2 * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
5 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
6 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
7 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
15 #include "internal/ctype.h"
16 #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
17 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
18 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
19 #include <openssl/evp.h>
20 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
21 #include <openssl/x509.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
23 #include <openssl/objects.h>
24 #include "internal/dane.h"
25 #include "internal/x509_int.h"
28 /* CRL score values */
30 /* No unhandled critical extensions */
32 #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
34 /* certificate is within CRL scope */
36 #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
40 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
42 /* Issuer name matches certificate */
44 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
46 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
48 #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
50 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
52 #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
54 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
56 #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
58 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
60 #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
62 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
64 #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
66 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
67 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
68 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
69 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
70 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
71 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
72 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
73 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
74 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
75 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted);
76 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
80 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth);
81 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
82 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
84 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
85 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
86 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
87 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
88 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl,
89 int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base,
90 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
91 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
93 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
94 unsigned int *preasons);
95 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
96 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
97 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
98 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
100 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
102 static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
107 /* Return 1 is a certificate is self signed */
108 static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
111 * FIXME: x509v3_cache_extensions() needs to detect more failures and not
112 * set EXFLAG_SET when that happens. Especially, if the failures are
113 * parse errors, rather than memory pressure!
115 X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
116 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
122 /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
124 static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
126 STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
129 /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
130 certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
133 /* Look for exact match */
134 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
135 xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
136 if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
139 if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
143 sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
148 * Inform the verify callback of an error.
149 * If B<x> is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at
151 * If B<err> is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
152 * unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
154 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
156 static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
158 ctx->error_depth = depth;
159 ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
160 if (err != X509_V_OK)
162 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
166 * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the
167 * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error
170 * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
172 static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
175 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
178 static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
181 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
183 if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0)
186 for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
187 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
190 * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only
191 * check the security of issuer keys.
193 if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
194 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0)
197 * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates
198 * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1.
200 if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
201 verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0)
207 static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
213 * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks,
214 * instantiate chain public key parameters.
216 if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 ||
217 (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 ||
218 (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 ||
219 (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1)
220 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
221 if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0)
224 err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain,
226 if (err != X509_V_OK) {
227 if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0)
231 /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */
232 ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx);
236 if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0)
239 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
240 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
241 if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
243 if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0)
247 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
248 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK)
249 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
253 int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
255 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
258 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
259 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
260 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
264 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
266 * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We
267 * cannot do another one.
269 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
270 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
275 * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that
276 * the first entry is in place
278 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
279 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
280 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
281 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
284 X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
285 ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
287 /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */
288 if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
289 !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
292 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
293 ret = dane_verify(ctx);
295 ret = verify_chain(ctx);
298 * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error,
299 * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored
300 * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE).
302 if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
303 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
308 * Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
310 static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
313 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
315 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
316 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
317 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
319 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1))
326 /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
328 static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
332 return cert_self_signed(x);
333 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
334 if (ret == X509_V_OK) {
337 /* Special case: single self signed certificate */
338 if (cert_self_signed(x) && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
340 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
341 ch = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
342 if (ch == issuer || !X509_cmp(ch, issuer)) {
343 ret = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP;
349 return (ret == X509_V_OK);
352 /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
354 static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
356 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
358 X509_up_ref(*issuer);
364 static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm)
366 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
369 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) {
370 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i);
371 if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) {
373 sk = sk_X509_new_null();
374 if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_push(sk, x) == 0) {
375 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
385 * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local
386 * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions.
388 static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth,
391 int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
394 * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust
395 * settings trump the purpose constraints.
397 * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in
398 * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in
399 * ctx->param->purpose!
401 * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from
402 * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets
403 * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however
404 * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value
405 * via the X509_PURPOSE API.
407 * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're
408 * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is
411 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose)
412 tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT);
415 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
417 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
420 switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) {
426 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0)
432 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE);
436 * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied
440 static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
442 int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
444 int proxy_path_length = 0;
446 int allow_proxy_certs;
447 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
450 * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
451 * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
452 * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
453 * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
454 * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
455 * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
456 * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
460 /* CRL path validation */
462 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
463 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
466 ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
467 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
470 for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
472 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
473 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
474 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
475 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
476 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION))
479 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
480 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
481 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED))
484 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
485 switch (must_be_ca) {
487 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
488 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
490 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
502 /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */
504 || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
507 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
512 if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK))
514 /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */
515 if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca))
517 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
518 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
519 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
520 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
521 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
524 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
525 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
528 * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate
529 * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not,
530 * the next certificate must be a CA certificate.
532 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
534 * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint
535 * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to
536 * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length
537 * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it.
539 * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start
540 * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC,
541 * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally,
542 * increment proxy_path_length.
544 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) {
545 if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
546 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
547 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED))
550 proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen;
560 static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
564 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
565 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
566 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
569 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
570 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
574 * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the
575 * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry
577 * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4))
579 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
580 X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x);
581 X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
582 X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL;
583 int last_object_nid = 0;
585 int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1;
587 /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */
588 if (last_object_loc < 1) {
589 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
590 goto proxy_name_done;
594 * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as
595 * there is in issuer.
597 if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject)
598 != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) {
599 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
600 goto proxy_name_done;
604 * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a
607 if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
609 == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject,
610 last_object_loc - 1))) {
611 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
612 goto proxy_name_done;
616 * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that
617 * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly
619 tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject);
620 if (tmpsubject == NULL) {
621 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
622 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
627 X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc);
629 OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry));
631 if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName
632 || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) {
633 err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION;
636 X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry);
637 X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject);
641 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err))
646 * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain
647 * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed
648 * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them
651 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
652 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
655 int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
657 /* If EE certificate check commonName too */
658 if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0)
659 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc);
664 case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM:
667 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv))
677 static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
679 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode);
682 static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
685 int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
688 if (vpm->peername != NULL) {
689 OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername);
690 vpm->peername = NULL;
692 for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
693 name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
694 if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0)
700 static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
702 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
704 if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
705 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
708 if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) {
709 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
712 if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
713 if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
719 static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted)
724 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
725 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
729 * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2)
730 * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth.
732 if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) {
733 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) {
734 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
735 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
741 * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up.
742 * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted
743 * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those,
744 * and wants to incrementally check just any added since.
746 for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) {
747 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
748 trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
749 /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
750 if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
752 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
757 * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains,
758 * the chain is PKIX trusted.
760 if (num_untrusted < num) {
761 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN)
763 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
766 if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
768 * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf
769 * for a direct trust store match.
772 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
773 mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
775 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
778 * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set,
779 * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed.
781 trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0);
782 if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
787 /* Replace leaf with trusted match */
788 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
790 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
795 * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
796 * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
798 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
801 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED))
802 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
803 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
806 if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane))
807 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
809 dane->pdpth = num_untrusted;
810 /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */
811 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
812 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
813 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
816 static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
818 int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0;
819 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
821 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
822 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
824 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
829 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
830 ctx->error_depth = i;
831 ok = check_cert(ctx);
838 static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
840 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
842 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
843 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
845 ctx->current_cert = x;
846 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
847 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
848 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
850 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
853 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
854 unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
856 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
858 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
860 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
862 * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback
865 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
868 ctx->current_crl = crl;
869 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
874 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
877 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
883 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
885 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
895 * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration,
898 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
899 ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL);
907 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
911 /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
913 static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
919 ctx->current_crl = crl;
920 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
921 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
922 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
927 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
931 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD))
938 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID))
942 if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) {
943 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
948 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD))
951 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
952 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
955 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED))
961 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
966 static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
967 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
968 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
970 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
971 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
972 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
973 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
974 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
976 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
977 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
979 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
980 if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0)
982 /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */
983 if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) {
985 if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl),
986 X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0)
989 * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day|
992 if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0)
996 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
997 best_score = crl_score;
998 best_reasons = reasons;
1002 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
1004 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
1005 *pscore = best_score;
1006 *preasons = best_reasons;
1007 X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl);
1008 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
1010 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
1013 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
1020 * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
1021 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
1024 static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
1026 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
1028 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
1030 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
1031 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
1033 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
1037 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
1041 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
1043 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
1053 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
1059 /* See if a base and delta are compatible */
1061 static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
1063 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
1064 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
1066 /* Base must have a CRL number */
1067 if (!base->crl_number)
1069 /* Issuer names must match */
1070 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
1072 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1073 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
1075 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
1077 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
1078 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1080 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1081 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
1087 * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or
1088 * retrieve a chain of deltas...
1091 static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
1092 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
1096 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
1098 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
1100 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
1101 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
1102 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
1103 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
1104 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
1105 X509_CRL_up_ref(delta);
1114 * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate
1115 * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not
1116 * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is
1117 * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL
1118 * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
1121 static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
1122 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1126 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
1128 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
1130 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
1131 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1133 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
1134 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
1135 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
1137 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
1138 /* If no new reasons reject */
1139 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1142 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1143 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1145 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1146 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
1147 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1150 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1152 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1153 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1156 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1157 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1159 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1160 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1162 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1164 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1167 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1169 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1170 /* If no new reasons reject */
1171 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1173 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1174 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1177 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1183 static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1184 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1186 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1187 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1188 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1191 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1194 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1196 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1197 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1198 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1199 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1204 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1205 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1206 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1208 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1209 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1210 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1215 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1217 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1221 * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of
1222 * untrusted certificates.
1224 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1225 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1226 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1228 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1229 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1230 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1237 * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1238 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1239 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will
1240 * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice.
1243 static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1245 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1248 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1251 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1254 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1255 /* Copy verify params across */
1256 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1258 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1259 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1261 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1262 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1266 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1267 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1269 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1274 * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and
1275 * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could
1276 * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more
1277 * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor,
1278 * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the
1282 static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1283 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1284 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1286 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1287 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1288 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1289 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1295 * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1296 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1297 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1298 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1299 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1302 static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1304 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1305 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1306 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1313 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1317 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1322 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1324 gens = b->name.fullname;
1325 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1328 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1329 gens = a->name.fullname;
1333 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1335 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1336 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1337 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1339 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1345 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1347 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1348 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1349 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1350 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1351 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1360 static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1363 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1364 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1366 return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1367 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1368 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1369 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1371 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1377 /* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1379 static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1380 unsigned int *preasons)
1383 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1385 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1386 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1389 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1392 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1393 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1394 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1395 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1396 if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1397 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1402 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint)
1403 && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1409 * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try
1410 * to find a delta CRL too
1413 static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1414 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1417 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1419 unsigned int reasons;
1420 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1421 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1422 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1424 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1425 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1426 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1430 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1432 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1434 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1438 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1440 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1443 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1445 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1446 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1447 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1455 /* Check CRL validity */
1456 static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1458 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1459 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1460 int cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1461 int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1463 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1464 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1465 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1467 * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next
1468 * certificate in chain.
1470 else if (cnum < chnum)
1471 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1473 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1474 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1475 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) &&
1476 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER))
1484 * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done
1486 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1487 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1488 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1489 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) &&
1490 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN))
1493 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) &&
1494 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE))
1497 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) &&
1498 check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 &&
1499 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR))
1502 if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) &&
1503 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION))
1507 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) &&
1508 !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1))
1511 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1512 ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer);
1515 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1519 int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags);
1521 if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv))
1523 /* Verify CRL signature */
1524 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 &&
1525 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1531 /* Check certificate against CRL */
1532 static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1537 * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled
1538 * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate
1539 * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can
1540 * change the meaning of CRL entries.
1542 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1543 && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) &&
1544 !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION))
1547 * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure
1548 * reason is not removeFromCRL.
1550 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1551 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1553 if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED))
1560 static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1567 * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a
1568 * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor
1569 * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280
1570 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the
1571 * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look
1572 * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain
1573 * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it
1574 * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the
1575 * X509_policy_check() call.
1577 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) {
1578 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1579 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1582 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1583 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1584 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed)
1585 sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
1587 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) {
1588 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1589 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
1592 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1593 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) {
1596 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */
1597 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1598 X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1600 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1602 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i,
1603 X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION))
1608 if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) {
1609 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1610 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1611 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1613 if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) {
1614 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1618 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1619 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1621 * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed
1622 * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then
1623 * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier
1624 * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK.
1626 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1634 * Check certificate validity times.
1635 * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
1636 * the validation status.
1638 * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
1640 int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
1645 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1646 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1647 else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1652 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime);
1653 if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
1655 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1656 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
1658 if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
1661 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime);
1662 if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
1664 if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
1665 X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
1667 if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
1672 static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1674 int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1675 X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1679 * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to
1680 * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as
1681 * NULL, since all we have is a bare key.
1683 if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) {
1689 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1692 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
1697 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
1698 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
1700 ctx->error_depth = n;
1701 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1705 * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback
1706 * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril).
1712 * Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless explicitly
1713 * asked for. It doesn't add any security and just wastes time. If
1714 * the issuer's public key is unusable, report the issuer certificate
1715 * and its depth (rather than the depth of the subject).
1717 if (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)) {
1718 if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1719 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
1720 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
1722 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1723 if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
1724 X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE))
1730 /* Calls verify callback as needed */
1731 if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
1735 * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any)
1738 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1739 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1740 ctx->error_depth = n;
1741 if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
1746 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1752 int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1754 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1757 int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1759 static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1760 static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
1761 ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
1762 int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
1765 * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
1766 * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
1767 * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1768 * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
1770 * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
1771 * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
1772 * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
1773 * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
1775 switch (ctm->type) {
1776 case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
1777 if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
1780 case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
1781 if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
1789 * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
1790 * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
1791 * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
1793 for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
1794 if (!ossl_isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
1797 if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
1801 * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
1802 * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
1803 * so we go through ASN.1
1805 asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
1806 if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
1808 if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
1812 * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
1813 * The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
1815 ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
1818 ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
1822 ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1824 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1827 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1829 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1832 ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1833 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1842 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) {
1843 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1844 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1845 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1846 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1848 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1851 int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1853 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1856 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1859 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1860 ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1862 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1863 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1866 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1870 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1871 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1875 /* first, populate the other certs */
1876 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1877 ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1878 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1882 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1886 /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */
1888 X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer,
1889 EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags)
1891 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
1893 STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL;
1894 /* CRLs can't be delta already */
1895 if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) {
1896 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA);
1899 /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */
1900 if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) {
1901 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER);
1904 /* Issuer names must match */
1905 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) {
1906 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH);
1909 /* AKID and IDP must match */
1910 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) {
1911 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH);
1914 if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) {
1915 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH);
1918 /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
1919 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) {
1920 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER);
1923 /* CRLs must verify */
1924 if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 ||
1925 X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) {
1926 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE);
1929 /* Create new CRL */
1930 crl = X509_CRL_new();
1931 if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1))
1933 /* Set issuer name */
1934 if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)))
1937 if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer)))
1939 if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer)))
1942 /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */
1944 if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0))
1948 * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL
1949 * number to correct value too.
1952 for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) {
1953 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
1954 ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i);
1955 if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1))
1959 /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */
1961 revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer);
1963 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) {
1964 X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp;
1965 rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i);
1967 * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here
1968 * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs.
1970 if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) {
1971 rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn);
1974 if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) {
1975 X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp);
1980 /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */
1982 if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md))
1988 X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1993 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1995 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
1998 void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
2000 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
2003 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2008 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
2013 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2015 return ctx->error_depth;
2018 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2020 ctx->error_depth = depth;
2023 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2025 return ctx->current_cert;
2028 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2030 ctx->current_cert = x;
2033 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2038 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2042 return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain);
2045 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2047 return ctx->current_issuer;
2050 X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2052 return ctx->current_crl;
2055 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2060 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
2065 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
2070 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
2073 * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust?
2074 * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust
2075 * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init().
2077 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
2080 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
2083 * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default
2084 * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case.
2086 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
2090 * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values.
2091 * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and
2092 * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't
2093 * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then
2094 * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL
2095 * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the
2096 * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL
2100 int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
2101 int purpose, int trust)
2104 /* If purpose not set use default */
2106 purpose = def_purpose;
2107 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
2110 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
2112 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2113 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2116 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2117 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2118 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
2120 * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is
2121 * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the
2122 * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled?
2125 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2126 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
2129 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2131 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
2133 trust = ptmp->trust;
2136 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
2138 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
2139 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
2144 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
2145 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
2146 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
2147 ctx->param->trust = trust;
2151 X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
2153 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
2156 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2162 void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2167 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2171 int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2172 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2178 ctx->untrusted = chain;
2180 ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
2181 ctx->other_ctx = NULL;
2185 ctx->explicit_policy = 0;
2186 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2187 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
2188 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
2189 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
2190 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
2191 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
2195 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0;
2196 /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */
2197 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2199 /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */
2201 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2205 if (store && store->check_issued)
2206 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2208 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2210 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2211 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2213 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2215 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2216 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2218 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2220 if (store && store->verify)
2221 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2223 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2225 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2226 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2228 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2230 if (store && store->get_crl)
2231 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2233 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2235 if (store && store->check_crl)
2236 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2238 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2240 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2241 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2243 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2245 if (store && store->check_policy)
2246 ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy;
2248 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2250 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2251 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2253 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs;
2255 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2256 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2258 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls;
2260 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2261 if (ctx->param == NULL) {
2262 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2267 * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults.
2270 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2272 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2275 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2276 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2279 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2284 * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the
2285 * purpose if this still yields the default value.
2287 if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
2288 int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose);
2289 X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
2292 ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp);
2295 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2298 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2302 * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not
2303 * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so.
2305 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
2310 * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This
2311 * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2313 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2315 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2316 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2317 ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk;
2320 void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2323 * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls
2324 * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free()
2325 * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the
2326 * pointers below after they're freed!
2328 /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */
2329 if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) {
2331 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2333 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2334 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2335 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2338 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2340 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2342 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2343 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data));
2346 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2348 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2351 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2353 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2356 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags,
2359 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2362 X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2367 STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2369 return ctx->untrusted;
2372 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2374 ctx->untrusted = sk;
2377 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2379 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2383 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2384 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb)
2386 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2389 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2391 return ctx->verify_cb;
2394 void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2395 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify)
2397 ctx->verify = verify;
2400 X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2405 X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2407 return ctx->get_issuer;
2410 X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2412 return ctx->check_issued;
2415 X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2417 return ctx->check_revocation;
2420 X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2422 return ctx->get_crl;
2425 X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2427 return ctx->check_crl;
2430 X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2432 return ctx->cert_crl;
2435 X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2437 return ctx->check_policy;
2440 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2442 return ctx->lookup_certs;
2445 X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2447 return ctx->lookup_crls;
2450 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2452 return ctx->cleanup;
2455 X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2460 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2462 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2465 int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2467 return ctx->num_untrusted;
2470 int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2472 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2473 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2476 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2479 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2484 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2486 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2490 void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane)
2495 static unsigned char *dane_i2d(
2498 unsigned int *i2dlen)
2500 unsigned char *buf = NULL;
2504 * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key.
2507 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT:
2508 len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf);
2510 case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI:
2511 len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf);
2514 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR);
2518 if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) {
2519 X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2523 *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len;
2527 #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */
2529 static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth)
2531 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2532 unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE;
2533 unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE;
2534 unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE;
2535 unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2536 unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL;
2537 unsigned int i2dlen = 0;
2538 unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2539 unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL;
2540 unsigned int cmplen = 0;
2544 danetls_record *t = NULL;
2547 mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK;
2550 * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2)
2552 if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
2553 mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2556 * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any
2557 * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain.
2558 * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already.
2560 if (dane->mdpth >= 0)
2561 mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK;
2564 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1
2565 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2
2566 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3
2567 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4
2569 * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building
2570 * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with
2571 * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which
2572 * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1).
2574 * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX
2575 * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest
2576 * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c.
2578 * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we
2579 * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers
2580 * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch
2581 * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1",
2582 * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public
2583 * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1"
2584 * or multiple "3 0 1" records.
2586 * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either
2587 * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after
2588 * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is
2589 * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation.
2591 recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0;
2592 for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) {
2593 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2594 if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0)
2596 if (t->usage != usage) {
2599 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2600 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2601 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2603 if (t->selector != selector) {
2604 selector = t->selector;
2606 /* Update per-selector state */
2607 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2608 i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen);
2612 /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */
2613 mtype = DANETLS_NONE;
2614 ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype];
2615 } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) {
2619 * <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-9>
2621 * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the
2622 * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals
2623 * other than "Full".
2625 if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal)
2630 * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant
2631 * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space.
2633 if (t->mtype != mtype) {
2634 const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype];
2640 if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) {
2648 * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any
2649 * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a
2652 if (cmplen == t->dlen &&
2653 memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) {
2654 if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK)
2656 if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) {
2657 dane->mdpth = depth;
2659 OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert);
2667 /* Clear the one-element DER cache */
2668 OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf);
2672 static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2674 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2678 if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0)
2679 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2682 * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if
2683 * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking
2684 * for an exact match for the leaf certificate).
2686 cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
2687 if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0)
2688 return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2690 ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1;
2691 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2694 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2697 static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2699 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2701 int num = ctx->num_untrusted;
2702 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2703 int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs);
2706 for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) {
2707 t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i);
2708 if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA ||
2709 t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI ||
2710 t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL ||
2711 X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0)
2714 /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */
2715 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2718 /* Record match via a bare TA public key */
2719 ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1;
2720 dane->mdpth = num - 1;
2723 /* Prune any excess chain certificates */
2724 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2725 for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num)
2726 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2728 return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
2731 return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2734 static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane)
2737 * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure.
2739 X509_free(dane->mcert);
2746 static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2748 int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags);
2750 if (err == X509_V_OK)
2752 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err);
2755 static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2757 X509 *cert = ctx->cert;
2758 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2765 * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record,
2766 * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1)
2767 * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the
2768 * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor.
2769 * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done
2771 * + matched < 0, internal error.
2772 * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record
2773 * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no
2774 * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test.
2776 matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0);
2777 done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0);
2780 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
2783 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2784 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2786 /* Callback invoked as needed */
2787 if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 &&
2790 /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */
2791 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2792 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2793 return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx);
2797 ctx->error_depth = 0;
2798 ctx->current_cert = cert;
2799 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2804 /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */
2805 if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert))
2807 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
2811 * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0
2812 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain.
2814 return verify_chain(ctx);
2817 /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */
2818 static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
2820 STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain;
2824 ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert);
2825 ctx->chain = saved_chain;
2830 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2832 SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane;
2833 int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2834 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
2835 int ss = cert_self_signed(cert);
2836 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
2837 unsigned int search;
2838 int may_trusted = 0;
2839 int may_alternate = 0;
2840 int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
2841 int alt_untrusted = 0;
2846 /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
2847 if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) {
2848 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2849 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
2853 #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
2854 #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
2855 #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */
2857 * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled.
2858 * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the
2859 * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first,
2860 * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain
2861 * if no luck with untrusted first.
2863 search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0;
2864 if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) {
2865 if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
2866 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
2867 else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
2873 * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is
2874 * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make
2875 * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go.
2877 if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
2878 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2879 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2884 * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add
2885 * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the
2886 * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with
2887 * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create
2888 * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE
2889 * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack
2890 * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for
2893 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) {
2894 if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2895 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2896 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2899 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) {
2900 if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) {
2901 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
2902 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2903 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
2910 * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound
2911 * might be reasonable.
2913 if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2)
2914 ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2;
2917 * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer.
2918 * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit,
2919 * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code.
2921 depth = ctx->param->depth + 1;
2923 while (search != 0) {
2928 * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run
2929 * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we
2930 * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point
2931 * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long.
2933 * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the
2934 * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last
2935 * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0,
2936 * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer
2937 * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be
2938 * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain
2939 * would be a-priori too long.
2941 if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) {
2942 i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
2943 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2945 * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative
2946 * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently
2947 * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable
2948 * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It
2949 * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain
2950 * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of
2951 * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a
2952 * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor
2953 * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or
2954 * ctx->num_untrusted.
2956 * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of
2957 * untrusted certificates, not a "depth".
2961 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1);
2963 ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
2966 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2967 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
2974 * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert?
2975 * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now
2976 * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note
2977 * that despite the current trust-store match we might still
2978 * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which
2979 * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try
2980 * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on
2981 * again with an even shorter untrusted chain!
2983 * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust
2984 * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted
2985 * certificate among the ones from the trust store.
2987 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
2988 if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0)) {
2989 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2991 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
2992 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
2996 search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
2997 for (; num > i; --num)
2998 X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
2999 ctx->num_untrusted = num;
3001 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3002 dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) {
3004 X509_free(dane->mcert);
3007 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3008 dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted)
3013 * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their
3014 * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain.
3017 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) {
3019 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3020 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3021 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3025 ss = cert_self_signed(x);
3026 } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) {
3028 * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same
3029 * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as
3030 * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid
3031 * possible impersonation via key substitution etc.
3033 if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) {
3034 /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */
3039 ctx->num_untrusted = --num;
3040 (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp);
3045 * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck
3046 * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper.
3047 * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer
3048 * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain.
3050 * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the
3051 * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE
3052 * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from
3053 * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the
3054 * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted
3055 * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
3058 if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) {
3059 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3060 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3061 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3065 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3066 switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
3067 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3068 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3078 * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if
3079 * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled,
3080 * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time,
3081 * and trying to extend the shorted chain.
3083 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) {
3084 /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */
3085 if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0)
3087 /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */
3088 if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 ||
3089 ctx->num_untrusted < 2)
3091 /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */
3092 search |= S_DOALTERNATE;
3093 alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1;
3099 * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates
3101 if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
3102 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3103 if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) {
3104 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3105 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3106 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
3110 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
3113 * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more
3114 * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled.
3116 xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
3118 search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
3120 search |= S_DOTRUSTED;
3124 /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */
3125 (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
3127 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
3128 X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3129 trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
3130 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
3135 X509_up_ref(x = xtmp);
3136 ++ctx->num_untrusted;
3137 ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp);
3140 * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate.
3142 switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) {
3143 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3144 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3150 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
3153 * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key
3154 * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust.
3156 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3158 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane))
3159 trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx);
3160 if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted)
3161 trust = check_trust(ctx, num);
3165 case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
3167 case X509_TRUST_REJECTED:
3168 /* Callback already issued */
3170 case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED:
3172 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
3174 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3175 X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG);
3176 if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) &&
3177 (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0))
3178 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH);
3179 if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
3180 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3181 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT);
3183 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3184 X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN);
3185 if (ctx->num_untrusted < num)
3186 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3187 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT);
3188 return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1,
3189 X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY);
3193 static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
3194 static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table);
3197 * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of
3200 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3202 static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3204 EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert);
3205 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3207 /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
3213 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3214 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3216 return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1];
3220 * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security
3221 * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether
3222 * self-signed or otherwise).
3224 * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
3226 static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
3229 int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
3233 if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
3234 level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
3236 if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
3239 return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];