2 * Copyright 1995-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
14 #include "../ssl_local.h"
15 #include "../quic/quic_local.h"
16 #include <openssl/evp.h>
17 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
18 #include <openssl/rand.h>
19 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
20 #include "record_local.h"
21 #include "internal/packet.h"
23 void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL_CONNECTION *s)
28 void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
31 memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
32 rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
38 if (rl->rrlmethod != NULL)
39 rl->rrlmethod->free(rl->rrl); /* Ignore return value */
40 if (rl->wrlmethod != NULL)
41 rl->wrlmethod->free(rl->wrl); /* Ignore return value */
42 BIO_free(rl->rrlnext);
50 DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
53 /* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
54 int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
56 return rl->rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
59 /* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
60 int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
62 return (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs)
63 || rl->rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
66 int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
68 return rl->wpend_tot > 0;
71 static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
73 uint32_t max_early_data;
74 SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
77 * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
78 * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
79 * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
81 if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
82 if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
83 && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
84 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
91 max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
92 else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
93 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data;
95 max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data
96 ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data;
98 return max_early_data;
101 static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t length,
102 size_t overhead, int send)
104 uint32_t max_early_data;
106 max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
108 if (max_early_data == 0) {
109 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
110 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
114 /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
115 max_early_data += overhead;
117 if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
118 SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
119 SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
122 s->early_data_count += length;
127 size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
130 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
135 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
139 iter = pqueue_iterator(sc->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
140 while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) {
142 num += rdata->length;
146 for (i = 0; i < sc->rlayer.num_recs; i++) {
147 if (sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
149 num += sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].length;
152 num += sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->app_data_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl);
157 void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len)
159 ctx->default_read_buf_len = len;
162 void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
164 SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
166 if (sc == NULL || IS_QUIC(s))
168 sc->rlayer.default_read_buf_len = len;
171 const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
173 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
179 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
182 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, NULL, &lng);
187 const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
189 const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
195 if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
198 sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, &shrt, NULL);
203 static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type,
204 const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
206 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0)
209 /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
210 if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
211 || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
212 && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
213 || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
214 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
221 * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
222 * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
224 int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
227 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
229 size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
231 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
232 OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
233 unsigned int recversion;
238 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
239 tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
241 * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
242 * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
243 * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
244 * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
245 * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
246 * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
247 * report the error in a way the user will notice
249 if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
250 || ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot != 0)
251 && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
252 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
256 if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
257 && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
258 /* SSLfatal() already called */
265 * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go
266 * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
269 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
270 || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
271 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
274 * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in
275 * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
278 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
279 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
280 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
281 /* SSLfatal() already called */
289 i = tls_write_check_pending(s, type, buf, len);
291 /* SSLfatal() already called */
295 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
296 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->retry_write_records(s->rlayer.wrl));
299 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
300 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
301 } /* else no retry required */
305 * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
306 * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
308 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
309 s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
310 s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
311 s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
314 if (tot == len) { /* done? */
319 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
320 if (s->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) {
321 i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl);
323 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
326 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
331 max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
332 split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
334 if (max_send_fragment == 0
335 || split_send_fragment == 0
336 || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
338 * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
339 * fragments so we shouldn't get here
341 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
346 * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
347 * and record version number > TLS 1.0
349 recversion = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
350 if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
352 && TLS1_get_version(ssl) > TLS1_VERSION
353 && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
354 recversion = TLS1_VERSION;
357 size_t tmppipelen, remain;
358 size_t j, lensofar = 0;
361 * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
362 * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
364 maxpipes = s->rlayer.wrlmethod->get_max_records(s->rlayer.wrl, type, n,
366 &split_send_fragment);
368 * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
369 * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
370 * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
371 * configured by the user.
373 if (s->max_pipelines > 0 && maxpipes > s->max_pipelines)
374 maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
376 if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
377 maxpipes = SSL_MAX_PIPELINES;
379 if (split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
380 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
384 if (n / maxpipes >= split_send_fragment) {
386 * We have enough data to completely fill all available
389 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
390 tmpls[j].type = type;
391 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
392 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + (j * split_send_fragment);
393 tmpls[j].buflen = split_send_fragment;
395 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
396 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = maxpipes * split_send_fragment;
398 /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
399 tmppipelen = n / maxpipes;
400 remain = n % maxpipes;
402 * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
407 for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
408 tmpls[j].type = type;
409 tmpls[j].version = recversion;
410 tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + lensofar;
411 tmpls[j].buflen = tmppipelen;
412 lensofar += tmppipelen;
416 /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
417 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = n;
420 i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
421 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(s->rlayer.wrl, tmpls, maxpipes));
423 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
424 s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
428 if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == n
429 || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
430 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE) != 0)) {
431 *written = tot + s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
432 s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
436 n -= s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
437 tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
441 int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int writing, int ret,
442 char *file, int line)
444 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
446 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) {
447 s->rwstate = writing ? SSL_WRITING : SSL_READING;
450 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
451 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) {
454 * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
458 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
459 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
460 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, NULL);
461 ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
462 } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) != 0) {
463 SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
464 s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
467 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
468 ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
469 SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING, NULL);
471 } else if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL) {
472 int al = s->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_alert_code(s->rlayer.rrl);
474 if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) {
476 ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
477 ossl_statem_fatal(s, al, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE, NULL);
480 * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
481 * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
482 * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
483 * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
487 * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
488 * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
489 * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
490 * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
492 if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR || ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF)
494 else if (ret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR)
501 int ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rr, size_t length)
503 assert(rr->length >= length);
504 if (rr->rechandle != NULL) {
507 /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
508 if (HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
509 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->release_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
512 /* RLAYER_fatal already called */
516 if (length == rr->length)
517 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
518 } else if (length == 0 || length == rr->length) {
519 /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
520 OPENSSL_free(rr->allocdata);
521 rr->allocdata = NULL;
523 rr->length -= length;
533 * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
534 * 'type' is one of the following:
536 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when tls_get_message_header and tls_get_message_body
538 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
539 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
541 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
542 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
544 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
545 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
546 * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
547 * argument is non NULL.
548 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
549 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
550 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
551 * Change cipher spec protocol
552 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
554 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
556 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
557 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
558 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
559 * Application data protocol
560 * none of our business
562 int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, uint8_t *recvd_type,
563 unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
564 int peek, size_t *readbytes)
567 size_t n, curr_rec, totalbytes;
569 void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
571 SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
573 is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s);
576 && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
577 && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
578 || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
579 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
583 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0))
584 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
586 unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
587 unsigned char *dst = buf;
592 while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
595 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--;
598 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
599 for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++)
600 s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
602 if (recvd_type != NULL)
603 *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
610 * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
613 if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
614 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
615 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
616 /* SSLfatal() already called */
623 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
626 * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs]
627 * rr[i].type - is the type of record
629 * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
630 * rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
632 /* get new records if necessary */
633 if (s->rlayer.curr_rec >= s->rlayer.num_recs) {
634 s->rlayer.curr_rec = s->rlayer.num_recs = 0;
636 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.num_recs];
638 ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
639 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
641 &rr->version, &rr->type,
642 &rr->data, &rr->length,
645 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
649 s->rlayer.num_recs++;
650 } while (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(s->rlayer.rrl)
651 && s->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
653 rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.curr_rec];
655 if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
656 && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
657 && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
658 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
659 SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
664 * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
665 * record that isn't an alert.
667 if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
668 s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
670 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
672 if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
673 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
674 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
675 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
676 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
681 * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in
684 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
685 s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
686 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
691 || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
692 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
695 * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or
696 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or
697 * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
700 * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
701 * doing a handshake for the first time
703 if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
704 && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
705 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
709 if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
710 && rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
711 && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
712 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
716 if (recvd_type != NULL)
717 *recvd_type = rr->type;
721 * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
722 * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
723 * SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
725 if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
732 curr_rec = s->rlayer.curr_rec;
734 if (len - totalbytes > rr->length)
737 n = len - totalbytes;
739 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
742 /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
743 if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
746 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, n))
750 || (peek && n == rr->length)) {
755 } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
756 && curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs
757 && totalbytes < len);
758 if (totalbytes == 0) {
759 /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
762 *readbytes = totalbytes;
767 * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message,
768 * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we
769 * were actually expecting a CCS).
773 * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
775 if (rr->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
777 * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
778 * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
779 * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
780 * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
782 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
786 if (ssl->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
787 && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
789 * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
790 * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing
791 * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
792 * if we are a server.
794 s->version = rr->version;
795 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
800 * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
801 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
804 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
805 unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
806 const unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off;
809 if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length)
810 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
811 || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
812 || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
813 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
818 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, ssl,
819 s->msg_callback_arg);
821 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
822 cb = s->info_callback;
823 else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
824 cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
827 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
828 cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
831 if ((!is_tls13 && alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
832 || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
833 s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
834 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
837 s->rlayer.alert_count++;
838 if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
839 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
840 SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
846 * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3
847 * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore.
849 if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) {
851 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY
852 && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) {
853 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
855 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
856 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
857 s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
858 SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
859 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
860 "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
861 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
862 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
864 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
866 } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
868 * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
869 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal
870 * alert because if application tried to renegotiate it
871 * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In
872 * future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
873 * the peer refused it where we carry on.
875 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
877 } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
878 /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
882 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
886 if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
887 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
891 * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are
892 * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other
893 * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them
894 * because we are unable to write any response due to having already
897 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
898 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
901 if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
904 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
905 rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
906 BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
907 BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
912 * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have
913 * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have
914 * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled
916 * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
918 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
920 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
921 SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
927 * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we
928 * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the
929 * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
930 * that we're just going to discard.
932 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
933 size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
934 unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
935 size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
937 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
939 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
941 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
943 memcpy(dest + *dest_len, rr->data + rr->off, n);
947 * We release the number of bytes consumed, or the whole record if it
950 if ((n > 0 || rr->length == 0) && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, n))
953 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
954 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
957 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
958 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
963 * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or
964 * protocol violation)
966 if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4)
967 && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) {
968 int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING);
970 /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
971 ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
973 i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
974 /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
982 * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a
983 * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read
984 * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now.
989 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
990 if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
993 * In the case where we try to read application data, but we
994 * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry
995 * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty
996 * problems in the blocking world
998 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
999 bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
1000 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1001 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1011 * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
1012 * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the
1013 * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where
1014 * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
1015 * record types, using up resources processing them.
1017 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1019 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1021 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1023 * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of
1024 * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
1025 * that should not happen when type != rr->type
1027 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1029 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1031 * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have
1032 * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read()
1033 * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read
1034 * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet
1035 * started), we will indulge it.
1037 if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) {
1038 s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2;
1040 } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) {
1042 * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data,
1043 * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server
1044 * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a
1045 * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be
1046 * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null
1047 * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
1050 if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
1051 EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
1052 /* SSLfatal() already called */
1055 if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0))
1059 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1066 * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
1067 * format and false otherwise.
1069 int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
1071 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s))
1073 return rl->tlsrecs[0].version == SSL2_VERSION;
1076 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper;
1077 static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p, int version,
1078 int content_type, const void *buf,
1079 size_t len, void *cbarg)
1081 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1082 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1084 if (s->msg_callback != NULL)
1085 s->msg_callback(write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl,
1086 s->msg_callback_arg);
1089 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper;
1090 static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg, int op, int bits, int nid,
1093 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1095 return ssl_security(s, op, bits, nid, other);
1098 static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper;
1099 static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg, int type, size_t len)
1101 SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
1102 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1104 return s->rlayer.record_padding_cb(ssl, type, len,
1105 s->rlayer.record_padding_arg);
1108 static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch[] = {
1109 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data },
1110 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper },
1111 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper },
1112 { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper },
1116 void ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1117 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth,
1120 s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod = meth;
1121 s->rlayer.rlarg = rlarg;
1124 static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
1128 if (s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod != NULL)
1129 return s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod;
1131 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
1132 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1133 return &ossl_dtls_record_method;
1135 return &ossl_tls_record_method;
1138 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1139 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
1140 if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
1141 && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) != 0
1142 && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)))
1143 return &ossl_ktls_record_method;
1146 /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
1147 return direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ ? s->rlayer.rrlmethod
1148 : s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1151 static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int direction)
1153 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *thismethod;
1154 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *thisrl;
1156 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1157 thismethod = s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1158 thisrl = s->rlayer.rrl;
1160 thismethod = s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1161 thisrl = s->rlayer.wrl;
1164 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
1166 SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
1168 if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod == &ossl_ktls_record_method) {
1169 /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
1170 SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1174 if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && thismethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
1175 thismethod->set_first_handshake(thisrl, 1);
1177 if (s->max_pipelines != 0 && thismethod->set_max_pipelines != NULL)
1178 thismethod->set_max_pipelines(thisrl, s->max_pipelines);
1183 int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
1184 int direction, int level,
1185 unsigned char *secret, size_t secretlen,
1186 unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
1187 unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
1188 unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
1189 const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen,
1190 int mactype, const EVP_MD *md,
1191 const SSL_COMP *comp, const EVP_MD *kdfdigest)
1193 OSSL_PARAM options[5], *opts = options;
1194 OSSL_PARAM settings[6], *set = settings;
1195 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD **thismethod;
1196 OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **thisrl, *newrl = NULL;
1198 SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
1199 const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth;
1200 int use_etm, stream_mac = 0, tlstree = 0;
1201 unsigned int maxfrag = (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE)
1202 ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)
1203 : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1204 int use_early_data = 0;
1205 uint32_t max_early_data;
1206 COMP_METHOD *compm = (comp == NULL) ? NULL : comp->method;
1208 meth = ssl_select_next_record_layer(s, direction, level);
1210 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1211 thismethod = &s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
1212 thisrl = &s->rlayer.rrl;
1215 thismethod = &s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
1216 thisrl = &s->rlayer.wrl;
1223 if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL)) {
1224 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1228 /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1229 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS,
1231 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE,
1233 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1234 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN,
1235 &s->rlayer.default_read_buf_len);
1236 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD,
1237 &s->rlayer.read_ahead);
1239 *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING,
1240 &s->rlayer.block_padding);
1242 *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1244 /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
1245 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1246 use_etm = SSL_READ_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1247 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1250 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1253 use_etm = SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
1254 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
1257 if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
1262 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM,
1266 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC,
1270 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE,
1274 * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
1275 * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
1277 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1278 && s->session != NULL
1279 && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
1280 maxfrag = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session);
1283 if (maxfrag != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1284 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN,
1288 * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
1289 * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
1290 * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
1292 if (s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1293 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
1294 || level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE);
1295 } else if (!s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) {
1296 use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY);
1298 if (use_early_data) {
1299 max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
1301 if (max_early_data != 0)
1302 *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA,
1306 *set = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
1312 unsigned int epoch = 0;
1313 OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch)];
1316 if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
1317 prev = s->rlayer.rrlnext;
1318 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1319 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1320 epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer) + 1; /* new epoch */
1322 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM
1323 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
1324 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
1327 next = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1330 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1333 s->rlayer.rrlnext = next;
1335 if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1336 && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
1337 epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) + 1; /* new epoch */
1341 * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
1342 * callbacks that we don't need.
1344 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch); i++) {
1345 switch (rlayer_dispatch[i].function_id) {
1346 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK:
1347 if (s->msg_callback == NULL)
1350 case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING:
1351 if (s->rlayer.record_padding_cb == NULL)
1357 rlayer_dispatch_tmp[j++] = rlayer_dispatch[i];
1360 rlret = meth->new_record_layer(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, version,
1361 s->server, direction, level, epoch,
1362 secret, secretlen, key, keylen, iv,
1363 ivlen, mackey, mackeylen, ciph, taglen,
1364 mactype, md, compm, kdfdigest, prev,
1365 thisbio, next, NULL, NULL, settings,
1366 options, rlayer_dispatch_tmp, s,
1367 s->rlayer.rlarg, &newrl);
1370 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL:
1371 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE);
1374 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR:
1375 if (*thismethod != meth && *thismethod != NULL) {
1377 * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
1378 * so we fallback to the original method and try again
1383 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER);
1386 case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS:
1390 /* Should not happen */
1391 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1398 * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
1399 * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that
1400 * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for
1401 * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we
1402 * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
1404 if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
1405 || direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
1406 || pqueue_peek(s->d1->sent_messages) == NULL) {
1407 if (*thismethod != NULL && !(*thismethod)->free(*thisrl)) {
1408 SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1416 return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s, direction);
1419 int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers)
1421 if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.rrlmethod != NULL)
1422 || !ossl_assert(s->rlayer.wrlmethod != NULL))
1424 s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, s->version);
1425 s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, s->version);