2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
111 /* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
124 /* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
152 #include "ssl_locl.h"
153 #include "kssl_lcl.h"
154 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
155 #include <openssl/rand.h>
156 #include <openssl/objects.h>
157 #include <openssl/evp.h>
158 #include <openssl/md5.h>
159 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
160 # include <openssl/dh.h>
162 #include <openssl/bn.h>
163 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
164 # include <openssl/engine.h>
167 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b);
169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
170 static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver)
172 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
173 return (SSLv3_client_method());
178 IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method,
179 ssl_undefined_function,
180 ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method)
182 int ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
185 unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
186 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
188 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
190 RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
194 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
195 cb = s->info_callback;
196 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
197 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
200 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
205 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
207 * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
208 * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
211 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
212 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
221 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
223 s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
224 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
228 case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
229 case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_CONNECT:
233 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
235 if ((s->version & 0xff00) != 0x0300) {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
241 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
246 /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */
247 s->type = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
249 if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
250 if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
254 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
262 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
267 /* setup buffing BIO */
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
273 /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
275 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
277 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
278 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
280 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
282 * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
284 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
287 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
288 case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
291 ret = ssl3_client_hello(s);
294 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
297 /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
298 if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
299 s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
303 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
304 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
305 ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
310 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
312 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
313 /* receive renewed session ticket */
314 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
318 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
322 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
323 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
324 /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH, SRP auth */
328 new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
329 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
330 ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
333 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
334 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
335 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
337 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
340 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
346 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
351 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
352 case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
353 ret = ssl3_get_key_exchange(s);
356 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
360 * at this point we check that we have the required stuff from
363 if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
369 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
370 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
371 ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
374 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
378 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
379 case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
380 ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
383 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
384 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
385 if ((ret = SRP_Calc_A_param(s)) <= 0) {
386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_SRP_A_CALC);
387 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
392 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req)
393 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
395 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
400 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
401 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
402 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
403 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
404 ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
407 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
411 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
412 case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
413 ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
417 * EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert sent back
420 * For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain of nothing is
421 * sent, but no verify packet is sent
424 * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication in ECDH
425 * cipher suites with ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. We
426 * need to skip the certificate verify message when client's
427 * ECDH public key is sent inside the client certificate.
429 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) {
430 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
432 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
434 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
435 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
441 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
442 case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
443 ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
446 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
450 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
451 case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
452 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
454 SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
458 #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
459 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
461 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
462 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A;
464 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
468 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
469 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
470 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
472 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
473 s->session->compress_meth = 0;
475 s->session->compress_meth = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
477 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
482 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
483 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))
491 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
492 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A:
493 case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B:
494 ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(s);
497 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
501 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
502 case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
503 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
504 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,
505 SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
507 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
509 ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len);
512 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
515 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
517 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
518 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) {
519 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
520 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER;
521 s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret = 0;
524 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
526 * Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected
528 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
529 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
533 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
538 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
539 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
540 case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
541 ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
544 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
548 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
550 ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
553 s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
558 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
559 case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
560 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
561 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
562 SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
567 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
569 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
573 case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
574 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
575 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
579 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
580 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
584 /* clean a few things up */
585 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
587 if (s->init_buf != NULL) {
588 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
593 * If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, remove the
596 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER))
597 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
598 /* else do it later in ssl3_write */
604 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
606 s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
610 s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
611 s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
614 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
626 /* did we do anything */
627 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
629 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
633 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
634 new_state = s->state;
636 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
637 s->state = new_state;
647 cb(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
651 int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s)
654 unsigned char *p, *d;
658 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
663 buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
664 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
665 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
666 if ((sess == NULL) ||
667 (sess->ssl_version != s->version) ||
668 !sess->session_id_length || (sess->not_resumable)) {
669 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
672 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
673 /* Determine which DTLS version to use */
674 int options = s->options;
675 /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */
676 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) {
677 if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,
679 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
683 * Disabling all versions is silly: return an error.
685 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) {
686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
690 * Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 features.
692 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
693 s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
696 * We only support one version: update method
698 if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)
699 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
700 s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
702 s->client_version = s->version;
704 /* else use the pre-loaded session */
706 p = s->s3->client_random;
709 * for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are
710 * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify
712 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
715 for (idx = 0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) {
724 if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
725 sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
728 /* Do the message type and length last */
729 d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
732 * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
733 * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
734 * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
735 * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
736 * choke if we initially report a higher version then
737 * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
738 * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
739 * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
742 * Possible scenario with previous logic:
743 * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
744 * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
745 * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
746 * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
747 * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
748 * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
749 * know that is maximum server supports.
750 * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
751 * containing version 1.0.
753 * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
754 * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
755 * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
756 * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
757 * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
758 * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
759 * the negotiated version.
761 *(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
762 *(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
765 memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
766 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
772 i = s->session->session_id_length;
775 if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
776 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
779 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, i);
783 /* cookie stuff for DTLS */
784 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
785 if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
789 *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len;
790 memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len);
791 p += s->d1->cookie_len;
794 /* Ciphers supported */
795 i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &(p[2]), 0);
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
800 #ifdef OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH
802 * Some servers hang if client hello > 256 bytes as hack workaround
803 * chop number of supported ciphers to keep it well below this if we
806 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION
807 && i > OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH)
808 i = OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH & ~1;
814 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
818 if (!ssl_allow_compression(s) || !s->ctx->comp_methods)
821 j = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
823 for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
824 comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, i);
828 *(p++) = 0; /* Add the NULL method */
830 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
832 if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
833 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
837 ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
839 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
846 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l);
847 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
850 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
851 return ssl_do_write(s);
856 int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
858 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
861 unsigned char *p, *d;
862 int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok;
865 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
869 * Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not match so set
870 * first packet if we're negotiating version.
875 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
876 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
877 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, &ok);
882 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
884 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
885 if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
886 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
888 } else { /* already sent a cookie */
890 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
897 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
898 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
899 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
903 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
904 if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
905 /* Work out correct protocol version to use */
906 int hversion = (p[0] << 8) | p[1];
907 int options = s->options;
908 if (hversion == DTLS1_2_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2))
909 s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method();
910 else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
912 SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
913 s->version = hversion;
914 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
916 } else if (hversion == DTLS1_VERSION && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1))
917 s->method = DTLSv1_client_method();
919 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
920 s->version = hversion;
921 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
924 s->version = s->method->version;
927 if ((p[0] != (s->version >> 8)) || (p[1] != (s->version & 0xff))) {
928 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
929 s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | p[1];
930 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
935 /* load the server hello data */
936 /* load the server random */
937 memcpy(s->s3->server_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
938 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
942 /* get the session-id */
945 if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) {
946 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
950 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
952 * check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared
955 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
956 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
957 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
958 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
959 &s->session->master_key_length,
961 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
962 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ?
963 pref_cipher : ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p + j);
967 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
969 if (!s->hit && j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length
970 && memcmp(p, s->session->session_id, j) == 0) {
971 if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length
972 || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) {
973 /* actually a client application bug */
974 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
976 SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
981 /* a miss or crap from the other end */
984 * If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new SSL_SESSION so
985 * we don't stuff up other people
987 if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
988 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
992 s->session->session_id_length = j;
993 memcpy(s->session->session_id, p, j); /* j could be 0 */
996 c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
999 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1003 /* Set version disabled mask now we know version */
1004 if (!SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
1005 ct->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
1009 * If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, so
1012 if (ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK)) {
1013 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1014 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1017 p += ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
1019 sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
1020 i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, c);
1022 /* we did not say we would use this cipher */
1023 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
1029 * Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
1030 * and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is
1031 * set and use it for comparison.
1033 if (s->session->cipher)
1034 s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
1035 if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
1036 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1038 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
1041 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1043 * Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for client
1046 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1048 /* lets get the compression algorithm */
1050 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1052 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1054 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1058 * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1059 * using compression.
1061 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
1062 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1067 if (s->hit && j != s->session->compress_meth) {
1068 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1070 SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM_NOT_RETURNED);
1075 else if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
1076 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_DISABLED);
1080 comp = ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods, j);
1082 if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) {
1083 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
1085 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1088 s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp;
1092 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1093 /* TLS extensions */
1094 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
1095 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1101 /* wrong packet length */
1102 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1109 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1114 int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
1116 int al, i, ok, ret = -1;
1117 unsigned long n, nc, llen, l;
1119 const unsigned char *q, *p;
1121 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
1123 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1124 int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth ==
1127 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1130 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1135 if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) ||
1136 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) &&
1137 (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) {
1138 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1142 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
1143 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1144 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
1147 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1149 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
1150 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1155 if (llen + 3 != n) {
1156 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1157 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1160 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
1162 if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
1163 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1165 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1170 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, l);
1172 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
1177 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1178 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1179 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1182 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1191 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
1192 if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0)
1193 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1194 && !((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1195 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1196 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1198 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1200 SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
1203 ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, i);
1206 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1210 sc = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1214 if (s->session->sess_cert)
1215 ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert);
1216 s->session->sess_cert = sc;
1218 sc->cert_chain = sk;
1220 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's certificate,
1221 * which we don't include in s3_srvr.c
1223 x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
1226 * VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end
1229 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
1231 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
1232 need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5) &&
1233 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
1237 fprintf(stderr, "pkey,x = %p, %p\n", pkey, x);
1238 fprintf(stderr, "ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x, pkey));
1239 fprintf(stderr, "cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %lx, %d\n",
1240 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name,
1241 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
1242 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, need_cert);
1243 #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1245 if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) {
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1249 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
1253 i = ssl_cert_type(x, pkey);
1254 if (need_cert && i < 0) {
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1258 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1263 int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
1264 if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) {
1266 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
1268 SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
1271 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1272 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1274 * Why would the following ever happen? We just created sc a couple
1277 if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL)
1278 X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
1279 sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 = x;
1280 sc->peer_key = &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]);
1282 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1283 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1284 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1285 s->session->peer = x;
1287 sc->peer_cert_type = i;
1288 sc->peer_key = NULL;
1290 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
1291 X509_free(s->session->peer);
1292 s->session->peer = NULL;
1294 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
1300 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1303 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1305 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
1309 int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1311 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1312 unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
1315 unsigned char *param, *p;
1317 long i, param_len, n, alg_k, alg_a;
1318 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1319 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1320 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1326 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1327 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
1328 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1329 EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1331 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
1334 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1337 * use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() as
1338 * ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped
1340 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1341 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1342 SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1343 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1347 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1349 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
1351 * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral
1354 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) {
1355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1356 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1359 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1361 * In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be omitted if no
1362 * identity hint is sent. Set session->sess_cert anyway to avoid
1365 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1366 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1367 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
1368 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1369 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
1372 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1376 param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1377 if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
1378 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1379 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
1380 RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
1381 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
1384 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1385 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
1386 DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
1387 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
1390 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1391 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
1392 EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
1393 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
1397 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
1400 /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */
1403 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1405 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1407 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1408 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
1409 char tmp_id_hint[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
1412 if (param_len > n) {
1413 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1419 * Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in
1420 * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of
1421 * a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK
1424 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
1425 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1429 if (i > n - param_len) {
1430 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1431 SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT_LENGTH);
1437 * If received PSK identity hint contains NULL characters, the hint
1438 * is truncated from the first NULL. p may not be ending with NULL,
1439 * so create a NULL-terminated string.
1441 memcpy(tmp_id_hint, p, i);
1442 memset(tmp_id_hint + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
1443 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
1444 OPENSSL_free(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1445 s->ctx->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(tmp_id_hint);
1446 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
1447 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1448 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1455 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1456 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1457 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
1459 if (param_len > n) {
1460 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1465 if (i > n - param_len) {
1466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_N_LENGTH);
1471 if (!(s->srp_ctx.N = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1477 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1478 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1485 if (i > n - param_len) {
1486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_G_LENGTH);
1491 if (!(s->srp_ctx.g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1492 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1497 if (1 > n - param_len) {
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1503 i = (unsigned int)(p[0]);
1506 if (i > n - param_len) {
1507 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_S_LENGTH);
1512 if (!(s->srp_ctx.s = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1518 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1519 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1526 if (i > n - param_len) {
1527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_B_LENGTH);
1532 if (!(s->srp_ctx.B = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1533 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1539 if (!srp_verify_server_param(s, &al)) {
1540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
1544 /* We must check if there is a certificate */
1545 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1546 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1548 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1549 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1553 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1554 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1556 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1557 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1561 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
1562 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1563 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1564 /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */
1565 if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
1566 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1567 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1570 if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
1571 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1576 if (param_len > n) {
1577 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1582 if (i > n - param_len) {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH);
1588 if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->n))) {
1589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1594 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1602 if (i > n - param_len) {
1603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH);
1608 if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(p, i, rsa->e))) {
1609 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1615 /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */
1616 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1618 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1619 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1621 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1624 s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = rsa;
1627 #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
1630 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1631 else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
1632 if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) {
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1638 if (param_len > n) {
1639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1644 if (i > n - param_len) {
1645 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
1650 if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1656 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1657 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1664 if (i > n - param_len) {
1665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH);
1670 if (!(dh->g = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1671 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1676 if (2 > n - param_len) {
1677 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1684 if (i > n - param_len) {
1685 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
1690 if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) {
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
1697 if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, DH_security_bits(dh), 0, dh)) {
1698 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1699 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
1702 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1703 if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1705 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1706 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1710 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
1711 else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS)
1713 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1714 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].
1717 /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1719 s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
1721 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
1722 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1724 SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
1727 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
1729 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1730 else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
1732 const EC_GROUP *group;
1734 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1740 * Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's ephemeral ECDH
1741 * public key. Keep accumulating lengths of various components in
1742 * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n.
1746 * XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves and the
1747 * ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We also need one
1748 * byte for the length of the encoded point
1751 if (param_len > n) {
1752 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1756 * Check curve is one of our preferences, if not server has sent an
1757 * invalid curve. ECParameters is 3 bytes.
1759 if (!tls1_check_curve(s, p, 3)) {
1760 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
1764 if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0) {
1765 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1767 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS);
1771 ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid);
1772 if (ngroup == NULL) {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1776 if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) {
1777 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1780 EC_GROUP_free(ngroup);
1782 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh);
1784 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1785 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
1786 al = SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION;
1787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1788 SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1794 /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */
1795 if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) ||
1796 ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) {
1797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1801 encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */
1804 if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) ||
1805 (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint,
1806 p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) {
1807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
1810 param_len += encoded_pt_len;
1813 p += encoded_pt_len;
1816 * The ECC/TLS specification does not mention the use of DSA to sign
1817 * ECParameters in the server key exchange message. We do support RSA
1821 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1822 else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA)
1824 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1825 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
1827 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1828 else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
1830 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
1831 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
1833 /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */
1834 EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint);
1835 s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = ecdh;
1837 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1839 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1840 srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
1842 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1846 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1848 /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
1850 /* if it was signed, check the signature */
1852 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1855 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1858 rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
1865 fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
1873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
1878 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1881 * Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty
1883 if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
1884 /* wrong packet length */
1885 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
1888 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1889 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1895 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1896 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1897 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
1898 ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1899 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1901 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1903 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1904 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &size);
1908 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa);
1910 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
1916 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1917 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1923 EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1924 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
1926 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
1928 EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, param, param_len);
1929 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, p, (int)n, pkey) <= 0) {
1931 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
1932 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
1937 /* aNULL, aSRP or kPSK do not need public keys */
1938 if (!(alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) && !(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) {
1939 /* Might be wrong key type, check it */
1940 if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s))
1941 /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */
1942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1945 /* still data left over */
1947 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
1951 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1952 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1955 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1957 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1958 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1962 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1966 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1967 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1968 EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
1972 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1976 int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1979 unsigned long n, nc, l;
1980 unsigned int llen, ctype_num, i;
1981 X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
1982 const unsigned char *p, *q;
1984 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
1986 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1987 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
1988 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B,
1989 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
1994 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
1996 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
1997 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
1999 * If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records as we
2000 * wont be doing client auth.
2002 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2003 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
2009 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
2010 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2015 /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
2016 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2017 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
2018 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2020 SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
2025 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2027 if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
2028 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2032 /* get the certificate types */
2034 if (s->cert->ctypes) {
2035 OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ctypes);
2036 s->cert->ctypes = NULL;
2038 if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) {
2039 /* If we exceed static buffer copy all to cert structure */
2040 s->cert->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(ctype_num);
2041 if (s->cert->ctypes == NULL) {
2042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2045 memcpy(s->cert->ctypes, p, ctype_num);
2046 s->cert->ctype_num = (size_t)ctype_num;
2047 ctype_num = SSL3_CT_NUMBER;
2049 for (i = 0; i < ctype_num; i++)
2050 s->s3->tmp.ctype[i] = p[i];
2052 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2055 * Check we have enough room for signature algorithms and following
2058 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen + 2) > n) {
2059 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2060 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2061 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2064 /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
2065 for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
2066 s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL;
2067 s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0;
2069 if ((llen & 1) || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, p, llen)) {
2070 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2072 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
2075 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
2076 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2077 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2083 /* get the CA RDNs */
2086 if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
2087 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2088 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2092 for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
2094 if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
2095 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2096 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
2102 if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
2103 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2104 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2109 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2110 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
2111 SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2114 if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
2115 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2123 /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
2124 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
2125 s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
2126 if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL)
2127 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
2128 s->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk;
2134 sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
2138 static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
2140 return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
2143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2144 int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
2146 int ok, al, ret = 0, ticklen;
2148 const unsigned char *p;
2151 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2152 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
2153 SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B,
2154 SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, 16384, &ok);
2160 /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */
2161 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2162 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2166 p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2167 n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint);
2169 /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */
2170 if (ticklen + 6 != n) {
2171 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2175 if (s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2176 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick);
2177 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0;
2179 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
2180 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) {
2181 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2184 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen);
2185 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
2187 * There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session. One is to set
2188 * an appropriate session ID and then the server must return a match in
2189 * ServerHello. This allows the normal client session ID matching to work
2190 * and we know much earlier that the ticket has been accepted. The
2191 * other way is to set zero length session ID when the ticket is
2192 * presented and rely on the handshake to determine session resumption.
2193 * We choose the former approach because this fits in with assumptions
2194 * elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is
2195 * SHA256 is disabled) hash of the ticket.
2197 EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
2198 s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
2199 EVP_sha256(), NULL);
2203 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2208 int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
2211 unsigned long resplen, n;
2212 const unsigned char *p;
2214 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2215 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
2216 SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B,
2217 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok);
2222 /* need at least status type + length */
2223 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2227 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2228 if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
2229 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2230 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
2234 if (resplen + 4 != n) {
2235 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2239 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
2240 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2241 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen);
2242 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) {
2243 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2244 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2247 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen;
2248 if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2250 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2252 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2253 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
2257 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2258 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2264 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2269 int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
2274 /* Second to last param should be very small, like 0 :-) */
2275 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2276 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
2277 SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B,
2278 SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, &ok);
2283 /* should contain no data */
2284 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2292 int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2296 unsigned long alg_k;
2297 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2299 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
2301 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2303 #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2304 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2305 EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
2306 const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
2307 EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
2308 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
2309 int encoded_pt_len = 0;
2310 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2312 unsigned char *pms = NULL;
2315 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
2316 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
2318 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2320 /* Fool emacs indentation */
2323 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2324 else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
2326 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2327 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2331 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2333 * We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA.
2335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2336 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2340 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
2341 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
2344 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2345 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].
2347 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2348 || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
2349 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2350 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2353 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
2354 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2357 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2358 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2359 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2363 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2364 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
2366 n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2368 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
2370 if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2)
2374 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2375 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
2379 /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
2380 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) {
2386 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2387 else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
2388 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2389 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2390 /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
2391 krb5_data *enc_ticket;
2392 krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
2393 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2394 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2395 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2396 unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
2397 unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2398 int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
2400 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2403 fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
2405 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2408 # ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
2410 authp = &authenticator;
2411 # endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
2413 krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
2414 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2419 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
2420 if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
2421 fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
2424 # endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2427 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
2433 * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
2434 * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
2436 * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
2437 * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
2438 * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
2439 * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
2440 * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
2442 * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
2443 * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
2444 * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
2445 * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
2447 * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
2448 * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
2449 * optional authenticator omitted.
2452 /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
2453 s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
2454 memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
2455 p += enc_ticket->length;
2456 n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
2458 /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
2459 if (authp && authp->length) {
2460 s2n(authp->length, p);
2461 memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
2463 n += authp->length + 2;
2469 s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
2473 pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2474 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2478 pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2479 pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2480 if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
2484 * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
2485 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
2486 * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
2487 * kssl_ctx->length);
2488 * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
2491 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2492 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
2493 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, pms, pmslen);
2494 EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
2496 if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
2497 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2498 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2501 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2503 /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
2505 memcpy(p, epms, outl);
2508 OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
2511 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2512 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
2513 DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt;
2514 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
2516 if (scert == NULL) {
2517 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2518 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2519 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2523 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
2524 dh_srvr = scert->peer_dh_tmp;
2526 /* we get them from the cert */
2527 int idx = scert->peer_cert_type;
2528 EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL;
2531 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
2533 dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey);
2534 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
2536 if (dh_srvr == NULL) {
2537 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2538 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2542 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) {
2543 /* Use client certificate key */
2544 EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
2547 dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey);
2548 if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2554 /* generate a new random key */
2555 if ((dh_clnt = DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) {
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2559 if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) {
2560 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2566 pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
2567 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2572 * use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
2573 * clear it out afterwards
2576 n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
2577 if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
2581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2587 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
2590 /* send off the data */
2591 n = BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key);
2593 BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key, p);
2599 /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2603 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
2604 else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
2605 const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
2607 int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0;
2610 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2611 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2612 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2613 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2618 * Did we send out the client's ECDH share for use in premaster
2619 * computation as part of client certificate? If so, set
2620 * ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2622 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
2624 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
2625 * authentication using ECDH certificates.
2626 * To add such support, one needs to add
2627 * code that checks for appropriate
2628 * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
2629 * For example, the cert have an ECC
2630 * key on the same curve as the server's
2631 * and the key should be authorized for
2634 * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
2635 * to skip sending the certificate verify
2638 * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
2639 * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
2640 * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
2641 * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
2645 if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
2646 tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp;
2648 /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */
2650 X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
2651 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509);
2652 if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL)
2653 || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)
2654 || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) {
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2656 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2660 tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec;
2663 srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2664 srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey);
2666 if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) {
2667 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2668 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2672 if ((clnt_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
2673 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2674 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2678 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) {
2679 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2682 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2684 * Reuse key info from our certificate We only need our
2685 * private key to perform the ECDH computation.
2687 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2688 tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec;
2689 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2690 if (priv_key == NULL) {
2691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2692 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2695 if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) {
2696 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2700 /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */
2701 if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) {
2702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2709 * use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but make sure to
2710 * clear it out afterwards
2713 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group);
2714 if (field_size <= 0) {
2715 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2718 pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
2719 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2722 n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
2723 if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
2724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2728 if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
2729 /* Send empty client key exch message */
2733 * First check the size of encoding and allocate memory
2737 EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2738 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2739 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2742 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
2743 OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char));
2744 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
2745 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
2746 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2747 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2751 /* Encode the public key */
2752 n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group,
2753 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh),
2754 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
2755 encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx);
2757 *p = n; /* length of encoded point */
2758 /* Encoded point will be copied here */
2760 /* copy the point */
2761 memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n);
2762 /* increment n to account for length field */
2766 /* Free allocated memory */
2767 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2768 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
2769 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2770 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
2771 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
2772 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
2774 #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
2775 else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
2776 /* GOST key exchange message creation */
2777 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2780 unsigned int md_len;
2782 unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
2783 EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
2787 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2792 * Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
2796 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST01)].x509;
2800 sess_cert->peer_pkeys[(keytype = SSL_PKEY_GOST94)].x509;
2802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2803 SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER);
2807 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key =
2808 X509_get_pubkey(peer_cert), NULL);
2810 * If we have send a certificate, and certificate key
2812 * * parameters match those of server certificate, use
2813 * certificate key for key exchange
2816 /* Otherwise, generate ephemeral key pair */
2818 EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2819 /* Generate session key */
2820 RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen);
2822 * If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
2824 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req && s->cert->key->privatekey) {
2825 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer
2826 (pkey_ctx, s->cert->key->privatekey) <= 0) {
2828 * If there was an error - just ignore it. Ephemeral key
2835 * Compute shared IV and store it in algorithm-specific context
2838 ukm_hash = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
2839 EVP_DigestInit(ukm_hash,
2840 EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94));
2841 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->client_random,
2843 EVP_DigestUpdate(ukm_hash, s->s3->server_random,
2845 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ukm_hash, shared_ukm, &md_len);
2846 EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ukm_hash);
2847 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2848 (pkey_ctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_IV, 8,
2850 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2854 /* Make GOST keytransport blob message */
2856 * Encapsulate it into sequence
2858 *(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
2860 if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
2861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2865 if (msglen >= 0x80) {
2867 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2870 *(p++) = msglen & 0xff;
2873 memcpy(p, tmp, msglen);
2874 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2875 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
2876 (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) {
2877 /* Set flag "skip certificate verify" */
2878 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
2880 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2881 EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
2884 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2885 else if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
2886 if (s->srp_ctx.A != NULL) {
2887 /* send off the data */
2888 n = BN_num_bytes(s->srp_ctx.A);
2890 BN_bn2bin(s->srp_ctx.A, p);
2893 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2894 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2897 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2898 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2899 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2900 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
2901 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2902 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2907 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2908 else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
2910 * The callback needs PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 bytes to return a
2911 * \0-terminated identity. The last byte is for us for simulating
2914 char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
2915 size_t identity_len;
2916 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2917 unsigned int psk_len = 0;
2921 if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) {
2922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2923 SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB);
2927 memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
2928 /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
2929 pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
2930 pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
2934 psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
2935 identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
2937 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
2938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2939 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2941 } else if (psk_len == 0) {
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2943 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2946 /* Change pmslen to real length */
2947 pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
2948 identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
2949 identity_len = strlen(identity);
2950 if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2952 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2955 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2957 memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
2959 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2963 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2964 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2965 s->session->psk_identity_hint =
2966 BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2967 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL
2968 && s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
2969 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2970 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2974 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2975 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2976 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity);
2977 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
2978 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2979 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2983 s2n(identity_len, p);
2984 memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
2985 n = 2 + identity_len;
2988 OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
2990 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2996 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
2997 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3001 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
3002 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
3005 /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
3006 n = ssl_do_write(s);
3007 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
3009 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
3011 * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
3012 * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
3015 if ((s->session->master_key_length =
3016 SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
3017 s->session->master_key)) <
3019 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
3020 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3026 /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
3029 s->cert->pmslen = pmslen;
3031 /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
3034 pmslen = s->cert->pmslen;
3037 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3041 s->session->master_key_length =
3042 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
3044 session->master_key,
3046 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
3048 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3049 if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
3050 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3051 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3061 OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
3063 s->cert->pms = NULL;
3065 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3066 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
3067 if (encodedPoint != NULL)
3068 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
3069 if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
3070 EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
3071 EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
3076 int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
3079 unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
3081 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
3087 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
3089 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
3090 p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
3091 pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3092 /* Create context from key and test if sha1 is allowed as digest */
3093 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
3094 EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx);
3095 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) > 0) {
3096 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
3097 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3100 [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
3105 * For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using agreed
3106 * digest and cached handshake records.
3108 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
3111 const EVP_MD *md = s->cert->key->digest;
3112 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3113 if (hdatalen <= 0 || !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
3114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3119 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client alg %s\n",
3122 if (!EVP_SignInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3123 || !EVP_SignUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)
3124 || !EVP_SignFinal(&mctx, p + 2, &u, pkey)) {
3125 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3131 * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
3134 if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
3135 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3136 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3137 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3138 } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3141 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3142 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
3143 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, &(data[0]));
3144 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data,
3145 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
3146 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
3147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
3154 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3155 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
3156 if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3157 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3158 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3159 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.dsa)) {
3160 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_DSA_LIB);
3167 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3168 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
3169 if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
3170 &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3171 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]),
3172 (unsigned int *)&j, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
3173 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
3180 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
3181 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
3182 unsigned char signbuf[64];
3184 size_t sigsize = 64;
3185 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
3186 NID_id_GostR3411_94, data);
3187 if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, signbuf, &sigsize, data, 32) <= 0) {
3188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3191 for (i = 63, j = 0; i >= 0; j++, i--) {
3192 p[2 + j] = signbuf[i];
3197 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3200 ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n);
3201 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
3203 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3204 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3205 return ssl_do_write(s);
3207 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3208 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3213 * Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently check
3214 * cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if static DH client
3215 * certificates can be used and optionally checks suitability for Suite B.
3217 static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3219 unsigned long alg_k;
3220 if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
3222 /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
3223 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
3226 * If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
3227 * adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
3229 if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
3230 !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
3232 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3233 /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
3234 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3235 SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
3236 int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
3237 EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
3238 clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
3239 /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
3240 if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
3243 spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
3245 /* Compare server and client parameters */
3246 i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
3247 EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
3251 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
3256 int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3259 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3262 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
3263 /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */
3264 if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
3265 i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
3267 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3271 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3274 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3276 if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3277 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3279 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3282 /* We need to get a client cert */
3283 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
3285 * If we get an error, we need to ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3286 * return(-1); We then get retied later
3289 i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
3291 s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
3294 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
3295 if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
3296 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
3297 if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
3299 } else if (i == 1) {
3301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
3302 SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
3308 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3309 if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s))
3312 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
3313 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0;
3314 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE);
3317 s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 2;
3321 /* Ok, we have a cert */
3322 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
3325 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
3326 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
3327 if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,
3328 (s->s3->tmp.cert_req ==
3329 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key)) {
3330 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3331 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3335 /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
3336 return ssl_do_write(s);
3339 #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
3341 int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
3345 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
3347 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3350 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3354 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
3355 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
3357 /* we don't have a certificate */
3358 if ((alg_a & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5)) || (alg_k & SSL_kPSK))
3361 sc = s->session->sess_cert;
3363 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3366 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3367 rsa = s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
3369 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3370 dh = s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
3373 /* This is the passed certificate */
3375 idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
3376 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
3377 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
3378 if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
3380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
3385 } else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) {
3386 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3387 SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3389 } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
3390 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT);
3394 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509);
3395 i = X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, pkey);
3396 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3398 /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */
3399 if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3401 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3404 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3405 else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DSA | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
3406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3407 SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT);
3411 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3412 if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) &&
3413 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA | EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) {
3414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3415 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
3419 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3420 if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
3421 !(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) {
3422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
3424 } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3425 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_RSA)) {
3426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3427 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT);
3430 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3431 else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) &&
3432 !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH | EVP_PKS_DSA)) {
3433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3434 SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT);
3440 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PKT_EXP)) {
3441 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3442 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
3444 || RSA_size(rsa) * 8 >
3445 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3447 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY);
3452 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
3453 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
3455 || DH_size(dh) * 8 >
3456 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) {
3457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3458 SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY);
3464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,
3465 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
3471 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
3477 * Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a case
3478 * of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of session
3479 * tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
3482 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3483 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3484 int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s)
3486 unsigned int len, padding_len;
3489 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) {
3490 len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len;
3491 padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32);
3492 d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3494 memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len);
3495 d[5 + len] = padding_len;
3496 memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len);
3497 *(d++) = SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO;
3498 l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d);
3499 s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B;
3500 s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len;
3504 return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
3509 int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
3512 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
3513 if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) {
3514 i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s,
3515 SSL_get_client_CA_list(s),
3516 px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
3521 if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb)
3522 i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);