2 * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
17 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
18 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
21 const unsigned char *data;
23 /* Parse the length byte */
24 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
25 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
26 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
27 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
28 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
32 /* Check that the extension matches */
33 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
34 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
35 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
36 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
40 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
41 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
42 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
43 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
44 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
48 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
54 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
56 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
57 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
58 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
59 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
60 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
61 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
62 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
63 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
64 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
65 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
66 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
67 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
68 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
69 * the value of the Host: field.
70 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
71 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
72 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
74 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
76 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
77 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
79 unsigned int servname_type;
82 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
83 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
84 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
85 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
90 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
91 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
92 * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
94 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
95 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
96 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
98 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
99 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
101 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
102 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
103 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
109 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
114 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
115 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
119 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
120 s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
121 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
122 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
126 s->servername_done = 1;
129 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
130 * fall back to a full handshake.
132 s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
133 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
134 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
141 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
142 size_t chainidx, int *al)
146 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
147 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
153 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
154 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
156 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
157 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
166 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
167 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
169 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
171 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
172 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
173 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
178 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
179 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
180 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
181 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
188 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
190 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
191 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
193 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
194 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
195 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
196 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
204 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
205 size_t chainidx, int *al)
207 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
209 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
210 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
215 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
216 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
224 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
225 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
227 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
229 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
233 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
234 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
238 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
240 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
242 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
246 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
252 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
253 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
255 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
256 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
257 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
258 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
259 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
263 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
266 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
269 const unsigned char *id_data;
271 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
272 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
277 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
278 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
279 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
280 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
282 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
286 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
287 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
288 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
292 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
293 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
294 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
299 /* Read in request_extensions */
300 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
305 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
306 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
308 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
309 X509_EXTENSION_free);
311 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
312 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
323 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
324 size_t chainidx, int *al)
327 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
330 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
338 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
339 * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert
340 * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
342 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
343 size_t chainidx, int *al)
345 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
347 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
350 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
351 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
356 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
358 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
359 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
360 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
364 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
366 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
367 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
368 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
369 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
370 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
371 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
379 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
380 size_t chainidx, int *al)
382 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
383 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
387 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
388 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
391 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
392 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
393 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
395 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
396 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
400 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
401 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
402 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
403 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
405 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
406 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
408 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
409 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
414 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
416 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
419 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
420 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
421 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
423 if (sprof->id == id) {
424 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
431 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
432 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
434 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
435 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
439 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
440 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
442 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
450 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
451 size_t chainidx, int *al)
453 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
460 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
461 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
462 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
464 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
465 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
468 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
471 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
472 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
473 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
477 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
478 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
479 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
480 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
481 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
489 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
490 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
491 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
493 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
494 size_t chainidx, int *al)
496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
497 unsigned int group_id;
498 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
499 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
500 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
501 int group_nid, found = 0;
502 unsigned int curve_flags;
504 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
508 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
509 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
514 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
515 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
520 /* Get our list of supported curves */
521 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
522 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
527 /* Get the clients list of supported curves. */
528 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
529 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
533 if (clnt_num_curves == 0) {
535 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
536 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
539 *al = SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
540 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
541 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
545 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
546 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
547 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
548 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
549 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
550 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
551 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
556 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
557 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
562 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
563 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
564 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
565 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
569 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
570 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
571 /* Share not suitable */
575 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
577 if (group_nid == 0) {
578 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
579 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
580 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
584 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
585 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
586 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
588 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
589 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
590 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
594 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
596 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
597 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
600 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
601 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
603 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
604 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
605 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
606 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
609 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
612 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
614 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
615 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
616 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
617 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
618 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
629 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
630 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
631 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
633 PACKET supported_groups_list;
635 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
636 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
637 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
638 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
639 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
643 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
644 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
645 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
646 if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
647 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
648 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
649 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
657 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
658 size_t chainidx, int *al)
660 /* The extension must always be empty */
661 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
662 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
666 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
672 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
673 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
675 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
676 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
683 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
684 size_t chainidx, int *al)
686 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
687 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
688 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
690 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
691 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
694 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
695 * ignore this extension
697 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
698 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
701 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
702 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
706 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
708 unsigned long ticket_agel;
711 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
712 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
713 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
717 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
719 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
720 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess);
721 if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
722 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
725 if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
728 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
731 * Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session.
734 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
740 * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to handle the case of a ticket renewal.
750 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
751 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
753 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
754 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
758 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
759 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
760 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
765 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize
766 || tls_psk_do_binder(s, md,
767 (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
768 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL,
770 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
771 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
775 sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
777 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
778 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
779 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
780 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
784 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the client does
785 * it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age is longer than ours
786 * (our ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the
787 * client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to our age
788 * calculation to adjust for rounding errors.
790 if (sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
791 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
792 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
793 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
795 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it for early
798 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
802 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
806 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
811 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
813 int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
814 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
816 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
819 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
820 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
821 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
822 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
823 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
824 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
825 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
826 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
827 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
835 int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
836 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
838 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
839 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
842 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
843 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
851 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
852 int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
853 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
855 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
856 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
857 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
858 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
859 const unsigned char *plist;
865 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
866 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
867 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
868 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
869 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
870 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
878 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
879 int tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
880 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
881 size_t chainidx, int *al)
883 const unsigned char *groups;
884 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
886 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
887 if (s->s3->group_id == 0)
890 /* Get our list of supported groups */
891 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &groups, &numgroups) || numgroups == 0) {
892 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
896 /* Copy group ID if supported */
897 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++, groups += 2) {
898 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
901 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
902 * so we don't need to add this extension
904 if (s->s3->group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0))
907 /* Add extension header */
908 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
909 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
910 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
911 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
913 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
919 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0))) {
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
921 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
936 int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
937 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
938 size_t chainidx, int *al)
940 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
941 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
945 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
946 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
954 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
955 int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
956 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
957 size_t chainidx, int *al)
959 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
962 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
965 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
966 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
967 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
972 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
973 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
976 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt))
977 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
978 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
986 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
987 int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
988 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
989 size_t chainidx, int *al)
991 const unsigned char *npa;
994 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
997 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1000 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1001 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1002 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1003 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1004 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1005 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1006 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1009 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1016 int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1017 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1019 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
1022 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1023 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1024 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1025 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1026 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1027 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1028 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1029 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1030 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1037 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1038 int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1039 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1041 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1044 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1045 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1046 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1047 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1048 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1049 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1058 int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1059 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1061 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1065 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1066 * for other cases too.
1068 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1069 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1070 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1071 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1076 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1077 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1078 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1085 int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1086 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1088 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1091 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1092 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1100 int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1101 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1103 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1104 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1105 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1106 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1109 /* No key_share received from client */
1110 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
1111 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1112 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1113 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1114 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1115 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1116 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 /* Must be resuming. */
1124 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1125 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1132 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1133 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1134 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1135 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1145 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1146 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1147 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1149 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1153 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1154 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1155 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1156 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1157 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1160 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1162 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1163 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1164 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1165 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1173 int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1174 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1176 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1177 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1178 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1179 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1180 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1181 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1182 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1185 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1186 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1187 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1190 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1191 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1198 int tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1199 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1201 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1202 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1205 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1206 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1207 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1208 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1209 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1216 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1219 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1220 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1221 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1222 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1229 int tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1230 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1235 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1236 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1237 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
1238 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1239 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);