2 * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
4 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 /* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
14 #include "cmp_local.h"
15 #include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
17 /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
18 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
19 #include <openssl/cmp.h>
20 #include <openssl/crmf.h>
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include "crypto/x509.h"
27 /* Verify a message protected by signature according to RFC section 5.1.3.3 */
28 static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
29 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert)
31 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
32 OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
33 int digest_nid, pk_nid;
34 const EVP_MD *digest = NULL;
35 EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
37 size_t prot_part_der_len = 0;
38 unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
39 BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
42 if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL))
45 /* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
46 if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage
47 && (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
48 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
52 pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
54 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY);
58 /* create the DER representation of protected part */
59 prot_part.header = msg->header;
60 prot_part.body = msg->body;
62 len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
63 if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL)
65 prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
67 /* verify signature of protected part */
68 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header),
70 || digest_nid == NID_undef || pk_nid == NID_undef
71 || (digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid)) == NULL) {
72 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ALGORITHM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
76 /* check msg->header->protectionAlg is consistent with public key type */
77 if (EVP_PKEY_type(pk_nid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
78 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
81 if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
83 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, digest, NULL, pubkey)
84 && EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, msg->protection->data,
85 msg->protection->length,
86 prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len) == 1) {
92 res = x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
93 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE);
95 ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
100 OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
101 EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
107 /* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
108 static int verify_PBMAC(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
109 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret)
111 ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL;
114 /* generate expected protection for the message */
115 if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, secret, NULL)) == NULL)
116 return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
118 valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0
119 && msg->protection->type == protection->type
120 && msg->protection->length == protection->length
121 && CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data,
122 protection->length) == 0;
123 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection);
125 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE);
131 * Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
132 * certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
133 * and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
135 * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
137 int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
138 X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert)
141 X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
144 if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) {
145 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
149 if (trusted_store == NULL) {
150 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE);
154 if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new_with_libctx(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) == NULL
155 || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store,
156 cert, ctx->untrusted_certs))
159 valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0;
161 /* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
162 err = ERR_peek_last_error();
163 if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE)
164 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
167 /* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
168 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
169 X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
173 /* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
174 static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success,
175 const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
176 const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
180 if (expect_name == NULL)
181 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
183 /* make sure that a matching name is there */
184 if (actual_name == NULL) {
185 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
188 str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0);
189 if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) {
190 if (log_success && str != NULL)
191 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc,
198 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
200 if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
201 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str);
206 /* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
207 static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
208 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid,
209 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
214 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
216 /* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
218 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
221 str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length);
222 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) {
224 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str);
230 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str);
232 if ((str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
233 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str);
238 static int already_checked(const X509 *cert,
239 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
243 for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--)
244 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0)
250 * Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
251 * The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
252 * and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
253 * Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
255 * Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
257 static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
258 const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
259 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
260 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
261 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
263 X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
264 int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
266 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
269 ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
270 self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
271 if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
272 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
275 str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
277 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
281 if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
282 || already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
283 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked");
287 time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
288 X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
290 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired"
291 : "cert is not yet valid");
295 if (!check_name(ctx, 1,
296 "cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
297 "sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
300 if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID))
302 /* prevent misleading error later in case x509v3_cache_extensions() fails */
303 if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(cert)) {
304 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert appears to be invalid");
307 if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, cert)) {
308 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
311 /* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
312 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
316 static int check_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
319 if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
323 "msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
328 * Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
329 * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
330 * and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
331 * from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert -
332 * provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
334 static int check_cert_path_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
335 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *scrt)
340 if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
343 if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
344 || !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
345 1 /* self-issued only */))
348 /* store does not include CRLs */
349 valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
352 "also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
355 * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
356 * OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
358 EVP_PKEY *privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
359 OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
360 ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
362 X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(privkey, crep);
364 * maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
367 valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
372 X509_STORE_free(store);
376 static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
377 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
379 return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert",
380 cert, NULL, NULL, msg)
381 && (check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)
382 || check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert));
386 * Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
387 * If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
388 * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
390 static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
392 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
393 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
394 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp)
396 int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL;
397 int n_acceptable_certs = 0;
400 if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) {
401 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc);
405 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */
406 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
408 if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL))
410 if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert,
411 already_checked1, already_checked2, msg))
413 n_acceptable_certs++;
414 if (mode_3gpp ? check_cert_path_3gpp(ctx, msg, cert)
415 : check_cert_path(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert)) {
416 /* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
417 if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
419 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) {
426 if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0)
427 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
432 * Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted_certs, which should include extraCerts
433 * at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
434 * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
436 static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
442 && ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
443 || ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)))
447 mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
448 : "trying first normal mode using trust store");
449 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
450 NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
452 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted_certs, "untrusted certs",
453 msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
456 if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
457 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts"
458 : "no trusted store");
460 STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted);
461 ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted,
462 mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts"
463 : "certs in trusted store",
464 msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs,
466 sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
471 static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
472 OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
478 * Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert.
479 * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
481 static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
483 X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
484 GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender;
486 char *skid_str = NULL;
487 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
488 OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
491 if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL)
492 return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
493 if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
494 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
498 /* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
499 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
501 /* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
502 (void)ERR_set_mark();
503 ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
506 * try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
507 * for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
510 if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) {
511 ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
512 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
515 /* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
516 (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
517 /* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */
519 "trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
520 (void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg);
523 res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
524 || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
525 ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
527 /* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
528 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
531 /* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
532 (void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
534 sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
535 skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL
536 : OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length);
537 if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
538 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
540 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
541 if (skid_str != NULL)
542 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
544 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
545 /* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
546 (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
547 (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
550 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
552 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = ");
553 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname);
555 if (skid_str != NULL) {
556 ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
557 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str);
562 OPENSSL_free(skid_str);
567 * Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
568 * based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
569 * the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
570 * else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs, in ctx->trusted
571 * (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
572 * On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
574 * If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
575 * the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
576 * if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
577 * validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
578 * This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
580 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
582 int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
586 if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
587 || msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) {
588 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
592 if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */
593 || msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
594 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
598 switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) {
599 /* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
600 case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
601 if (ctx->secretValue == 0) {
602 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CHECKING_PBM_NO_SECRET_AVAILABLE);
606 if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue))
611 * 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
614 case NID_id_DHBasedMac:
615 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC);
624 if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg))
626 } else { /* use pinned sender cert */
627 /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
628 if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt))
630 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
631 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
640 * Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
641 * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs.
644 * its sender is of appropriate type (curently only X509_NAME) and
645 * matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx
646 * it has a valid body type
647 * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
648 * is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
649 * its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
650 * its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
652 * If everything is fine:
653 * learns the senderNonce from the received message,
654 * learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx,
655 * and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted.
657 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
659 int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
660 ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
662 OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
663 const X509_NAME *expected_sender;
665 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL))
667 hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg);
669 /* validate sender name of received msg */
670 if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
671 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
672 return 0; /* TODO FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
675 * Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
676 * Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret
677 * or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy.
679 expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender;
680 if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL)
681 expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
682 if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName,
683 "expected sender", expected_sender))
685 /* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
687 if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
689 "received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
691 * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg()
692 * and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
693 * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
694 * Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the
695 * extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway.
696 * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
698 if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
699 /* this allows self-signed certs */
700 X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
701 | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND))
704 /* validate message protection */
705 if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) {
706 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
707 if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
708 && (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
709 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
710 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
715 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
716 if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
717 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
718 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
724 /* check CMP version number in header */
725 if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
726 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
727 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
732 if (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) {
733 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
734 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
739 /* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
740 if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
741 && (hdr->transactionID == NULL
742 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID,
743 hdr->transactionID) != 0)) {
744 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
745 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED);
750 /* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
751 if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL
752 && (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL
753 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce,
754 hdr->recipNonce) != 0)) {
755 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
756 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED);
762 * RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
763 * the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
764 * --> Store for setting in next message
766 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce))
769 /* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
770 if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
771 && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID))
775 * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
776 * such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
777 * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
778 * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
780 if (!X509_add_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
781 /* this allows self-signed certs */
782 X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP
783 | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND))
786 if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
788 * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
789 * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
790 * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
791 * certificate by the initiator.'
793 switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) {
794 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
795 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
796 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
797 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
798 if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
799 STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
800 /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
802 if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
803 /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
814 int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int accept_RAVerified)
816 if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
818 switch (msg->body->type) {
819 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
821 X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr;
823 if (X509_REQ_verify(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req)) <= 0) {
824 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
825 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED);
831 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
832 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
833 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
834 if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID,
835 accept_RAVerified)) {
836 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
842 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);