1 /* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
153 #include "ssl_locl.h"
154 #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
155 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
156 #include <openssl/rand.h>
157 #include <openssl/objects.h>
158 #include <openssl/evp.h>
159 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
160 #include <openssl/x509.h>
161 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
162 # include <openssl/dh.h>
164 #include <openssl/bn.h>
165 #include <openssl/md5.h>
167 static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
168 int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, int sslv2format);
171 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
172 static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
174 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
176 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
178 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
179 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) {
180 if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) {
182 * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp
186 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
188 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al);
195 int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
198 unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
199 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
201 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
203 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
207 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
208 cb = s->info_callback;
209 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
210 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
212 /* init things to blank */
214 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
219 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
221 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
222 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
225 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
226 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
235 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
237 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
241 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
242 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
246 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
248 if ((s->version >> 8 != 3) && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
249 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
250 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
254 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
259 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
261 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
262 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
264 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
267 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
270 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
276 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
278 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
283 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
285 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
287 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
289 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
291 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
292 * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
294 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
296 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
300 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
301 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
302 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
303 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
305 SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
307 * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
308 * support secure renegotiation.
310 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
311 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
312 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
314 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
318 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
321 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
322 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
327 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
330 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
333 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
334 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
337 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
341 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
344 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
345 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
346 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
348 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
351 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
352 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
353 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
356 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
358 * callback indicates firther work to be done
360 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
363 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
364 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
366 * This is not really an error but the only means to for
367 * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
369 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
370 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
371 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
373 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
380 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
384 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
385 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
386 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
392 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
396 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
401 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
402 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
403 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
404 /* normal PSK or SRP */
405 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
406 (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) {
407 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
411 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
412 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
414 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
417 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
422 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
423 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
424 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
427 * clear this, it may get reset by
428 * send_server_key_exchange
430 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
433 * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
434 * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
435 * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
436 * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
437 * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
442 * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
445 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
446 /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */
447 || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
448 /* For other PSK always send SKE */
449 || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK)))
451 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
452 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
453 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
455 || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
456 || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
457 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
458 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
459 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
460 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
461 [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
462 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
467 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
473 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
477 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
478 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
479 if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
480 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
482 * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
483 * during re-negotiation:
485 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
486 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
488 * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
489 * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
492 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
494 * ... except when the application insists on
495 * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
498 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
499 /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
500 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
502 * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
505 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
506 /* no cert request */
508 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
509 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
510 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
511 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
515 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
516 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
519 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
524 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
525 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
526 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
529 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
530 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
534 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
537 * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
538 * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
539 * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
540 * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
541 * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
545 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
546 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
550 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
552 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
555 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
556 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
557 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
558 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
563 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
566 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
567 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
568 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
573 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
574 * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
575 * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
576 * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
578 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
580 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
581 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
583 if (!s->session->peer)
585 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
586 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
587 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
591 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
592 * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
594 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
595 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
602 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
606 * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
607 * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
608 * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
611 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
612 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
615 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
616 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
619 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
628 EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
630 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
639 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
640 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
641 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
645 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
649 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
650 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
651 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
652 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
656 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
661 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A:
662 case SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B:
663 ret = ssl3_get_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A,
664 SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_B);
668 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
669 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
671 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
672 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
674 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
679 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
680 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
681 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
682 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
686 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
687 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
688 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
690 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
694 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
695 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
696 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
699 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
703 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
704 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
705 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
708 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
712 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
713 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
715 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
716 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
718 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
722 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
724 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
728 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
731 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
732 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
735 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
741 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
742 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
743 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
744 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
745 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
747 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
749 ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
752 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
754 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CHANGE_A;
756 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
761 /* clean a few things up */
762 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
764 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
767 /* remove buffering on output */
768 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
772 if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
777 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
779 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
781 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
784 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
799 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
801 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
805 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
806 new_state = s->state;
808 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
809 s->state = new_state;
815 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
819 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
823 int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
826 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
827 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
828 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
831 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
834 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
835 return ssl_do_write(s);
838 int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
840 int i, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
841 unsigned int j, cipherlen, complen;
842 unsigned int cookie_len = 0;
846 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
847 unsigned char *q = NULL;
848 SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
850 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
853 unsigned char *sess, *cdata;
855 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
859 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
860 * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
861 * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
862 * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
864 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
865 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
868 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
869 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
870 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
871 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
872 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
877 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
878 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
879 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
883 /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
884 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
885 unsigned int version;
888 * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
889 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
890 * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes
891 * the rest right through. Its format is:
893 * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer
894 * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here
896 * 5-6 cipher_spec_length
897 * 7-8 session_id_length
898 * 9-10 challenge_length
902 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &mt)
903 || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
905 * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
906 * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
913 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)) {
914 /* No protocol version supplied! */
915 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
918 if (version == 0x0002) {
919 /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
920 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
922 } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
924 s->client_version = version;
926 /* No idea what protocol this is */
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
932 * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
933 * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
935 if(!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
936 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
937 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
942 /* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
943 if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
944 if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
945 if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
948 } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
949 switch(s->client_version) {
952 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2)) {
953 s->version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
954 s->method = TLSv1_2_server_method();
958 /* Deliberately fall through */
960 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1)) {
961 s->version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
962 s->method = TLSv1_1_server_method();
966 /* Deliberately fall through */
968 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) {
969 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
970 s->method = TLSv1_server_method();
974 /* Deliberately fall through */
976 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
977 if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
978 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
979 s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
988 } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
989 || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
991 * For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
992 * negotiation comes later.
998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
999 if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
1001 * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
1004 s->version = s->client_version;
1006 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1010 if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
1012 * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
1013 * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
1014 * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
1016 unsigned int csl, sil, cl;
1018 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &csl)
1019 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &sil)
1020 || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cl)) {
1021 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1022 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1027 /* we need at least one cipher */
1028 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1033 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &cdata, csl)) {
1034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1035 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1039 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, cdata, csl, &(ciphers), 1) == NULL) {
1044 * Ignore any session id. We don't allow resumption in a backwards
1045 * compatible ClientHello
1047 if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, sil)) {
1048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1049 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1054 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1057 /* Load the client random */
1058 i = (cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : cl;
1059 memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1060 if (!PACKET_peek_copy_bytes(&pkt,
1061 s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - i,
1063 || !PACKET_forward(&pkt, cl)
1064 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1066 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1070 /* No compression, so set complen to 0 */
1073 /* If we get here we've got SSLv3+ in an SSLv3+ record */
1075 /* load the client random and get the session-id */
1076 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
1077 || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &j)
1078 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sess, j)) {
1079 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1080 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1085 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
1086 * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
1089 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
1091 if (!PACKET_peek_1(&pkt, &cookie_len)) {
1092 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1093 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1097 if (cookie_len == 0)
1103 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
1104 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
1105 * ignore resumption requests with flag
1106 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
1107 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
1108 * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
1109 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
1110 * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
1111 * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
1112 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
1116 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
1117 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1120 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &pkt, sess, j);
1122 * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
1124 * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
1125 * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
1126 * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
1127 * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
1128 * will abort the handshake with an error.
1130 if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
1131 /* previous session */
1137 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
1142 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1143 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &cookie_len)) {
1144 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1145 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1149 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1150 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1151 * does not cause an overflow.
1153 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
1155 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1160 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1161 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
1162 && cookie_len > 0) {
1164 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1166 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1171 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
1172 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1174 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1176 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1179 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1181 /* default verification */
1182 else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1183 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
1184 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1188 /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
1191 /* Skip over cookie */
1192 if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, cookie_len)) {
1193 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1199 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
1200 /* Select version to use */
1201 if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
1202 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
1203 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
1204 s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
1205 } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
1206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1207 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
1208 s->version = s->client_version;
1209 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1211 } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
1212 !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
1213 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
1214 s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1217 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
1218 s->version = s->client_version;
1219 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
1222 s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
1226 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &cipherlen)) {
1227 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1228 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1232 if (cipherlen == 0) {
1233 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1238 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &cdata, cipherlen)) {
1239 /* not enough data */
1240 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1245 if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, cdata, cipherlen, &(ciphers), 0) == NULL) {
1249 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1252 id = s->session->cipher->id;
1255 fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
1256 sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
1258 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
1259 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
1261 fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1262 i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1270 * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1275 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1276 && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
1278 * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
1279 * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
1280 * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
1281 * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
1282 * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
1284 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1285 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
1286 s->session->cipher = c;
1293 * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
1296 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1298 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1304 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &complen)
1305 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &cdata, complen)) {
1306 /* not enough data */
1307 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1312 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1315 for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
1322 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1323 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1328 /* TLS extensions */
1329 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1330 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &pkt)) {
1331 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1337 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake
1338 * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before
1339 * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket
1340 * processing to use it in key derivation.
1344 pos = s->s3->server_random;
1345 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
1350 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
1351 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
1353 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1354 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
1355 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers,
1357 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
1359 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1360 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
1364 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1366 pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s,
1371 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
1372 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1377 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
1378 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1379 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1380 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1381 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1386 * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1387 * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
1388 * algorithms from the client, starting at q.
1390 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
1391 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1392 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1393 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1394 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1396 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1397 /* Can't disable compression */
1398 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1399 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1400 SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1403 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1404 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) {
1405 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1406 if (comp_id == comp->id) {
1407 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1411 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1413 SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1416 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1417 for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
1418 if (q[k] == comp_id)
1422 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1423 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1424 SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1429 else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
1430 /* See if we have a match */
1431 int m, nn, v, done = 0;
1434 nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1435 for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
1436 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
1438 for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
1448 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1454 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1455 * using compression.
1457 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1464 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher
1468 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1469 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
1471 s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
1473 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1474 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1475 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1476 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1481 if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1485 /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
1487 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
1488 int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
1490 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1491 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
1495 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
1498 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1500 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1503 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1504 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1507 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1508 /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
1509 if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
1510 s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
1511 ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
1513 if (s->session->not_resumable)
1514 /* do not send a session ticket */
1515 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
1517 /* Session-id reuse */
1518 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1521 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1522 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
1527 * we now have the following setup.
1529 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1530 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1531 * compression - basically ignored right now
1532 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1533 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1534 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1535 * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
1538 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1539 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
1540 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1550 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1552 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1555 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1556 return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
1559 int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1562 unsigned char *p, *d;
1567 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1568 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1570 /* Do the message type and length last */
1571 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1573 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1574 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1577 * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
1578 * ssl3_get_client_hello()
1580 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1581 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1584 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1585 * back in the server hello:
1586 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1587 * we send back the old session ID.
1588 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1589 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1590 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1591 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1593 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1594 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1595 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1596 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1599 if (s->session->not_resumable ||
1600 (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1602 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1604 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1605 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1607 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1611 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1614 /* put the cipher */
1615 i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
1618 /* put the compression method */
1619 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1622 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1625 *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1628 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1629 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1630 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1634 ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
1636 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1638 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
1644 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1648 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1651 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1652 return ssl_do_write(s);
1655 int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1658 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1659 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
1660 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1663 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1666 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1667 return ssl_do_write(s);
1670 int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1672 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1676 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1679 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1680 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1682 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1683 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1684 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1687 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1690 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1691 unsigned char *p, *d;
1701 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1702 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1703 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1708 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1710 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1711 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1713 * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
1716 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
1717 n += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1719 /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
1720 if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
1722 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1723 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1724 if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
1725 rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
1726 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
1727 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1728 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1730 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1733 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1734 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1735 SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1739 cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
1742 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1744 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1749 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
1752 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1753 if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
1754 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
1755 dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
1757 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1759 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1764 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1765 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1766 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1768 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
1771 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1772 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1773 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1776 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
1777 DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
1778 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1780 SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1783 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1784 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1785 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1789 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
1791 else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1792 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1797 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1798 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1799 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
1800 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1805 dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1806 dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1807 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1817 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1818 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
1819 const EC_GROUP *group;
1821 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1822 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
1823 /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
1824 int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
1825 if (nid != NID_undef)
1826 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1827 } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
1828 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1829 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
1831 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
1832 s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1834 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1835 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1836 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1837 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1841 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1843 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1847 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1848 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1849 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1852 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
1854 else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1859 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1860 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1861 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1862 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1863 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1864 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1870 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1871 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1872 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1877 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1878 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1879 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1880 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1885 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
1886 * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
1890 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1892 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1893 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1898 * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
1899 * allocate memory accordingly.
1901 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1902 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1903 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1906 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1907 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
1908 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1909 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1911 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1915 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1916 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1917 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1918 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1920 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1925 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1929 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
1930 * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
1931 * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1934 n += 4 + encodedlen;
1937 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
1938 * can set these to NULLs
1945 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1946 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1947 if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
1948 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1949 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1950 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
1951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1952 SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1955 r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
1956 r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
1957 r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
1958 r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
1962 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1964 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1967 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1968 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1969 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1970 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1977 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
1978 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
1979 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
1981 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1984 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1990 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
1991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
1994 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
1996 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1997 if (type & SSL_PSK) {
1998 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1999 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) {
2000 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
2001 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
2002 strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
2003 p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2010 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
2011 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2012 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
2022 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2023 if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2025 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
2026 * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
2027 * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
2028 * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
2030 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
2038 memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
2039 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2040 encodedPoint = NULL;
2048 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
2049 * points to the space at the end.
2051 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2052 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2055 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
2056 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
2057 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
2058 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
2059 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
2060 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2062 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2064 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2065 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
2069 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
2070 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
2079 /* send signature algorithm */
2080 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2081 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
2082 /* Should never happen */
2083 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2085 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2091 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2093 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
2094 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
2096 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
2098 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
2099 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
2100 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
2101 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
2106 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2109 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
2110 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2111 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2112 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
2117 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
2118 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2119 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2124 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2125 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2126 return ssl_do_write(s);
2128 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2130 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2131 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2132 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2134 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2135 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2139 int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2141 unsigned char *p, *d;
2142 int i, j, nl, off, n;
2143 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
2147 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
2150 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2152 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2154 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
2159 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2160 const unsigned char *psigs;
2161 unsigned char *etmp = p;
2162 nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
2163 /* Skip over length for now */
2165 nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
2166 /* Now fill in length */
2176 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2179 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
2180 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
2181 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
2182 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
2183 (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
2184 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2188 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
2190 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
2195 /* else no CA names */
2196 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
2199 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
2200 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2204 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2207 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2208 return ssl_do_write(s);
2210 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2214 int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2219 unsigned long alg_k;
2220 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2222 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2224 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2226 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
2228 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2229 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2230 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2231 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2232 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2235 unsigned char *data;
2238 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2239 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2240 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2241 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
2245 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
2246 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2247 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2251 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2253 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2254 /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
2255 if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
2256 unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
2259 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
2260 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2261 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2264 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2265 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2267 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2270 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
2271 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2273 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2277 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2278 s->session->psk_identity = OPENSSL_malloc(i + 1);
2279 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2280 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2282 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2285 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, (unsigned char *)s->session->psk_identity,
2287 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2291 s->session->psk_identity[i] = '\0';
2293 psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
2296 if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2297 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2300 } else if (psklen == 0) {
2302 * PSK related to the given identity not found
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2305 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2306 al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2310 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
2311 s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
2312 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
2314 if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
2315 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2320 s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
2322 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2323 /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
2324 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2325 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2329 /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
2330 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
2331 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2337 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2338 if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
2339 unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2341 unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
2344 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2345 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) {
2346 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2347 rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2349 * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already
2352 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2354 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2359 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2360 if ((pkey == NULL) ||
2361 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2362 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2364 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2367 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2370 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2371 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
2372 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
2373 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2377 remain = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
2379 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
2380 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2381 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2382 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2386 if (!PACKET_back(&pkt, 2)) {
2388 * We already read these 2 bytes so this should never
2391 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2392 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2393 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2399 remain = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
2403 * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
2404 * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
2405 * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
2406 * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
2407 * bound is sufficient to be safe.
2410 if (remain < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
2411 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2413 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2417 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, remain)) {
2418 /* We already checked we had enough data so this shouldn't happen */
2419 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2420 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2424 * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of
2425 * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
2426 * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and
2427 * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt
2428 * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1
2431 if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
2432 sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
2435 RSA_private_decrypt(remain, data, data, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2439 * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will
2440 * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise.
2443 constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
2446 * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then
2447 * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The
2448 * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2449 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number
2450 * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in
2451 * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
2454 constant_time_eq_8(data[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
2456 constant_time_eq_8(data[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
2459 * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2460 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2461 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2462 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2463 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2464 * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
2467 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
2468 unsigned char workaround_good;
2470 constant_time_eq_8(data[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
2472 constant_time_eq_8(data[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
2473 version_good |= workaround_good;
2477 * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to
2478 * remain non-zero (0xff).
2480 decrypt_good &= version_good;
2483 * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using
2484 * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not
2485 * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees
2486 * it is still sufficiently large to read from.
2488 for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
2489 data[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, data[j],
2490 rand_premaster_secret[j]);
2493 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, data, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret),
2495 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2496 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2501 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2502 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2504 EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
2506 unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
2508 if (!PACKET_get_bookmark(&pkt, &bookm)) {
2509 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2510 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2513 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)) {
2514 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
2515 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2516 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2517 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2522 if (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != i) {
2523 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2525 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2528 if (!PACKET_goto_bookmark(&pkt, bookm)) {
2529 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2531 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2534 i = PACKET_remaining(&pkt);
2537 if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
2538 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA;
2539 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)
2540 idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA;
2542 skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey;
2543 if ((skey == NULL) ||
2544 (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
2545 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2546 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2547 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2550 dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
2551 } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
2552 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2553 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2554 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2557 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
2560 /* Get pubkey from cert */
2561 EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2563 if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1)
2564 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2566 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2567 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2569 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2572 EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
2573 pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
2575 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2576 /* We already checked we have enough data */
2577 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2579 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2582 pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
2585 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2589 i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
2592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2597 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2598 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
2604 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
2605 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2606 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2614 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2615 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2619 const EC_GROUP *group;
2620 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2621 unsigned char *shared;
2623 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2624 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2625 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2629 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2630 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2631 /* use the certificate */
2632 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2635 * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the
2636 * ServerKeyExchange msg.
2638 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2641 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2642 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2644 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2645 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2646 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2650 /* Let's get client's public key */
2651 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
2652 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2657 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2659 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
2660 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2662 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2665 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2666 == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
2668 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication
2669 * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the
2670 * code is never executed. When that support is added, we
2671 * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is
2672 * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly
2673 * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
2675 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2677 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2681 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2682 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
2684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2687 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2690 * Get client's public key from encoded point in the
2691 * ClientKeyExchange message.
2693 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
2694 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2695 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2699 /* Get encoded point length */
2700 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &i)) {
2701 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2703 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2706 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)
2707 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
2708 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2711 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
2712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2717 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2718 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2719 if (field_size <= 0) {
2720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2723 shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
2724 if (shared == NULL) {
2725 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2728 i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
2731 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2732 OPENSSL_free(shared);
2736 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2737 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2738 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2739 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2740 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2741 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2743 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
2744 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2745 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2751 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2752 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2753 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &i)
2754 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, i)) {
2755 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2756 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2759 if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
2760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2763 if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
2764 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
2765 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2767 SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
2770 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2771 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2772 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2777 if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
2778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2782 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2783 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2785 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2786 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2787 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2788 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
2789 unsigned long alg_a;
2793 /* Get our certificate private key */
2794 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2795 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2796 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2798 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
2799 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2801 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2802 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2803 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a
2804 * client certificate for authorization only.
2806 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2807 if (client_pub_pkey) {
2808 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2811 /* Decrypt session key */
2812 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, n)) {
2813 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2818 ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
2819 n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
2820 || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
2821 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2822 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2827 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
2828 (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
2829 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2830 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2833 /* Generate master secret */
2834 if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
2835 sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
2836 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2837 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2840 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2841 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2842 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2847 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2848 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2853 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2860 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2861 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2865 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2866 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2867 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2868 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2870 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2871 OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
2872 s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
2874 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
2878 int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2880 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2881 unsigned char *sig, *data;
2882 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2887 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2890 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2893 * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
2894 * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
2895 * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
2896 * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
2897 * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
2898 * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
2900 if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
2905 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2906 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2907 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2908 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
2909 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2914 peer = s->session->peer;
2915 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2916 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2918 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2920 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2921 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2925 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2926 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2928 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2931 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2933 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
2936 if (n == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2939 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2942 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &sig, 2)) {
2943 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2946 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
2948 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2950 } else if (rv == 0) {
2951 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2955 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
2958 if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &len)) {
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2960 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2964 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2965 if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2967 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2970 if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&pkt, &data, len)) {
2971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2972 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2976 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2979 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2980 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2981 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2982 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2986 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
2989 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
2990 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2991 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2992 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2996 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
2997 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2998 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3002 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3003 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3004 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3005 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len,
3008 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3009 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3013 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3019 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3020 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3021 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3022 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3023 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.dsa);
3026 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3032 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3033 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3034 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3035 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3036 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.ec);
3039 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3045 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3046 unsigned char signature[64];
3048 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3049 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3051 fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", len);
3053 for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
3054 signature[63 - idx] = data[idx];
3056 j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3058 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3060 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3061 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3066 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3073 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3074 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3077 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3078 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3079 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3080 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3084 int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3086 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
3088 unsigned long l, llen, n;
3089 const unsigned char *certstart;
3090 unsigned char *certbytes;
3091 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
3094 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3097 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
3102 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
3103 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3104 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3105 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3106 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3107 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3111 * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
3113 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3115 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3116 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3119 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
3123 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
3124 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3129 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3130 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3135 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
3136 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3140 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&pkt, &llen)
3141 || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&pkt, &spkt, llen)
3142 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != 0) {
3143 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3148 while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
3149 if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
3150 || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
3151 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3152 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3153 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3157 certstart = certbytes;
3158 x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3163 if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
3164 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3165 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3166 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3169 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
3170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3176 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
3177 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3178 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3179 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3180 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3181 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3184 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3185 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3186 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
3187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3188 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3189 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3192 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3193 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
3194 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3199 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
3201 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3202 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3203 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
3207 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
3208 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3211 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
3213 al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3215 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
3218 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3221 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3222 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
3223 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3225 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
3226 s->session->peer_chain = sk;
3228 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
3229 * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
3236 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
3238 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3240 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
3244 int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3248 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
3249 cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
3251 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3252 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3256 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
3257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3258 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3261 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3264 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3265 return ssl_do_write(s);
3268 /* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3269 int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3271 unsigned char *senc = NULL;
3275 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
3276 unsigned char *p, *macstart;
3277 const unsigned char *const_p;
3278 int len, slen_full, slen;
3281 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3282 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3283 unsigned char key_name[16];
3285 /* get session encoding length */
3286 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3288 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
3291 if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
3292 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3295 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3297 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3301 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3302 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3305 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
3309 * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
3312 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3315 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3317 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3318 if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
3319 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3323 if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
3324 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3327 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3330 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3331 * follows handshake_header_length +
3332 * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3333 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3334 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3335 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3337 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3338 SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
3339 EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3342 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3344 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
3345 * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
3347 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
3348 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3352 if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
3354 if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3355 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
3357 if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3358 EVP_sha256(), NULL))
3360 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3364 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
3365 * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
3366 * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
3368 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3370 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3372 /* Output key name */
3374 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3377 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3378 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3379 /* Encrypt session data */
3380 if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
3383 if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
3387 if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
3389 if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
3392 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3393 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3396 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3398 len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
3399 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
3400 p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
3402 if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
3404 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3408 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3409 return ssl_do_write(s);
3412 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3413 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3414 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3418 int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3420 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
3423 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3424 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3425 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3428 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
3429 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3433 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3436 *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3437 /* message length */
3438 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3440 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
3441 /* length of OCSP response */
3442 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3443 /* actual response */
3444 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3445 /* number of bytes to write */
3446 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3447 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3451 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3452 return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3455 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3457 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
3458 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
3460 int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3463 unsigned int proto_len, padding_len;
3468 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3469 * extension in their ClientHello
3471 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
3472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
3473 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3474 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3478 /* See the payload format below */
3479 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3480 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3481 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3482 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
3488 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
3489 * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
3490 * ssl3_get_finished).
3492 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
3493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3494 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3499 goto err; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3502 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, s->init_msg, n)) {
3503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3508 * The payload looks like:
3510 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3511 * uint8 padding_len;
3512 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3514 if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &proto_len)){
3515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3519 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3520 if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
3521 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3525 if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&pkt, s->next_proto_negotiated, proto_len)
3526 || !PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &padding_len)
3527 || PACKET_remaining(&pkt) != padding_len) {
3528 OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
3529 s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
3530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3536 s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
3541 #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
3543 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
3545 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
3548 const SSL_CIPHER *c;
3549 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
3553 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
3556 n = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN;
3558 n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
3560 if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
3561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3562 SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
3565 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
3566 sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
3568 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3573 sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
3576 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw);
3577 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num);
3578 if (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw == NULL) {
3579 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3582 s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num;
3584 for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
3585 /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
3586 if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
3587 (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3588 (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3589 /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
3590 if (s->renegotiate) {
3591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3592 SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
3593 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3596 s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
3598 #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
3599 fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
3604 /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
3605 if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
3606 (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
3607 (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
3609 * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
3610 * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
3613 if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
3614 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
3615 SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3617 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
3618 SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
3627 * We only support SSLv2 format ciphers in SSLv3+ using a
3628 * SSLv2 backward compatible ClientHello. In this case the first
3629 * byte is always 0 for SSLv3 compatible ciphers. Anything else
3630 * is an SSLv2 cipher and we ignore it
3633 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &p[1]);
3637 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
3641 if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
3642 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3652 if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
3653 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);