2 * Copyright 2012-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
11 * This file has no dependencies on the rest of libssl because it is shared
12 * with the providers. It contains functions for low level MAC calculations.
13 * Responsibility for this lies with the HMAC implementation in the
14 * providers. However there are legacy code paths in libssl which also need to
15 * do this. In time those legacy code paths can be removed and this file can be
16 * moved out of libssl.
21 * MD5 and SHA-1 low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
24 #include "internal/deprecated.h"
26 #include "internal/constant_time.h"
27 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
29 #include <openssl/evp.h>
30 #include <openssl/md5.h>
31 #include <openssl/sha.h>
33 char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
34 int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
35 unsigned char *md_out,
37 const unsigned char header[13],
38 const unsigned char *data,
40 size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
41 const unsigned char *mac_secret,
42 size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
44 # define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
45 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
46 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
47 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
49 # define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
50 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
51 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
52 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
53 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
54 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
56 # define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \
57 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \
58 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \
59 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \
60 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \
61 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \
62 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \
63 *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff))
66 * MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's
67 * length field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.)
69 #define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16
72 * MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support.
73 * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest
76 #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128
79 * u32toLE serializes an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in
80 * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four.
82 #define u32toLE(n, p) \
83 (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \
84 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \
85 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \
86 *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24))
89 * These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the
90 * standard "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such
91 * a function typically does.
93 static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
96 u32toLE(md5->A, md_out);
97 u32toLE(md5->B, md_out);
98 u32toLE(md5->C, md_out);
99 u32toLE(md5->D, md_out);
102 static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
105 l2n(sha1->h0, md_out);
106 l2n(sha1->h1, md_out);
107 l2n(sha1->h2, md_out);
108 l2n(sha1->h3, md_out);
109 l2n(sha1->h4, md_out);
112 static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
114 SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx;
117 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
118 l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out);
122 static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out)
124 SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx;
127 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
128 l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out);
132 #undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX
133 #define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX
136 * ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
139 * ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
140 * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX.
141 * md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written.
142 * md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here.
143 * header: the 13-byte, TLS record header.
144 * data: the record data itself, less any preceding explicit IV.
145 * data_size: the secret, reported length of the data once the MAC and padding
147 * data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
148 * record, including MAC and padding.
149 * is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
151 * On entry: we know that data is data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size in length
152 * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error
154 int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD *md,
155 unsigned char *md_out,
157 const unsigned char header[13],
158 const unsigned char *data,
160 size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size,
161 const unsigned char *mac_secret,
162 size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
166 unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
168 void (*md_final_raw) (void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
169 void (*md_transform) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
170 size_t md_size, md_block_size = 64;
171 size_t sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
172 len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
173 num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
174 size_t bits; /* at most 18 bits */
175 unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES];
176 /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */
177 unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
178 unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
179 unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
181 unsigned md_out_size_u;
182 EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL;
184 * mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that
185 * terminates * the hash.
187 size_t md_length_size = 8;
188 char length_is_big_endian = 1;
192 * This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about
193 * many possible overflows later in this function.
195 if (!ossl_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024))
198 if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "MD5")) {
199 if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
201 md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
203 (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform;
205 sslv3_pad_length = 48;
206 length_is_big_endian = 0;
207 } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA1")) {
208 if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
210 md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw;
212 (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform;
214 } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-224")) {
215 if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
217 md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
219 (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
221 } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-256")) {
222 if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
224 md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw;
226 (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform;
228 } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-384")) {
229 if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
231 md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
233 (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
237 } else if (EVP_MD_is_a(md, "SHA2-512")) {
238 if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0)
240 md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw;
242 (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform;
248 * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to
249 * check that the hash function is supported.
251 if (md_out_size != NULL)
253 return ossl_assert(0);
256 if (!ossl_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES)
257 || !ossl_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE)
258 || !ossl_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE))
263 header_length = mac_secret_length + sslv3_pad_length + 8 /* sequence
265 1 /* record type */ +
266 2 /* record length */ ;
270 * variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
271 * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
272 * padding value. In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of
273 * the plaintext varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively
274 * assume that the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes
275 * of hash termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final
276 * block, we say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
277 * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
278 * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final |variance_blocks|
280 * vary based on the padding. Later in the function, if the message is
281 * short and there obviously cannot be this many blocks then
282 * variance_blocks can be reduced.
284 variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : ( ((255 + 1 + md_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size) + 1);
286 * From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
287 * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
290 len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
292 * max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC,
293 * including * |header|, assuming that there's no padding.
295 max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1;
296 /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */
298 (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size -
301 * In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle the
302 * final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the end
303 * to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we can't
304 * leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can be hashed
305 * right away because no padding value can affect whether they are
308 num_starting_blocks = 0;
310 * k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where
311 * we start processing.
315 * mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be MACed.
317 mac_end_offset = data_size + header_length;
319 * c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that contains
322 c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size;
324 * index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating
327 index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size;
329 * index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash length,
332 index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
334 * bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash block
335 * for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of SSLv3.
339 * For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need at
340 * least two because the header is larger than a single block.
342 if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) {
343 num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
344 k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks;
347 bits = 8 * mac_end_offset;
350 * Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and secret
351 * bytes are included in |header| because they take more than a
354 bits += 8 * md_block_size;
355 memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
356 if (!ossl_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad)))
358 memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
359 for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
362 md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
365 if (length_is_big_endian) {
366 memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
367 length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
368 length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
369 length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
370 length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (unsigned char)bits;
372 memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size);
373 length_bytes[md_length_size - 5] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24);
374 length_bytes[md_length_size - 6] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16);
375 length_bytes[md_length_size - 7] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8);
376 length_bytes[md_length_size - 8] = (unsigned char)bits;
384 * The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is
385 * the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header
386 * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no
387 * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and
388 * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be
389 * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just
392 if (header_length <= md_block_size) {
393 /* Should never happen */
396 overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
397 md_transform(md_state.c, header);
398 memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
399 memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang);
400 md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
401 for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size - 1; i++)
402 md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - overhang);
404 /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
405 memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
406 memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
407 md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
408 for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++)
409 md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - 13);
413 memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
416 * We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct it
417 * in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80
418 * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in
419 * constant time, to |mac_out|.
421 for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks;
423 unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
424 unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_a);
425 unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_b);
426 for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) {
427 unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1;
428 if (k < header_length)
430 else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length)
431 b = data[k - header_length];
434 is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c);
435 is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c + 1);
437 * If this is the block containing the end of the application
438 * data, and we are at the offset for the 0x80 value, then
439 * overwrite b with 0x80.
441 b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b);
443 * If this block contains the end of the application data
444 * and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero.
446 b = b & ~is_past_cp1;
448 * If this is index_b (the final block), but not index_a (the end
449 * of the data), then the 64-bit length didn't fit into index_a
450 * and we're having to add an extra block of zeros.
452 b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a;
455 * The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the length.
457 if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) {
458 /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */
459 b = constant_time_select_8(is_block_b,
462 md_length_size)], b);
467 md_transform(md_state.c, block);
468 md_final_raw(md_state.c, block);
469 /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */
470 for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++)
471 mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b;
474 md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
478 if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0)
481 /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
482 memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
484 if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0
485 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0
486 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
489 /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
490 for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
493 if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0
494 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0)
497 /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
498 ret = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
499 if (ret && md_out_size)
500 *md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
504 EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);