2 * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
12 #include "statem_locl.h"
15 * Parse the client's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
17 int tls_parse_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
18 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
21 const unsigned char *data;
23 /* Parse the length byte */
24 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &ilen)
25 || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, ilen)) {
26 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
27 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
28 *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
32 /* Check that the extension matches */
33 if (ilen != s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) {
34 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
35 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
36 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
40 if (memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
41 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)) {
42 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE,
43 SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
44 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
48 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
54 * The servername extension is treated as follows:
56 * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
57 * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
58 * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
59 * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
60 * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
61 * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
62 * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
63 * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
64 * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
65 * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
66 * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
67 * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
68 * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
69 * the value of the Host: field.
70 * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
71 * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
72 * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
74 * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
76 int tls_parse_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
77 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
79 unsigned int servname_type;
82 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &sni)
83 /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
84 || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
85 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
90 * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
91 * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
92 * syntax inextensibly and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
94 * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
95 * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
96 * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
98 * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
99 * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
101 if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
102 || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
103 || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
104 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
109 if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
110 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
114 if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
115 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
119 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.hostname);
120 s->session->ext.hostname = NULL;
121 if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->ext.hostname)) {
122 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
126 s->servername_done = 1;
129 * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
130 * fall back to a full handshake.
132 s->servername_done = s->session->ext.hostname
133 && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->ext.hostname,
134 strlen(s->session->ext.hostname));
140 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
141 int tls_parse_ctos_srp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
142 size_t chainidx, int *al)
146 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &srp_I)
147 || PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I)) {
148 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
153 * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
154 * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
156 if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
157 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
165 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
166 int tls_parse_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
167 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
169 PACKET ec_point_format_list;
171 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ec_point_format_list)
172 || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
173 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
178 if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
179 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats,
180 &s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len)) {
181 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
188 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
190 int tls_parse_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
191 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
193 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb &&
194 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
195 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
196 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
197 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
204 int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
205 size_t chainidx, int *al)
207 PACKET supported_sig_algs;
209 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
210 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
211 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
215 if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
216 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
223 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
224 int tls_parse_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
225 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
227 PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
229 /* Not defined if we get one of these in a client Certificate */
233 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->ext.status_type)) {
234 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
238 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
240 * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
242 s->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing;
246 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2 (pkt, &responder_id_list)) {
247 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
252 * We remove any OCSP_RESPIDs from a previous handshake
253 * to prevent unbounded memory growth - CVE-2016-6304
255 sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free);
256 if (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
257 s->ext.ocsp.ids = sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null();
258 if (s->ext.ocsp.ids == NULL) {
259 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
263 s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL;
266 while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
269 const unsigned char *id_data;
271 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list, &responder_id)
272 || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
273 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
277 id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
278 /* TODO(size_t): Convert d2i_* to size_t */
279 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
280 (int)PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
282 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
286 if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
287 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
288 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
292 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->ext.ocsp.ids, id)) {
293 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
294 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
299 /* Read in request_extensions */
300 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &exts)) {
301 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
305 if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
306 const unsigned char *ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
308 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts,
309 X509_EXTENSION_free);
311 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data, (int)PACKET_remaining(&exts));
312 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts == NULL || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
313 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
323 int tls_parse_ctos_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
324 size_t chainidx, int *al)
327 * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
330 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
338 * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.|pkt| holds the contents of the ALPN
339 * extension, not including type and length. |al| is a pointer to the alert
340 * value to send in the event of a failure. Returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
342 int tls_parse_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
343 size_t chainidx, int *al)
345 PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
347 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
350 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
351 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
352 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
356 save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
358 /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
359 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
360 || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
361 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
364 } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
366 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
367 s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
368 s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
369 if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
370 &s->s3->alpn_proposed, &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
371 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
379 int tls_parse_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
380 size_t chainidx, int *al)
382 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srvr;
383 unsigned int ct, mki_len, id;
387 /* Ignore this if we have no SRTP profiles */
388 if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) == NULL)
391 /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list and check it is even */
392 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || (ct & 1) != 0
393 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, ct)) {
394 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
395 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
396 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
400 srvr = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
401 s->srtp_profile = NULL;
402 /* Search all profiles for a match initially */
403 srtp_pref = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(srvr);
405 while (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
406 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &id)) {
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
408 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
409 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
414 * Only look for match in profiles of higher preference than
416 * If no profiles have been have been configured then this
419 for (i = 0; i < srtp_pref; i++) {
420 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *sprof =
421 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(srvr, i);
423 if (sprof->id == id) {
424 s->srtp_profile = sprof;
431 /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */
432 if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki_len)) {
433 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP,
434 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
435 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
439 if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, mki_len)
440 || PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
441 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
442 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
450 int tls_parse_ctos_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
451 size_t chainidx, int *al)
453 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC))
460 * Process a psk_kex_modes extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
461 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
462 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
464 int tls_parse_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
465 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
467 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
468 PACKET psk_kex_modes;
471 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &psk_kex_modes)
472 || PACKET_remaining(&psk_kex_modes) == 0) {
473 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
477 while (PACKET_get_1(&psk_kex_modes, &mode)) {
478 if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
479 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
480 else if (mode == TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)
481 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
489 * Process a key_share extension received in the ClientHello. |pkt| contains
490 * the raw PACKET data for the extension. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
491 * If a failure occurs then |*al| is set to an appropriate alert value.
493 int tls_parse_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
494 size_t chainidx, int *al)
496 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
497 unsigned int group_id;
498 PACKET key_share_list, encoded_pt;
499 const unsigned char *clntcurves, *srvrcurves;
500 size_t clnt_num_curves, srvr_num_curves;
501 int group_nid, found = 0;
502 unsigned int curve_flags;
504 if (s->hit && (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE) == 0)
508 if (s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) {
509 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
510 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
514 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &key_share_list)) {
515 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
516 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
520 /* Get our list of supported curves */
521 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &srvrcurves, &srvr_num_curves)) {
522 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
523 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
528 * Get the clients list of supported curves.
529 * TODO(TLS1.3): We should validate that we actually received
532 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
533 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
534 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
538 while (PACKET_remaining(&key_share_list) > 0) {
539 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&key_share_list, &group_id)
540 || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&key_share_list, &encoded_pt)
541 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
542 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
543 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
544 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
549 * If we already found a suitable key_share we loop through the
550 * rest to verify the structure, but don't process them.
555 /* Check if this share is in supported_groups sent from client */
556 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 0)) {
557 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
558 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
562 /* Check if this share is for a group we can use */
563 if (!check_in_list(s, group_id, srvrcurves, srvr_num_curves, 1)) {
564 /* Share not suitable */
568 group_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(group_id, &curve_flags);
570 if (group_nid == 0) {
571 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
572 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE,
573 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
577 if ((curve_flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) {
578 /* Can happen for some curves, e.g. X25519 */
579 EVP_PKEY *key = EVP_PKEY_new();
581 if (key == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(key, group_nid)) {
582 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
583 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
587 s->s3->peer_tmp = key;
589 /* Set up EVP_PKEY with named curve as parameters */
590 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
593 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0
594 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx,
596 || EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &s->s3->peer_tmp) <= 0) {
597 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
598 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
599 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
602 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
605 s->s3->group_id = group_id;
607 if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(s->s3->peer_tmp,
608 PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
609 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
610 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
611 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
622 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
623 int tls_parse_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
624 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
626 PACKET supported_groups_list;
628 /* Each group is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
629 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_groups_list)
630 || PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) == 0
631 || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_groups_list) % 2) != 0) {
632 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
636 OPENSSL_free(s->session->ext.supportedgroups);
637 s->session->ext.supportedgroups = NULL;
638 s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0;
639 if (!PACKET_memdup(&supported_groups_list,
640 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups,
641 &s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len)) {
642 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
650 int tls_parse_ctos_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
651 size_t chainidx, int *al)
653 /* The extension must always be empty */
654 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
655 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
659 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
665 int tls_parse_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
666 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
668 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
669 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
676 int tls_parse_ctos_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
677 size_t chainidx, int *al)
679 PACKET identities, binders, binder;
680 size_t binderoffset, hashsize;
681 SSL_SESSION *sess = NULL;
683 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
684 uint32_t ticket_age = 0, now, agesec, agems;
687 * If we have no PSK kex mode that we recognise then we can't resume so
688 * ignore this extension
690 if ((s->ext.psk_kex_mode
691 & (TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE | TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)) == 0)
694 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &identities)) {
695 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
699 for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
701 unsigned long ticket_agel;
704 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
705 || !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
706 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
710 ticket_age = (uint32_t)ticket_agel;
712 ret = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
713 PACKET_remaining(&identity), NULL, 0, &sess);
714 if (ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC || ret == TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER) {
715 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
718 if (ret == TICKET_NO_DECRYPT)
721 md = ssl_md(sess->cipher->algorithm2);
724 * Don't recognise this cipher so we can't use the session.
727 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
733 * TODO(TLS1.3): Somehow we need to handle the case of a ticket renewal.
743 binderoffset = PACKET_data(pkt) - (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
744 hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
746 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &binders)) {
747 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
751 for (i = 0; i <= id; i++) {
752 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&binders, &binder)) {
753 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
758 if (PACKET_remaining(&binder) != hashsize
759 || tls_psk_do_binder(s, md,
760 (const unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data,
761 binderoffset, PACKET_data(&binder), NULL,
763 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
764 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
768 sess->ext.tick_identity = id;
770 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
771 agesec = now - (uint32_t)sess->time;
772 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
773 ticket_age -= sess->ext.tick_age_add;
777 * For simplicity we do our age calculations in seconds. If the client does
778 * it in ms then it could appear that their ticket age is longer than ours
779 * (our ticket age calculation should always be slightly longer than the
780 * client's due to the network latency). Therefore we add 1000ms to our age
781 * calculation to adjust for rounding errors.
783 if (sess->timeout >= (long)agesec
784 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 == agesec
785 && ticket_age <= agems + 1000
786 && ticket_age + TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE >= agems + 1000) {
788 * Ticket age is within tolerance and not expired. We allow it for early
791 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
795 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
799 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
804 * Add the server's renegotiation binding
806 int tls_construct_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
807 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
809 if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding)
812 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
813 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
814 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
815 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
816 s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
817 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->previous_server_finished,
818 s->s3->previous_server_finished_len)
819 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
820 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
821 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
828 int tls_construct_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
829 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
831 if (s->hit || s->servername_done != 1
832 || s->session->ext.hostname == NULL)
835 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
836 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
837 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
844 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
845 int tls_construct_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
846 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
848 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
849 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
850 int using_ecc = ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
851 && (s->session->ext.ecpointformats != NULL);
852 const unsigned char *plist;
858 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
859 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
860 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
861 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, plist, plistlen)
862 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
863 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
871 int tls_construct_stoc_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
872 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
873 size_t chainidx, int *al)
875 const unsigned char *groups;
876 size_t numgroups, i, first = 1;
878 /* s->s3->group_id is non zero if we accepted a key_share */
879 if (s->s3->group_id == 0)
882 /* Get our list of supported groups */
883 if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &groups, &numgroups) || numgroups == 0) {
884 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
888 /* Copy group ID if supported */
889 for (i = 0; i < numgroups; i++, groups += 2) {
890 if (tls_curve_allowed(s, groups, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
893 * Check if the client is already using our preferred group. If
894 * so we don't need to add this extension
896 if (s->s3->group_id == GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0))
899 /* Add extension header */
900 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
901 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
902 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
903 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
905 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
911 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, GET_GROUP_ID(groups, 0))) {
912 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS,
913 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
919 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
927 int tls_construct_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
928 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
929 size_t chainidx, int *al)
931 if (!s->ext.ticket_expected || !tls_use_ticket(s)) {
932 s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
936 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
937 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
945 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
946 int tls_construct_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
947 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
948 size_t chainidx, int *al)
950 if (!s->ext.status_expected)
953 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && chainidx != 0)
956 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
957 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
958 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
963 * In TLSv1.3 we include the certificate status itself. In <= TLSv1.2 we
964 * send back an empty extension, with the certificate status appearing as a
967 if ((SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_cert_status_body(s, pkt))
968 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
969 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
977 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
978 int tls_construct_stoc_next_proto_neg(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
979 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
980 size_t chainidx, int *al)
982 const unsigned char *npa;
985 int npn_seen = s->s3->npn_seen;
988 if (!npn_seen || s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb == NULL)
991 ret = s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
992 s->ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg);
993 if (ret == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
994 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
995 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, npa, npalen)) {
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_NEXT_PROTO_NEG,
997 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1000 s->s3->npn_seen = 1;
1007 int tls_construct_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1008 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1010 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
1013 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
1014 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
1015 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1016 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1017 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected,
1018 s->s3->alpn_selected_len)
1019 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1020 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1028 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1029 int tls_construct_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1030 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1032 if (s->srtp_profile == NULL)
1035 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1036 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1037 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 2)
1038 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->srtp_profile->id)
1039 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
1040 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1041 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1049 int tls_construct_stoc_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1050 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1052 if (!s->ext.use_etm)
1056 * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
1057 * for other cases too.
1059 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
1060 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
1061 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
1062 || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) {
1067 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
1068 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1076 int tls_construct_stoc_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1077 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1079 if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) == 0)
1082 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
1083 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1091 int tls_construct_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1092 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1094 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1095 unsigned char *encodedPoint;
1096 size_t encoded_pt_len = 0;
1097 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->peer_tmp, *skey = NULL;
1100 /* No key_share received from client */
1101 if (s->hello_retry_request) {
1102 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1103 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1104 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)
1105 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE,
1107 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1114 /* Must be resuming. */
1115 if (!s->hit || !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
1116 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1117 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1123 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
1124 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1125 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->s3->group_id)) {
1126 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1130 skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
1132 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1136 /* Generate encoding of server key */
1137 encoded_pt_len = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, &encodedPoint);
1138 if (encoded_pt_len == 0) {
1139 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1140 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1144 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len)
1145 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1146 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1147 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1148 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1151 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1153 /* This causes the crypto state to be updated based on the derived keys */
1154 s->s3->tmp.pkey = skey;
1155 if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey, 1) == 0) {
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1164 int tls_construct_stoc_cryptopro_bug(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1165 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1167 const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1168 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
1169 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
1170 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1171 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1172 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1173 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1176 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x80
1177 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) != 0x81)
1178 || (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG) == 0)
1181 if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext))) {
1182 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_CRYPTOPRO_BUG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1189 int tls_construct_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1190 X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al)
1192 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1193 if (s->max_early_data == 0)
1196 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1197 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1198 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, s->max_early_data)
1199 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1200 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1207 if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
1210 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
1211 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1212 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1213 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1220 int tls_construct_stoc_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1221 size_t chainidx, int *al)
1226 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1227 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1228 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick_identity)
1229 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1230 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);