2 * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
13 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
15 #define COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION 0
18 * 2 bytes for packet length, 2 bytes for format version, 2 bytes for
19 * protocol version, 2 bytes for group id, 2 bytes for cipher id, 1 byte for
20 * key_share present flag, 4 bytes for timestamp, 2 bytes for the hashlen,
21 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE for transcript hash, 1 byte for app cookie length, app cookie
22 * length bytes, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes for the HMAC of the whole thing.
24 #define MAX_COOKIE_SIZE (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 1 + 4 + 2 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + 1 \
25 + SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
28 * Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
29 * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
30 * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
31 * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
32 * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
34 #define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
35 + SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
39 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
41 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
42 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
45 const unsigned char *data;
47 /* Parse the length byte */
48 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
49 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
50 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
51 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
55 /* Check that the extension matches */
56 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
57 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
58 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
62 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
63 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
64 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
65 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
69 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
75 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
77 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
78 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
79 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
80 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
81 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
82 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
83 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
84 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
85 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
86 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
87 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
88 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
89 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
90 * the value of the Host: field.
91 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
92 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
93 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
95 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
97 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
98 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
100 unsigned int servname_type;
101 PACKET sni, hostname;
103 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
104 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
105 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
106 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
107 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
112 * Although the intent was for server_name to be extensible, RFC 4366
113 * was not clear about it; and so OpenSSL among other implementations,
114 * always and only allows a 'host_name' name types.
115 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
116 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
117 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
119 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
120 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
122 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
123 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
124 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
125 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
126 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
131 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
132 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
133 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
134 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
138 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
139 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME,
140 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
141 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
145 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
146 s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
147 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
148 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SERVER_NAME,
149 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
153 s->servername_done = 1;
156 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
157 * fall back to a full handshake.
159 s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
160 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
161 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
163 if (!s->servername_done && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL)
164 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
170 int tls_parse_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
171 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
175 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
176 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
177 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
181 /* Received |value| should be a valid max-fragment-length code. */
182 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
183 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
184 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
185 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
190 * RFC 6066: The negotiated length applies for the duration of the session
191 * including session resumptions.
192 * We should receive the same code as in resumed session !
194 if (s->hit && s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode != value) {
195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
196 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN,
197 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
202 * Store it in session, so it'll become binding for us
203 * and we'll include it in a next Server Hello.
205 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
209 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
210 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
215 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
216 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
218 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
219 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
224 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
225 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
227 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SRP,
229 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
237 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
238 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
239 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
241 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
243 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
244 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
245 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS,
246 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
251 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
252 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
253 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
254 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
255 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
262 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
264 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
265 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
267 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
268 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
269 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
270 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
272 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
279 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
280 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
282 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
284 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
285 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
286 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
287 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
291 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
292 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
293 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
300 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
303 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
305 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
306 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
307 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
308 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
312 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
313 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
314 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
321 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
322 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
323 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
325 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
327 /* We ignore this in a resumption handshake */
331 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
335 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
336 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
337 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
341 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
343 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
345 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
349 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
350 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
351 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
356 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
357 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
359 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
360 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
361 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
362 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
364 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
368 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
371 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
374 const unsigned char *id_data;
376 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
377 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
378 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
379 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
383 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
384 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
385 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
386 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
389 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
393 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
394 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
396 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
401 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
402 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
403 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
404 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
410 /* Read in request_extensions */
411 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
412 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
413 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
417 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
418 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
420 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
421 X509_EXTENSION_free);
423 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
424 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
425 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
426 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
435 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
436 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
440 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
443 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
451 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
452 * extension, not including type and length. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
454 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
457 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
459 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
462 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
463 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
464 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
465 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
469 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
471 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
472 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
473 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
475 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
478 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
480 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
481 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
482 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
483 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
484 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
485 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_ALPN,
486 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
493 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
494 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
497 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
498 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
502 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
503 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
506 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
507 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
508 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
509 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
510 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
514 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
515 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
516 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
517 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
519 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
520 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
521 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
522 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
527 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
529 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
532 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
533 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
534 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
536 if (sprof->id == id) {
537 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
544 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
545 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
546 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
547 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
551 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
552 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
553 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
554 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
562 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
565 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
572 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
573 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
575 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
576 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
578 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
579 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
582 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
583 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES,
585 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
589 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
590 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
591 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
592 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE
593 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX) != 0)
594 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
602 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
603 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
605 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
608 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
609 unsigned int group_id;
610 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
611 const uint16_t *clntgroups, *srvrgroups;
612 size_t clnt_num_groups, srvr_num_groups;
615 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
619 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
620 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
621 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
625 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
626 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
627 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
631 /* Get our list of supported groups */
632 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &srvrgroups, &srvr_num_groups);
633 /* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
634 tls1_get_peer_groups(s, &clntgroups, &clnt_num_groups);
635 if (clnt_num_groups == 0) {
637 * This can only happen if the supported_groups extension was not sent,
638 * because we verify that the length is non-zero when we process that
641 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
642 SSL_R_MISSING_SUPPORTED_GROUPS_EXTENSION);
646 if (s->s3->group_id != 0 && PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) == 0) {
648 * If we set a group_id already, then we must have sent an HRR
649 * requesting a new key_share. If we haven't got one then that is an
652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
653 SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
657 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
658 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
659 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
660 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
661 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
662 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
667 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
668 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
674 * If we sent an HRR then the key_share sent back MUST be for the group
675 * we requested, and must be the only key_share sent.
677 if (s->s3->group_id != 0
678 && (group_id != s->s3->group_id
679 || PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) != 0)) {
680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
681 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
685 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
686 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntgroups, clnt_num_groups, 0)) {
687 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
688 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
692 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
693 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrgroups, srvr_num_groups, 1)) {
694 /* Share not suitable */
698 if ((s->s3->peer_tmp = ssl_generate_param_group(group_id)) == NULL) {
699 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
700 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
704 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
706 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
707 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
708 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
709 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
710 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
721 int tls_parse_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
724 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
725 unsigned int format, version, key_share, group_id;
728 PACKET cookie, raw, chhash, appcookie;
730 const unsigned char *data, *mdin, *ciphdata;
731 unsigned char hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
732 unsigned char hrr[MAX_HRR_SIZE];
733 size_t rawlen, hmaclen, hrrlen, ciphlen;
734 unsigned long tm, now;
736 /* Ignore any cookie if we're not set up to verify it */
737 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL
738 || (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
741 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)) {
742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
743 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
748 data = PACKET_data(&raw);
749 rawlen = PACKET_remaining(&raw);
750 if (rawlen < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH
751 || !PACKET_forward(&raw, rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
752 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
753 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
756 mdin = PACKET_data(&raw);
758 /* Verify the HMAC of the cookie */
759 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
760 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
761 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
762 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
764 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
765 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
767 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
768 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
772 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
773 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
774 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
775 rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
776 || hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
777 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
779 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
780 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
784 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
787 if (CRYPTO_memcmp(hmac, mdin, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0) {
788 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
789 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
793 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &format)) {
794 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
795 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
798 /* Check the cookie format is something we recognise. Ignore it if not */
799 if (format != COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
803 * The rest of these checks really shouldn't fail since we have verified the
807 /* Check the version number is sane */
808 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &version)) {
809 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
810 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
813 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
814 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
815 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
819 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cookie, &group_id)) {
820 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
821 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
825 ciphdata = PACKET_data(&cookie);
826 if (!PACKET_forward(&cookie, 2)) {
827 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
828 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
831 if (group_id != s->s3->group_id
832 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher
833 != ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, ciphdata, 0)) {
835 * We chose a different cipher or group id this time around to what is
836 * in the cookie. Something must have changed.
838 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
843 if (!PACKET_get_1(&cookie, &key_share)
844 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&cookie, &tm)
845 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&cookie, &chhash)
846 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&cookie, &appcookie)
847 || PACKET_remaining(&cookie) != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
848 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
849 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
853 /* We tolerate a cookie age of up to 10 minutes (= 60 * 10 seconds) */
854 now = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
855 if (tm > now || (now - tm) > 600) {
856 /* Cookie is stale. Ignore it */
860 /* Verify the app cookie */
861 if (s->ctx->verify_stateless_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&appcookie),
862 PACKET_remaining(&appcookie)) == 0) {
863 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
864 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
869 * Reconstruct the HRR that we would have sent in response to the original
870 * ClientHello so we can add it to the transcript hash.
871 * Note: This won't work with custom HRR extensions
873 if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&hrrpkt, hrr, sizeof(hrr), 0)) {
874 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
875 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
878 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)
879 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(&hrrpkt)
880 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLS1_2_VERSION)
881 || !WPACKET_memcpy(&hrrpkt, hrrrandom, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
882 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&hrrpkt, s->tmp_session_id,
883 s->tmp_session_id_len)
884 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &hrrpkt,
886 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&hrrpkt, 0)
887 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)) {
888 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
890 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
893 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
894 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
895 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Fix this before release */
896 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->version_draft)
897 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
898 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
899 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
900 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
904 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
905 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
906 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, s->s3->group_id)
907 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt)) {
908 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
910 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
914 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&hrrpkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
915 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(&hrrpkt)
916 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(&hrrpkt, data, rawlen)
917 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* cookie extension */
918 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* extension block */
919 || !WPACKET_close(&hrrpkt) /* message */
920 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(&hrrpkt, &hrrlen)
921 || !WPACKET_finish(&hrrpkt)) {
922 WPACKET_cleanup(&hrrpkt);
923 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_COOKIE,
924 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
928 /* Reconstruct the transcript hash */
929 if (!create_synthetic_message_hash(s, PACKET_data(&chhash),
930 PACKET_remaining(&chhash), hrr,
932 /* SSLfatal() already called */
936 /* Act as if this ClientHello came after a HelloRetryRequest */
937 s->hello_retry_request = 1;
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
946 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
947 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
949 PACKET supported_groups_list;
951 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
952 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
953 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
954 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
955 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
956 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
960 if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
961 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
962 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
963 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
964 if (!tls1_save_u16(&supported_groups_list,
965 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
966 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
967 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
968 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
969 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
978 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
981 /* The extension must always be empty */
982 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
983 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
984 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EMS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
988 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
994 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
995 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
997 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
999 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1003 if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) {
1004 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1005 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1012 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1015 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
1016 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
1017 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
1018 unsigned int id, i, ext = 0;
1019 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1022 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
1023 * ignore this extension
1025 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
1026 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
1029 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
1030 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1031 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1035 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1036 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
1038 unsigned long ticket_agel;
1041 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
1042 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
1043 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1044 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1048 idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
1049 if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
1050 && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
1052 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1053 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1057 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1059 && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
1060 && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1062 unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
1063 unsigned int pskdatalen;
1065 if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
1066 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1067 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1070 pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
1072 OPENSSL_free(pskid);
1073 if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
1074 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1075 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1077 } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
1078 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
1079 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
1082 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
1083 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
1085 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
1086 if (cipher == NULL) {
1087 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1088 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1089 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1093 sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
1095 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
1097 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
1098 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
1100 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1101 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1102 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1105 OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
1108 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1111 /* We found a PSK */
1112 SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
1114 if (sesstmp == NULL) {
1115 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1116 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1119 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1123 * We've just been told to use this session for this context so
1124 * make sure the sid_ctx matches up.
1126 memcpy(sess->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
1127 sess->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
1130 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1132 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
1135 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
1136 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0,
1139 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_EMPTY) {
1140 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1141 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1145 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC
1146 || ret == SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
1147 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1148 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1151 if (ret == SSL_TICKET_NONE || ret == SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
1154 /* Check for replay */
1155 if (s->max_early_data > 0
1156 && !SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, sess)) {
1157 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1162 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
1163 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1164 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
1165 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1166 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
1169 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the
1170 * client does it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age
1171 * is longer than ours (our ticket age calculation should always be
1172 * slightly longer than the client's due to the network latency).
1173 * Therefore we add 1000ms to our age calculation to adjust for
1177 && sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
1178 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
1179 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
1180 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
1182 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it
1185 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
1189 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
1190 if (md != ssl_md(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)) {
1191 /* The ciphersuite is not compatible with this session. */
1192 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1194 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1203 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1204 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
1206 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
1207 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1208 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1212 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
1213 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
1214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1215 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1220 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize) {
1221 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
1222 SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1225 if (tls_psk_do_binder(s, md, (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
1226 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL, sess, 0,
1228 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1232 sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
1234 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1238 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
1242 int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1243 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1245 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1246 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
1247 SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
1251 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
1257 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
1259 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1260 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1263 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
1264 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1266 /* Still add this even if SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is set */
1267 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1268 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1269 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1270 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
1271 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
1272 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
1273 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
1274 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1275 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1276 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE,
1277 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1278 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1281 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1284 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1285 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1288 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
1289 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
1290 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1292 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1293 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME,
1295 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1296 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1299 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1302 /* Add/include the server's max fragment len extension into ServerHello */
1303 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1304 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1307 if (!USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1308 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1311 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
1312 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
1314 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
1315 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1316 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
1317 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1318 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1319 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1320 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1323 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1327 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1328 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1331 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1332 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1333 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
1334 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
1335 const unsigned char *plist;
1339 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1341 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
1342 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
1343 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1344 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
1345 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1346 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1347 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1348 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1351 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1355 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1356 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1357 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1360 const uint16_t *groups;
1361 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
1363 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
1364 if (s->s3->group_id == 0)
1365 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1367 /* Get our list of supported groups */
1368 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &groups, &numgroups);
1369 if (numgroups == 0) {
1370 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1371 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1372 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1375 /* Copy group ID if supported */
1376 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++) {
1377 uint16_t group = groups[i];
1379 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1382 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
1383 * so we don't need to add this extension
1385 if (s->s3->group_id == group)
1386 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1388 /* Add extension header */
1389 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
1390 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
1391 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1392 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1394 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1395 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1396 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1401 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group)) {
1402 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1403 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1404 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1405 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1410 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1411 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1412 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
1413 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1414 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1417 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1421 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1422 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1425 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1426 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
1427 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1430 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1431 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1432 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1433 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1434 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1437 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1440 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1441 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1442 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1445 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
1446 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1448 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
1449 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1451 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
1452 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1453 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1454 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1455 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1459 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
1460 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
1463 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt)) {
1464 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1465 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1467 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1468 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1469 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1470 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1473 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1477 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1478 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1479 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1482 const unsigned char *npa;
1483 unsigned int npalen;
1485 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
1487 s->s3->npn_seen = 0;
1488 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
1489 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1491 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1492 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
1493 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1494 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
1495 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
1496 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1497 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
1498 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1499 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1501 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1504 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1508 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1509 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1511 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
1512 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1514 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1515 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1516 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1517 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1518 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1519 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1520 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1521 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1522 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1523 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1524 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1527 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1530 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1531 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1532 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1535 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1536 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1538 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1539 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1540 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1541 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1542 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1543 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1544 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP,
1545 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1546 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1549 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1553 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1554 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1556 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1557 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1560 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1561 * for other cases too.
1563 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1564 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1565 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1566 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1568 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1571 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1572 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1573 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM,
1574 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1575 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1578 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1581 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1582 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1584 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1585 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1587 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1588 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1589 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS,
1590 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1591 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1594 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1597 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1598 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1601 if (!ossl_assert(SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
1602 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1603 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1604 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1605 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1608 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
1609 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1610 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Update to remove the TLSv1.3 draft indicator */
1611 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->version_draft)
1612 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1613 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1614 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
1615 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1616 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1619 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1622 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1623 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1626 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1627 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1628 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1629 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1631 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) {
1633 /* Original key_share was acceptable so don't ask for another one */
1634 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1636 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1637 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1638 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1639 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1640 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1641 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1642 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1643 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1646 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1650 /* No key_share received from client - must be resuming */
1651 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1652 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1653 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1654 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1656 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1659 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1660 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1661 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1662 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1663 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1664 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1667 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1669 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1670 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1671 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1674 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1675 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1676 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1677 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1679 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1680 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1683 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1684 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1685 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1686 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1687 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1688 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1689 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1691 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1693 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1694 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1695 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1696 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1697 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1699 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1701 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1705 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1706 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1708 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1709 unsigned char *hashval1, *hashval2, *appcookie1, *appcookie2, *cookie;
1710 unsigned char *hmac, *hmac2;
1711 size_t startlen, ciphlen, totcookielen, hashlen, hmaclen, appcookielen;
1714 int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1716 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
1717 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1719 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb == NULL) {
1720 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1721 SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
1722 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1725 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
1726 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1727 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1728 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &startlen)
1729 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, MAX_COOKIE_SIZE, &cookie)
1730 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, COOKIE_STATE_FORMAT_VERSION)
1731 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
1732 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1733 || !s->method->put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, pkt,
1735 /* Is there a key_share extension present in this HRR? */
1736 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL)
1737 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, (unsigned int)time(NULL))
1738 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1739 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashval1)) {
1740 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1741 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1742 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1746 * Get the hash of the initial ClientHello. ssl_handshake_hash() operates
1747 * on raw buffers, so we first reserve sufficient bytes (above) and then
1748 * subsequently allocate them (below)
1750 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)
1751 || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval1, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) {
1752 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1753 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1756 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hashlen, &hashval2)
1757 || !ossl_assert(hashval1 == hashval2)
1758 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1759 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
1760 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SSL_COOKIE_LENGTH, &appcookie1)) {
1761 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1762 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1763 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1766 /* Generate the application cookie */
1767 if (s->ctx->gen_stateless_cookie_cb(s, appcookie1, &appcookielen) == 0) {
1768 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1769 SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE);
1770 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1773 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, appcookielen, &appcookie2)
1774 || !ossl_assert(appcookie1 == appcookie2)
1775 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1776 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &totcookielen)
1777 || !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, &hmac)) {
1778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1779 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1780 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1782 hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
1784 totcookielen -= startlen;
1785 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)) {
1786 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1787 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1788 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1791 /* HMAC the cookie */
1792 hctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
1793 pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL,
1794 s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key,
1795 sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext
1797 if (hctx == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
1798 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1799 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1803 if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
1804 || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, cookie,
1805 totcookielen) <= 0) {
1806 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1807 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1811 if (!ossl_assert(totcookielen + hmaclen <= MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)) {
1812 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1813 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1817 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, hmaclen, &hmac2)
1818 || !ossl_assert(hmac == hmac2)
1819 || !ossl_assert(cookie == hmac - totcookielen)
1820 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1821 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1822 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
1823 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1827 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1830 EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
1831 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1834 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1838 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1839 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1842 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1843 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1844 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1845 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1846 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1847 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1848 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1851 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1852 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1853 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1854 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1856 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1858 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1859 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1862 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1865 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1866 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1869 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1870 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1871 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1873 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1874 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1875 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1876 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1877 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1878 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1879 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1882 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1885 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1886 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1888 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1889 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1890 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1891 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA,
1892 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1893 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1896 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1899 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1900 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1903 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1905 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1906 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1907 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
1908 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1909 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
1910 SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1911 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1914 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;