2 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
58 /* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
116 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
117 #include <openssl/evp.h>
118 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
119 #include <openssl/rand.h>
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
138 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->rrec);
139 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec);
142 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
144 unsigned char *rp, *wp;
148 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d;
152 read_ahead = rl->read_ahead;
153 rp = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
154 rlen = SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&rl->rbuf);
155 wp = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->wbuf);
156 wlen = SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&rl->wbuf);
157 memset(rl, 0, sizeof (RECORD_LAYER));
158 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&rl->rbuf, rp);
159 SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(&rl->rbuf, rlen);
160 SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&rl->wbuf, wp);
161 SSL3_BUFFER_set_len(&rl->wbuf, wlen);
163 /* Do I need to do this? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
164 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
167 rl->read_ahead = read_ahead;
168 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
173 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
176 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
178 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
179 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
180 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->wbuf))
181 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
182 SSL3_RECORD_release(&rl->rrec);
185 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
187 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
190 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
192 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf) != 0;
195 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
197 rl->packet_length = len;
199 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
200 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
201 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
205 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
206 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
211 void RECORD_LAYER_dup(RECORD_LAYER *dst, RECORD_LAYER *src)
214 * Currently only called from SSL_dup...which only seems to expect the
215 * rstate to be duplicated and nothing else from the RECORD_LAYER???
217 dst->rstate = src->rstate;
220 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
222 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, 8);
225 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
227 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, 8);
230 void RECORD_LAYER_set_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *ws)
232 memcpy(rl->write_sequence, ws, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
235 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
237 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
240 return (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec) == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
241 ? SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec) : 0;
244 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
248 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
249 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
252 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
255 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
265 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
269 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
270 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
273 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
276 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
286 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
289 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
290 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
291 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
292 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
293 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
303 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
305 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
309 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
310 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
311 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
315 /* start with empty packet ... */
318 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
320 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
323 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
324 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
325 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
327 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
328 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
329 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
330 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
331 * overrun can be triggered.
333 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
337 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
338 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
339 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
343 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
344 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
347 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
348 if (left == 0 && extend)
350 if (left > 0 && n > left)
354 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
356 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
362 /* else we need to read more data */
364 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
365 pkt = rb->buf + align;
367 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
368 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
370 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt) { /* len > 0 */
371 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
372 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
373 rb->offset = len + align;
376 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
377 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
381 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
382 if (&s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
383 /* ignore max parameter */
388 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
389 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
394 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
395 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
400 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
401 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
402 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
410 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
412 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
417 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
418 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
419 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
421 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
423 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
427 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
430 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
431 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
437 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
438 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
440 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
442 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
445 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
446 unsigned int max_send_fragment;
448 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
450 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
453 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
457 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
458 OPENSSL_assert(s->rlayer.wnum <= INT_MAX);
459 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
462 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
463 i = s->handshake_func(s);
467 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
473 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
474 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
475 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
476 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
477 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
478 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
479 * report the error in a way the user will notice
482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
487 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
488 * will happen with non blocking IO
491 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
493 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
494 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
497 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
499 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
501 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
502 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
503 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
504 * compromise is considered worthy.
506 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
507 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
508 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
509 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
510 EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher) &
511 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
512 unsigned char aad[13];
513 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
516 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
517 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
518 max_send_fragment -= 512;
520 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
521 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
523 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
524 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
525 max_send_fragment, NULL);
527 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
532 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
538 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
539 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
546 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
547 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
552 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
553 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
555 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
560 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
561 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
563 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
565 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
567 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
568 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
575 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
576 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
577 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
579 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
580 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
585 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
586 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
589 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
590 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
591 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
594 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
595 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
597 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
603 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
604 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
605 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
606 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
608 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
610 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
611 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
614 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
618 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
627 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
628 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
629 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
636 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
637 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
641 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
643 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
644 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
649 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
650 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
652 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
653 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
655 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
657 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
659 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
669 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
670 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
672 unsigned char *p, *plen;
673 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
678 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
682 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
683 * will happen with non blocking IO
686 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
688 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
689 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
690 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
693 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
697 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
700 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
703 wr = &s->rlayer.wrec;
706 if ((sess == NULL) ||
707 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
708 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
709 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
712 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
718 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
720 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
722 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
723 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
726 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
728 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
729 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
730 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
733 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
738 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
740 /* insufficient space */
741 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
746 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
749 if (create_empty_fragment) {
750 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
752 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
753 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
754 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
756 align = (long)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
757 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
761 } else if (prefix_len) {
762 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
764 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
765 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
766 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
772 /* write the header */
774 *(p++) = type & 0xff;
777 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
779 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
780 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
782 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B
783 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
786 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
788 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
791 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
792 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
793 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
794 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
795 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
799 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
800 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
801 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
807 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
808 wr->data = p + eivlen;
809 wr->length = (int)len;
810 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
813 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
816 /* first we compress */
817 if (s->compress != NULL) {
818 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) {
819 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
823 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
824 wr->input = wr->data;
828 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
829 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
833 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
834 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
836 wr->length += mac_size;
844 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
846 wr->length += eivlen;
849 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1) < 1)
852 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
853 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, p + wr->length, 1) < 0)
855 wr->length += mac_size;
858 /* record length after mac and block padding */
859 s2n(wr->length, plen);
862 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen - 5, 5, s,
863 s->msg_callback_arg);
866 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
869 wr->type = type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
870 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
872 if (create_empty_fragment) {
874 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
880 /* now let's set up wb */
881 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
884 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
887 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = len;
888 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
889 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
890 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
892 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
893 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
898 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
899 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
903 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf;
906 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
907 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
908 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
909 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
910 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
916 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
917 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
918 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
919 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
920 (unsigned int)wb->left);
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
928 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
929 return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
931 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
933 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
934 * using a datagram service
946 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
947 * 'type' is one of the following:
949 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
950 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
951 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
953 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
954 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
956 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
957 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
958 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
959 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
960 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
961 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
962 * Change cipher spec protocol
963 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
965 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
967 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
968 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
969 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
970 * Application data protocol
971 * none of our business
973 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
978 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
980 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&s->rlayer.rbuf)) {
981 /* Not initialized yet */
982 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
986 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
987 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
989 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
994 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
995 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
997 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
998 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1003 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1006 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1009 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1010 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1011 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1016 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1019 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1020 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1021 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1030 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1033 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
1034 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
1035 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1036 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
1038 rr = &s->rlayer.rrec;
1040 /* get new packet if necessary */
1041 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
1042 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1047 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1049 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1050 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1051 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1052 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1053 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1058 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1061 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1063 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1067 if (type == rr->type) { /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1068 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
1070 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1071 * doing a handshake for the first time
1073 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1074 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1075 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1083 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1086 n = (unsigned int)len;
1088 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1092 if (rr->length == 0) {
1093 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1095 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
1096 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0)
1097 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1104 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1105 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello).
1109 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1110 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1113 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1114 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1115 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1117 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1118 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1119 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1120 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1121 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1122 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1123 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1124 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1126 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1127 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
1128 /* We can ignore 0 return values */
1129 if(tls1_process_heartbeat(s, SSL3_RECORD_get_data(&s->rlayer.rrec),
1130 SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec)) < 0) {
1134 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
1136 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1137 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1138 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1143 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1144 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1146 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1148 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1150 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1154 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1155 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1160 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1161 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1162 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1165 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1167 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1168 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1169 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1170 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1172 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1173 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1174 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1175 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1176 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1180 if (s->msg_callback)
1181 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1182 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1183 s->msg_callback_arg);
1185 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1186 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1187 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1188 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1189 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1190 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1195 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1199 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1200 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1201 /* no read-ahead left? */
1204 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1205 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1206 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1207 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1209 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1210 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1211 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1212 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1219 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1220 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1225 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1226 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1227 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1230 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1231 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1232 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1233 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1234 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1235 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1236 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1238 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1241 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1242 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1243 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1245 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1247 if (s->msg_callback)
1248 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1249 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1250 s->msg_callback_arg);
1252 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1253 cb = s->info_callback;
1254 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1255 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1258 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1259 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1262 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1263 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1264 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1265 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1269 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1270 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1271 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1272 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1273 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1274 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1276 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1277 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1281 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1282 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1285 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1288 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1289 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1290 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1291 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1292 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1293 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1294 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1297 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1298 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1305 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1307 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1312 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1314 * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly
1315 * what the record payload has to look like
1317 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1318 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1319 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1324 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1325 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1326 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1327 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1331 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1332 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1333 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1337 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1341 if (s->msg_callback)
1342 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1343 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1345 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1346 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1353 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1355 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1356 if (((s->state & SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1357 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1358 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1362 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1366 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1370 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1371 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&s->rlayer.rbuf) == 0) {
1372 /* no read-ahead left? */
1375 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1376 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1377 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1378 * problems in the blocking world
1380 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1381 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1382 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1383 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1393 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1394 * an unexpected message alert.
1396 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1400 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1401 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1403 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1405 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1407 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1408 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that should not
1409 * happen when type != rr->type
1411 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1412 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1414 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1416 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1417 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1418 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1419 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1420 * started), we will indulge it.
1422 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1423 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1424 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1425 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1426 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1427 ) || ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1428 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1429 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1432 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1435 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1443 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1448 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1452 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {