PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CIPHERS:207:unable to find ciphers
PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ENTROPY:202:unable to get entropy
PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_NONCE:203:unable to get nonce
-PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_RESEED_PROP_COUNTER:198:\
- unable to get parent reseed prop counter
PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH:199:unable to get parent strength
PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_INITIALISE_CIPHERS:208:unable to initialise ciphers
PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SHA1:143:unable to load sha1
RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_RESEED_PROP_COUNTER:141:\
unable to get parent reseed prop counter
RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH:138:unable to get parent strength
-RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_RESEED_COUNTER :142:unable to get reseed counter
RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT:140:unable to lock parent
RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS:132:unsupported drbg flags
RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE:120:unsupported drbg type
"unable to get parent reseed prop counter"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH),
"unable to get parent strength"},
- {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_RESEED_COUNTER),
- "unable to get reseed counter"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT),
"unable to lock parent"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS),
# define RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_FETCH_DRBG 144
# define RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_RESEED_PROP_COUNTER 141
# define RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH 138
-# define RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_RESEED_COUNTER 142
# define RAND_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT 140
# define RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_FLAGS 132
# define RAND_R_UNSUPPORTED_DRBG_TYPE 120
SOURCE[../libcommon.a]=provider_err.c provider_ctx.c
$FIPSCOMMON=provider_util.c capabilities.c bio_prov.c digest_to_nid.c\
- securitycheck.c
+ securitycheck.c provider_seeding.c
SOURCE[../libnonfips.a]=$FIPSCOMMON securitycheck_default.c
SOURCE[../libfips.a]=$FIPSCOMMON securitycheck_fips.c
# define PROV_R_NO_PARAMETERS_SET 177
# define PROV_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE 178
# define PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 106
+# define PROV_R_PARENT_CANNOT_GENERATE_RANDOM_NUMBERS 228
# define PROV_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED 182
# define PROV_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK 194
# define PROV_R_PATH_MUST_BE_ABSOLUTE 219
# define PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_CIPHERS 207
# define PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_ENTROPY 202
# define PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_NONCE 203
-# define PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_RESEED_PROP_COUNTER 198
# define PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH 199
# define PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_INITIALISE_CIPHERS 208
# define PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SHA1 143
"operation not supported for this keytype"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL),
"output buffer too small"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_PARENT_CANNOT_GENERATE_RANDOM_NUMBERS),
+ "parent cannot generate random numbers"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_PARENT_LOCKING_NOT_ENABLED),
"parent locking not enabled"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK),
"unable to get entropy"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_NONCE),
"unable to get nonce"},
- {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_RESEED_PROP_COUNTER),
- "unable to get parent reseed prop counter"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_PARENT_STRENGTH),
"unable to get parent strength"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PROV, 0, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_INITIALISE_CIPHERS),
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/core_dispatch.h>
+#include "prov/seeding.h"
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_get_entropy_fn *c_get_entropy = NULL;
+static OSSL_FUNC_cleanup_entropy_fn *c_cleanup_entropy = NULL;
+static OSSL_FUNC_get_nonce_fn *c_get_nonce = NULL;
+static OSSL_FUNC_cleanup_nonce_fn *c_cleanup_nonce = NULL;
+
+int ossl_prov_seeding_from_dispatch(const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns)
+{
+ for (; fns->function_id != 0; fns++) {
+ switch (fns->function_id) {
+ case OSSL_FUNC_GET_ENTROPY:
+ if (c_get_entropy == NULL)
+ c_get_entropy = OSSL_FUNC_get_entropy(fns);
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_CLEANUP_ENTROPY:
+ if (c_cleanup_entropy == NULL)
+ c_cleanup_entropy = OSSL_FUNC_cleanup_entropy(fns);
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_GET_NONCE:
+ if (c_get_nonce == NULL)
+ c_get_nonce = OSSL_FUNC_get_nonce(fns);
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_CLEANUP_NONCE:
+ if (c_cleanup_nonce == NULL)
+ c_cleanup_nonce = OSSL_FUNC_cleanup_nonce(fns);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+size_t ossl_prov_get_entropy(PROV_CTX *prov_ctx, unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+ if (c_get_entropy == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return c_get_entropy(ossl_prov_ctx_get0_handle(prov_ctx),
+ pout, entropy, min_len, max_len);
+}
+
+void ossl_prov_cleanup_entropy(PROV_CTX *prov_ctx, unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len)
+{
+ if (c_cleanup_entropy != NULL)
+ c_cleanup_entropy(ossl_prov_ctx_get0_handle(prov_ctx), buf, len);
+}
+
+size_t ossl_prov_get_nonce(PROV_CTX *prov_ctx, unsigned char **pout,
+ size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+ const void *salt,size_t salt_len)
+{
+ if (c_get_nonce == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ return c_get_nonce(ossl_prov_ctx_get0_handle(prov_ctx), pout,
+ min_len, max_len, salt, salt_len);
+}
+
+void ossl_prov_cleanup_nonce(PROV_CTX *prov_ctx, unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ if (c_cleanup_nonce != NULL)
+ c_cleanup_nonce(ossl_prov_ctx_get0_handle(prov_ctx), buf, len);
+}
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
+#include "prov/seeding.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
/*
OSSL_FUNC_core_get_libctx_fn *c_get_libctx = NULL;
BIO_METHOD *corebiometh;
- if (!ossl_prov_bio_from_dispatch(in))
+ if (!ossl_prov_bio_from_dispatch(in)
+ || !ossl_prov_seeding_from_dispatch(in))
return 0;
for (; in->function_id != 0; in++) {
switch (in->function_id) {
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
+#include "prov/seeding.h"
#include "self_test.h"
static const char FIPS_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES[] = "provider=fips,fips=yes";
FIPS_GLOBAL *fgbl;
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = NULL;
+ if (!ossl_prov_seeding_from_dispatch(in))
+ return 0;
for (; in->function_id != 0; in++) {
switch (in->function_id) {
case OSSL_FUNC_CORE_GET_LIBCTX:
case OSSL_FUNC_BIO_VSNPRINTF:
c_BIO_vsnprintf = OSSL_FUNC_BIO_vsnprintf(in);
break;
- case OSSL_FUNC_SELF_TEST_CB: {
+ case OSSL_FUNC_SELF_TEST_CB:
c_stcbfn = OSSL_FUNC_self_test_cb(in);
break;
- }
default:
/* Just ignore anything we don't understand */
break;
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
-#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
/* Hardware-based seeding functions. */
size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool);
void prov_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out);
-size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
-int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
-
/*
* Add some platform specific additional data
*
*/
int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
+/*
+ * External seeding functions from the core dispatch table.
+ */
+int ossl_prov_seeding_from_dispatch(const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns);
+
+size_t ossl_prov_get_entropy(PROV_CTX *prov_ctx, unsigned char **pout,
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
+void ossl_prov_cleanup_entropy(PROV_CTX *prov_ctx, unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
+size_t ossl_prov_get_nonce(PROV_CTX *prov_ctx, unsigned char **pout,
+ size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+ const void *salt, size_t salt_len);
+void ossl_prov_cleanup_nonce(PROV_CTX *prov_ctx, unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t len);
SUBDIRS=seeding
-$COMMON=drbg.c test_rng.c drbg_ctr.c drbg_hash.c drbg_hmac.c crngt.c rand_pool.c
+$COMMON=drbg.c test_rng.c drbg_ctr.c drbg_hash.c drbg_hmac.c crngt.c
SOURCE[../../libfips.a]=$COMMON
SOURCE[../../libnonfips.a]=$COMMON
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
#include "drbg_local.h"
#include "prov/seeding.h"
typedef struct crng_test_global_st {
unsigned char crngt_prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- RAND_POOL *crngt_pool;
+ EVP_MD *md;
+ int preloaded;
+ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
} CRNG_TEST_GLOBAL;
-static int crngt_get_entropy(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
+static int crngt_get_entropy(PROV_CTX *provctx, const EVP_MD *digest,
unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *md_size)
{
int r;
size_t n;
unsigned char *p;
- EVP_MD *fmd;
- if (pool == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- n = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
- if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
- fmd = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "SHA256", "");
- if (fmd == NULL)
- return 0;
- p = rand_pool_detach(pool);
- r = EVP_Digest(p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, fmd, NULL);
+ n = ossl_prov_get_entropy(provctx, &p, 0, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
+ if (n == CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
+ r = EVP_Digest(p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, digest, NULL);
if (r != 0)
memcpy(buf, p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
- rand_pool_reattach(pool, p);
- EVP_MD_free(fmd);
- return r;
+ ossl_prov_cleanup_entropy(provctx, p, n);
+ return r != 0;
}
+ if (n != 0)
+ ossl_prov_cleanup_entropy(provctx, p, n);
return 0;
}
{
CRNG_TEST_GLOBAL *crngt_glob = vcrngt_glob;
- rand_pool_free(crngt_glob->crngt_pool);
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(crngt_glob->lock);
+ EVP_MD_free(crngt_glob->md);
OPENSSL_free(crngt_glob);
}
static void *rand_crng_ossl_ctx_new(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx)
{
- unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
CRNG_TEST_GLOBAL *crngt_glob = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*crngt_glob));
if (crngt_glob == NULL)
return NULL;
- if ((crngt_glob->crngt_pool
- = rand_pool_new(0, 1, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL) {
+ if ((crngt_glob->md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "SHA256", "")) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(crngt_glob);
return NULL;
}
- if (crngt_get_entropy(ctx, crngt_glob->crngt_pool, buf,
- crngt_glob->crngt_prev, NULL)) {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
- return crngt_glob;
+
+ if ((crngt_glob->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) == NULL) {
+ EVP_MD_free(crngt_glob->md);
+ OPENSSL_free(crngt_glob);
+ return NULL;
}
- rand_pool_free(crngt_glob->crngt_pool);
- OPENSSL_free(crngt_glob);
- return NULL;
+
+ return crngt_glob;
}
static const OSSL_LIB_CTX_METHOD rand_crng_ossl_ctx_method = {
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance)
{
- unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ], md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
+ unsigned char *ent, *entp, *entbuf;
unsigned int sz;
- RAND_POOL *pool;
- size_t q, r = 0, s, t = 0;
- int attempts = 3, crng_test_pass = 1;
- OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(drbg->provctx);
+ size_t bytes_needed;
+ size_t r = 0, s, t;
+ int crng_test_pass = 1;
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_prov_ctx_get0_libctx(drbg->provctx);
CRNG_TEST_GLOBAL *crngt_glob
= ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_RAND_CRNGT_INDEX,
&rand_crng_ossl_ctx_method);
if (crngt_glob == NULL)
return 0;
- if ((pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len)) == NULL)
+ if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(crngt_glob->lock))
return 0;
+ if (!crngt_glob->preloaded) {
+ if (!crngt_get_entropy(drbg->provctx, crngt_glob->md, buf,
+ crngt_glob->crngt_prev, NULL)) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ goto unlock_return;
+ }
+ crngt_glob->preloaded = 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate how many bytes of seed material we require, rounded up
+ * to the nearest byte. If the entropy is of less than full quality,
+ * the amount required should be scaled up appropriately here.
+ */
+ bytes_needed = (entropy + 7) / 8;
+ if (bytes_needed < min_len)
+ bytes_needed = min_len;
+ if (bytes_needed > max_len)
+ goto unlock_return;
+ entp = ent = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(bytes_needed);
+ if (ent == NULL)
+ goto unlock_return;
+
OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &stcb, &stcbarg);
if (stcb != NULL) {
st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(stcb, stcbarg);
OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_RNG);
}
- while ((q = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1)) > 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
- s = q > sizeof(buf) ? sizeof(buf) : q;
- if (!crngt_get_entropy(libctx, crngt_glob->crngt_pool, buf, md, &sz))
+ for (t = bytes_needed; t > 0;) {
+ /* Care needs to be taken to avoid overrunning the buffer */
+ s = t >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ ? CRNGT_BUFSIZ : t;
+ entbuf = t >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ ? entp : buf;
+ if (!crngt_get_entropy(drbg->provctx, crngt_glob->md, entbuf, md, &sz))
goto err;
+ if (t < CRNGT_BUFSIZ)
+ memcpy(entp, buf, t);
/* Force a failure here if the callback returns 1 */
if (OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, md))
memcpy(md, crngt_glob->crngt_prev, sz);
crng_test_pass = 0;
goto err;
}
- if (!rand_pool_add(pool, buf, s, s * 8))
- goto err;
+ /* Update for next block */
memcpy(crngt_glob->crngt_prev, md, sz);
- t += s;
- attempts++;
+ entp += s;
+ t -= s;
}
- r = t;
- *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-err:
+ r = bytes_needed;
+ *pout = ent;
+ ent = NULL;
+
+ err:
OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, crng_test_pass);
OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
- rand_pool_free(pool);
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(ent, bytes_needed);
+
+ unlock_return:
+ CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(crngt_glob->lock);
return r;
}
-void ossl_crngt_cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+void ossl_crngt_cleanup_entropy(ossl_unused PROV_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "crypto/cryptlib.h"
#include "prov/seeding.h"
-#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
{
OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
void *parent = drbg->parent;
- unsigned int r;
+ unsigned int r = 0;
*params = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_COUNTER, &r);
if (!ossl_drbg_lock_parent(drbg)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOCK_PARENT);
goto err;
}
- if (!drbg->parent_get_ctx_params(parent, params)) {
- ossl_drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_RESEED_PROP_CTR);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!drbg->parent_get_ctx_params(parent, params))
+ r = 0;
ossl_drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
return r;
int entropy, size_t min_len,
size_t max_len, int prediction_resistance)
{
- size_t ret = 0;
- size_t entropy_available = 0;
- RAND_POOL *pool;
unsigned int p_str;
+ size_t r, bytes_needed;
+ unsigned char *buffer;
- if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
- if (!get_parent_strength(drbg, &p_str))
- return 0;
- if (drbg->strength > p_str) {
- /*
- * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
- * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
- */
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, PROV_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!get_parent_strength(drbg, &p_str))
+ return 0;
+ if (drbg->strength > p_str) {
+ /*
+ * We currently don't support the algorithm from NIST SP 800-90C
+ * 10.1.2 to use a weaker DRBG as source
+ */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PARENT_STRENGTH_TOO_WEAK);
+ return 0;
}
- if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
- pool = drbg->seed_pool;
- pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
- } else {
- pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
- if (pool == NULL) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (drbg->parent_generate == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_PARENT_CANNOT_GENERATE_RANDOM_NUMBERS);
+ return 0;
}
- if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
- size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
- unsigned char *buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
+ /* Figure out how many bytes we need */
+ bytes_needed = entropy >= 0 ? (entropy + 7) / 8 : 0;
+ if (bytes_needed < min_len)
+ bytes_needed = min_len;
+ if (bytes_needed > max_len)
+ bytes_needed = max_len;
- if (buffer != NULL) {
- size_t bytes = 0;
-
- if (drbg->parent_generate == NULL)
- goto err;
- /*
- * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
- * generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
- * if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
- */
- ossl_drbg_lock_parent(drbg);
- /*
- * Get random data from parent. Include our DRBG address as
- * additional input, in order to provide a distinction between
- * different DRBG child instances.
- *
- * Note: using the sizeof() operator on a pointer triggers
- * a warning in some static code analyzers, but it's
- * intentional and correct here.
- */
- if (drbg->parent_generate(drbg->parent, buffer, bytes_needed,
- drbg->strength, prediction_resistance,
- (unsigned char *)&drbg,
- sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
- bytes = bytes_needed;
- ossl_drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
- drbg->parent_reseed_counter = get_parent_reseed_count(drbg);
-
- rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
- entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
- }
- } else {
- /* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
- entropy_available = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
+ /* Allocate storage */
+ buffer = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(bytes_needed);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
}
- if (entropy_available > 0) {
- ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
- *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+ /*
+ * Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
+ * generating bits from it. Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
+ * if locking is not required (while drbg->parent->lock == NULL).
+ */
+ ossl_drbg_lock_parent(drbg);
+ /*
+ * Get random data from parent. Include our DRBG address as
+ * additional input, in order to provide a distinction between
+ * different DRBG child instances.
+ *
+ * Note: using the sizeof() operator on a pointer triggers
+ * a warning in some static code analyzers, but it's
+ * intentional and correct here.
+ */
+ r = drbg->parent_generate(drbg->parent, buffer, bytes_needed,
+ drbg->strength, prediction_resistance,
+ (unsigned char *)&drbg,
+ sizeof(drbg));
+ ossl_drbg_unlock_parent(drbg);
+ if (r == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(buffer, bytes_needed);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_GENERATE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
-
-err:
- if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
- rand_pool_free(pool);
- return ret;
+ *pout = buffer;
+ return bytes_needed;
}
/*
* Implements the cleanup_entropy() callback
*
*/
-static void prov_drbg_cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
+static void prov_drbg_cleanup_entropy(ossl_unused PROV_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
- if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
- OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
- }
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
}
static size_t get_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout, int entropy,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance)
{
-#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
if (drbg->parent == NULL)
+#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
return ossl_crngt_get_entropy(drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len,
prediction_resistance);
+#else
+ return ossl_prov_get_entropy(drbg->provctx, pout, entropy, min_len,
+ max_len);
#endif
return prov_drbg_get_entropy(drbg, pout, entropy, min_len, max_len,
static void cleanup_entropy(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
+ if (drbg->parent == NULL) {
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
- if (drbg->parent == NULL)
ossl_crngt_cleanup_entropy(drbg, out, outlen);
- else
+#else
+ ossl_prov_cleanup_entropy(drbg->provctx, out, outlen);
#endif
+ } else {
prov_drbg_cleanup_entropy(drbg, out, outlen);
+ }
}
#ifndef PROV_RAND_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
};
/* Get a nonce from the operating system */
-static size_t prov_drbg_get_nonce(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
- unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+static size_t prov_drbg_get_nonce(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout,
+ size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
size_t ret = 0, n;
- RAND_POOL *pool;
unsigned char *buf = NULL;
- OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(drbg->provctx);
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = ossl_prov_ctx_get0_libctx(drbg->provctx);
PROV_DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl
= ossl_lib_ctx_get_data(libctx, OSSL_LIB_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX,
&drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method);
struct {
- void *instance;
+ void *drbg;
int count;
} data;
-
+
if (dngbl == NULL)
return 0;
- if (drbg->parent != NULL) {
- if (drbg->parent_nonce != NULL) {
- n = drbg->parent_nonce(drbg->parent, NULL, 0, drbg->min_noncelen,
- drbg->max_noncelen);
- if (n > 0 && (buf = OPENSSL_malloc(n)) != NULL) {
- ret = drbg->parent_nonce(drbg->parent, buf, 0,
- drbg->min_noncelen,
- drbg->max_noncelen);
- if (ret == n) {
- *pout = buf;
- return ret;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ if (drbg->parent != NULL && drbg->parent_nonce != NULL) {
+ n = drbg->parent_nonce(drbg->parent, NULL, 0, drbg->min_noncelen,
+ drbg->max_noncelen);
+ if (n > 0 && (buf = OPENSSL_malloc(n)) != NULL) {
+ ret = drbg->parent_nonce(drbg->parent, buf, 0,
+ drbg->min_noncelen, drbg->max_noncelen);
+ if (ret == n) {
+ *pout = buf;
+ return ret;
}
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
}
}
- /* Use the built in nonce source */
+ /* Use the built in nonce source plus some of our specifics */
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
- pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
- if (pool == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- data.instance = drbg;
+ data.drbg = drbg;
CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dngbl->rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count,
dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
-
- if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
- goto err;
-
- ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
- *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
-
- err:
- rand_pool_free(pool);
-
- return ret;
+ return ossl_prov_get_nonce(drbg->provctx, pout, min_len, max_len,
+ &data, sizeof(data));
}
-
-static void prov_drbg_clear_nonce(PROV_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *nonce,
- size_t noncelen)
-{
- OPENSSL_clear_free(nonce, noncelen);
-}
-#else
-# define prov_drbg_clear_nonce(drbg, nonce, len) \
- OPENSSL_clear_free((nonce), (len))
#endif /* PROV_RAND_GET_RANDOM_NONCE */
/*
}
#ifndef PROV_RAND_GET_RANDOM_NONCE
else { /* parent == NULL */
- noncelen = prov_drbg_get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->strength / 2,
- drbg->min_noncelen,
+ noncelen = prov_drbg_get_nonce(drbg, &nonce, drbg->min_noncelen,
drbg->max_noncelen);
if (noncelen < drbg->min_noncelen
|| noncelen > drbg->max_noncelen) {
end:
if (entropy != NULL)
cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
- prov_drbg_clear_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
+ if (nonce != NULL)
+ ossl_prov_cleanup_nonce(drbg->provctx, nonce, noncelen);
if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY)
return 1;
return 0;
*/
static int rand_drbg_restart(PROV_DRBG *drbg)
{
- if (drbg->seed_pool != NULL) {
- drbg->state = EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR;
- rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
- drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
/* repair error state */
if (drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_ERROR)
drbg->uninstantiate(drbg);
/* reinstantiate drbg */
ossl_prov_drbg_instantiate(drbg, drbg->strength, 0, NULL, 0);
- rand_pool_free(drbg->seed_pool);
- drbg->seed_pool = NULL;
return drbg->state == EVP_RAND_STATE_READY;
}
if (drbg == NULL)
return;
- rand_pool_free(drbg->adin_pool);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(drbg->lock);
OPENSSL_free(drbg);
}
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_int(p, drbg->strength))
return 0;
- p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST);
+ p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST);
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, drbg->max_request))
return 0;
# include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
# include "internal/nelem.h"
# include "internal/numbers.h"
+# include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
/* How many times to read the TSC as a randomness source. */
# define TSC_READ_COUNT 4
*/
struct prov_drbg_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
- void *provctx;
+ PROV_CTX *provctx;
/* Virtual functions are cache here */
int (*instantiate)(PROV_DRBG *drbg,
int fork_id;
unsigned short flags; /* various external flags */
- /*
- * The random_data is used by PROV_add()/drbg_add() to attach random
- * data to the global drbg, such that the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback
- * can pull it during instantiation and reseeding. This is necessary to
- * reconcile the different philosophies of the PROV and the PROV_DRBG
- * with respect to how randomness is added to the RNG during reseeding
- * (see PR #4328).
- */
- struct rand_pool_st *seed_pool;
-
- /*
- * Auxiliary pool for additional data.
- */
- struct rand_pool_st *adin_pool;
-
/*
* The following parameters are setup by the per-type "init" function.
*
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, NULL)
-#define OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_GETTABLE_CTX_COMMON \
+#define OSSL_PARAM_DRBG_GETTABLE_CTX_COMMON \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STATE, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH, NULL), \
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST, NULL), \
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_ENTROPYLEN, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ENTROPYLEN, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_NONCELEN, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_NONCELEN, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_PERSLEN, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ADINLEN, NULL), \
- OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_COUNTER, NULL), \
+ OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_COUNTER, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_time_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_REQUESTS, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL, NULL)
$COMMON=$COMMON rand_vms.c
ENDIF
-SOURCE[../../../libfips.a]=$COMMON
SOURCE[../../../libnonfips.a]=$COMMON
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
#include "prov/seeding.h"
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
#include "prov/seeding.h"
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
#include "crypto/rand.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include "internal/dso.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
#include "prov/seeding.h"
#include <descrip.h>
#include <dvidef.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
#include "crypto/rand.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "prov/seeding.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "prov/rand_pool.h"
+#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
#include "crypto/rand.h"
#include "prov/seeding.h"
if (p != NULL && !OSSL_PARAM_get_time_t(p, &drbg->reseed_time))
return 0;
- if (!set_size_t(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST, &drbg->max_request)
+ if (!set_size_t(params, OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST, &drbg->max_request)
|| !set_size_t(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_ENTROPYLEN,
&drbg->min_entropylen)
|| !set_size_t(params, OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ENTROPYLEN,
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_TEST_ENTROPY, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_TEST_NONCE, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_uint(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_STRENGTH, NULL),
- OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST, NULL),
+ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_RAND_PARAM_MAX_REQUEST, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_ENTROPYLEN, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MAX_ENTROPYLEN, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_DRBG_PARAM_MIN_NONCELEN, NULL),
projects / openssl.git / commitdiff