Rename typed version of M_ASN1_get M_ASN1_get_x to avoid conflicts.
authorDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Wed, 20 Apr 2005 21:48:06 +0000 (21:48 +0000)
committerDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Wed, 20 Apr 2005 21:48:06 +0000 (21:48 +0000)
Remove more bogus shadow warnings.

crypto/asn1/a_hdr.c
crypto/asn1/asn1_mac.h
crypto/asn1/x_pkey.c
crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

index c5520b7..d1c2a7b 100644 (file)
@@ -83,10 +83,10 @@ ASN1_HEADER *d2i_ASN1_HEADER(ASN1_HEADER **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 
        M_ASN1_D2I_Init();
         M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
-        M_ASN1_D2I_get(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,ret->header,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+        M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,ret->header,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
        if (ret->meth != NULL)
                {
-               M_ASN1_D2I_get(void,ret->data,ret->meth->d2i);
+               M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(void,ret->data,ret->meth->d2i);
                }
        else
                {
index f95cb14..d958ca6 100644 (file)
@@ -126,7 +126,14 @@ err:\
                (c.eos=ASN1_const_check_infinite_end(&c.p,c.slen)))
 
 /* Don't use this with d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN() */
-#define M_ASN1_D2I_get(type,b,func) \
+#define M_ASN1_D2I_get(b, func) \
+       c.q=c.p; \
+       if (func(&(b),&c.p,c.slen) == NULL) \
+               {c.line=__LINE__; goto err; } \
+       c.slen-=(c.p-c.q);
+
+/* Don't use this with d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN() */
+#define M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(type,b,func) \
        c.q=c.p; \
        if (((D2I_OF(type))func)(&(b),&c.p,c.slen) == NULL) \
                {c.line=__LINE__; goto err; } \
index ee860be..8453618 100644 (file)
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ X509_PKEY *d2i_X509_PKEY(X509_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
 
        M_ASN1_D2I_Init();
        M_ASN1_D2I_start_sequence();
-       M_ASN1_D2I_get(X509_ALGOR,ret->enc_algor,d2i_X509_ALGOR);
-       M_ASN1_D2I_get(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,ret->enc_pkey,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
+       M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(X509_ALGOR,ret->enc_algor,d2i_X509_ALGOR);
+       M_ASN1_D2I_get_x(ASN1_OCTET_STRING,ret->enc_pkey,d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING);
 
        ret->cipher.cipher=EVP_get_cipherbyname(
                OBJ_nid2ln(OBJ_obj2nid(ret->enc_algor->algorithm)));
index 4a30827..9be7aca 100644 (file)
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
        int depth,i,ok=0;
        int num;
-       int (*cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+       int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
        STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
        if (ctx->cert == NULL)
                {
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 #else
        int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
        X509 *x;
-       int (*cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+       int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
        int proxy_path_length = 0;
        int allow_proxy_certs =
                !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
 #else
        int i, ok;
        X509 *x;
-       int (*cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+       int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
        cb=ctx->verify_cb;
 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
        i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
        int ok=0,n;
        X509 *xs,*xi;
        EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
-       int (*cb)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+       int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
 
        cb=ctx->verify_cb;