ssl/s3_pkt.c

   1 /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
   2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
   3  * All rights reserved.
   4  *
   5  * This package is an SSL implementation written
   6  * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
   7  * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
   8  *
   9  * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
  10  * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
  11  * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
  12  * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
  13  * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
  14  * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  15  *
  16  * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
  17  * the code are not to be removed.
  18  * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
  19  * as the author of the parts of the library used.
  20  * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
  21  * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
  22  *
  23  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  24  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  25  * are met:
  26  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
  27  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  28  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  29  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
  30  *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
  31  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
  32  *    must display the following acknowledgement:
  33  *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
  34  *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
  35  *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
  36  *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
  37  * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
  38  *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
  39  *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
  40  *
  41  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
  42  * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  43  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
  44  * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
  45  * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
  46  * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
  47  * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
  48  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
  49  * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
  50  * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
  51  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  52  *
  53  * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
  54  * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
  55  * copied and put under another distribution licence
  56  * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  57  */
  58 /* ====================================================================
  59  * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  60  *
  61  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  62  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
  63  * are met:
  64  *
  65  * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
  66  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
  67  *
  68  * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
  69  *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
  70  *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
  71  *    distribution.
  72  *
  73  * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
  74  *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
  75  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  76  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  77  *
  78  * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
  79  *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
  80  *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
  81  *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
  82  *
  83  * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
  84  *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
  85  *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
  86  *
  87  * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
  88  *    acknowledgment:
  89  *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
  90  *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
  91  *
  92  * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
  93  * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
  94  * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
  95  * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
  96  * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
  97  * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
  98  * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
  99  * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 100  * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
 101  * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 102  * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 103  * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 104  * ====================================================================
 105  *
 106  * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
 107  * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
 108  * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
 109  *
 110  */
 111
 112 #include <stdio.h>
 113 #include <errno.h>
 114 #define USE_SOCKETS
 115 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
 118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 119
 120 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 121                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
 122 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
 123
 124 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
 125         {
 126         /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
 127          * packet by another n bytes.
 128          * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
 129          * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
 130          * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
 131          * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
 132          */
 133         int i,len,left;
 134         long align=0;
 135         unsigned char *pkt;
 136         SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
 137
 138         if (n <= 0) return n;
 139
 140         rb    = &(s->s3->rbuf);
 141         if (rb->buf == NULL)
 142                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
 143                         return -1;
 144
 145         left  = rb->left;
 146 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
 147         align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 148         align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
 149 #endif
 150
 151         if (!extend)
 152                 {
 153                 /* start with empty packet ... */
 154                 if (left == 0)
 155                         rb->offset = align;
 156                 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 157                         {
 158                         /* check if next packet length is large
 159                          * enough to justify payload alignment... */
 160                         pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
 161                         if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
 162                             && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
 163                                 {
 164                                 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
 165                                  * and its length field is insane, we can
 166                                  * only be led to wrong decision about
 167                                  * whether memmove will occur or not.
 168                                  * Header values has no effect on memmove
 169                                  * arguments and therefore no buffer
 170                                  * overrun can be triggered. */
 171                                 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
 172                                 rb->offset = align;
 173                                 }
 174                         }
 175                 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
 176                 s->packet_length = 0;
 177                 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
 178                 }
 179
 180         /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
 181          * because the read operation returns the whole packet
 182          * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
 183         if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 184                 {
 185                 if (left > 0 && n > left)
 186                         n = left;
 187                 }
 188
 189         /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
 190         if (left >= n)
 191                 {
 192                 s->packet_length+=n;
 193                 rb->left=left-n;
 194                 rb->offset+=n;
 195                 return(n);
 196                 }
 197
 198         /* else we need to read more data */
 199
 200         len = s->packet_length;
 201         pkt = rb->buf+align;
 202         /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
 203          * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
 204          * 'left' extra ones at the end */
 205         if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
 206                 {
 207                 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
 208                 s->packet = pkt;
 209                 rb->offset = len + align;
 210                 }
 211
 212         if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
 213                 {
 214                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 215                 return -1;
 216                 }
 217
 218         if (!s->read_ahead)
 219                 /* ignore max parameter */
 220                 max = n;
 221         else
 222                 {
 223                 if (max < n)
 224                         max = n;
 225                 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
 226                         max = rb->len - rb->offset;
 227                 }
 228
 229         while (left < n)
 230                 {
 231                 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
 232                  * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
 233                  * len+max if possible) */
 234
 235                 clear_sys_error();
 236                 if (s->rbio != NULL)
 237                         {
 238                         s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
 239                         i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
 240                         }
 241                 else
 242                         {
 243                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
 244                         i = -1;
 245                         }
 246
 247                 if (i <= 0)
 248                         {
 249                         rb->left = left;
 250                         if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
 251                             SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 252                                 if (len+left == 0)
 253                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
 254                         return(i);
 255                         }
 256                 left+=i;
 257                 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
 258                  * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
 259                  * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
 260                 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 261                         {
 262                         if (n > left)
 263                                 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
 264                         }
 265                 }
 266
 267         /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
 268         rb->offset += n;
 269         rb->left = left - n;
 270         s->packet_length += n;
 271         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 272         return(n);
 273         }
 274
 275 /* Call this to get a new input record.
 276  * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
 277  * or non-blocking IO.
 278  * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
 279  * ssl->s3->rrec.type    - is the type of record
 280  * ssl->s3->rrec.data,   - data
 281  * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
 282  */
 283 /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
 284 static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 285         {
 286         int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
 287         int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
 288         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 289         SSL_SESSION *sess;
 290         unsigned char *p;
 291         unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
 292         short version;
 293         int mac_size;
 294         int clear=0;
 295         size_t extra;
 296         int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
 297         unsigned char *mac = NULL;
 298
 299         rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 300         sess=s->session;
 301
 302         if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
 303                 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
 304         else
 305                 extra=0;
 306         if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
 307                 {
 308                 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
 309                  * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
 310                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 311                 return -1;
 312                 }
 313
 314 again:
 315         /* check if we have the header */
 316         if (    (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
 317                 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
 318                 {
 319                 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
 320                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
 321                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
 322
 323                 p=s->packet;
 324
 325                 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
 326                 rr->type= *(p++);
 327                 ssl_major= *(p++);
 328                 ssl_minor= *(p++);
 329                 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
 330                 n2s(p,rr->length);
 331 #if 0
 332 fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
 333 #endif
 334
 335                 /* Lets check version */
 336                 if (!s->first_packet)
 337                         {
 338                         if (version != s->version)
 339                                 {
 340                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
 341                                 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
 342                                         /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
 343                                         s->version = (unsigned short)version;
 344                                 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
 345                                 goto f_err;
 346                                 }
 347                         }
 348
 349                 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
 350                         {
 351                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
 352                         goto err;
 353                         }
 354
 355                 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 356                         {
 357                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 358                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 359                         goto f_err;
 360                         }
 361
 362                 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
 363                 }
 364
 365         /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
 366
 367         if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
 368                 {
 369                 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
 370                 i=rr->length;
 371                 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
 372                 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
 373                 /* now n == rr->length,
 374                  * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
 375                 }
 376
 377         s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
 378
 379         /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
 380          * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
 381          */
 382         rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
 383
 384         /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
 385          * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
 386          * need to be copied into rr->data by either
 387          * the decryption or by the decompression
 388          * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
 389          * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
 390
 391         /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
 392          * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
 393
 394         /* check is not needed I believe */
 395         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
 396                 {
 397                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 398                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 399                 goto f_err;
 400                 }
 401
 402         /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
 403         rr->data=rr->input;
 404
 405         enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
 406         if (enc_err <= 0)
 407                 {
 408                 if (enc_err == 0)
 409                         /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
 410                         goto err;
 411
 412                 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
 413                  * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
 414                  * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
 415                  * the MAC computation anyway. */
 416                 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 417                 }
 418
 419 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 420 printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
 421 { unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 422 printf("\n");
 423 #endif
 424
 425         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
 426         if (    (sess == NULL) ||
 427                 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
 428                 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
 429                 clear=1;
 430
 431         if (!clear)
 432                 {
 433                 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
 434                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
 435                 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
 436
 437                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
 438                         {
 439 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
 440                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 441                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 442                         goto f_err;
 443 #else
 444                         decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 445 #endif
 446                         }
 447                 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
 448                 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
 449                         {
 450                         rr->length -= mac_size;
 451                         mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
 452                         }
 453                 else
 454                         {
 455                         /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
 456 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
 457                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 458                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 459                         goto f_err;
 460 #else
 461                         decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 462                         rr->length = 0;
 463 #endif
 464                         }
 465                 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
 466                 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
 467                         {
 468                         decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 469                         }
 470                 }
 471
 472         if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
 473                 {
 474                 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
 475                  * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
 476                  * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
 477                  * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
 478                  * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
 479                 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
 480                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
 481                 goto f_err;
 482                 }
 483
 484         /* r->length is now just compressed */
 485         if (s->expand != NULL)
 486                 {
 487                 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
 488                         {
 489                         al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 490                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 491                         goto f_err;
 492                         }
 493                 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
 494                         {
 495                         al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
 496                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
 497                         goto f_err;
 498                         }
 499                 }
 500
 501         if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
 502                 {
 503                 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
 504                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 505                 goto f_err;
 506                 }
 507
 508         rr->off=0;
 509         /* So at this point the following is true
 510          * ssl->s3->rrec.type   is the type of record
 511          * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
 512          * ssl->s3->rrec.off    == offset to first valid byte
 513          * ssl->s3->rrec.data   == where to take bytes from, increment
 514          *                         after use :-).
 515          */
 516
 517         /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
 518         s->packet_length=0;
 519
 520         /* just read a 0 length packet */
 521         if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
 522
 523 #if 0
 524 fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
 525 #endif
 526
 527         return(1);
 528
 529 f_err:
 530         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
 531 err:
 532         return(ret);
 533         }
 534
 535 int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
 536         {
 537 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 538         int i;
 539         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 540
 541         rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
 542         i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
 543                 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
 544         if (i < 0)
 545                 return(0);
 546         else
 547                 rr->length=i;
 548         rr->data=rr->comp;
 549 #endif
 550         return(1);
 551         }
 552
 553 int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
 554         {
 555 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
 556         int i;
 557         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
 558
 559         wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
 560         i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
 561                 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
 562                 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
 563         if (i < 0)
 564                 return(0);
 565         else
 566                 wr->length=i;
 567
 568         wr->input=wr->data;
 569 #endif
 570         return(1);
 571         }
 572
 573 /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
 574  * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
 575  */
 576 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
 577         {
 578         const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
 579         unsigned int tot,n,nw;
 580         int i;
 581
 582         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 583         tot=s->s3->wnum;
 584         s->s3->wnum=0;
 585
 586         if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
 587                 {
 588                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
 589                 if (i < 0) return(i);
 590                 if (i == 0)
 591                         {
 592                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 593                         return -1;
 594                         }
 595                 }
 596
 597         n=(len-tot);
 598         for (;;)
 599                 {
 600                 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
 601                         nw=s->max_send_fragment;
 602                 else
 603                         nw=n;
 604
 605                 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
 606                 if (i <= 0)
 607                         {
 608                         s->s3->wnum=tot;
 609                         return i;
 610                         }
 611
 612                 if ((i == (int)n) ||
 613                         (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
 614                          (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
 615                         {
 616                         /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
 617                          * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
 618                         s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
 619
 620                         return tot+i;
 621                         }
 622
 623                 n-=i;
 624                 tot+=i;
 625                 }
 626         }
 627
 628 static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 629                          unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
 630         {
 631         unsigned char *p,*plen;
 632         int i,mac_size,clear=0;
 633         int prefix_len=0;
 634         int eivlen;
 635         long align=0;
 636         SSL3_RECORD *wr;
 637         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
 638         SSL_SESSION *sess;
 639
 640         if (wb->buf == NULL)
 641                 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
 642                         return -1;
 643
 644         /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
 645          * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
 646         if (wb->left != 0)
 647                 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
 648
 649         /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
 650         if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
 651                 {
 652                 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
 653                 if (i <= 0)
 654                         return(i);
 655                 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
 656                 }
 657
 658         if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
 659                 return 0;
 660
 661         wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
 662         sess=s->session;
 663
 664         if (    (sess == NULL) ||
 665                 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
 666                 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
 667                 clear=1;
 668
 669         if (clear)
 670                 mac_size=0;
 671         else
 672                 {
 673                 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
 674                 if (mac_size < 0)
 675                         goto err;
 676                 }
 677
 678         /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
 679         if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
 680                 {
 681                 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
 682                  * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
 683
 684                 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
 685                         {
 686                         /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
 687                          * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
 688                          * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
 689                          * together with the actual payload) */
 690                         prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
 691                         if (prefix_len <= 0)
 692                                 goto err;
 693
 694                         if (prefix_len >
 695                 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
 696                                 {
 697                                 /* insufficient space */
 698                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 699                                 goto err;
 700                                 }
 701                         }
 702
 703                 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
 704                 }
 705
 706         if (create_empty_fragment)
 707                 {
 708 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
 709                 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
 710                  * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
 711                  * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
 712                  * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
 713                 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 714                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
 715 #endif
 716                 p = wb->buf + align;
 717                 wb->offset  = align;
 718                 }
 719         else if (prefix_len)
 720                 {
 721                 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
 722                 }
 723         else
 724                 {
 725 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
 726                 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 727                 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
 728 #endif
 729                 p = wb->buf + align;
 730                 wb->offset  = align;
 731                 }
 732
 733         /* write the header */
 734
 735         *(p++)=type&0xff;
 736         wr->type=type;
 737
 738         *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
 739         *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
 740
 741         /* field where we are to write out packet length */
 742         plen=p;
 743         p+=2;
 744         /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers and TLS version 1.1 or later */
 745         if (s->enc_write_ctx && s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
 746                 {
 747                 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
 748                 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
 749                         {
 750                         eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
 751                         if (eivlen <= 1)
 752                                 eivlen = 0;
 753                         }
 754                 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
 755                 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
 756                         eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
 757                 }
 758         else
 759                 eivlen = 0;
 760
 761         /* lets setup the record stuff. */
 762         wr->data=p + eivlen;
 763         wr->length=(int)len;
 764         wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
 765
 766         /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
 767          * wr->data */
 768
 769         /* first we compress */
 770         if (s->compress != NULL)
 771                 {
 772                 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
 773                         {
 774                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
 775                         goto err;
 776                         }
 777                 }
 778         else
 779                 {
 780                 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
 781                 wr->input=wr->data;
 782                 }
 783
 784         /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
 785          * from wr->input.  Length should be wr->length.
 786          * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
 787
 788         if (mac_size != 0)
 789                 {
 790                 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + eivlen]),1) < 0)
 791                         goto err;
 792                 wr->length+=mac_size;
 793                 }
 794
 795         wr->input=p;
 796         wr->data=p;
 797
 798         if (eivlen)
 799                 {
 800         /*      if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
 801                         goto err; */
 802                 wr->length += eivlen;
 803                 }
 804
 805         /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
 806         s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
 807
 808         /* record length after mac and block padding */
 809         s2n(wr->length,plen);
 810
 811         /* we should now have
 812          * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
 813          * wr->length long */
 814         wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
 815         wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
 816
 817         if (create_empty_fragment)
 818                 {
 819                 /* we are in a recursive call;
 820                  * just return the length, don't write out anything here
 821                  */
 822                 return wr->length;
 823                 }
 824
 825         /* now let's set up wb */
 826         wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
 827
 828         /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
 829         s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
 830         s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
 831         s->s3->wpend_type=type;
 832         s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
 833
 834         /* we now just need to write the buffer */
 835         return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
 836 err:
 837         return -1;
 838         }
 839
 840 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
 841 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
 842         unsigned int len)
 843         {
 844         int i;
 845         SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
 846
 847 /* XXXX */
 848         if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
 849                 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
 850                         !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
 851                 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
 852                 {
 853                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
 854                 return(-1);
 855                 }
 856
 857         for (;;)
 858                 {
 859                 clear_sys_error();
 860                 if (s->wbio != NULL)
 861                         {
 862                         s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
 863                         i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
 864                                 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
 865                                 (unsigned int)wb->left);
 866                         }
 867                 else
 868                         {
 869                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
 870                         i= -1;
 871                         }
 872                 if (i == wb->left)
 873                         {
 874                         wb->left=0;
 875                         wb->offset+=i;
 876                         if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
 877                             SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
 878                                 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
 879                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 880                         return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
 881                         }
 882                 else if (i <= 0) {
 883                         if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
 884                             s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
 885                                 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
 886                                    point in using a datagram service */
 887                                 wb->left = 0;
 888                         }
 889                         return(i);
 890                 }
 891                 wb->offset+=i;
 892                 wb->left-=i;
 893                 }
 894         }
 895
 896 /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
 897  * 'type' is one of the following:
 898  *
 899  *   -  SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
 900  *   -  SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
 901  *   -  0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
 902  *
 903  * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
 904  * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
 905  *
 906  * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
 907  * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
 908  * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
 909  * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
 910  * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
 911  * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
 912  *     Change cipher spec protocol
 913  *             just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
 914  *     Alert protocol
 915  *             2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
 916  *     Handshake protocol
 917  *             4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
 918  *             to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
 919  *             here, anything else is handled by higher layers
 920  *     Application data protocol
 921  *             none of our business
 922  */
 923 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
 924         {
 925         int al,i,j,ret;
 926         unsigned int n;
 927         SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 928         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
 929
 930         if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
 931                 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
 932                         return(-1);
 933
 934         if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
 935             (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
 936                 {
 937                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
 938                 return -1;
 939                 }
 940
 941         if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
 942                 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
 943                 {
 944                 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
 945                 unsigned char *dst = buf;
 946                 unsigned int k;
 947
 948                 /* peek == 0 */
 949                 n = 0;
 950                 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
 951                         {
 952                         *dst++ = *src++;
 953                         len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
 954                         n++;
 955                         }
 956                 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
 957                 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
 958                         s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
 959                 return n;
 960         }
 961
 962         /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
 963
 964         if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
 965                 {
 966                 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
 967                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
 968                 if (i < 0) return(i);
 969                 if (i == 0)
 970                         {
 971                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
 972                         return(-1);
 973                         }
 974                 }
 975 start:
 976         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
 977
 978         /* s->s3->rrec.type         - is the type of record
 979          * s->s3->rrec.data,    - data
 980          * s->s3->rrec.off,     - offset into 'data' for next read
 981          * s->s3->rrec.length,  - number of bytes. */
 982         rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
 983
 984         /* get new packet if necessary */
 985         if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
 986                 {
 987                 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
 988                 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
 989                 }
 990
 991         /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
 992
 993         if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
 994                                        * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
 995                 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
 996                 {
 997                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
 998                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
 999                 goto f_err;
1000                 }
1001
1002         /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
1003          * (even in 'peek' mode) */
1004         if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
1005                 {
1006                 rr->length=0;
1007                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1008                 return(0);
1009                 }
1010
1011
1012         if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1013                 {
1014                 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
1015                  * are doing a handshake for the first time */
1016                 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1017                         (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
1018                         {
1019                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1020                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1021                         goto f_err;
1022                         }
1023
1024                 if (len <= 0) return(len);
1025
1026                 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1027                         n = rr->length;
1028                 else
1029                         n = (unsigned int)len;
1030
1031                 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1032                 if (!peek)
1033                         {
1034                         rr->length-=n;
1035                         rr->off+=n;
1036                         if (rr->length == 0)
1037                                 {
1038                                 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1039                                 rr->off=0;
1040                                 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1041                                         ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1042                                 }
1043                         }
1044                 return(n);
1045                 }
1046
1047
1048         /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1049          * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1050
1051         /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1052          * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1053          */
1054                 {
1055                 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1056                 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1057                 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1058
1059                 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1060                         {
1061                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1062                         dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1063                         dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1064                         }
1065                 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1066                         {
1067                         dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1068                         dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1069                         dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1070                         }
1071
1072                 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1073                         {
1074                         n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1075                         if (rr->length < n)
1076                                 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1077
1078                         /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1079                         while (n-- > 0)
1080                                 {
1081                                 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1082                                 rr->length--;
1083                                 }
1084
1085                         if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1086                                 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1087                         }
1088                 }
1089
1090         /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1091          * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1092          * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1093
1094         /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1095         if ((!s->server) &&
1096                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1097                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1098                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1099                 {
1100                 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1101
1102                 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1103                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1104                         (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1105                         {
1106                         al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1107                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1108                         goto f_err;
1109                         }
1110
1111                 if (s->msg_callback)
1112                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1113
1114                 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1115                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1116                         !s->s3->renegotiate)
1117                         {
1118                         ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1119                         if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1120                                 {
1121                                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1122                                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1123                                 if (i == 0)
1124                                         {
1125                                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1126                                         return(-1);
1127                                         }
1128
1129                                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1130                                         {
1131                                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1132                                                 {
1133                                                 BIO *bio;
1134                                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1135                                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1136                                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1137                                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1138                                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1139                                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1140                                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1141                                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1142                                                 return(-1);
1143                                                 }
1144                                         }
1145                                 }
1146                         }
1147                 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1148                  * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1149                 goto start;
1150                 }
1151         /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1152          * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1153          * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1154          */
1155         if (s->server &&
1156                 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1157                 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1158                 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1159                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1160                 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1161                 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1162                 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1163
1164                 {
1165                 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1166                 rr->length = 0;
1167                 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1168                 goto start;
1169                 }
1170         if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1171                 {
1172                 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1173                 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1174
1175                 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1176
1177                 if (s->msg_callback)
1178                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1179
1180                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1181                         cb=s->info_callback;
1182                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1183                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1184
1185                 if (cb != NULL)
1186                         {
1187                         j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1188                         cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1189                         }
1190
1191                 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1192                         {
1193                         s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1194                         if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1195                                 {
1196                                 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1197                                 return(0);
1198                                 }
1199                         /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1200                          * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1201                          * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1202                          * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1203                          * expects it to succeed.
1204                          *
1205                          * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1206                          * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1207                          */
1208                         else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1209                                 {
1210                                 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1211                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1212                                 goto f_err;
1213                                 }
1214 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1215                         else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1216                                 return(0);
1217 #endif
1218                         }
1219                 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1220                         {
1221                         char tmp[16];
1222
1223                         s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1224                         s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1225                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1226                         BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1227                         ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1228                         s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1229                         SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1230                         return(0);
1231                         }
1232                 else
1233                         {
1234                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1235                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1236                         goto f_err;
1237                         }
1238
1239                 goto start;
1240                 }
1241
1242         if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1243                 {
1244                 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1245                 rr->length=0;
1246                 return(0);
1247                 }
1248
1249         if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1250                 {
1251                 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1252                  * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1253                 if (    (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1254                         (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1255                         {
1256                         al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1257                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1258                         goto f_err;
1259                         }
1260
1261                 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1262                 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1263                         {
1264                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1265                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1266                         goto f_err;
1267                         }
1268
1269                 rr->length=0;
1270
1271                 if (s->msg_callback)
1272                         s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1273
1274                 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1275                 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1276                         goto err;
1277                 else
1278                         goto start;
1279                 }
1280
1281         /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1282         if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&     !s->in_handshake)
1283                 {
1284                 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1285                         !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1286                         {
1287 #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1288        * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1289        * protocol violations): */
1290                         s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1291                                 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1292                                 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1293 #else
1294                         s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1295 #endif
1296                         s->renegotiate=1;
1297                         s->new_session=1;
1298                         }
1299                 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1300                 if (i < 0) return(i);
1301                 if (i == 0)
1302                         {
1303                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1304                         return(-1);
1305                         }
1306
1307                 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1308                         {
1309                         if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1310                                 {
1311                                 BIO *bio;
1312                                 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1313                                  * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1314                                  * the retry option set.  Otherwise renegotiation may
1315                                  * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1316                                 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1317                                 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1318                                 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1319                                 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1320                                 return(-1);
1321                                 }
1322                         }
1323                 goto start;
1324                 }
1325
1326         switch (rr->type)
1327                 {
1328         default:
1329 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1330                 /* TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1331                  * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1332                  */
1333                 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION)
1334                         {
1335                         rr->length = 0;
1336                         goto start;
1337                         }
1338 #endif
1339                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1340                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1341                 goto f_err;
1342         case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1343         case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1344         case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1345                 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1346                  * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1347                  * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1348                 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1349                 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1350                 goto f_err;
1351         case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1352                 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1353                  * but have application data.  If the library was
1354                  * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1355                  * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1356                  * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1357                  * we will indulge it.
1358                  */
1359                 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1360                         (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1361                         ((
1362                                 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1363                                 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1364                                 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1365                                 ) || (
1366                                         (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1367                                         (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1368                                         (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1369                                         )
1370                                 ))
1371                         {
1372                         s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1373                         return(-1);
1374                         }
1375                 else
1376                         {
1377                         al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1378                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1379                         goto f_err;
1380                         }
1381                 }
1382         /* not reached */
1383
1384 f_err:
1385         ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1386 err:
1387         return(-1);
1388         }
1389
1390 int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1391         {
1392         int i;
1393         const char *sender;
1394         int slen;
1395
1396         if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1397                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1398         else
1399                 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1400
1401         if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1402                 {
1403                 if (s->session == NULL)
1404                         {
1405                         /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1406                         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1407                         return (0);
1408                         }
1409
1410                 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1411                 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1412                 }
1413
1414         if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1415                 return(0);
1416
1417         /* we have to record the message digest at
1418          * this point so we can get it before we read
1419          * the finished message */
1420         if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1421                 {
1422                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1423                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1424                 }
1425         else
1426                 {
1427                 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1428                 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1429                 }
1430
1431         s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1432                 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1433
1434         return(1);
1435         }
1436
1437 int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1438         {
1439         /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1440         desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1441         if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1442                 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1443         if (desc < 0) return -1;
1444         /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1445         if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1446                 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1447
1448         s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1449         s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1450         s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1451         if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1452                 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1453         /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1454          * some time in the future */
1455         return -1;
1456         }
1457
1458 int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1459         {
1460         int i,j;
1461         void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1462
1463         s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1464         i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1465         if (i <= 0)
1466                 {
1467                 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1468                 }
1469         else
1470                 {
1471                 /* Alert sent to BIO.  If it is important, flush it now.
1472                  * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1473                  * we will not worry too much. */
1474                 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1475                         (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1476
1477                 if (s->msg_callback)
1478                         s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1479
1480                 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1481                         cb=s->info_callback;
1482                 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1483                         cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1484
1485                 if (cb != NULL)
1486                         {
1487                         j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1488                         cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1489                         }
1490                 }
1491         return(i);
1492         }