-/*
- * Copyright 2018-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "ssl_local.h"
-#include "internal/ktls.h"
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
- /*
- * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.
- *
- * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the
- * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this
- * function will fail.
- */
-static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
-{
- SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = s->rrlmethod->get0_rbuf(s->rrl);
- PACKET pkt, subpkt;
- int count = 0;
-
- if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))
- return -1;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
- /* Skip record type and version */
- if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))
- return -1;
-
- /* Read until next record */
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))
- return -1;
-
- count += 1;
- }
-
- return count;
-}
-
-/*
- * The kernel cannot offload receive if a partial TLS record has been read.
- * Check the read buffer for unprocessed records. If the buffer contains a
- * partial record, fail and return 0. Otherwise, update the sequence
- * number at *rec_seq for the count of unprocessed records and return 1.
- */
-static int check_rx_read_ahead(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *rec_seq)
-{
- int bit, count_unprocessed;
-
- count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);
- if (count_unprocessed < 0)
- return 0;
-
- /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */
- while (count_unprocessed) {
- for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */
- ++rec_seq[bit];
- if (rec_seq[bit] != 0)
- break;
- }
- count_unprocessed--;
-
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
-# include "crypto/cryptodev.h"
-
-/*-
- * Check if a given cipher is supported by the KTLS interface.
- * The kernel might still fail the setsockopt() if no suitable
- * provider is found, but this checks if the socket option
- * supports the cipher suite used at all.
- */
-int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
- size_t taglen)
-{
-
- switch (s->version) {
- case TLS1_VERSION:
- case TLS1_1_VERSION:
- case TLS1_2_VERSION:
- case TLS1_3_VERSION:
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-
- switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc) {
- case SSL_AES128GCM:
- case SSL_AES256GCM:
- return 1;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
- case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
- return 1;
-# endif
- case SSL_AES128:
- case SSL_AES256:
- if (s->ext.use_etm)
- return 0;
- switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac) {
- case SSL_SHA1:
- case SSL_SHA256:
- case SSL_SHA384:
- return 1;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-/* Function to configure kernel TLS structure */
-int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, void *rl_sequence,
- ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info, int is_tx,
- unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen, unsigned char *mac_key,
- size_t mac_secret_size)
-{
- memset(crypto_info, 0, sizeof(*crypto_info));
- switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc) {
- case SSL_AES128GCM:
- case SSL_AES256GCM:
- crypto_info->cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16;
- crypto_info->iv_len = ivlen;
- break;
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
- case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
- crypto_info->cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
- crypto_info->iv_len = ivlen;
- break;
-# endif
- case SSL_AES128:
- case SSL_AES256:
- switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac) {
- case SSL_SHA1:
- crypto_info->auth_algorithm = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC;
- break;
- case SSL_SHA256:
- crypto_info->auth_algorithm = CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC;
- break;
- case SSL_SHA384:
- crypto_info->auth_algorithm = CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC;
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
- crypto_info->cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
- crypto_info->iv_len = ivlen;
- crypto_info->auth_key = mac_key;
- crypto_info->auth_key_len = mac_secret_size;
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
- crypto_info->cipher_key = key;
- crypto_info->cipher_key_len = keylen;
- crypto_info->iv = iv;
- crypto_info->tls_vmajor = (s->version >> 8) & 0x000000ff;
- crypto_info->tls_vminor = (s->version & 0x000000ff);
-# ifdef TCP_RXTLS_ENABLE
- memcpy(crypto_info->rec_seq, rl_sequence, sizeof(crypto_info->rec_seq));
- if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->rec_seq))
- return 0;
-# else
- if (!is_tx)
- return 0;
-# endif
- return 1;
-};
-
-#endif /* __FreeBSD__ */
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX)
-
-/* Function to check supported ciphers in Linux */
-int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
- size_t taglen)
-{
- switch (s->version) {
- case TLS1_2_VERSION:
- case TLS1_3_VERSION:
- break;
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* check that cipher is AES_GCM_128, AES_GCM_256, AES_CCM_128
- * or Chacha20-Poly1305
- */
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_CCM_128
- if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "AES-128-CCM")) {
- if (s->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION /* broken on 5.x kernels */
- || taglen != EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
- return 0;
- return 1;
- } else
-# endif
- if (0
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_128
- || EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "AES-128-GCM")
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_256
- || EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "AES-256-GCM")
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
- || EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "ChaCha20-Poly1305")
-# endif
- ) {
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Function to configure kernel TLS structure */
-int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, void *rl_sequence,
- ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info, int is_tx,
- unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, unsigned char *key,
- size_t keylen, unsigned char *mac_key,
- size_t mac_secret_size)
-{
- unsigned char geniv[EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN];
- unsigned char *eiv;
- SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
- if (!is_tx)
- return 0;
-# endif
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
- || EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- if (!ossl_assert(EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN == EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
- || !ossl_assert(EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
- == EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
- return 0;
- if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- if (!ossl_assert(ivlen == EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN))
- return 0;
- if (is_tx) {
- if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, geniv,
- EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, 0) <= 0)
- return 0;
- } else {
- memset(geniv, 0, EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
- }
- eiv = geniv;
- } else {
- if (!ossl_assert(ivlen == EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN
- + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
- return 0;
- eiv = iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
- }
- }
-
- memset(crypto_info, 0, sizeof(*crypto_info));
- switch (EVP_CIPHER_get_nid(c))
- {
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_128
- case NID_aes_128_gcm:
- if (!ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE == EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
- || !ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE == EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
- return 0;
- crypto_info->gcm128.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128;
- crypto_info->gcm128.info.version = s->version;
- crypto_info->tls_crypto_info_len = sizeof(crypto_info->gcm128);
- memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.iv, eiv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE);
- memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.salt, iv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
- memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.key, key, keylen);
- memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
- TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
- if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_256
- case NID_aes_256_gcm:
- if (!ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE == EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
- || !ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE == EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
- return 0;
- crypto_info->gcm256.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256;
- crypto_info->gcm256.info.version = s->version;
- crypto_info->tls_crypto_info_len = sizeof(crypto_info->gcm256);
- memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.iv, eiv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE);
- memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.salt, iv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE);
- memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.key, key, keylen);
- memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
- TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
- if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->gcm256.rec_seq))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_CCM_128
- case NID_aes_128_ccm:
- if (!ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE == EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
- || !ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE == EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
- return 0;
- crypto_info->ccm128.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128;
- crypto_info->ccm128.info.version = s->version;
- crypto_info->tls_crypto_info_len = sizeof(crypto_info->ccm128);
- memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.iv, eiv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE);
- memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.salt, iv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
- memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.key, key, keylen);
- memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
- TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
- if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-# endif
-# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
- case NID_chacha20_poly1305:
- if (!ossl_assert(ivlen == TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IV_SIZE))
- return 0;
- crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
- crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.info.version = s->version;
- crypto_info->tls_crypto_info_len = sizeof(crypto_info->chacha20poly1305);
- memcpy(crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.iv, iv, ivlen);
- memcpy(crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.key, key, keylen);
- memcpy(crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
- TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
- if (!is_tx
- && !check_rx_read_ahead(s,
- crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.rec_seq))
- return 0;
- return 1;
-# endif
- default:
- return 0;
- }
-
-}
-
-#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX */