*Tomáš Mráz*
+ * Removed RSA padding mode for SSLv23 (which was only used for
+ SSLv2). This includes the functions RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() and
+ RSA_padding_add_SSLv23() and the `-ssl` option in the deprecated
+ `rsautl` command.
+
+ *Rich Salz*
+
* Deprecated the obsolete X9.31 RSA key generation related functions
BN_X931_generate_Xpq(), BN_X931_derive_prime_ex(), and
BN_X931_generate_prime_ex().
typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
OPT_ENGINE, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_ASN1PARSE, OPT_HEXDUMP,
- OPT_RSA_RAW, OPT_OAEP, OPT_SSL, OPT_PKCS, OPT_X931,
+ OPT_RSA_RAW, OPT_OAEP, OPT_PKCS, OPT_X931,
OPT_SIGN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_REV, OPT_ENCRYPT, OPT_DECRYPT,
OPT_PUBIN, OPT_CERTIN, OPT_INKEY, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_KEYFORM,
OPT_R_ENUM, OPT_PROV_ENUM
OPT_SECTION("Output"),
{"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output file"},
- {"ssl", OPT_SSL, '-', "Use SSL v2 padding"},
{"raw", OPT_RSA_RAW, '-', "Use no padding"},
{"pkcs", OPT_PKCS, '-', "Use PKCS#1 v1.5 padding (default)"},
{"x931", OPT_X931, '-', "Use ANSI X9.31 padding"},
case OPT_OAEP:
pad = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
break;
- case OPT_SSL:
- pad = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
- break;
case OPT_PKCS:
pad = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
break;
{
static const OSSL_ITEM str_value_map[] = {
{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, "pkcs1" },
- { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, "sslv23" },
{ RSA_NO_PADDING, "none" },
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oaep" },
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON\
rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \
- rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c rsa_ssl.c
+ rsa_pmeth.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c
IF[{- !$disabled{'deprecated-0.9.8'} -}]
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=rsa_depr.c
ENDIF
int nbits, const BIGNUM *e, BN_CTX *ctx,
BN_GENCB *cb);
-int ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to,
- int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
- int flen);
int ossl_rsa_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to,
int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
int flen);
from, flen, NULL, 0,
NULL, NULL);
break;
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- i = ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(rsa->libctx, buf, num, from, flen);
- break;
-#endif
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
default:
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
break;
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
- break;
-#endif
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
memcpy(to, buf, (r = j));
break;
if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
- } else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0) {
- pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
} else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-/*
- * RSA low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
- * internal use.
- */
-#include "internal/deprecated.h"
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/rsa.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "internal/constant_time.h"
-#include "rsa_local.h"
-
-int ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *to,
- int tlen, const unsigned char *from,
- int flen)
-{
- int i, j;
- unsigned char *p;
-
- if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)to;
-
- *(p++) = 0;
- *(p++) = 2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */
-
- /* pad out with non-zero random data */
- j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen;
-
- if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, p, j) <= 0)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
- if (*p == '\0')
- do {
- if (RAND_bytes_ex(libctx, p, 1) <= 0)
- return 0;
- } while (*p == '\0');
- p++;
- }
-
- memset(p, 3, 8);
- p += 8;
- *(p++) = '\0';
-
- memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
- return 1;
-}
-
-int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen)
-{
- return ossl_rsa_padding_add_SSLv23_ex(NULL, to, tlen, from, flen);
-}
-
-/*
- * Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
- * if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
- * preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
- */
-int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
-{
- int i;
- /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
- unsigned char *em = NULL;
- unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
- int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
-
- if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
- return -1;
-
- if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
- return -1;
- }
-
- em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (em == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
- * BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
- * bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
- * in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
- */
- for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
- flen -= 1 & mask;
- from -= 1 & mask;
- *--em = *from & mask;
- }
-
- good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]);
- good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2);
- err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
- mask = ~good;
-
- /* scan over padding data */
- found_zero_byte = 0;
- threes_in_row = 0;
- for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
- unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]);
-
- zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
- i, zero_index);
- found_zero_byte |= equals0;
-
- threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
- threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(em[i], 3);
- }
-
- /*
- * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|.
- * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
- * also fails.
- */
- good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
- err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
- RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
- mask = ~good;
-
- /*
- * Reject if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. Note
- * that RFC5246 incorrectly states this the other way around, i.e. reject
- * if it is not preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. However this is
- * corrected in subsequent errata for that RFC.
- */
- good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
- err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
- RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
- mask = ~good;
-
- /*
- * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
- * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
- */
- msg_index = zero_index + 1;
- mlen = num - msg_index;
-
- /*
- * For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
- */
- good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
- err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
-
- /*
- * Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
- * Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|.
- * Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
- * Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
- * the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
- * parts of the buffer multiple times based on the bits set in the real
- * length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
- * The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
- */
- tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen),
- num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen);
- for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
- mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
- for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++)
- em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
- }
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
- to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]);
- }
-
- OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, err);
- err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
-
- return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
-}
=item B<rsa_padding_mode:>I<mode>
This sets the RSA padding mode. Acceptable values for I<mode> are B<pkcs1> for
-PKCS#1 padding, B<sslv23> for SSLv23 padding, B<none> for no padding, B<oaep>
+PKCS#1 padding, B<none> for no padding, B<oaep>
for B<OAEP> mode, B<x931> for X9.31 mode and B<pss> for PSS.
In PKCS#1 padding if the message digest is not set then the supplied data is
[B<-pkcs>]
[B<-x931>]
[B<-oaep>]
-[B<-ssl>]
-[B<-raw>]
-[B<-pkcs>]
-[B<-ssl>]
[B<-raw>]
[B<-hexdump>]
[B<-asn1parse>]
Decrypt the input data using an RSA private key.
-=item B<-pkcs>, B<-oaep>, B<-x931> B<-ssl>, B<-raw>
+=item B<-pkcs>, B<-oaep>, B<-x931> B<-raw>
The padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP,
-ANSI X9.31,
-special padding used in SSL v2 backwards compatible handshakes,
-or no padding, respectively.
+ANSI X9.31, or no padding, respectively.
For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used.
=item B<-hexdump>
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding() sets the RSA padding mode for I<ctx>.
The I<pad> parameter can take the value B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> for PKCS#1
-padding, B<RSA_SSLV23_PADDING> for SSLv23 padding, B<RSA_NO_PADDING> for
+padding, B<RSA_NO_PADDING> for
no padding, B<RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING> for OAEP padding (encrypt and
decrypt only), B<RSA_X931_PADDING> for X9.31 padding (signature operations
only), B<RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING> (sign and verify only) and
RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2,
RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP,
RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1, RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1,
-RSA_padding_add_SSLv23, RSA_padding_check_SSLv23,
RSA_padding_add_none, RSA_padding_check_none - asymmetric encryption
padding
const unsigned char *p, int pl,
const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
- int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f, int fl);
-
- int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f, int fl, int rsa_len);
-
int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *f, int fl);
PKCS #1 v2.0 EME-OAEP
-=item SSLv23
-
-PKCS #1 EME-PKCS1-v1_5 with SSL-specific modification
-
=item none
simply copy the data
EME-OAEP as defined in PKCS #1 v2.0 with SHA-1, MGF1 and an empty
encoding parameter. This mode is recommended for all new applications.
-=item RSA_SSLV23_PADDING
-
-PKCS #1 v1.5 padding with an SSL-specific modification that denotes
-that the server is SSL3 capable.
-
=item RSA_NO_PADDING
Raw RSA encryption. This mode should I<only> be used to implement
=item "pkcs1" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15>)
-=item "sslv23" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23>)
-
=item "x931" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931>)
=item "pss" (B<OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS>)
The type of padding to be used. The interpretation of this value will depend
on the algorithm in use. The default provider understands these RSA padding
-modes: 1 (RSA_PKCS1_PADDING), 2 (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING), 3 (RSA_NO_PADDING),
+modes: 1 (RSA_PKCS1_PADDING), 3 (RSA_NO_PADDING),
4 (RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING), 5 (RSA_X931_PADDING), 6 (RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) and
7 (RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING). See L<EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(3)> for
further details.
/* RSA padding modes */
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE "none"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 "pkcs1"
-#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 "sslv23"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP "oaep"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 "x931"
#define OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS "pss"
# define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13)
# define RSA_PKCS1_PADDING 1
-# define RSA_SSLV23_PADDING 2
# define RSA_NO_PADDING 3
# define RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING 4
# define RSA_X931_PADDING 5
int num,
const unsigned char *param, int plen,
const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_MD *mgf1md);
-OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
-int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f, int fl);
-OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
-int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
- const unsigned char *f, int fl,
- int rsa_len);
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *f, int fl);
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
- { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
{ RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_OAEP }, /* Correct spelling first */
{ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, "oeap" },
static OSSL_ITEM padding_item[] = {
{ RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PKCSV15 },
- { RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_SSLV23 },
{ RSA_NO_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_NONE },
{ RSA_X931_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_X931 },
{ RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING, OSSL_PKEY_RSA_PAD_MODE_PSS },
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
err_extra_text = "PKCS#1 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
goto cont;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- err_extra_text = "SSLv3 padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
- goto cont;
case RSA_NO_PADDING:
err_extra_text = "No padding not allowed with RSA-PSS";
goto cont;
NULL, NULL);
}
-static int test_rsa_sslv23(int idx)
-{
- int ret;
-
- /* Simulate an SSLv2 only client talking to a TLS capable server */
- ret = test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, 1, NULL,
- NULL, NULL);
-
- /* Simulate a TLS capable client talking to an SSLv2 only server */
- ret &= test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, 1, NULL,
- NULL, NULL);
-
- /*
- * Simulate a TLS capable client talking to a TLS capable server. Should
- * fail due to detecting a rollback attack.
- */
- ret &= test_rsa_simple(idx, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, RSA_SSLV23_PADDING, 0, NULL,
- NULL, NULL);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
static int test_rsa_oaep(int idx)
{
int ret = 0;
int setup_tests(void)
{
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_pkcs1, 3);
- ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_sslv23, 3);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_oaep, 3);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_rsa_security_bit, OSSL_NELEM(rsa_security_bits_cases));
return 1;
CRYPTO_nistcts128_encrypt 1425 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CONF_modules_finish 1426 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
BN_value_one 1427 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-RSA_padding_add_SSLv23 1428 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
+RSA_padding_add_SSLv23 1428 3_0_0 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
OCSP_RESPBYTES_it 1429 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
EVP_aes_192_wrap 1430 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OCSP_CERTID_it 1431 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:OCSP
EDIPARTYNAME_new 3370 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CMS_add1_cert 3371 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS
DSO_convert_filename 3372 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
-RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 3373 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
+RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 3373 3_0_0 NOEXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATEDIN_3_0
CRYPTO_gcm128_finish 3374 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_SAFEBAGS_it 3375 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
PKCS12_PBE_add 3376 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
projects / openssl.git / commitdiff