) -
1863 PACKET_remaining(pkt))) {
1864 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1865 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1869 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1870 const unsigned char *sigalgs;
1872 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sigalgs, 2)) {
1873 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1874 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1877 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sigalgs, pkey);
1879 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1881 } else if (rv == 0) {
1882 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1886 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1888 } else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
1889 md = EVP_md5_sha1();
1894 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &signature)
1895 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1896 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1897 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1900 maxsig = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1902 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1908 * Check signature length
1910 if (PACKET_remaining(&signature) > (size_t)maxsig) {
1911 /* wrong packet length */
1912 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1914 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1918 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
1919 if (md_ctx == NULL) {
1920 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1925 if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0
1926 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1927 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1928 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1929 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
1930 || EVP_VerifyUpdate(md_ctx, PACKET_data(¶ms),
1931 PACKET_remaining(¶ms)) <= 0) {
1932 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1933 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1934 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
1937 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
1938 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(md_ctx, PACKET_data(&signature),
1939 (unsigned int)PACKET_remaining(&signature),
1942 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1943 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1947 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
1949 /* aNULL, aSRP or PSK do not need public keys */
1950 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
1951 && !(alg_k & SSL_PSK)) {
1952 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1953 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
1954 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1955 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1956 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1958 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1962 /* still data left over */
1963 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1964 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1965 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1970 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
1973 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1974 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
1975 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1978 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_certificate_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1980 int ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
1981 unsigned int list_len, ctype_num, i, name_len;
1982 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1983 const unsigned char *data;
1984 const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes;
1985 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1987 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
1988 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1992 /* get the certificate types */
1993 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ctype_num)
1994 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ctype_num)) {
1995 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1999 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2000 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2001 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2002 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2003 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2004 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2008 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, data, ctype_num);
2009 s->cert->ctype_num = ctype_num;
2010 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2012 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2013 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = data[i];
2015 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2016 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2017 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, list_len)) {
2018 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2020 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2024 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2025 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2026 s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
2027 s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
2029 if ((list_len & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, list_len)) {
2030 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2031 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2032 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2035 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2036 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2037 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2041 ssl_set_default_md(s);
2044 /* get the CA RDNs */
2045 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &list_len)
2046 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != list_len) {
2047 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2052 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
2053 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &name_len)
2054 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &namebytes, name_len)) {
2055 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2057 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2061 namestart = namebytes;
2063 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&namebytes,
2064 name_len)) == NULL) {
2065 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2066 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2070 if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) {
2071 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2072 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2073 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2076 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2083 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2084 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2085 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2086 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2087 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2090 ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2093 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2096 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2100 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2102 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2105 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_new_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2108 unsigned int ticklen;
2109 unsigned long ticket_lifetime_hint;
2110 unsigned int sess_len;
2112 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &ticket_lifetime_hint)
2113 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ticklen)
2114 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ticklen) {
2115 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2120 /* Server is allowed to change its mind and send an empty ticket. */
2122 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2124 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
2125 int i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode;
2126 SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
2128 * We reused an existing session, so we need to replace it with a new
2131 if (i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) {
2133 * Remove the old session from the cache. We carry on if this fails
2135 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
2138 if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == 0) {
2139 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2144 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
2145 s->session = new_sess;
2148 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2149 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2151 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2152 if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
2153 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2156 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen)) {
2157 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2162 s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint;
2163 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2165 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2166 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2167 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2168 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2169 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2170 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2171 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2172 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2173 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2176 * TODO(size_t): we use sess_len here because EVP_Digest expects an int
2177 * but s->session->session_id_length is a size_t
2179 if (!EVP_Digest(s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen,
2180 s->session->session_id, &sess_len,
2181 EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2185 s->session->session_id_length = sess_len;
2186 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2188 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2190 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2191 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2194 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_status(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2200 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)
2201 || type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2202 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2203 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2206 if (!PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &resplen)
2207 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != resplen) {
2208 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2212 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = OPENSSL_malloc(resplen);
2213 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp == NULL) {
2214 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2218 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, resplen)) {
2219 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2220 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2223 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2224 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
2226 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2227 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2228 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2232 * Perform miscellaneous checks and processing after we have received the
2233 * server's initial flight. In TLS1.3 this is after the Server Finished message.
2234 * In <=TLS1.2 this is after the ServerDone message. Returns 1 on success or 0
2237 int tls_process_initial_server_flight(SSL *s, int *al)
2240 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
2243 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
2244 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2249 * Call the ocsp status callback if needed. The |tlsext_ocsp_resp| and
2250 * |tlsext_ocsp_resplen| values will be set if we actually received a status
2251 * message, or NULL and -1 otherwise
2253 if (s->tlsext_status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing
2254 && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb != NULL) {
2256 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2258 *al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2260 SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2264 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2265 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_INITIAL_SERVER_FLIGHT,
2266 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2270 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
2271 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
2272 /* Note we validate the SCTs whether or not we abort on error */
2273 if (!ssl_validate_ct(s) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
2274 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2283 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_server_done(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
2285 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2287 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
2288 /* should contain no data */
2289 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2290 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2293 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2294 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2295 if (SRP_Calc_A_param(s) <= 0) {
2296 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
2303 * Error queue messages are generated directly by this function
2305 if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
2308 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2309 /* Only applies to renegotiation */
2310 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
2311 && s->renegotiate != 0)
2312 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
2315 return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
2318 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2319 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2320 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
2323 static int tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2325 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2328 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2329 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2332 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
2333 size_t identitylen = 0;
2334 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2335 unsigned char *tmppsk = NULL;
2336 char *tmpidentity = NULL;
2339 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2341 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2345 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2347 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint,
2348 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2351 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2353 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2355 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2356 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE,
2357 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2358 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2362 identitylen = strlen(identity);
2363 if (identitylen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2365 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2369 tmppsk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen);
2370 tmpidentity = OPENSSL_strdup(identity);
2371 if (tmppsk == NULL || tmpidentity == NULL) {
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2373 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2377 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2378 s->s3->tmp.psk = tmppsk;
2379 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2381 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2382 s->session->psk_identity = tmpidentity;
2385 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, identity, identitylen)) {
2386 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2387 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2394 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2395 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2396 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmppsk, psklen);
2397 OPENSSL_clear_free(tmpidentity, identitylen);
2401 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_PSK_PREAMBLE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2402 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2407 static int tls_construct_cke_rsa(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2409 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2410 unsigned char *encdata = NULL;
2411 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2412 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
2414 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2417 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2419 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2421 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2425 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2426 if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey) == NULL) {
2427 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2431 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2432 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2434 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2435 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2439 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2440 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2441 /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
2442 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, (int)(pmslen - 2)) <= 0) {
2446 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2447 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
2448 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2451 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2452 if (pctx == NULL || EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0
2453 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2454 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2457 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, enclen, &encdata)
2458 || EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, encdata, &enclen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2462 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2465 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2467 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2471 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2472 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
2473 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2477 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2478 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2482 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2483 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2488 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2493 static int tls_construct_cke_dhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2495 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2497 const BIGNUM *pub_key;
2498 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2499 unsigned char *keybytes = NULL;
2501 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2505 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2509 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey);
2511 if (dh_clnt == NULL || ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0)
2514 /* send off the data */
2515 DH_get0_key(dh_clnt, &pub_key, NULL);
2516 if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(pub_key), &keybytes))
2519 BN_bn2bin(pub_key, keybytes);
2520 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2524 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2526 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_DHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2527 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2531 static int tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2533 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2534 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2535 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
2536 EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL, *skey = NULL;
2539 skey = s->s3->peer_tmp;
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2545 ckey = ssl_generate_pkey(skey);
2547 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2551 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 0) == 0) {
2552 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2556 /* Generate encoding of client key */
2557 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(ckey, &encodedPoint);
2559 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2564 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)) {
2565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2571 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2572 EVP_PKEY_free(ckey);
2575 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_ECDHE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2576 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2581 static int tls_construct_cke_gost(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2583 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2584 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2585 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx = NULL;
2588 unsigned int md_len;
2589 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2590 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash = NULL;
2591 int dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94;
2592 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2595 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aGOST12) != 0)
2596 dgst_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256;
2599 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2601 peer_cert = s->session->peer;
2603 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2604 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST,
2605 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2609 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(X509_get0_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2610 if (pkey_ctx == NULL) {
2611 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2616 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2617 * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2618 * certificate key for key exchange
2621 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2623 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2625 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2630 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0
2631 /* Generate session key
2632 * TODO(size_t): Convert this function
2634 || RAND_bytes(pms, (int)pmslen) <= 0) {
2635 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2636 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2640 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2643 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2644 if (ukm_hash == NULL
2645 || EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash, EVP_get_digestbynid(dgst_nid)) <= 0
2646 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2647 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2648 || EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2649 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0
2650 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len) <= 0) {
2651 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2655 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2657 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT,
2658 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8, shared_ukm) < 0) {
2659 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2660 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2663 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2665 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2668 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
2669 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2670 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
2674 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
2675 || (msglen >= 0x80 && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0x81))
2676 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, tmp, msglen)) {
2677 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2682 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2683 s->s3->tmp.pms = pms;
2684 s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen;
2688 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2689 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2690 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ukm_hash);
2693 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_GOST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2694 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2699 static int tls_construct_cke_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
2701 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2702 unsigned char *abytes = NULL;
2704 if (s->srp_ctx.A == NULL
2705 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A),
2707 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2710 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, abytes);
2712 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2713 s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2714 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2721 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CKE_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2722 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2727 int tls_construct_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2729 unsigned long alg_k;
2732 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2734 if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK)
2735 && !tls_construct_cke_psk_preamble(s, pkt, &al))
2738 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2739 if (!tls_construct_cke_rsa(s, pkt, &al))
2741 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2742 if (!tls_construct_cke_dhe(s, pkt, &al))
2744 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2745 if (!tls_construct_cke_ecdhe(s, pkt, &al))
2747 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2748 if (!tls_construct_cke_gost(s, pkt, &al))
2750 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2751 if (!tls_construct_cke_srp(s, pkt, &al))
2753 } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
2754 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2755 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2762 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2763 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen);
2764 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2765 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2766 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2767 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2772 int tls_client_key_exchange_post_work(SSL *s)
2774 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2777 pms = s->s3->tmp.pms;
2778 pmslen = s->s3->tmp.pmslen;
2780 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2782 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
2783 if (!srp_generate_client_master_secret(s)) {
2784 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK,
2785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2792 if (pms == NULL && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
2793 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2794 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2797 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 1)) {
2798 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2799 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_POST_WORK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2800 /* ssl_generate_master_secret frees the pms even on error */
2808 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
2809 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2810 unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
2811 char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
2814 * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
2817 memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL,
2818 sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL));
2820 if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
2821 sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
2822 sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0)
2825 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
2826 sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
2832 OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen);
2833 s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL;
2837 int tls_construct_client_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
2840 const EVP_MD *md = s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys];
2841 EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
2845 unsigned char *sig = NULL;
2847 mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
2849 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2852 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2854 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2855 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2856 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2860 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)&& !tls12_get_sigandhash(pkt, pkey, md)) {
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2865 fprintf(stderr, "Using client alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2867 sig = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey));
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2872 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL)
2873 || !EVP_SignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
2874 || (s->version == SSL3_VERSION
2875 && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET,
2876 (int)s->session->master_key_length,
2877 s->session->master_key))
2878 || !EVP_SignFinal(mctx, sig, &u, pkey)) {
2879 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2882 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2884 int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
2885 if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001
2886 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256
2887 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512)
2888 BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, u);
2892 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, u)) {
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2897 /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */
2898 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
2902 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2906 EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
2907 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2912 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
2913 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
2914 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
2916 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2918 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
2920 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
2921 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->s3->tmp.md[s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys])
2924 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
2925 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
2927 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
2928 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
2933 WORK_STATE tls_prepare_client_certificate(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
2936 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2939 if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
2940 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
2941 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
2942 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
2944 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2948 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2949 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
2952 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2954 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2955 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2957 /* Fall through to WORK_MORE_B */
2961 /* We need to get a client cert */
2962 if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
2964 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2965 * return(-1); We then get retied later
2967 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
2969 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
2972 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
2973 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
2974 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
2976 } else if (i == 1) {
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PREPARE_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2979 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
2983 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2984 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
2987 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
2988 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
2989 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
2990 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
2992 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
2993 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
2994 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2995 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3001 return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
3004 /* Shouldn't ever get here */
3008 int tls_construct_client_certificate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3013 * TODO(TLS1.3): For now we must put an empty context. Needs to be filled in
3016 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0))
3017 || !ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, pkt,
3018 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2) ? NULL
3021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3022 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3029 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3031 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3034 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3038 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3039 int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3041 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3042 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3044 /* we don't have a certificate */
3045 if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3048 /* This is the passed certificate */
3050 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3051 idx = s->session->peer_type;
3052 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3053 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s->session->peer, s) == 0) {
3055 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3060 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3062 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3066 pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer);
3067 i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer, pkey);
3069 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3070 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3072 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3075 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3076 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3078 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3082 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3083 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK) &&
3084 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
3085 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3086 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3090 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3091 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) && (s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)) {
3092 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3100 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3104 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3105 int tls_construct_next_proto(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
3107 size_t len, padding_len;
3108 unsigned char *padding = NULL;
3110 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3111 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3113 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, len)
3114 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, padding_len, &padding)) {
3115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3119 memset(padding, 0, padding_len);
3123 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3128 static MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_encrypted_extensions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
3130 int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3132 RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL;
3134 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions)) {
3135 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3140 if (!tls_collect_extensions(s, &extensions, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3142 || !tls_parse_all_extensions(s, EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
3143 rawexts, NULL, 0, &al))
3146 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3147 return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
3150 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3151 ossl_statem_set_error(s);
3152 OPENSSL_free(rawexts);
3153 return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
3156 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3160 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3161 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3162 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3163 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3168 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3169 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
3173 int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk, WPACKET *pkt)
3176 size_t totlen = 0, len, maxlen;
3177 int empty_reneg_info_scsv = !s->renegotiate;
3178 /* Set disabled masks for this session */
3179 ssl_set_client_disabled(s);
3184 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
3185 # if OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH < 6
3186 # error Max cipher length too short
3189 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
3190 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
3193 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3194 maxlen = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
3197 /* Maximum length that can be stored in 2 bytes. Length must be even */
3200 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv)
3202 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV)
3205 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) && totlen < maxlen; i++) {
3206 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3208 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
3209 /* Skip disabled ciphers */
3210 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED))
3213 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(c, pkt, &len)) {
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3222 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
3227 if (empty_reneg_info_scsv) {
3228 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3229 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3231 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3232 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3236 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) {
3237 static SSL_CIPHER scsv = {
3238 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
3240 if (!s->method->put_cipher_by_char(&scsv, pkt, &len)) {
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_LIST_TO_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);