2 * Copyright 2007-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
4 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 /* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
14 #include "cmp_local.h"
15 #include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
17 /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
18 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
19 #include <openssl/cmp.h>
20 #include <openssl/crmf.h>
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
24 /* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */
25 static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
26 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert)
28 OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
29 EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
30 BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
33 if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL))
36 /* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
37 if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage
38 && (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
39 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
43 pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
45 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY);
49 prot_part.header = msg->header;
50 prot_part.body = msg->body;
52 if (ASN1_item_verify_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART),
53 msg->header->protectionAlg, msg->protection,
54 &prot_part, NULL, pubkey, cmp_ctx->libctx,
55 cmp_ctx->propq) > 0) {
61 res = ossl_x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
62 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE);
64 ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
68 EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
74 /* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
75 static int verify_PBMAC(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
77 ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL;
80 /* generate expected protection for the message */
81 if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL)
82 return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
84 valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0
85 && msg->protection->type == protection->type
86 && msg->protection->length == protection->length
87 && CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data,
88 protection->length) == 0;
89 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection);
91 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE);
97 * Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
98 * certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
99 * and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
101 * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
103 int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
104 X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert)
107 X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
110 if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) {
111 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
115 if (trusted_store == NULL) {
116 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE);
120 if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL
121 || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store,
122 cert, ctx->untrusted))
125 valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0;
127 /* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
128 err = ERR_peek_last_error();
129 if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE)
130 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
133 /* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
134 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
135 X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
139 /* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
140 static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success,
141 const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
142 const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
146 if (expect_name == NULL)
147 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
149 /* make sure that a matching name is there */
150 if (actual_name == NULL) {
151 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
154 str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0);
155 if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) {
156 if (log_success && str != NULL)
157 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc,
164 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
166 if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
167 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str);
172 /* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
173 static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
174 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid,
175 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
180 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
182 /* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
184 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
187 str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length);
188 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) {
190 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str);
196 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str);
198 if ((str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
199 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str);
204 static int already_checked(const X509 *cert,
205 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
209 for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--)
210 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0)
216 * Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
217 * The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
218 * and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
219 * Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
221 * Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
223 static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
224 const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
225 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
226 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
227 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
229 X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
230 int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
232 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
235 ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
236 self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
237 if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
238 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
241 str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
243 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
247 if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
248 || already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
249 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked");
253 time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
254 X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
256 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired"
257 : "cert is not yet valid");
261 if (!check_name(ctx, 1,
262 "cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
263 "sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
266 if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID))
268 /* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */
269 if (!ossl_x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) {
270 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid");
273 if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) {
274 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
277 /* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
278 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
282 static int check_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
285 if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
289 "msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
294 * Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
295 * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
296 * and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
297 * from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert -
298 * provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
300 static int check_cert_path_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
301 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *scrt)
306 if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
309 if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
310 || !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
311 1 /* self-issued only */))
314 /* store does not include CRLs */
315 valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
318 "also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
321 * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
322 * OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
324 EVP_PKEY *pkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
325 OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
326 ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
328 X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_cert(crep, ctx, pkey);
330 * maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
333 valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
338 X509_STORE_free(store);
342 static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
343 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
345 return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert",
346 cert, NULL, NULL, msg)
347 && (check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)
348 || check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert));
352 * Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
353 * If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
354 * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
356 static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
358 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
359 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
360 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp)
362 int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL;
363 int n_acceptable_certs = 0;
366 if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) {
367 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc);
371 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */
372 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
374 if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL))
376 if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert,
377 already_checked1, already_checked2, msg))
379 n_acceptable_certs++;
380 if (mode_3gpp ? check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert)
381 : check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)) {
382 /* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
383 if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
385 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) {
392 if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0)
393 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
398 * Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted, which should include extraCerts
399 * at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
400 * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
402 static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
408 && ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
409 || OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)))
413 mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
414 : "trying first normal mode using trust store");
415 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
416 NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
418 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted, "untrusted certs",
419 msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
422 if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
423 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts"
424 : "no trusted store");
426 STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted);
427 ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted,
428 mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts"
429 : "certs in trusted store",
430 msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted,
432 sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
437 static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
438 OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
444 * Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert.
445 * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
447 static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
449 X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
450 GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender;
452 char *skid_str = NULL;
453 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
454 OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
457 if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL)
458 return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
459 if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
460 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
464 /* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
465 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
467 /* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
468 (void)ERR_set_mark();
469 ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
472 * try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
473 * for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
476 if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) {
477 ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
478 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
481 /* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
482 (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
483 /* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */
485 "trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
486 (void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg);
489 res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
490 || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
491 ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
493 /* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
494 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
497 /* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
498 (void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
500 sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
501 skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL
502 : OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length);
503 if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
504 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
506 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
507 if (skid_str != NULL)
508 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
510 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
511 /* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
512 (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
513 (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
516 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
518 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = ");
519 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname);
521 if (skid_str != NULL) {
522 ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
523 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str);
528 OPENSSL_free(skid_str);
533 * Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
534 * based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
535 * the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
536 * else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted, in ctx->trusted
537 * (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
538 * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
540 * If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
541 * the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
542 * if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
543 * validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
544 * This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
546 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
548 int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
552 ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "validating CMP message");
553 if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
554 || msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) {
555 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
559 if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */
560 || msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
561 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
565 switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) {
566 /* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
567 case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
568 if (ctx->secretValue == NULL) {
569 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no secret available for verifying PBM-based CMP message protection");
572 if (verify_PBMAC(ctx, msg)) {
574 * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
575 * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
576 * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
577 * certificate by the initiator.'
579 switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) {
582 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
583 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
584 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
585 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
586 if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
587 STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
588 /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
590 if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
591 /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
599 "sucessfully validated PBM-based CMP message protection");
602 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "verifying PBM-based CMP message protection failed");
606 * 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
609 case NID_id_DHBasedMac:
610 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC);
619 if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
620 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no trust store nor pinned server cert available for verifying signature-based CMP message protection");
623 if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg))
625 } else { /* use pinned sender cert */
626 /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
627 if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
629 "sucessfully validated signature-based CMP message protection");
633 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "CMP message signature verification failed");
634 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
643 * Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
644 * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted.
647 * its sender is of appropriate type (curently only X509_NAME) and
648 * matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx
649 * it has a valid body type
650 * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
651 * is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
652 * its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
653 * its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
655 * If everything is fine:
656 * learns the senderNonce from the received message,
657 * learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx,
658 * and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted.
660 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
662 int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
663 ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
665 OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
666 const X509_NAME *expected_sender;
668 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL))
670 hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg);
672 /* validate sender name of received msg */
673 if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
674 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
678 * Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
679 * Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret
680 * or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy.
682 expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender;
683 if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL)
684 expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
685 if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName,
686 "expected sender", expected_sender))
688 /* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
690 if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
692 "received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
694 * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg()
695 * and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
696 * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
697 * Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the
698 * extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway.
699 * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
701 if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts,
702 /* this allows self-signed certs */
703 X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
704 | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND))
707 /* validate message protection */
708 if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) {
709 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
710 if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
711 && (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
712 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
713 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
718 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
719 if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
720 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
721 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
727 /* check CMP version number in header */
728 if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
729 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
730 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
735 if (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) {
736 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
737 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
742 /* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
743 if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
744 && (hdr->transactionID == NULL
745 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID,
746 hdr->transactionID) != 0)) {
747 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
748 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED);
753 /* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
754 if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL
755 && (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL
756 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce,
757 hdr->recipNonce) != 0)) {
758 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
759 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED);
765 * RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
766 * the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
767 * --> Store for setting in next message
769 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce))
772 /* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
773 if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
774 && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID))
778 * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
779 * such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
780 * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
781 * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
783 if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted, msg->extraCerts,
784 /* this allows self-signed certs */
785 X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
786 | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND))
789 if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
791 * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
792 * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
793 * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
794 * certificate by the initiator.'
796 switch (OSSL_CMP_MSG_get_bodytype(msg)) {
797 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
798 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
799 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
800 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
801 if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
802 STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
803 /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
805 if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
806 /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
817 int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
818 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int acceptRAVerified)
820 if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
822 switch (msg->body->type) {
823 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
825 X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr;
827 if (X509_REQ_verify_ex(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req), ctx->libctx,
829 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
830 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED);
836 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
837 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
838 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
839 if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID,
841 ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) {
842 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
848 ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);