2 * Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
3 * Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
4 * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
6 * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
7 * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
8 * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
9 * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
12 /* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
14 #include "cmp_local.h"
15 #include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
17 /* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
18 #include <openssl/asn1t.h>
19 #include <openssl/cmp.h>
20 #include <openssl/crmf.h>
21 #include <openssl/err.h>
22 #include <openssl/x509.h>
23 #include "crypto/x509.h"
28 * Verify a message protected by signature according to section 5.1.3.3
29 * (sha1+RSA/DSA or any other algorithm supported by OpenSSL).
31 * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
33 static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
34 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert)
36 EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
37 OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
38 int digest_nid, pk_nid;
39 const EVP_MD *digest = NULL;
40 EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
42 size_t prot_part_der_len = 0;
43 unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
44 BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
47 if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL))
50 /* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
51 if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage
52 && (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
53 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
57 pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
59 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY);
63 /* create the DER representation of protected part */
64 prot_part.header = msg->header;
65 prot_part.body = msg->body;
67 len = i2d_OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
68 if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL)
70 prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
72 /* verify signature of protected part */
73 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(msg->header->protectionAlg->algorithm),
75 || digest_nid == NID_undef || pk_nid == NID_undef
76 || (digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid)) == NULL) {
77 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ALGORITHM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
81 /* check msg->header->protectionAlg is consistent with public key type */
82 if (EVP_PKEY_type(pk_nid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
83 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
86 if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
88 if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, digest, NULL, pubkey)
89 && EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, msg->protection->data,
90 msg->protection->length,
91 prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len) == 1) {
97 res = x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
98 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE);
100 ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
104 EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
105 OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
106 EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
112 /* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
113 static int verify_PBMAC(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
114 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret)
116 ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL;
119 /* generate expected protection for the message */
120 if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, secret, NULL)) == NULL)
121 return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
123 valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0
124 && msg->protection->type == protection->type
125 && msg->protection->length == protection->length
126 && CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data,
127 protection->length) == 0;
128 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection);
130 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE);
136 * Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
137 * certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
138 * and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
140 * Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
142 int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store,
146 X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
149 if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) {
150 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
154 if (trusted_store == NULL) {
155 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE);
159 if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL
160 || !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store,
161 cert, ctx->untrusted_certs))
164 valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0;
166 /* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
167 err = ERR_peek_last_error();
168 if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE)
169 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
172 /* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
173 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
174 X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
178 /* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
179 static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success,
180 const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
181 const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
185 if (expect_name == NULL)
186 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
188 /* make sure that a matching name is there */
189 if (actual_name == NULL) {
190 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
193 str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0);
194 if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) {
195 if (log_success && str != NULL)
196 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc,
203 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
205 if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
206 ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str);
211 /* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
212 static int check_kid(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
213 X509 *cert, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
216 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert);
219 return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
221 /* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
223 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
226 str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length);
227 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) {
229 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str);
235 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str);
237 if ((str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
238 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str);
243 static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
247 for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--)
248 if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0)
254 * Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
255 * The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
256 * and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
257 * Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
259 * Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
261 static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
262 const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
263 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
264 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
265 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
267 X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
268 int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
270 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
273 ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
274 self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
275 if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
276 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
279 str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
281 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
285 if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
286 || already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
287 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked");
291 time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
292 X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
294 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired"
295 : "cert is not yet valid");
299 if (!check_name(ctx, 1,
300 "cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
301 "sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
304 if (!check_kid(ctx, cert, msg->header->senderKID))
306 /* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
307 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
311 static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
312 X509 *scrt, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
314 if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
315 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
318 if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
322 "msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
327 * Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
328 * (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
329 * and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
330 * from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
331 * provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
333 static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
334 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
339 if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
342 if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
343 || !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
344 1 /* self-issued only */))
347 /* store does not include CRLs */
348 valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
351 "also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
354 * verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
355 * OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
357 EVP_PKEY *privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
358 OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
359 ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
361 X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(privkey, crep);
363 * maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
366 valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
371 X509_STORE_free(store);
375 static int check_msg_given_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
376 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
378 return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert",
379 cert, NULL, NULL, msg)
380 && (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert, msg)
381 || check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, cert, msg));
385 * Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
386 * If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
388 static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
390 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
391 const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
392 const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp)
394 int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL;
395 int n_acceptable_certs = 0;
398 if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) {
399 ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc);
403 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */
404 X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
406 if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL))
408 if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert,
409 already_checked1, already_checked2, msg))
411 n_acceptable_certs++;
412 if (mode_3gpp ? check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, cert, msg)
413 : check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert, msg)) {
414 /* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
415 if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
417 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) {
424 if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0)
425 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
430 * Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted_certs, which should include extraCerts
431 * at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
433 static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
439 && ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
440 || ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)))
444 mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
445 : "trying first normal mode using trust store");
446 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
447 NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
449 if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted_certs, "untrusted certs",
450 msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
453 if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
454 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts"
455 : "no trusted store");
457 STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted);
458 ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted,
459 mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts"
460 : "certs in trusted store",
461 msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs,
463 sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
468 static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
469 OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
474 /* verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert */
475 static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
477 X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
478 GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender;
480 char *skid_str = NULL;
481 const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
482 OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
485 if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL)
486 return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
487 if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
488 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
492 /* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
493 OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
495 /* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
496 (void)ERR_set_mark();
497 ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
500 * try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
501 * for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
504 if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) {
505 ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
506 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
509 /* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
510 (void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
511 /* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */
513 "trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
514 (void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg);
517 res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
518 || check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
519 ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
521 /* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
522 (void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
525 /* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
526 (void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
528 sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
529 skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL
530 : OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length);
531 if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
532 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
534 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
535 if (skid_str != NULL)
536 ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
538 ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
539 /* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
540 (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
541 (void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
544 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
546 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = ");
547 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname);
549 if (skid_str != NULL) {
550 ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
551 ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str);
556 OPENSSL_free(skid_str);
561 * Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
562 * based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
563 * the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
564 * else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs, in ctx->trusted
565 * (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
567 * If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
568 * the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
569 * if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
570 * validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
571 * This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
573 * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
575 int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
578 int nid = NID_undef, pk_nid = NID_undef;
579 const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
581 const X509_NAME *expected_sender;
583 if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
584 || msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) {
585 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
589 /* validate sender name of received msg */
590 if (msg->header->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
591 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
592 return 0; /* TODO FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
595 * Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
596 * Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret
597 * or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy.
599 expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender;
600 if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL)
601 expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
602 if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field",
603 msg->header->sender->d.directoryName,
604 "expected sender", expected_sender))
606 /* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
608 if ((alg = msg->header->protectionAlg) == NULL /* unprotected message */
609 || msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
610 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
614 /* determine the nid for the used protection algorithm */
615 X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, NULL, NULL, alg);
616 nid = OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID);
619 /* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
620 case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
621 if (ctx->secretValue == 0) {
622 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CHECKING_PBM_NO_SECRET_AVAILABLE);
626 if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue)) {
628 * RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
629 * "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
630 * the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
631 * certificate by the initiator.'
633 switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) {
636 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
637 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
638 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
639 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
640 if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
641 STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
642 /* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
644 if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
645 /* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
657 * 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
660 case NID_id_DHBasedMac:
661 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC);
668 if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm), NULL, &pk_nid)
669 || pk_nid == NID_undef) {
670 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
675 if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg))
677 } else { /* use pinned sender cert */
678 /* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
679 if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt))
681 ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
682 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
691 * Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
692 * Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs
695 * it has a valid body type
696 * its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
697 * is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
698 * its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
699 * its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
701 * If everything is fine:
702 * learns the senderNonce from the received message,
703 * learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx.
705 * returns body type (which is >= 0) of the message on success, -1 on error
707 int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
708 ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
712 if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
715 if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
717 "received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
719 /* validate message protection */
720 if (msg->header->protectionAlg != 0) {
721 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
722 if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
723 && (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
724 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
725 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
730 /* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
731 if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
732 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
733 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
739 /* check CMP version number in header */
740 if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg)) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
741 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
742 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
747 if ((rcvd_type = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) < 0) {
748 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
749 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
754 /* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
755 if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
756 && (msg->header->transactionID == NULL
757 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID,
758 msg->header->transactionID) != 0)) {
759 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
760 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED);
765 /* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
766 if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL
767 && (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL
768 || ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce,
769 msg->header->recipNonce) != 0)) {
770 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
771 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED);
777 * RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
778 * the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
779 * --> Store for setting in next message
781 if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, msg->header->senderNonce))
784 /* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
785 if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
786 && !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, msg->header->transactionID))
790 * Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
791 * such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
792 * the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
793 * For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
795 if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
796 0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
797 1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
803 int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int accept_RAVerified)
805 if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
807 switch (msg->body->type) {
808 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
810 X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr;
812 if (X509_REQ_verify(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req)) <= 0) {
813 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
814 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED);
820 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
821 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
822 case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
823 if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID,
824 accept_RAVerified)) {
825 #ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
831 CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);