Changes between 0.9.8k and 1.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ *) Add "missing" function EVP_MD_flags() (without this the only way to
+ retrieve a digest flags is by accessing the structure directly. Update
+ EVP_MD_do_all*() and EVP_CIPHER_do_all*() to include the name a digest
+ or cipher is registered as in the "from" argument. Print out all
+ registered digests in the dgst usage message instead of manually
+ attempting to work them out.
+ [Steve Henson]
+
*) If no SSLv2 ciphers are used don't use an SSLv2 compatible client hello:
this allows the use of compression and extensions. Change default cipher
string to remove SSLv2 ciphersuites. This effectively avoids ancient SSLv2
const char *sig_name, const char *md_name,
const char *file,BIO *bmd);
+static void list_md_fn(const EVP_MD *m,
+ const char *from, const char *to, void *arg)
+ {
+ const char *mname;
+ /* Skip aliases */
+ if (!m)
+ return;
+ mname = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_MD_type(m));
+ /* Skip shortnames */
+ if (strcmp(from, mname))
+ return;
+ /* Skip clones */
+ if (EVP_MD_flags(m) & EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_DIGEST)
+ return;
+ if (strchr(mname, ' '))
+ mname= EVP_MD_name(m);
+ BIO_printf(arg, "-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
+ mname, mname);
+ }
+
int MAIN(int, char **);
int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
BIO_printf(bio_err,"-verify file verify a signature using public key in file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,"-prverify file verify a signature using private key in file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,"-keyform arg key file format (PEM or ENGINE)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"-out filename output to filename rather than stdout\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,"-signature file signature to verify\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,"-sigopt nm:v signature parameter\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,"-hmac key create hashed MAC with key\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"-mac algorithm create MAC (not neccessarily HMAC)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err,"-macopt nm:v MAC algorithm parameters or key\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
BIO_printf(bio_err,"-engine e use engine e, possibly a hardware device.\n");
#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm (default)\n",
- LN_md5,LN_md5);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- LN_md4,LN_md4);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- LN_md2,LN_md2);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- LN_sha1,LN_sha1);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- LN_sha224,LN_sha224);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- LN_sha256,LN_sha256);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- LN_sha384,LN_sha384);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- LN_sha512,LN_sha512);
-#endif
-#endif
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- LN_mdc2,LN_mdc2);
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- LN_ripemd160,LN_ripemd160);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL
- BIO_printf(bio_err,"-%-14s to use the %s message digest algorithm\n",
- SN_whirlpool,SN_whirlpool);
-#endif
+ EVP_MD_do_all_sorted(list_md_fn, bio_err);
goto end;
}
pkey = PEM_read_bio_Parameters(in, NULL);
if (!pkey)
{
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading paramters\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading parameters\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage: pkeyutl [options]\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-in file input file\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-out file output file\n");
- BIO_printf(bio_err, "-signature file signature file (verify operation only)\n");
+ BIO_printf(bio_err, "-sigfile file signature file (verify operation only)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-inkey file input key\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-keyform arg private key format - default PEM\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "-pubin input is a public key\n");
serial = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, *(++argv));
if (!serial) goto bad;
}
- else if ((md_alg=EVP_get_digestbyname(&((*argv)[1]))) != NULL)
- {
- /* ok */
- digest=md_alg;
- }
else if (strcmp(*argv,"-extensions") == 0)
{
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
if (--argc < 1) goto bad;
req_exts = *(++argv);
}
+ else if ((md_alg=EVP_get_digestbyname(&((*argv)[1]))) != NULL)
+ {
+ /* ok */
+ digest=md_alg;
+ }
else
{
BIO_printf(bio_err,"unknown option %s\n",*argv);
#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER 44 /* Destination for the data */
+#define BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT 45
/* modifiers */
#define BIO_FP_READ 0x02
#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+#include <sys/timeb.h>
+#endif
+
#define IP_MTU 14 /* linux is lame */
#ifdef WATT32
unsigned int connected;
unsigned int _errno;
unsigned int mtu;
+ struct timeval hstimeoutdiff;
+ struct timeval hstimeout;
} bio_dgram_data;
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram(void)
BIO_set_retry_read(b);
data->_errno = get_last_socket_error();
}
+ memset(&(data->hstimeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (data->hstimeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->hstimeout.tv_usec > 0)
+ {
+ struct timeval curtime;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+ struct _timeb tb;
+ _ftime(&tb);
+ curtime.tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
+ curtime.tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
+#else
+ gettimeofday(&curtime, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ if (curtime.tv_sec >= data->hstimeout.tv_sec &&
+ curtime.tv_usec >= data->hstimeout.tv_usec)
+ {
+ data->_errno = EAGAIN;
+ ret = -1;
+ memset(&(data->hstimeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+ }
+ }
}
}
return(ret);
memcpy(&(data->peer), to, sizeof(struct sockaddr));
break;
+ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT:
+ if (num > 0)
+ {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
+ struct _timeb tb;
+ _ftime(&tb);
+ data->hstimeout.tv_sec = (long)tb.time;
+ data->hstimeout.tv_usec = (long)tb.millitm * 1000;
+#else
+ gettimeofday(&(data->hstimeout), NULL);
+#endif
+ data->hstimeout.tv_sec += data->hstimeoutdiff.tv_sec;
+ data->hstimeout.tv_usec += data->hstimeoutdiff.tv_usec;
+ if (data->hstimeout.tv_usec >= 1000000)
+ {
+ data->hstimeout.tv_sec++;
+ data->hstimeout.tv_usec -= 1000000;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ memset(&(data->hstimeout), 0, sizeof(struct timeval));
+ }
+ break;
#if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO)
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT:
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0)
{ perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; }
#endif
+ memcpy(&(data->hstimeoutdiff), ptr, sizeof(struct timeval));
break;
case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT:
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
if(operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) {
DSA_SIG *sig;
sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA_SIG));
+ if (!sig)
+ {
+ DSAerr(DSA_F_SIG_CB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
sig->r = NULL;
sig->s = NULL;
*pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)sig;
- if(sig) return 2;
- DSAerr(DSA_F_SIG_CB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
+ return 2;
}
return 1;
}
int EVP_MD_pkey_type(const EVP_MD *md);
int EVP_MD_size(const EVP_MD *md);
int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md);
+unsigned long EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md);
const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
#define EVP_MD_CTX_size(e) EVP_MD_size(EVP_MD_CTX_md(e))
return md->md_size;
}
+unsigned long EVP_MD_flags(const EVP_MD *md)
+ {
+ return md->flags;
+ }
+
const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
if (!ctx)
if (nm->alias)
dc->fn(NULL, nm->name, nm->data, dc->arg);
else
- dc->fn((const EVP_CIPHER *)nm->data, NULL, NULL, dc->arg);
+ dc->fn((const EVP_CIPHER *)nm->data, nm->name, NULL, dc->arg);
}
void EVP_CIPHER_do_all(void (*fn)(const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
if (nm->alias)
dc->fn(NULL, nm->name, nm->data, dc->arg);
else
- dc->fn((const EVP_MD *)nm->data, NULL, NULL, dc->arg);
+ dc->fn((const EVP_MD *)nm->data, nm->name, NULL, dc->arg);
}
void EVP_MD_do_all(void (*fn)(const EVP_MD *md,
/* Verify CRL issuer */
ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
- if (!ret)
+ if (ret <= 0)
goto err;
/* Check chain is acceptable */
IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE)
+IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_DATA)
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<ca>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
cipher suites using SHA1.
+=item B<aGOST>
+
+cipher suites using GOST R 34.10 (either 2001 or 94) for authenticaction
+(needs an engine supporting GOST algorithms).
+
+=item B<aGOST01>
+
+cipher suites using GOST R 34.10-2001 authentication.
+
+=item B<aGOST94>
+
+cipher suites using GOST R 34.10-94 authentication (note that R 34.10-94
+standard has been expired so use GOST R 34.10-2001)
+
+=item B<kGOST>
+
+cipher suites, using VKO 34.10 key exchange, specified in the RFC 4357.
+
+=item B<GOST94>
+
+cipher suites, using HMAC based on GOST R 34.11-94.
+
+=item B<GOST89MAC>
+
+cipher suites using GOST 28147-89 MAC B<instead of> HMAC.
+
+
=back
=head1 CIPHER SUITE NAMES
TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA ADH-SEED-SHA
+=head2 GOST ciphersuites from draft-chudov-cryptopro-cptls, extending TLS v1.0
+
+Note: these ciphers require an engine which including GOST cryptographic
+algorithms, such as the B<ccgost> engine, included in the OpenSSL distribution.
+
+ TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST94-GOST89-GOST89
+ TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89
+ TLS_GOSTR341094_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 GOST94-NULL-GOST94
+ TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411 GOST2001-NULL-GOST94
+
=head2 Additional Export 1024 and other cipher suites
Note: these ciphers can also be used in SSL v3.
[B<-CAfile file>]
[B<-CApath dir>]
[B<-md digest>]
-[B<-des>]
-[B<-des3>]
-[B<-rc2-40>]
-[B<-rc2-64>]
-[B<-rc2-128>]
-[B<-aes128>]
-[B<-aes192>]
-[B<-aes256>]
-[B<-camellia128>]
-[B<-camellia192>]
-[B<-camellia256>]
+[B<-[cipher]>]
[B<-nointern>]
[B<-no_signer_cert_verify>]
[B<-nocerts>]
digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning. If not present then the
default digest algorithm for the signing key will be used (usually SHA1).
-=item B<-des -des3 -rc2-40 -rc2-64 -rc2-128 -aes128 -aes192 -aes256 -camellia128 -camellia192 -camellia256>
+=item B<-[cipher]>
-the encryption algorithm to use. DES (56 bits), triple DES (168 bits), 40, 64
-or 128 bit RC2, 128, 192 or 256 bit AES, or 128, 192 or 256 bit Camellia
-respectively. Any other cipher name (as recognized by the
+the encryption algorithm to use. For example triple DES (168 bits) - B<-des3>
+or 256 bit AES - B<-aes256>. Any standard algorithm name (as used by the
EVP_get_cipherbyname() function) can also be used preceded by a dash, for
-example B<-aes_128_cbc>.
+example B<-aes_128_cbc>. See L<B<enc>|enc(1)> for a list of ciphers
+supported by your version of OpenSSL.
If not specified triple DES is used. Only used with B<-encrypt> and
B<-EncryptedData_create> commands.
then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
address matches that specified in the From: address.
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy>
+
+Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
+L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
=back
=head1 NOTES
[B<-binary>]
[B<-out filename>]
[B<-sign filename>]
+[B<-keyform arg>]
[B<-passin arg>]
[B<-verify filename>]
[B<-prverify filename>]
digitally sign the digest using the private key in "filename".
+=item B<-keyform arg>
+
+Specifies the key format to sign digest with. Only PEM and ENGINE
+formats are supported by the B<dgst> command.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+Use engine B<id> for operations (including private key storage).
+This engine is not used as source for digest algorithms, unless it is
+also specified in the configuration file.
+
+=item B<-sigopt nm:v>
+
+Pass options to the signature algorithm during sign or verify operations.
+Names and values of these options are algorithm-specific.
+
+
=item B<-passin arg>
the private key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
create a hashed MAC using "key".
+=item B<-mac alg>
+
+create MAC (keyed Message Authentication Code). The most popular MAC
+algorithm is HMAC (hash-based MAC), but there are other MAC algorithms
+which are not based on hash, for instance B<gost-mac> algorithm,
+supported by B<ccgost> engine. MAC keys and other options should be set
+via B<-macopt> parameter.
+
+=item B<-macopt nm:v>
+
+Passes options to MAC algorithm, specified by B<-mac> key.
+Following options are supported by both by B<HMAC> and B<gost-mac>:
+
+=over 8
+
+=item B<key:string>
+
+Specifies MAC key as alphnumeric string (use if key contain printable
+characters only). String length must conform to any restrictions of
+the MAC algorithm for example exactly 32 chars for gost-mac.
+
+=item B<hexkey:string>
+
+Specifies MAC key in hexadecimal form (two hex digits per byte).
+Key length must conform to any restrictions of the MAC algorithm
+for example exactly 32 chars for gost-mac.
+
+=back
+
=item B<-rand file(s)>
a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<dhparam>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<dsa>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<dsaparam>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<ec>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<ecparam>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
[B<-pass arg>]
[B<-e>]
[B<-d>]
-[B<-a>]
+[B<-a/-base64>]
[B<-A>]
[B<-k password>]
[B<-kfile filename>]
[B<-K key>]
[B<-iv IV>]
+[B<-S salt>]
+[B<-salt>]
+[B<-nosalt>]
+[B<-z>]
+[B<-md>]
[B<-p>]
[B<-P>]
[B<-bufsize number>]
[B<-nopad>]
[B<-debug>]
+[B<-none>]
+[B<-engine id>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
the data is base64 encoded after encryption. If decryption is set then
the input data is base64 decoded before being decrypted.
+=item B<-base64>
+
+same as B<-a>
+
=item B<-A>
if the B<-a> option is set then base64 process the data on one line.
This is for compatibility with previous versions of OpenSSL. Superseded by
the B<-pass> argument.
+=item B<-nosalt>
+
+do not use a salt
+
+=item B<-salt>
+
+use salt (randomly generated or provide with B<-S> option) when
+encrypting (this is the default).
+
=item B<-S salt>
-the actual salt to use: this must be represented as a string comprised only
-of hex digits.
+the actual salt to use: this must be represented as a string of hex digits.
=item B<-K key>
debug the BIOs used for I/O.
+=item B<-z>
+
+Compress or decompress clear text using zlib before encryption or after
+decryption. This option exists only if OpenSSL with compiled with zlib
+or zlib-dynamic option.
+
+=item B<-none>
+
+Use NULL cipher (no encryption or decryption of input).
+
=back
=head1 NOTES
The program can be called either as B<openssl ciphername> or
-B<openssl enc -ciphername>.
+B<openssl enc -ciphername>. But the first form doesn't work with
+engine-provided ciphers, because this form is processed before the
+configuration file is read and any ENGINEs loaded.
+
+Engines which provide entirely new encryption algorithms (such as ccgost
+engine which provides gost89 algorithm) should be configured in the
+configuration file. Engines, specified in the command line using -engine
+options can only be used for hadrware-assisted implementations of
+ciphers, which are supported by OpenSSL core or other engine, specified
+in the configuration file.
+
+When enc command lists supported ciphers, ciphers provided by engines,
+specified in the configuration files are listed too.
A password will be prompted for to derive the key and IV if necessary.
=head1 SUPPORTED CIPHERS
+Note that some of these ciphers can be disabled at compile time
+and some are available only if an appropriate engine is configured
+in the configuration file. The output of the B<enc> command run with
+unsupported options (for example B<openssl enc -help>) includes a
+list of ciphers, supported by your versesion of OpenSSL, including
+ones provided by configured engines.
+
+
base64 Base 64
bf-cbc Blowfish in CBC mode
desx DESX algorithm.
+ gost89 GOST 28147-89 in CFB mode (provided by ccgost engine)
+ gost89-cnt `GOST 28147-89 in CNT mode (provided by ccgost engine)
+
idea-cbc IDEA algorithm in CBC mode
idea same as idea-cbc
idea-cfb IDEA in CFB mode
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<gendsa>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<genpkey>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms. If used this option should precede all other
=back
+=head1 GOST2001 KEY GENERATION AND PARAMETER OPTIONS
+
+Gost 2001 support is not enabled by default. To enable this algorithm,
+one should load the ccgost engine in the OpenSSL configuration file.
+See README.gost file in the engines/ccgost directiry of the source
+distribution for more details.
+
+Use of a parameter file for the GOST R 34.10 algorithm is optional.
+Parameters can be specified during key generation directly as well as
+during generation of parameter file.
+
+=over 4
+
+=item B<paramset:name>
+
+Specifies GOST R 34.10-2001 parameter set according to RFC 4357.
+Parameter set can be specified using abbreviated name, object short name or
+numeric OID. Following parameter sets are supported:
+
+ paramset OID Usage
+ A 1.2.643.2.2.35.1 Signature
+ B 1.2.643.2.2.35.2 Signature
+ C 1.2.643.2.2.35.3 Signature
+ XA 1.2.643.2.2.36.0 Key exchange
+ XB 1.2.643.2.2.36.1 Key exchange
+ test 1.2.643.2.2.35.0 Test purposes
+
+=back
+
+
+
=head1 NOTES
The use of the genpkey program is encouraged over the algorithm specific
Generate an RSA private key using default parameters:
- openssl genpkey -algoritm RSA -out key.pem
+ openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem
Encrypt output private key using 128 bit AES and the passphrase "hello":
- openssl genpkey -algoritm RSA -out key.pem -aes-128-cbc -pass pass:hello
+ openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -aes-128-cbc -pass pass:hello
Generate a 2048 bit RSA key using 3 as the public exponent:
- openssl genpkey -algoritm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 \
+ openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA -out key.pem -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 \
-pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:3
Generate 1024 bit DSA parameters:
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<genrsa>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
Cipher Suite Description Determination.
+=item L<B<cms>|cms(1)>
+
+CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) utility
+
=item L<B<crl>|crl(1)>
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Management.
Diffie-Hellman Parameter Management.
Obsoleted by L<B<dhparam>|dhparam(1)>.
+=item L<B<dhparam>|dhparam(1)>
+
+Generation and Management of Diffie-Hellman Parameters. Superseded by
+L<B<genpkey>|genpkey(1)> and L<B<pkeyparam>|pkeyparam(1)>
+
+
=item L<B<dsa>|dsa(1)>
DSA Data Management.
DSA Parameter Generation and Management. Superseded by
L<B<genpkey>|genpkey(1)> and L<B<pkeyparam>|pkeyparam(1)>
+=item L<B<ec>|ec(1)>
+
+EC (Elliptic curve) key processing
+
+=item L<B<ecparam>|ecparam(1)>
+
+EC parameter manipulation and generation
+
=item L<B<enc>|enc(1)>
Encoding with Ciphers.
-=item L<B<errstr>|errstr(1)>
+=item L<B<engine>|engine(1)>
-Error Number to Error String Conversion.
+Engine (loadble module) information and manipulation.
-=item L<B<dhparam>|dhparam(1)>
+=item L<B<errstr>|errstr(1)>
-Generation and Management of Diffie-Hellman Parameters. Superseded by
-L<B<genpkey>|genpkey(1)> and L<B<pkeyparam>|pkeyparam(1)>
+Error Number to Error String Conversion.
=item B<gendh>
Generation of RSA Private Key. Superceded by L<B<genpkey>|genpkey(1)>.
+=item L<B<nseq>|nseq(1)
+
+Create or examine a netscape certificate sequence
+
=item L<B<ocsp>|ocsp(1)>
Online Certificate Status Protocol utility.
Public and private key management.
-=item L<B<pkeyutl>|pkeyutl(1)>
-
-Public key algorithm cryptographic operation utility.
-
=item L<B<pkeyparam>|pkeyparam(1)>
Public key algorithm parameter management.
+=item L<B<pkeyutl>|pkeyutl(1)>
+
+Public key algorithm cryptographic operation utility.
+
=item L<B<rand>|rand(1)>
Generate pseudo-random bytes.
RSA key management.
+
=item L<B<rsautl>|rsautl(1)>
RSA utility for signing, verification, encryption, and decryption. Superseded
Algorithm Speed Measurement.
+=item L<B<spkac>|spkac(1)>
+
+SPKAC printing and generating utility
+
=item L<B<ts>|ts(1)>
Time Stamping Authority tool (client/server)
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkcs7>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkcs8>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkey>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkeyparam>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
[B<-sigfile file>]
[B<-inkey file>]
[B<-keyform PEM|DER>]
+[B<-passin arg>]
[B<-peerkey file>]
[B<-peerform PEM|DER>]
[B<-pubin>]
[B<-pkeyopt opt:value>]
[B<-hexdump>]
[B<-asn1parse>]
+[B<-engine id>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
=item B<-keyform PEM|DER>
-the key format PEM or DER.
+the key format PEM, DER or ENGINE.
+
+=item B<-passin arg>
+
+the input key password source. For more information about the format of B<arg>
+see the B<PASS PHRASE ARGUMENTS> section in L<openssl(1)|openssl(1)>.
+
=item B<-peerkey file>
=item B<-peerform PEM|DER>
-the peer key format PEM or DER.
+the peer key format PEM, DER or ENGINE.
+
+=item B<-engine id>
+
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<pkeyutl>
+to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
+thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
+for all available algorithms.
+
=item B<-pubin>
[B<-new>]
[B<-rand file(s)>]
[B<-newkey rsa:bits>]
-[B<-newkey dsa:file>]
[B<-newkey alg:file>]
[B<-nodes>]
[B<-key filename>]
[B<-keyform PEM|DER>]
[B<-keyout filename>]
-[B<-[md5|sha1|md2|mdc2]>]
+[B<-keygen_engine id>]
+[B<-[digest]>]
[B<-config filename>]
[B<-subj arg>]
[B<-multivalue-rdn>]
[B<-days n>]
[B<-set_serial n>]
[B<-asn1-kludge>]
+[B<-no-asn1-kludge>]
[B<-newhdr>]
[B<-extensions section>]
[B<-reqexts section>]
[B<-utf8>]
[B<-nameopt>]
+[B<-reqopt>]
+[B<-subject>]
+[B<-subj arg>]
[B<-batch>]
[B<-verbose>]
[B<-engine id>]
prints out the certificate request in text form.
+=item B<-subject>
+
+prints out the request subject (or certificate subject if B<-x509> is
+specified)
+
=item B<-pubkey>
outputs the public key.
If the B<-key> option is not used it will generate a new RSA private
key using information specified in the configuration file.
+=item B<-subj arg>
+
+Replaces subject field of input request with specified data and outputs
+modified request. The arg must be formatted as
+I</type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=...>,
+characters may be escaped by \ (backslash), no spaces are skipped.
+
=item B<-rand file(s)>
a file or files containing random data used to seed the random number
this option creates a new certificate request and a new private
key. The argument takes one of several forms. B<rsa:nbits>, where
B<nbits> is the number of bits, generates an RSA key B<nbits>
-in size. B<dsa:filename> generates a DSA key using the parameters
-in the file B<filename>. B<param:file> generates a key using the
-parameter file B<file>, the algorithm is determined by the
-parameters. B<algname:file> use algorithm B<algname> and parameter file
-B<file> the two algorithms must match or an error occurs. B<algname> just
-uses algorithm B<algname>.
+in size. If B<nbits> is omitted, i.e. B<-newkey rsa> specified,
+the default key size, specified in the configuration file is used.
+
+All other algorithms support the B<-newkey alg:file> form, where file may be
+an algorithm parameter file, created by the B<genpkey -genparam> command
+or and X.509 certificate for a key with approriate algorithm.
+
+B<param:file> generates a key using the parameter file or certificate B<file>,
+the algorithm is determined by the parameters. B<algname:file> use algorithm
+B<algname> and parameter file B<file>: the two algorithms must match or an
+error occurs. B<algname> just uses algorithm B<algname>, and parameters,
+if neccessary should be specified via B<-pkeyopt> parameter.
+
+B<dsa:filename> generates a DSA key using the parameters
+in the file B<filename>. B<ec:filename> generates EC key (usable both with
+ECDSA or ECDH algorithms), B<gost2001:filename> generates GOST R
+34.10-2001 key (requires B<ccgost> engine configured in the configuration
+file). If just B<gost2001> is specified a parameter set should be
+specified by B<-pkeyopt paramset:X>
+
=item B<-pkeyopt opt:value>
if this option is specified then if a private key is created it
will not be encrypted.
-=item B<-[md5|sha1|md2|mdc2]>
+=item B<-[digest]>
+
+this specifies the message digest to sign the request with (such as
+B<-md5>, B<-sha1>). This overrides the digest algorithm specified in
+the configuration file.
-this specifies the message digest to sign the request with. This
-overrides the digest algorithm specified in the configuration file.
-This option is ignored for DSA requests: they always use SHA1.
+Some public key algorithms may override this choice. For instance, DSA
+signatures always use SHA1, GOST R 34.10 signatures always use
+GOST R 34.11-94 (B<-md_gost94>).
=item B<-config filename>
commas. Alternatively the B<-nameopt> switch may be used more than once to
set multiple options. See the L<x509(1)|x509(1)> manual page for details.
+=item B<-reqopt>
+
+customise the output format used with B<-text>. The B<option> argument can be
+a single option or multiple options separated by commas.
+
+See discission of the B<-certopt> parameter in the L<B<x509>|x509(1)>
+command.
+
+
=item B<-asn1-kludge>
by default the B<req> command outputs certificate requests containing
It should be noted that very few CAs still require the use of this option.
+=item B<-no-asn1-kludge>
+
+Reverses effect of B<-asn1-kludge>
+
=item B<-newhdr>
Adds the word B<NEW> to the PEM file header and footer lines on the outputed
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
+=item B<-keygen_engine id>
+
+specifies an engine (by its unique B<id> string) which would be used
+for key generation operations.
+
=back
=head1 CONFIGURATION FILE FORMAT
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<rsa>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
A file containing trusted certificates to use during server authentication
and to use when attempting to build the client certificate chain.
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy>
+
+Set various certificate chain valiadition option. See the
+L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
=item B<-reconnect>
reconnects to the same server 5 times using the same session ID, this can
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<s_client>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<s_client>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<s_server>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<s_server>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
[B<-resign>]
[B<-verify>]
[B<-pk7out>]
-[B<-des>]
-[B<-des3>]
-[B<-rc2-40>]
-[B<-rc2-64>]
-[B<-rc2-128>]
-[B<-aes128>]
-[B<-aes192>]
-[B<-aes256>]
-[B<-camellia128>]
-[B<-camellia192>]
-[B<-camellia256>]
+[B<-[cipher]>]
[B<-in file>]
[B<-certfile file>]
[B<-signer file>]
digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning. If not present then the
default digest algorithm for the signing key will be used (usually SHA1).
-=item B<-des -des3 -rc2-40 -rc2-64 -rc2-128 -aes128 -aes192 -aes256 -camellia128 -camellia192 -camellia256>
+=item B<-[cipher]>
-the encryption algorithm to use. DES (56 bits), triple DES (168 bits), 40, 64
-or 128 bit RC2, 128, 192 or 256 bit AES, or 128, 192 or 256 bit Camellia
-respectively. Any other cipher name (as recognized by the
+the encryption algorithm to use. For example DES (56 bits) - B<-des>,
+triple DES (168 bits) - B<-des3>,
EVP_get_cipherbyname() function) can also be used preceded by a dash, for
-example B<-aes_128_cbc>.
+example B<-aes_128_cbc>. See L<B<enc>|enc(1)> for list of ciphers
+supported by your version of OpenSSL.
If not specified 40 bit RC2 is used. Only used with B<-encrypt>.
then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email
address matches that specified in the From: address.
+=item B<-purpose, -ignore_critical, -issuer_checks, -crl_check, -crl_check_all, -policy_check, -extended_crl, -x509_strict, -policy>
+
+Set various options of certificate chain verification. See
+L<B<verify>|verify(1)> manual page for details.
+
=back
=head1 NOTES
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<speed>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<speed>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<spkac>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
=item B<-engine> id
-Specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<ts>
+Specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<ts>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms. Default is builtin. (Optional)
[B<-CApath directory>]
[B<-CAfile file>]
[B<-purpose purpose>]
+[B<-policy arg>]
+[B<-ignore_critical>]
+[B<-crl_check>]
+[B<-crl_check_all>]
+[B<-policy_check>]
+[B<-explicit_policy>]
+[B<-inhibit_any>]
+[B<-inhibit_map>]
+[B<-x509_strict>]
+[B<-extended_crl>]
+[B<-use_deltas>]
+[B<-policy_print>]
[B<-untrusted file>]
[B<-help>]
[B<-issuer_checks>]
does not itself imply that anything is wrong: during the normal
verify process several rejections may take place.
+=item B<-policy arg>
+
+Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set
+(see RFC3280 et al). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric
+form. This argument can appear more than once.
+
+=item B<-policy_check>
+
+Enables certificate policy processing.
+
+=item B<-explicit_policy>
+
+Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC3280 et al).
+
+=item B<-inhibit_any>
+
+Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC3280 et al).
+
+=item B<-inhibit_map>
+
+Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC3280 et al).
+
+=item B<-policy_print>
+
+Print out diagnostics, related to policy checking
+
+=item B<-crl_check>
+
+Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to lookup a valid CRL.
+If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
+
+=item B<-crl_check_all>
+
+Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
+to lookup valid CRLs.
+
+=item B<-ignore_critical>
+
+Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
+supported by OpenSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by
+RFC3280 et al). If this option is set critical extensions are
+ignored.
+
+=item B<-x509_strict>
+
+Disable workarounds for broken certificates which have to be disabled
+for strict X.509 compliance.
+
+=item B<-extended_crl>
+
+Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
+signing keys.
+
+=item B<-use_deltas>
+
+Enable support for delta CRLs.
+
=item B<->
marks the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
=item B<-engine id>
-specifying an engine (by it's unique B<id> string) will cause B<req>
+specifying an engine (by its unique B<id> string) will cause B<x509>
to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine,
thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default
for all available algorithms.
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN), "GOST_DO_SIGN"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY), "GOST_DO_VERIFY"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_CTRL), "GOST_IMIT_CTRL"},
+{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_FINAL), "GOST_IMIT_FINAL"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_UPDATE), "GOST_IMIT_UPDATE"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01), "PARAM_COPY_GOST01"},
{ERR_FUNC(GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST94), "PARAM_COPY_GOST94"},
#define GOST_F_GOST_DO_SIGN 112
#define GOST_F_GOST_DO_VERIFY 113
#define GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_CTRL 114
+#define GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_FINAL 140
#define GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_UPDATE 115
#define GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST01 116
#define GOST_F_PARAM_COPY_GOST94 117
int gost_imit_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx,unsigned char *md)
{
struct ossl_gost_imit_ctx *c = ctx->md_data;
- if (!c->key_set) return 0;
+ if (!c->key_set) {
+ GOSTerr(GOST_F_GOST_IMIT_FINAL, GOST_R_MAC_KEY_NOT_SET);
+ return 0;
+ }
if (c->bytes_left)
{
int i;
static void dtls1_set_message_header_int(SSL *s, unsigned char mt,
unsigned long len, unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off,
unsigned long frag_len);
-static int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
static long dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn,
long max, int *ok);
}
}
- frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
- if ( frag == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
-
if (frag_len)
{
+ frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len);
+ if ( frag == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ memcpy(&(frag->msg_header), msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr));
+
/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
goto err;
- }
- memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
+ memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(msg_hdr->seq);
- item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
- if ( item == NULL)
- goto err;
+ item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
+ if ( item == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+ }
- pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
err:
return dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s) ;
}
+int
+dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs)
+ {
+ /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence number,
+ * since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. However, the
+ * ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using only the sequence
+ * will result in the CCS and Finished having the same index. To prevent this,
+ * the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of a CCS 1 is subtracted.
+ * This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also maintains the order of the
+ * index (important for priority queues) and fits in the unsigned short variable.
+ */
+ return seq * 2 - is_ccs;
+ }
-static int
+int
dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s)
{
pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages;
for ( item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter))
{
frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
- if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s, frag->msg_header.seq, 0, &found) <= 0 &&
- found)
+ if ( dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+ dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs),
+ 0, &found) <= 0 && found)
{
fprintf(stderr, "dtls1_retransmit_message() failed\n");
return -1;
pitem *item;
hm_fragment *frag;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
- unsigned int epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
/* this function is called immediately after a message has
* been serialized */
{
OPENSSL_assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len +
DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == (unsigned int)s->init_num);
- epoch++;
}
else
{
frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len;
frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs;
+ /* save current state*/
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress = s->compress;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session = s->session;
+ frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
memset(seq64be,0,sizeof(seq64be));
- seq64be[0] = (unsigned char)(epoch>>8);
- seq64be[1] = (unsigned char)(epoch);
- seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(frag->msg_header.seq>>8);
- seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(frag->msg_header.seq);
+ seq64be[6] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs)>>8);
+ seq64be[7] = (unsigned char)(dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq,
+ frag->msg_header.is_ccs));
item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag);
if ( item == NULL)
hm_fragment *frag ;
unsigned long header_length;
unsigned char seq64be[8];
+ struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_state;
+ unsigned char save_write_sequence[8];
/*
OPENSSL_assert(s->init_num == 0);
frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, 0,
frag->msg_header.frag_len);
+ /* save current state */
+ saved_state.enc_write_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx;
+ saved_state.write_hash = s->write_hash;
+ saved_state.compress = s->compress;
+ saved_state.session = s->session;
+ saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+ saved_state.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch;
+
s->d1->retransmitting = 1;
+
+ /* restore state in which the message was originally sent */
+ s->enc_write_ctx = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx;
+ s->write_hash = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash;
+ s->compress = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.compress;
+ s->session = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.session;
+ s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
+ {
+ memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ?
- SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+ SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE);
+
+ /* restore current state */
+ s->enc_write_ctx = saved_state.enc_write_ctx;
+ s->write_hash = saved_state.write_hash;
+ s->compress = saved_state.compress;
+ s->session = saved_state.session;
+ s->d1->w_epoch = saved_state.epoch;
+
+ if (frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.epoch == saved_state.epoch - 1)
+ {
+ memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
+ }
+
s->d1->retransmitting = 0;
(void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s));
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
else
{
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 0, NULL);
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
else
ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(s);
if ( ret <= 0)
goto end;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 0, NULL);
if ( s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
else
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
/* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_client_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_finished(s,
SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B,
s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label,
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 0, NULL);
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
goto end;
/* break; */
d1->processed_rcds.q=pqueue_new();
d1->buffered_messages = pqueue_new();
d1->sent_messages=pqueue_new();
+ d1->buffered_app_data.q=pqueue_new();
if ( s->server)
{
}
if( ! d1->unprocessed_rcds.q || ! d1->processed_rcds.q
- || ! d1->buffered_messages || ! d1->sent_messages)
+ || ! d1->buffered_messages || ! d1->sent_messages || ! d1->buffered_app_data.q)
{
if ( d1->unprocessed_rcds.q) pqueue_free(d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if ( d1->processed_rcds.q) pqueue_free(d1->processed_rcds.q);
if ( d1->buffered_messages) pqueue_free(d1->buffered_messages);
if ( d1->sent_messages) pqueue_free(d1->sent_messages);
+ if ( d1->buffered_app_data.q) pqueue_free(d1->buffered_app_data.q);
OPENSSL_free(d1);
return (0);
}
}
pqueue_free(s->d1->sent_messages);
+ while ( (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q)) != NULL)
+ {
+ frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data;
+ OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
+ OPENSSL_free(frag);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+ pqueue_free(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
+
OPENSSL_free(s->d1);
}
* s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
+ /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
+ * so process data buffered during the last handshake
+ * in advance, if any.
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
+ {
+ pitem *item;
+ item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
+ if (item)
+ {
+ dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(item->data);
+ pitem_free(item);
+ }
+ }
+
/* get new packet if necessary */
if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
{
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
&& (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
{
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
- goto err;
+ /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
+ * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
+ * buffer the application data for later processing rather
+ * than dropping the connection.
+ */
+ dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), 0);
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
}
/* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
}
- /* else it's a CCS message, or it's wrong */
- else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
- {
- /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
- al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
+ else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
+ {
+ /* Application data while renegotiating
+ * is allowed. Try again reading.
+ */
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ {
+ BIO *bio;
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
+ bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
+ BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
+ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
if (dest_maxlen > 0)
{
n2s(p, seq);
n2l3(p, frag_off);
- dtls1_retransmit_message(s, seq, frag_off, &found);
+ dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
+ dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
+ frag_off, &found);
if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
{
/* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
goto start;
}
+ /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
+ * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
+ */
+ if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
+ {
+ dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
+ rr->length = 0;
+ goto start;
+ }
+
if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
{
else
{
seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
+ memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
s->d1->w_epoch++;
}
case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
s->shutdown=0;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
s->shutdown=0;
ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 0, NULL);
s->new_session = 2;
if (s->d1->send_cookie)
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s);
if ( ret <= 0) goto end;
s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
/* Check if it is anon DH */
if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL))
{
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
)
)
{
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
}
else
{
s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 1, NULL);
ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 0, NULL);
if (ret == 2)
s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
else {
* have not asked for it :-) */
ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 0, NULL);
s->init_num=0;
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 0, NULL);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
s->init_num=0;
/* we should decide if we expected this one */
ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 0, NULL);
s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num=0;
ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
if (ret <= 0) goto end;
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_TIMEOUT, 0, NULL);
if (s->hit)
s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
else
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
/* next message is server hello */
s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0;
+ s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
goto end;
/* break; */
encoding */
} DTLS1_BITMAP;
+struct dtls1_retransmit_state
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */
+#else
+ char *compress;
+#endif
+ SSL_SESSION *session;
+ unsigned short epoch;
+ };
+
struct hm_header_st
{
unsigned char type;
unsigned long frag_off;
unsigned long frag_len;
unsigned int is_ccs;
+ struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_retransmit_state;
};
struct ccs_header_st
unsigned short handshake_read_seq;
+ /* save last sequence number for retransmissions */
+ unsigned char last_write_sequence[8];
+
/* Received handshake records (processed and unprocessed) */
record_pqueue unprocessed_rcds;
record_pqueue processed_rcds;
/* Buffered (sent) handshake records */
pqueue sent_messages;
+ /* Buffered application records.
+ * Only for records between CCS and Finished
+ * to prevent either protocol violation or
+ * unnecessary message loss.
+ */
+ record_pqueue buffered_app_data;
+
unsigned int mtu; /* max wire packet size */
struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr;
int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs);
int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq,
unsigned long frag_off, int *found);
+int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs);
+int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s);
void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s);
void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr);
void dtls1_get_ccs_header(unsigned char *data, struct ccs_header_st *ccs_hdr);
TS_CONF_set_signer_cert 4534 EXIST::FUNCTION:
X509_NAME_hash_old 4535 EXIST::FUNCTION:
ASN1_TIME_set_string 4536 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_MD_flags 4537 EXIST::FUNCTION:
} elsif($arg eq "-write") {
$dowrite = 1;
shift @ARGV;
+ } elsif($arg eq "-help" || $arg eq "-h" || $arg eq "-?" || $arg eq "--help") {
+ print STDERR <<"EOF";
+mkerr.pl [options] ...
+
+Options:
+
+ -conf F Use the config file F instead of the default one:
+ crypto/err/openssl.ec
+
+ -hprefix P Prepend the filenames in generated #include <header>
+ statements with prefix P. Default: 'openssl/' (without
+ the quotes, naturally)
+
+ -debug Turn on debugging verbose output on stderr.
+
+ -rebuild Rebuild all header and C source files, irrespective of the
+ fact if any error or function codes have been added/removed.
+ Default: only update files for libraries which saw change
+ (of course, this requires '-write' as well, or no
+ files will be touched!)
+
+ -recurse scan a preconfigured set of directories / files for error and
+ function codes:
+ (<crypto/*.c>, <crypto/*/*.c>, <ssl/*.c>, <apps/*.c>)
+ When this option is NOT specified, the filelist is taken from
+ the commandline instead. Here, wildcards may be embedded. (Be
+ sure to escape those to prevent the shell from expanding them
+ for you when you wish mkerr.pl to do so instead.)
+ Default: take file list to scan from the command line.
+
+ -reindex Discard the numeric values previously assigned to the error
+ and function codes as extracted from the scanned header files;
+ instead renumber all of them starting from 100. (Note that
+ the numbers assigned through 'R' records in the config file
+ remain intact.)
+ Default: keep previously assigned numbers. (You are warned
+ when collisions are detected.)
+
+ -nostatic Generates a different source code, where these additional
+ functions are generated for each library specified in the
+ config file:
+ void ERR_load_<LIB>_strings(void);
+ void ERR_unload_<LIB>_strings(void);
+ void ERR_<LIB>_error(int f, int r, char *fn, int ln);
+ #define <LIB>err(f,r) ERR_<LIB>_error(f,r,__FILE__,__LINE__)
+ while the code facilitates the use of these in an environment
+ where the error support routines are dynamically loaded at
+ runtime.
+ Default: 'static' code generation.
+
+ -staticloader Prefix generated functions with the 'static' scope modifier.
+ Default: don't write any scope modifier prefix.
+
+ -write Actually (over)write the generated code to the header and C
+ source files as assigned to each library through the config
+ file.
+ Default: don't write.
+
+ -help / -h / -? / --help Show this help text.
+
+ ... Additional arguments are added to the file list to scan,
+ assuming '-recurse' was NOT specified on the command line.
+
+EOF
+ exit 1;
} else {
last;
}
$cskip{$3} = $1;
if($3 ne "NONE") {
$csrc{$1} = $3;
- $fmax{$1} = 99;
- $rmax{$1} = 99;
+ $fmax{$1} = 100;
+ $rmax{$1} = 100;
$fassigned{$1} = ":";
$rassigned{$1} = ":";
$fnew{$1} = 0;
if($1 eq "R") {
$rcodes{$name} = $code;
if ($rassigned{$lib} =~ /:$code:/) {
- print STDERR "!! ERROR: $lib reason code $code assigned twice\n";
+ print STDERR "!! ERROR: $lib reason code $code assigned twice (collision at $name)\n";
++$errcount;
}
$rassigned{$lib} .= "$code:";
}
} else {
if ($fassigned{$lib} =~ /:$code:/) {
- print STDERR "!! ERROR: $lib function code $code assigned twice\n";
+ print STDERR "!! ERROR: $lib function code $code assigned twice (collision at $name)\n";
++$errcount;
}
$fassigned{$lib} .= "$code:";
print STDERR "File loaded: ".$file."\r" if $debug;
open(IN, "<$file") || die "Can't open source file $file\n";
while(<IN>) {
+ # skip obsoleted source files entirely!
+ last if(/^#error\s+obsolete/);
+
if(/(([A-Z0-9]+)_F_([A-Z0-9_]+))/) {
next unless exists $csrc{$2};
next if($1 eq "BIO_F_BUFFER_CTX");
$fnew{$2}++;
}
$notrans{$1} = 1 unless exists $ftrans{$3};
+ print STDERR "Function: $1\t= $fcodes{$1} (lib: $2, name: $3)\n" if $debug;
}
if(/(([A-Z0-9]+)_R_[A-Z0-9_]+)/) {
next unless exists $csrc{$2};
$rcodes{$1} = "X";
$rnew{$2}++;
}
+ print STDERR "Reason: $1\t= $rcodes{$1} (lib: $2)\n" if $debug;
}
}
close IN;
} else {
push @out,
"/* ====================================================================\n",
-" * Copyright (c) 2001-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.\n",
+" * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.\n",
" *\n",
" * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without\n",
" * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions\n",
print OUT <<"EOF";
/* $cfile */
/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1999-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2009 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
#define sk_${type_thing}_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) SKM_sk_set_cmp_func($type_thing, (st), (cmp))
#define sk_${type_thing}_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup($type_thing, st)
#define sk_${type_thing}_pop_free(st, free_func) SKM_sk_pop_free($type_thing, (st), (free_func))
-#define sk_${type_thing}_free(st) SKM_sk_free($type_thing, (st))
#define sk_${type_thing}_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift($type_thing, (st))
#define sk_${type_thing}_pop(st) SKM_sk_pop($type_thing, (st))
#define sk_${type_thing}_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort($type_thing, (st))
#define sk_${t1}_pop_free(st, free_func) sk_pop_free(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st), CHECKED_SK_FREE_FUNC2($t1, free_func))
#define sk_${t1}_insert(st, val, i) sk_insert(CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val), i)
#define sk_${t1}_free(st) SKM_sk_free(${t1}, st)
+#define sk_${t1}_set(st, i, val) sk_set((_STACK *)CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st), i, CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
+#define sk_${t1}_zero(st) SKM_sk_zero($t1, (st))
+#define sk_${t1}_unshift(st, val) sk_unshift((_STACK *)CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, val))
+#define sk_${t1}_find_ex(st, val) sk_find_ex((_STACK *)CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st), CHECKED_CONST_PTR_OF($t2, val))
+#define sk_${t1}_delete(st, i) SKM_sk_delete($t1, (st), (i))
+#define sk_${t1}_delete_ptr(st, ptr) ($t1 *)sk_delete_ptr((_STACK *)CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st), CHECKED_PTR_OF($t2, ptr))
+#define sk_${t1}_set_cmp_func(st, cmp) \\
+ ((int (*)(const $t2 * const *,const $t2 * const *)) \\
+ sk_set_cmp_func((_STACK *)CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st), CHECKED_SK_CMP_FUNC($t2, cmp)))
+#define sk_${t1}_dup(st) SKM_sk_dup($t1, st)
+#define sk_${t1}_shift(st) SKM_sk_shift($t1, (st))
+#define sk_${t1}_pop(st) ($t2 *)sk_pop((_STACK *)CHECKED_PTR_OF(STACK_OF($t1), st))
+#define sk_${t1}_sort(st) SKM_sk_sort($t1, (st))
+#define sk_${t1}_is_sorted(st) SKM_sk_is_sorted($t1, (st))
+
EOF
}
print "Checking compiler...\n";
if (open(TEST,">cctest.c")) {
- print TEST "#include <stdio.h>\n#include <errno.h>\nmain(){printf(\"Hello world\\n\");}\n";
+ print TEST "#include <stdio.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <errno.h>\nmain(){printf(\"Hello world\\n\");}\n";
close(TEST);
system("$cc -o cctest cctest.c");
if (`./cctest` !~ /Hello world/) {
print OUT "Can't create cctest.c\n";
}
if (open(TEST,">cctest.c")) {
- print TEST "#include <openssl/opensslv.h>\nmain(){printf(OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT);}\n";
+ print TEST "#include <stdio.h>\n#include <stdlib.h>\n#include <openssl/opensslv.h>\nmain(){printf(OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT);}\n";
close(TEST);
system("$cc -o cctest -Iinclude cctest.c");
$cctest = `./cctest`;
SSLv23_client_method 110 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
SSLv23_method 111 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
SSLv23_server_method 112 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
-SSLv2_client_method 113 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
-SSLv2_method 114 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
-SSLv2_server_method 115 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA
+SSLv2_client_method 113 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2
+SSLv2_method 114 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2
+SSLv2_server_method 115 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA,SSL2
SSLv3_client_method 116 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSLv3_method 117 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSLv3_server_method 118 EXIST::FUNCTION:
projects / openssl.git / commitdiff