2 * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
10 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
11 #include "../ssl_local.h"
12 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
13 #include "statem_local.h"
15 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
16 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
19 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
21 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
23 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
24 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
25 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
26 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
27 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
28 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
29 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
32 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
35 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
36 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
39 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
40 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
42 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
43 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
44 /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
45 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
46 /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
47 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
48 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
49 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
50 strlen(s->ext.hostname))
51 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
52 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
53 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
54 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
57 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
60 /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
61 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
62 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
65 if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
66 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
68 /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
70 * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
71 * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
73 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
74 /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
75 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
76 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
77 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
78 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
79 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
82 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
85 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
86 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
87 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
89 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
90 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
91 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
93 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
94 /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
95 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
96 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
97 /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
98 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
99 || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
100 strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
101 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
102 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
103 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
104 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
107 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
111 static int use_ecc(SSL *s, int min_version, int max_version)
114 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
115 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
116 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
117 size_t num_groups, j;
119 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
120 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
123 cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s);
124 end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
125 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
126 const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
128 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
129 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
130 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
131 || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
132 || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
137 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
141 /* Check we have at least one EC supported group */
142 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
143 for (j = 0; j < num_groups; j++) {
144 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[j];
146 if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, 1, NULL)
147 && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
154 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
155 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
158 const unsigned char *pformats;
160 int reason, min_version, max_version;
162 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
164 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
165 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
167 if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version))
168 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
170 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
171 tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
173 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
174 /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
175 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
176 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
177 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
178 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
179 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
182 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
185 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
186 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
189 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
190 size_t num_groups = 0, i, tls13added = 0, added = 0;
191 int min_version, max_version, reason;
193 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
195 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
196 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
200 * We only support EC groups in TLSv1.2 or below, and in DTLS. Therefore
201 * if we don't have EC support then we don't send this extension.
203 if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version)
204 && (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION))
205 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
208 * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
210 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
212 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
213 /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
214 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
215 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
216 || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
217 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
218 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
220 /* Copy group ID if supported */
221 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
222 uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
225 if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, 0, &okfortls13)
226 && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
227 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
228 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
229 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
231 if (okfortls13 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
236 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
237 if (added == 0 || (tls13added == 0 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION))
238 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS,
239 "No groups enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version");
241 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
242 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
245 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
248 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
249 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
254 if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
255 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
257 if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
258 && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
259 && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
260 ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
261 } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
262 && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
263 ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
264 s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
265 if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
266 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
267 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
269 memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
270 s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
271 s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
276 if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
277 s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
278 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
280 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
281 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
282 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
283 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
286 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
289 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
290 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
294 const uint16_t *salg;
296 if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s))
297 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
299 salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
300 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
301 /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
302 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
303 /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
304 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
305 || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
306 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
307 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
308 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
309 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
312 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
315 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
316 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
317 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
322 /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
324 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
326 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
327 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
329 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
330 /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
331 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
332 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
333 /* Sub-packet for the ids */
334 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
336 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
338 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
339 unsigned char *idbytes;
340 OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
341 int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
344 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
345 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
346 || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
347 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
348 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
351 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
352 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
353 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
354 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
356 if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
357 unsigned char *extbytes;
358 int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
361 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
362 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
364 if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
365 || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
368 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
371 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
372 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
373 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
376 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
380 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
381 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
382 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
384 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
385 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
388 * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
389 * for Next Protocol Negotiation
391 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
392 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
393 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
394 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
397 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
401 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
402 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
406 if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
407 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
409 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
410 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
411 /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
412 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
413 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
414 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
415 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
416 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
420 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
424 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
425 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
426 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
429 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
433 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
435 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
436 /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
437 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
438 /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
439 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
440 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
441 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
444 end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
445 for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
446 const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
447 sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
449 if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
450 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
451 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
454 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
455 /* Add an empty use_mki value */
456 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
457 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
458 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
459 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
462 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
466 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
467 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
469 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
470 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
472 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
473 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
474 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
475 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
478 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
481 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
482 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
483 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
485 if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
486 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
488 /* Not defined for client Certificates */
490 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
492 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
493 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
494 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
495 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
498 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
502 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
503 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
505 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
506 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
508 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
509 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
510 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
511 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
514 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
517 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
518 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
521 int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
523 reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
525 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
526 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
530 * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
531 * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
533 if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
534 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
536 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
537 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
538 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
539 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
540 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
543 for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
544 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
545 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
546 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
549 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
550 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
551 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
554 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
558 * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
560 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
561 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
564 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
565 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
567 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
568 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
569 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
570 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
571 || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
572 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
573 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
574 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
575 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
578 s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
580 s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
583 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
586 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
587 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id)
589 unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL;
590 EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
593 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey != NULL) {
594 if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) {
595 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
599 * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
601 key_share_key = s->s3.tmp.pkey;
603 key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id);
604 if (key_share_key == NULL) {
605 /* SSLfatal() already called */
610 /* Encode the public key. */
611 encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(key_share_key,
613 if (encodedlen == 0) {
614 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
618 /* Create KeyShareEntry */
619 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
620 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) {
621 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
626 * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
627 * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
628 * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
630 s->s3.tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
631 s->s3.group_id = curve_id;
632 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
636 if (s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL)
637 EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
638 OPENSSL_free(encoded_point);
643 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
644 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
647 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
648 size_t i, num_groups = 0;
649 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
650 uint16_t curve_id = 0;
652 /* key_share extension */
653 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
654 /* Extension data sub-packet */
655 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
656 /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
657 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
659 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
662 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
665 * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
668 if (s->s3.group_id != 0) {
669 curve_id = s->s3.group_id;
671 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
673 if (!tls_group_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
676 curve_id = pgroups[i];
682 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
683 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
686 if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) {
687 /* SSLfatal() already called */
688 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
691 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
692 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
693 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
695 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
697 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
701 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
702 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
704 EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
706 /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
707 if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
708 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
710 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
711 /* Extension data sub-packet */
712 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
713 || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
714 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
715 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
716 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
720 ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
722 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
723 s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
724 s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
729 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
730 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
733 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
734 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
735 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
736 const unsigned char *id = NULL;
738 SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
739 SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
740 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
742 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
743 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
745 if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
746 && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
748 && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
749 SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
750 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
751 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
754 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
755 if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
756 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
759 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
760 psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
763 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
764 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
765 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
766 } else if (psklen > 0) {
767 const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
768 const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
770 idlen = strlen(identity);
771 if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
772 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
773 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
775 id = (unsigned char *)identity;
778 * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
779 * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
781 cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
782 if (cipher == NULL) {
783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
784 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
787 psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
789 || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
790 || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
791 || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
792 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
793 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
794 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
796 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
799 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
801 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
802 s->psksession = psksess;
803 if (psksess != NULL) {
804 OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
805 s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
806 if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
807 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
808 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
810 s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
813 if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
814 || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
815 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
816 s->max_early_data = 0;
817 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
819 edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
820 s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
822 if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
823 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
824 || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
825 && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
826 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
827 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
828 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
832 if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
833 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
834 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
838 * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
841 if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
842 PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
845 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
846 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
847 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
849 while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
850 if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
851 edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
857 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
858 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
859 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
863 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
864 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
865 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
866 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
867 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
871 * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
872 * extension, we set it to accepted.
874 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
875 s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
877 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
880 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
881 #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
884 * PSK pre binder overhead =
885 * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
886 * 2 bytes for extension length
887 * 2 bytes for identities list length
888 * 2 bytes for identity length
889 * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
890 * 2 bytes for binder list length
891 * 1 byte for binder length
892 * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
893 * subsequent binder bytes
895 #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
897 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
898 unsigned int context, X509 *x,
901 unsigned char *padbytes;
904 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
905 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
908 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
909 * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
910 * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
911 * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
913 if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
914 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
915 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
919 * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
920 * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
922 if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
923 && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
924 && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
925 const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
929 * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
932 hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
937 if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
938 /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
939 hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
942 * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
943 * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
944 * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
945 * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
952 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
953 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
954 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
955 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
957 memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
960 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
964 * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
966 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
967 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
970 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0;
971 size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen;
972 unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
973 const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
976 s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
979 * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
980 * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
981 * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
985 * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
986 * so don't add this extension.
988 if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
989 || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
990 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
992 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
993 handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
995 if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
996 /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
997 if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
998 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
999 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1001 mdres = ssl_md(s->ctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
1002 if (mdres == NULL) {
1004 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1010 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
1012 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
1013 * so we can't use it.
1019 * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
1020 * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
1021 * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
1022 * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
1023 * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
1026 now = (uint32_t)time(NULL);
1027 agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time;
1029 * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
1030 * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
1031 * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
1032 * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
1033 * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
1039 if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
1040 /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
1045 * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
1048 agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
1050 if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
1052 * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
1053 * If so we just ignore it.
1059 * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
1062 agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
1064 reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres);
1065 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1070 if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
1071 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1073 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1074 mdpsk = ssl_md(s->ctx, s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
1075 if (mdpsk == NULL) {
1077 * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
1078 * If this happens it's an application bug.
1080 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1081 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1084 if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
1086 * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
1087 * session. This is an application bug.
1089 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
1090 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1093 pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk);
1096 /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
1097 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
1098 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1099 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
1100 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1101 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1105 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
1106 s->session->ext.ticklen)
1107 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
1108 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1109 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1113 if (s->psksession != NULL) {
1114 if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
1115 s->psksession_id_len)
1116 || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
1117 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1118 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1120 s->ext.tick_identity++;
1123 if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
1124 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
1125 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1127 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
1128 || (s->psksession != NULL
1129 && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
1130 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1131 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
1132 || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
1134 * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
1135 * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
1137 || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
1138 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1139 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1142 msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
1145 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1146 resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
1147 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1148 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1151 if (s->psksession != NULL
1152 && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
1153 pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
1154 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1155 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1158 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1160 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1164 EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
1165 ossl_unused unsigned int context,
1166 ossl_unused X509 *x,
1167 ossl_unused size_t chainidx)
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1170 if (!s->pha_enabled)
1171 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1173 /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
1174 if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
1175 || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
1176 || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
1177 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1178 return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
1181 s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
1183 return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
1185 return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
1191 * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
1193 int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1194 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1196 size_t expected_len = s->s3.previous_client_finished_len
1197 + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len;
1199 const unsigned char *data;
1201 /* Check for logic errors */
1202 if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1203 || s->s3.previous_client_finished_len != 0)
1204 || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
1205 || s->s3.previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
1206 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1210 /* Parse the length byte */
1211 if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
1212 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1216 /* Consistency check */
1217 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
1218 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
1222 /* Check that the extension matches */
1223 if (ilen != expected_len) {
1224 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1228 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
1229 || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
1230 s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
1231 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1235 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
1236 || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
1237 s->s3.previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
1238 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
1241 s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
1246 /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
1247 int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1248 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1252 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
1253 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1257 /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
1258 if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
1259 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1260 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1264 /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
1266 * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
1267 * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
1268 * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
1270 if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
1271 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1272 SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
1277 * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
1278 * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
1280 s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
1285 int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1286 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1288 if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1289 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1293 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1294 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1299 if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
1300 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1303 s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
1304 if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
1305 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1313 int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1314 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1316 size_t ecpointformats_len;
1317 PACKET ecptformatlist;
1319 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
1320 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1324 ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
1325 if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
1326 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
1330 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
1331 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
1332 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
1333 if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
1334 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
1340 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
1341 s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
1342 ecpointformats_len)) {
1343 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1351 int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1352 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1354 if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
1355 !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt),
1356 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1357 s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
1358 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1362 if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
1363 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1366 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1367 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1371 s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
1376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
1377 int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1378 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1380 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1381 /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
1382 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1387 * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
1388 * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
1390 if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1394 if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
1395 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1399 if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
1400 /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
1401 * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
1406 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1407 return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
1410 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1411 s->ext.status_expected = 1;
1418 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
1419 int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1422 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
1423 /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
1424 /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */
1429 * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
1430 * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
1431 * need to let control continue to flow to that.
1433 if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
1434 size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
1436 /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
1437 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
1440 s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
1442 s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
1443 if (s->ext.scts == NULL
1444 || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
1445 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1450 ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
1451 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
1454 * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
1455 * otherwise this is unsolicited.
1457 if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
1458 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1460 SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1464 if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
1465 TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
1466 PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1468 /* SSLfatal already called */
1478 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1480 * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1481 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
1482 * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
1484 static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
1486 PACKET tmp_protocol;
1488 while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
1489 if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
1490 || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
1491 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1499 int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1502 unsigned char *selected;
1503 unsigned char selected_len;
1506 /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
1507 if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
1510 /* We must have requested it. */
1511 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
1512 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1516 /* The data must be valid */
1518 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
1519 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1522 if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1524 PACKET_remaining(pkt),
1525 s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) !=
1526 SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1527 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1532 * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
1533 * a single Serverhello
1535 OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
1536 s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1537 if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
1538 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
1543 s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
1550 int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1555 /* We must have requested it. */
1556 if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
1557 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1561 * The extension data consists of:
1562 * uint16 list_length
1563 * uint8 proto_length;
1564 * uint8 proto[proto_length];
1566 if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
1567 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
1568 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
1569 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1572 OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
1573 s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
1574 if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1575 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1578 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)) {
1579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1582 s->s3.alpn_selected_len = len;
1584 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
1585 || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
1586 || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)
1588 /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
1589 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
1593 * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
1594 * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
1596 if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
1597 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1600 s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
1601 OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
1602 if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
1603 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1606 s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
1612 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1613 int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1616 unsigned int id, ct, mki;
1618 STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
1619 SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
1621 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
1622 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
1623 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
1624 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1625 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1626 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1631 /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
1632 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
1636 /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
1637 clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
1639 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
1644 * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
1645 * presumably offered)
1647 for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
1648 prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
1650 if (prof->id == id) {
1651 s->srtp_profile = prof;
1656 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
1657 SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
1662 int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1665 /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
1666 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
1667 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
1668 && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
1674 int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1677 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
1679 s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
1681 s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
1686 int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1687 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1689 unsigned int version;
1691 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
1692 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1693 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1698 * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
1699 * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
1701 if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
1702 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
1703 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
1707 /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
1708 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
1711 /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
1712 s->version = version;
1717 int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1720 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1721 unsigned int group_id;
1723 EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
1724 const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
1727 if (ckey == NULL || s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
1728 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1732 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
1733 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1737 if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
1738 const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
1739 size_t i, num_groups;
1741 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1742 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1747 * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
1748 * already sent in the first ClientHello
1750 if (group_id == s->s3.group_id) {
1751 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1755 /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
1756 tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
1757 for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
1758 if (group_id == pgroups[i])
1762 || !tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
1763 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1767 s->s3.group_id = group_id;
1768 EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.pkey);
1769 s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
1773 if (group_id != s->s3.group_id) {
1775 * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
1778 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1782 if ((ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(s->ctx, group_id)) == NULL) {
1783 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
1787 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
1788 || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
1789 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1793 if (!ginf->is_kem) {
1795 skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
1796 if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
1797 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
1801 if (EVP_PKEY_set1_encoded_public_key(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
1802 PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
1803 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1804 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1808 if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
1809 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1810 EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
1813 s->s3.peer_tmp = skey;
1816 const unsigned char *ct = PACKET_data(&encoded_pt);
1817 size_t ctlen = PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt);
1819 if (ssl_decapsulate(s, ckey, ct, ctlen, 1) == 0) {
1820 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1829 int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1834 if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
1835 || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
1836 &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
1837 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1844 int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
1845 X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
1847 if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
1848 unsigned long max_early_data;
1850 if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
1851 || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1852 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
1856 s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
1861 if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1862 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1866 if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
1869 * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
1870 * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
1871 * server should not be accepting it.
1873 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
1877 s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
1882 int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
1885 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
1886 unsigned int identity;
1888 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
1889 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1893 if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
1894 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
1899 * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
1900 * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
1901 * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
1903 if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
1905 SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
1906 s->psksession = NULL;
1910 if (s->psksession == NULL) {
1911 /* Should never happen */
1912 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1917 * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
1918 * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
1919 * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
1921 if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
1922 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
1923 || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
1924 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
1925 memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
1927 SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
1928 s->session = s->psksession;
1929 s->psksession = NULL;
1931 /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
1933 s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;