1 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
4 * This package is an SSL implementation written
5 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
6 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
9 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
10 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
11 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
12 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
13 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
16 * the code are not to be removed.
17 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
18 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
19 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
20 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
23 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
26 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
27 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
28 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
29 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
30 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
31 * must display the following acknowledgement:
32 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
33 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
34 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
35 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
36 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
37 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
38 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
41 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
43 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
44 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
45 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
46 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
48 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
49 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
52 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
53 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
54 * copied and put under another distribution licence
55 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 /* ====================================================================
58 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
61 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
64 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
65 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
68 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
69 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
72 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
73 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
74 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
75 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
78 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
79 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
80 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
83 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
84 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
89 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
92 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
93 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
94 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
95 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
96 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
97 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
98 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
99 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
100 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
101 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
102 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
103 * ====================================================================
105 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
106 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
107 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
115 #include "../ssl_locl.h"
116 #include <openssl/evp.h>
117 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
118 #include <openssl/rand.h>
119 #include "record_locl.h"
121 #ifndef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
122 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
125 #if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
126 !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
127 defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
128 defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) || \
129 defined(__INTEL__) ) \
131 # undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
132 # define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
135 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
138 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
139 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec, 1);
142 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
146 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
148 /* Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
149 * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
154 rl->packet_length = 0;
156 memset(rl->alert_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->alert_fragment));
157 rl->alert_fragment_len = 0;
158 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
159 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
163 rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
165 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
166 for(pipes = 0; pipes < rl->numwpipes; pipes++)
167 SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->wbuf[pipes]);
169 SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
170 SSL3_RECORD_clear(&rl->wrec, 1);
172 RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
173 RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
176 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
179 void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
181 if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
182 ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
183 if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
184 ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
185 /* TODO: Check why there is no release of wrec here?? */
186 SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
189 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
191 return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
194 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
196 return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
197 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes-1]) != 0;
200 int RECORD_LAYER_set_data(RECORD_LAYER *rl, const unsigned char *buf, int len)
202 rl->packet_length = len;
204 rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
205 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
206 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(rl->s))
210 rl->packet = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&rl->rbuf);
211 SSL3_BUFFER_set_data(&rl->rbuf, buf, len);
216 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
218 memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
221 void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
223 memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
226 int ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
231 if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
234 for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
235 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
236 != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
238 num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
244 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
248 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
249 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
252 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
255 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
265 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
269 switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
270 case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
273 case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
276 case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
286 int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend, int clearold)
289 * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
290 * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
291 * s->s3->rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
292 * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
293 * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
294 * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
295 * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
305 rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
307 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
311 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
312 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
313 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
317 /* start with empty packet ... */
320 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
322 * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
325 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
326 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
327 && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
329 * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
330 * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
331 * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
332 * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
333 * overrun can be triggered.
335 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
339 s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
340 s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
341 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
345 * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
346 * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
349 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
350 if (left == 0 && extend)
352 if (left > 0 && n > left)
356 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
358 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
364 /* else we need to read more data */
366 len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
367 pkt = rb->buf + align;
369 * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
370 * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
372 if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) { /* len > 0 */
373 memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
374 s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
375 rb->offset = len + align;
378 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { /* does not happen */
379 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
383 /* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
384 if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
385 /* ignore max parameter */
390 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
391 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
396 * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and
397 * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
402 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
403 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
404 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
406 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
412 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
414 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
419 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
420 * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
421 * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
423 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
425 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
429 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
432 s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
433 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
439 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
440 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
442 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
444 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
447 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
448 unsigned int max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
449 unsigned int u_len = (unsigned int)len;
451 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
455 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_NEGATIVE_LENGTH);
459 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
460 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
462 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
463 * than the the original len from a write which didn't complete for
464 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
465 * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
466 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
467 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
468 * report the error in a way the user will notice
470 if ((unsigned int)len < s->rlayer.wnum) {
471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
478 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
479 i = s->handshake_func(s);
483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
489 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
490 * will happen with non blocking IO
493 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot);
495 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
496 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
499 tot += i; /* this might be last fragment */
501 #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
503 * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
504 * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
505 * jumbo buffer to accomodate up to 8 records, but the
506 * compromise is considered worthy.
508 if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
509 u_len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment) &&
510 s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
511 !SSL_USE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
512 EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
513 EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
514 unsigned char aad[13];
515 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
518 /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
519 if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
520 max_send_fragment -= 512;
522 if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
523 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
525 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
526 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
527 max_send_fragment, NULL);
529 if (u_len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
534 wb->buf = OPENSSL_malloc(packlen);
535 if (wb->buf == NULL) {
536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
540 } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
541 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
548 if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
549 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
554 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
555 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
557 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
562 if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
563 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
565 nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
567 memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
569 aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
570 aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
577 packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
578 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
579 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
581 if (packlen <= 0 || packlen > (int)wb->len) { /* never happens */
582 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
587 mb_param.out = wb->buf;
588 mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
591 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
592 EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
593 sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
596 s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
597 if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
599 while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
605 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
606 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
607 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
608 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
610 i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw);
612 if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
613 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf);
616 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
620 OPENSSL_free(wb->buf); /* free jumbo buffer */
629 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
630 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
631 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
638 split_send_fragment = s->split_send_fragment;
640 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
641 * 1 pipeline. Similaraly if the cipher does not support pipelined
642 * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
645 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
646 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
648 * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
651 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
655 || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
656 || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
657 & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
658 || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
660 if (s->max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment > s->max_send_fragment
661 || split_send_fragment == 0) {
663 * We should have prevented this when we set the split and max send
664 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
671 unsigned int pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
672 unsigned int numpipes, j;
677 numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
678 if (numpipes > maxpipes)
681 if (n / numpipes >= s->max_send_fragment) {
683 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
686 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
687 pipelens[j] = s->max_send_fragment;
690 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
691 tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
692 remain = n % numpipes;
693 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
694 pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
700 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0);
702 /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
703 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
708 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
709 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
711 * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
712 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
714 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
716 if ((i == (int)n) && s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
718 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
728 int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
729 unsigned int *pipelens, unsigned int numpipes,
730 int create_empty_fragment)
732 unsigned char *outbuf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], *plen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
733 SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
734 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
740 unsigned int totlen = 0;
743 for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
744 totlen += pipelens[j];
746 * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
747 * will happen with non blocking IO
749 if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer))
750 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen));
752 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
753 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
754 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
757 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
760 if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes)
761 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes))
764 if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
769 if ((sess == NULL) ||
770 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
771 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
772 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
775 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
781 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
783 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
785 * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
786 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
789 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
791 * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
792 * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
793 * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
796 unsigned int tmppipelen = 0;
798 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1);
803 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
805 /* insufficient space */
806 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
811 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
814 if (create_empty_fragment) {
815 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
816 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
818 * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
819 * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
820 * payload, then we can just pretent we simply have two headers.
822 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
823 align = (0-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
825 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
826 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
827 } else if (prefix_len) {
828 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
829 outbuf[0] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
832 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
833 wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
834 #if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
835 align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
836 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
838 outbuf[j] = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + align;
839 SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
843 /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
844 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
845 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
846 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
847 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
851 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
852 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
853 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
854 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
855 eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
863 /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
864 memset(wr, 0, sizeof wr);
865 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
866 /* write the header */
867 *(outbuf[j]++) = type & 0xff;
868 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type);
870 *(outbuf[j]++) = (s->version >> 8);
872 * Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
873 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
875 if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
876 && !s->renegotiate && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
877 *(outbuf[j]++) = 0x1;
879 *(outbuf[j]++) = s->version & 0xff;
881 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
885 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
886 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j] + eivlen);
887 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(&wr[j], (int)pipelens[j]);
888 SSL3_RECORD_set_input(&wr[j], (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
889 totlen += pipelens[j];
892 * we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data
895 /* first we compress */
896 if (s->compress != NULL) {
897 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, &wr[j])) {
898 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
902 memcpy(wr[j].data, wr[j].input, wr[j].length);
903 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
907 * we should still have the output to wr->data and the input from
908 * wr->input. Length should be wr->length. wr->data still points in the
912 if (!SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
913 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
914 &(outbuf[j][wr[j].length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
916 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
920 SSL3_RECORD_set_data(&wr[j], outbuf[j]);
921 SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
925 * if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0) goto err;
927 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], eivlen);
931 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1) < 1)
934 for (j=0; j < numpipes; j++) {
935 if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
936 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &wr[j],
937 outbuf[j] + wr[j].length, 1) < 0)
939 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], mac_size);
942 /* record length after mac and block padding */
943 s2n(SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]), plen[j]);
946 s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, plen[j] - 5, 5, s,
947 s->msg_callback_arg);
950 * we should now have wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
953 SSL3_RECORD_set_type(&wr[j], type); /* not needed but helps for debugging */
954 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
956 if (create_empty_fragment) {
958 * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
962 /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
963 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
966 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(wr);
969 /* now let's set up wb */
970 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
971 prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&wr[j]));
977 * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
980 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
981 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
982 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
983 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
985 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
986 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen);
991 /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
992 int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
996 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
997 unsigned int currbuf = 0;
1000 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > (int)len)
1001 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf) &&
1002 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
1003 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
1004 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
1009 /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
1010 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
1011 && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
1016 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
1017 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
1018 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
1019 (char *)&(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])[
1020 SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
1021 (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
1023 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
1026 if (i == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
1027 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1028 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
1029 if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
1031 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1032 return (s->rlayer.wpend_ret);
1033 } else if (i <= 0) {
1034 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
1036 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
1037 * using a datagram service
1039 SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
1043 SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], i);
1044 SSL3_BUFFER_add_left(&wb[currbuf], -i);
1049 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
1050 * 'type' is one of the following:
1052 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
1053 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
1054 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
1056 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
1057 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
1059 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
1060 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
1061 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
1062 * argument is non NULL.
1063 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
1064 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
1065 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
1066 * Change cipher spec protocol
1067 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
1069 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
1070 * Handshake protocol
1071 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
1072 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
1073 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
1074 * Application data protocol
1075 * none of our business
1077 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
1081 unsigned int n, curr_rec, num_recs, read_bytes;
1084 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
1086 rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
1088 if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
1089 /* Not initialized yet */
1090 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
1094 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1095 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
1097 SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
1098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1102 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1103 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1105 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1106 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1111 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
1114 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
1117 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1118 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1119 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1121 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1122 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1128 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
1131 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
1132 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
1133 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1137 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1142 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1145 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
1146 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
1147 * rr[i].data, - data
1148 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
1149 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
1151 rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
1152 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1155 /* get new records if necessary */
1156 if (num_recs == 0) {
1157 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
1160 num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
1161 if (num_recs == 0) {
1162 /* Shouldn't happen */
1163 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1164 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1168 /* Skip over any records we have already used or are zero in length */
1170 curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rr[curr_rec]) == 0;
1172 if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
1173 RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
1177 } while (num_recs == 0);
1180 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
1182 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
1183 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
1184 && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
1185 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1186 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
1191 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
1194 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
1195 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1196 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1200 if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
1201 || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1202 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) {
1204 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
1205 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
1206 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1209 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
1210 * doing a handshake for the first time
1212 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
1213 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
1214 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
1219 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
1220 && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
1221 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
1222 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1223 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1227 if (recvd_type != NULL)
1228 *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
1235 if ((unsigned int)len - read_bytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
1236 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
1238 n = (unsigned int)len - read_bytes;
1240 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
1243 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -n);
1244 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
1245 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
1246 s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1247 SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
1250 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
1251 || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
1256 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
1257 && read_bytes < (unsigned int)len);
1258 if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
1259 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1260 && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
1261 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1266 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
1267 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
1268 * were actually expecting a CCS).
1271 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1272 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1278 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
1280 if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
1282 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
1283 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
1284 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
1285 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
1287 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1288 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1292 if(s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
1293 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
1295 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
1296 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing with
1297 * (we don't allow heartbeats yet). We shouldn't be receiving anything
1298 * other than a ClientHello if we are a server.
1300 s->version = rr->rec_version;
1301 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1307 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, fill
1308 * that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1311 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1312 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1313 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1315 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
1316 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1317 dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
1318 dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
1319 } else if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
1320 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1321 dest = s->rlayer.alert_fragment;
1322 dest_len = &s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len;
1325 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1326 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1327 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
1328 n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
1330 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1332 dest[(*dest_len)++] =
1333 SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)[SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr)];
1334 SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, 1);
1335 SSL3_RECORD_add_length(rr, -1);
1338 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1339 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1344 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1345 * s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1346 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
1349 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1351 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1352 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1353 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1354 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1356 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1357 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1358 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1359 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1360 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1364 if (s->msg_callback)
1365 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1366 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1367 s->msg_callback_arg);
1369 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1370 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1371 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1372 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1373 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1374 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1379 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1383 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1384 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1385 /* no read-ahead left? */
1388 * In the case where we try to read application data,
1389 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1390 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1391 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world
1393 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1394 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1395 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1396 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1403 * we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, now try
1404 * again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for
1409 * If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1410 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. WARNING:
1411 * experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1414 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1415 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1416 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1417 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1418 (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1419 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1420 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
1421 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1422 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1425 if (s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1426 int alert_level = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[0];
1427 int alert_descr = s->rlayer.alert_fragment[1];
1429 s->rlayer.alert_fragment_len = 0;
1431 if (s->msg_callback)
1432 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1433 s->rlayer.alert_fragment, 2, s,
1434 s->msg_callback_arg);
1436 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1437 cb = s->info_callback;
1438 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1439 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1442 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1443 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1446 if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
1447 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1448 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1449 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1453 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1454 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
1455 * alert because if application tried to renegotiatie it
1456 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
1457 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
1458 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
1460 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1461 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1462 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1465 #ifdef SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME
1466 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_MISSING_SRP_USERNAME)
1469 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) {
1472 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1473 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1475 BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
1476 ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
1477 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1478 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1481 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1489 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a
1491 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1492 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1496 if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1497 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1503 * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation)
1505 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
1506 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
1507 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1508 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1509 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
1513 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1517 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1521 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1522 if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
1523 /* no read-ahead left? */
1526 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
1527 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1528 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1529 * problems in the blocking world
1531 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1532 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1533 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1534 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1541 switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
1544 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types: TLS v1.2 give
1545 * an unexpected message alert.
1547 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1548 SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
1551 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1552 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1554 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1556 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1558 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1559 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1560 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1562 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1565 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1567 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1568 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1569 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1570 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1571 * started), we will indulge it.
1573 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1574 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1577 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1578 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1585 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1589 void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
1593 for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
1601 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1602 * format and false otherwise.
1604 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1606 return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
1610 * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
1612 unsigned int RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1614 return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);