2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "../quic/quic_local.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include "record_local.h"
21 #include "internal/packet.h"
23 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL_CONNECTION *s)
28 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
31 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
32 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
37 if (rl->rrlmethod != NULL)
38 rl->rrlmethod->free(rl->rrl); /* Ignore return value */
39 if (rl->wrlmethod != NULL)
40 rl->wrlmethod->free(rl->wrl); /* Ignore return value */
41 BIO_free(rl->rrlnext);
49 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
52 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
53 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
55 return rl->rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
58 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
59 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
61 return (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs)
62 || rl->rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
65 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
67 return rl->wpend_tot > 0;
70 static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
72 uint32_t max_early_data;
73 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
76 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
77 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
78 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
80 if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
81 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
82 && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
83 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
90 max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
91 else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
92 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data;
94 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data
95 ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data;
97 return max_early_data;
100 static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t length,
101 size_t overhead, int send)
103 uint32_t max_early_data;
105 max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
107 if (max_early_data == 0) {
108 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
109 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
113 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
114 max_early_data += overhead;
116 if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
117 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
118 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
121 s->early_data_count += length;
126 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
129 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
134 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
138 iter = pqueue_iterator(sc->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
139 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) {
141 num += rdata->length;
145 for (i = 0; i < sc->rlayer.num_recs; i++) {
146 if (sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
148 num += sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].length;
151 num += sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->app_data_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl);
156 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
158 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
161 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
163 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
165 if (sc == NULL || IS_QUIC(s))
167 sc->rlayer.default_read_buf_len = len;
170 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
172 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
178 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
181 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, NULL, &lng);
186 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
188 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
194 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
197 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, &shrt, NULL);
202 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type,
203 const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
205 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0)
208 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
209 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
210 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
211 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
212 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
213 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
220 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
221 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
223 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
226 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
228 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
230 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
231 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
232 unsigned int recversion;
237 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
238 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
240 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
241 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
242 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
243 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
244 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
245 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
246 * report the error in a way the user will notice
248 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
249 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot != 0)
250 && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
251 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
255 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
256 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
257 /* SSLfatal() already called */
264 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
265 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
268 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
269 || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
270 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
273 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
274 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
277 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
278 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
279 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
280 /* SSLfatal() already called */
288 i = tls_write_check_pending(s, type, buf, len);
290 /* SSLfatal() already called */
294 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
295 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->retry_write_records(s->rlayer.wrl));
297 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
300 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
301 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
302 } /* else no retry required */
306 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
307 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
309 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
310 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
311 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
314 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
319 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
320 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) {
321 i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl);
323 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
324 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
327 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
332 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
333 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
335 if (max_send_fragment == 0
336 || split_send_fragment == 0
337 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
339 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
340 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
342 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
347 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
348 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
350 recversion = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
351 if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
353 && TLS1_get_version(ssl) > TLS1_VERSION
354 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
355 recversion = TLS1_VERSION;
358 size_t tmppipelen, remain;
359 size_t j, lensofar = 0;
362 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
363 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
365 maxpipes = s->rlayer.wrlmethod->get_max_records(s->rlayer.wrl, type, n,
367 &split_send_fragment);
369 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
370 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
371 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
372 * configured by the user.
374 if (s->max_pipelines > 0 && maxpipes > s->max_pipelines)
375 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
377 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
378 maxpipes = SSL_MAX_PIPELINES;
380 if (split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
381 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
385 if (n / maxpipes >= split_send_fragment) {
387 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
390 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
391 tmpls[j].type = type;
392 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
393 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + (j * split_send_fragment);
394 tmpls[j].buflen = split_send_fragment;
396 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
397 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = maxpipes * split_send_fragment;
399 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
400 tmppipelen = n / maxpipes;
401 remain = n % maxpipes;
403 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
408 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
409 tmpls[j].type = type;
410 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
411 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + lensofar;
412 tmpls[j].buflen = tmppipelen;
413 lensofar += tmppipelen;
417 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
418 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = n;
421 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
422 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(s->rlayer.wrl, tmpls, maxpipes));
424 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
425 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
429 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == n
430 || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
431 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE) != 0)) {
432 *written = tot + s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
433 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
437 n -= s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
438 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
442 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int writing, int ret,
443 char *file, int line)
445 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
447 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) {
448 s->rwstate = writing ? SSL_WRITING : SSL_READING;
451 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
452 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) {
455 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
459 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
460 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
461 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, NULL);
462 ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
463 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) != 0) {
464 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
465 s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
468 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
470 * This reason code is part of the API and may be used by
471 * applications for control flow decisions.
473 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
474 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING, NULL);
476 } else if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL) {
477 int al = s->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_alert_code(s->rlayer.rrl);
479 if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) {
481 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
482 ossl_statem_fatal(s, al, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE, NULL);
485 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
486 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
487 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
488 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
492 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
493 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
494 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
495 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
497 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR || ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF)
499 else if (ret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR)
506 int ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rr, size_t length)
508 assert(rr->length >= length);
509 if (rr->rechandle != NULL) {
512 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
513 if (HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
514 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->release_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
517 /* RLAYER_fatal already called */
521 if (length == rr->length)
522 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
523 } else if (length == 0 || length == rr->length) {
524 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
525 OPENSSL_free(rr->allocdata);
526 rr->allocdata = NULL;
528 rr->length -= length;
538 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
539 * 'type' is one of the following:
541 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when tls_get_message_header and tls_get_message_body
543 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
544 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
546 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
547 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
549 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
550 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
551 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
552 * argument is non NULL.
553 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
554 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
555 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
556 * Change cipher spec protocol
557 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
559 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
561 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
562 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
563 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
564 * Application data protocol
565 * none of our business
567 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, uint8_t *recvd_type,
568 unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
569 int peek, size_t *readbytes)
572 size_t n, curr_rec, totalbytes;
574 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
576 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
578 is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s);
581 && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
582 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
583 || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
584 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
588 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
589 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
591 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
592 unsigned char *dst = buf;
597 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
600 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
603 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
604 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
605 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
607 if (recvd_type != NULL)
608 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
615 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
618 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
619 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
620 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
621 /* SSLfatal() already called */
628 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
631 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
632 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
634 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
635 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
637 /* get new records if necessary */
638 if (s->rlayer.curr_rec >= s->rlayer.num_recs) {
639 s->rlayer.curr_rec = s->rlayer.num_recs = 0;
641 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.num_recs];
643 ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
644 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
646 &rr->version, &rr->type,
647 &rr->data, &rr->length,
650 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
654 s->rlayer.num_recs++;
655 } while (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(s->rlayer.rrl)
656 && s->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
658 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.curr_rec];
660 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
661 && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
662 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
663 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
664 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
669 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
670 * record that isn't an alert.
672 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
673 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
675 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
677 if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
678 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
679 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
680 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
681 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
686 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
689 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
690 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
691 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
696 || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
697 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
700 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
701 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
702 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
705 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
706 * doing a handshake for the first time
708 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
709 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
710 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
714 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
715 && rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
716 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
717 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
721 if (recvd_type != NULL)
722 *recvd_type = rr->type;
726 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
727 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
728 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
730 if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
737 curr_rec = s->rlayer.curr_rec;
739 if (len - totalbytes > rr->length)
742 n = len - totalbytes;
744 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
747 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
748 if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
751 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, n))
755 || (peek && n == rr->length)) {
760 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
761 && curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs
762 && totalbytes < len);
763 if (totalbytes == 0) {
764 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
767 *readbytes = totalbytes;
772 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
773 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
774 * were actually expecting a CCS).
778 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
780 if (rr->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
782 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
783 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
784 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
785 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
787 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
791 if (ssl->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
792 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
794 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
795 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
796 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
797 * if we are a server.
799 s->version = rr->version;
800 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
805 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
806 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
809 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
810 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
811 const unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off;
814 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length)
815 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
816 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
817 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
818 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
823 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, ssl,
824 s->msg_callback_arg);
826 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
827 cb = s->info_callback;
828 else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
829 cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
832 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
833 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
836 if ((!is_tls13 && alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
837 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
838 s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
839 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
842 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
843 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
844 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
845 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
851 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
852 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
854 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
856 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
857 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
858 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
860 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
861 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
862 s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
863 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
864 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
865 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
866 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
867 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
869 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
871 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
873 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
874 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
875 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
876 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
877 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
878 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
880 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
882 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
883 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
887 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
891 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
892 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
896 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
897 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
898 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
899 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
902 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
903 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
906 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
909 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
910 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
911 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
912 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
917 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
918 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
919 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
921 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
923 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
925 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
926 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
932 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
933 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
934 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
935 * that we're just going to discard.
937 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
938 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
939 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
940 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
942 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
944 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
946 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
948 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, rr->data + rr->off, n);
952 * We release the number of bytes consumed, or the whole record if it
955 if ((n > 0 || rr->length == 0) && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, n))
958 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
959 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
962 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
963 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
968 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
969 * protocol violation)
971 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
972 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
973 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
975 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
976 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
978 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
979 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
987 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
988 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
989 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
994 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
995 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
998 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
999 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
1000 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
1001 * problems in the blocking world
1003 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1004 bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
1005 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1006 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1016 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1017 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1018 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1019 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1020 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1022 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1024 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1026 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1028 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1029 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1030 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1032 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1034 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1036 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1037 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1038 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1039 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1040 * started), we will indulge it.
1042 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1043 s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
1045 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1047 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1048 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1049 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1050 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1051 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1052 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1055 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1056 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1057 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1060 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
1064 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1071 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1072 * format and false otherwise.
1074 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1076 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s))
1078 return rl->tlsrecs[0].version == SSL2_VERSION;
1081 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper;
1082 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p, int version,
1083 int content_type, const void *buf,
1084 size_t len, void *cbarg)
1086 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1087 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1089 if (s->msg_callback != NULL)
1090 s->msg_callback(write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl,
1091 s->msg_callback_arg);
1094 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper;
1095 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg, int op, int bits, int nid,
1098 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1100 return ssl_security(s, op, bits, nid, other);
1103 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper;
1104 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg, int type, size_t len)
1106 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1107 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1109 return s->rlayer.record_padding_cb(ssl, type, len,
1110 s->rlayer.record_padding_arg);
1113 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch[] = {
1114 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data },
1115 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper },
1116 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper },
1117 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper },
1121 void ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1122 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth,
1125 s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod = meth;
1126 s->rlayer.rlarg = rlarg;
1129 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1133 if (s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod != NULL)
1134 return s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod;
1136 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
1137 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1138 return &ossl_dtls_record_method;
1140 return &ossl_tls_record_method;
1143 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1144 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1145 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1146 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) != 0
1147 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)))
1148 return &ossl_ktls_record_method;
1151 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1152 return direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ ? s->rlayer.rrlmethod
1153 : s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1156 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int direction)
1158 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *thismethod;
1159 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *thisrl;
1161 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1162 thismethod = s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1163 thisrl = s->rlayer.rrl;
1165 thismethod = s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1166 thisrl = s->rlayer.wrl;
1169 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1171 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1173 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod == &ossl_ktls_record_method) {
1174 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1175 SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1179 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && thismethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
1180 thismethod->set_first_handshake(thisrl, 1);
1182 if (s->max_pipelines != 0 && thismethod->set_max_pipelines != NULL)
1183 thismethod->set_max_pipelines(thisrl, s->max_pipelines);
1188 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1189 int direction, int level,
1190 unsigned char *secret, size_t secretlen,
1191 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
1192 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
1193 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
1194 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen,
1195 int mactype, const EVP_MD *md,
1196 const SSL_COMP *comp, const EVP_MD *kdfdigest)
1198 OSSL_PARAM options[5], *opts = options;
1199 OSSL_PARAM settings[6], *set = settings;
1200 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD **thismethod;
1201 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **thisrl, *newrl = NULL;
1203 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1204 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth;
1205 int use_etm, stream_mac = 0, tlstree = 0;
1206 unsigned int maxfrag = (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE)
1207 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)
1208 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1209 int use_early_data = 0;
1210 uint32_t max_early_data;
1211 COMP_METHOD *compm = (comp == NULL) ? NULL : comp->method;
1213 meth = ssl_select_next_record_layer(s, direction, level);
1215 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1216 thismethod = &s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1217 thisrl = &s->rlayer.rrl;
1220 thismethod = &s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1221 thisrl = &s->rlayer.wrl;
1228 if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL)) {
1229 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1234 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS,
1236 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE,
1238 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1239 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN,
1240 &s->rlayer.default_read_buf_len);
1241 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD,
1242 &s->rlayer.read_ahead);
1244 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING,
1245 &s->rlayer.block_padding);
1247 *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1249 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1250 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1251 use_etm = SSL_READ_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1252 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1255 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1258 use_etm = SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1259 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1262 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1267 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM,
1271 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC,
1275 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE,
1279 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1280 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1282 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1283 && s->session != NULL
1284 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1285 maxfrag = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session);
1288 if (maxfrag != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1289 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN,
1293 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1294 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1295 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1297 if (s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1298 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1299 || level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE);
1300 } else if (!s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) {
1301 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY);
1303 if (use_early_data) {
1304 max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
1306 if (max_early_data != 0)
1307 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA,
1311 *set = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1317 unsigned int epoch = 0;
1318 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch)];
1321 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1322 prev = s->rlayer.rrlnext;
1323 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1324 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1325 epoch = dtls1_get_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_READ); /* new epoch */
1327 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
1328 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1329 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1332 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1335 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1338 s->rlayer.rrlnext = next;
1340 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1341 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1342 epoch = dtls1_get_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); /* new epoch */
1346 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1347 * callbacks that we don't need.
1349 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch); i++) {
1350 switch (rlayer_dispatch[i].function_id) {
1351 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK:
1352 if (s->msg_callback == NULL)
1355 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING:
1356 if (s->rlayer.record_padding_cb == NULL)
1362 rlayer_dispatch_tmp[j++] = rlayer_dispatch[i];
1365 rlret = meth->new_record_layer(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, version,
1366 s->server, direction, level, epoch,
1367 secret, secretlen, key, keylen, iv,
1368 ivlen, mackey, mackeylen, ciph, taglen,
1369 mactype, md, compm, kdfdigest, prev,
1370 thisbio, next, NULL, NULL, settings,
1371 options, rlayer_dispatch_tmp, s,
1372 s->rlayer.rlarg, &newrl);
1375 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL:
1376 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE);
1379 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR:
1380 if (*thismethod != meth && *thismethod != NULL) {
1382 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1383 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1388 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER);
1391 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS:
1395 /* Should not happen */
1396 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1403 * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
1404 * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that
1405 * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for
1406 * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we
1407 * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
1409 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1410 || direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1411 || pqueue_peek(s->d1->sent_messages) == NULL) {
1412 if (*thismethod != NULL && !(*thismethod)->free(*thisrl)) {
1413 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1421 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s, direction);
1424 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers)
1426 if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.rrlmethod != NULL)
1427 || !ossl_assert(s->rlayer.wrlmethod != NULL))
1429 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, s->version);
1430 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, s->version);