#include "handshake_helper.h"
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new()
+{
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret;
+ ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ OPENSSL_assert(ret != NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void HANDSHAKE_RESULT_free(HANDSHAKE_RESULT *result)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(result->client_npn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result->server_npn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result->client_alpn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result->server_alpn_negotiated);
+ OPENSSL_free(result);
+}
+
/*
* Since there appears to be no way to extract the sent/received alert
* from the SSL object directly, we use the info callback and stash
ssl_servername_t servername;
} HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA;
+typedef struct ctx_data {
+ unsigned char *npn_protocols;
+ size_t npn_protocols_len;
+ unsigned char *alpn_protocols;
+ size_t alpn_protocols_len;
+} CTX_DATA;
+
+/* |ctx_data| itself is stack-allocated. */
+static void ctx_data_free_data(CTX_DATA *ctx_data)
+{
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->npn_protocols);
+ ctx_data->npn_protocols = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx_data->alpn_protocols);
+ ctx_data->alpn_protocols = NULL;
+}
+
static int ex_data_idx;
static void info_cb(const SSL *s, int where, int ret)
}
}
-/*
- * Select the appropriate server CTX.
+/* Select the appropriate server CTX.
* Returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if a match was found.
* If |ignore| is 1, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK on mismatch.
* Otherwise, returns SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL on mismatch.
return 1;
}
-static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL* s, unsigned char* key_name, unsigned char *iv,
+static int broken_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name, unsigned char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
{
return 0;
}
-static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL* s, unsigned char* key_name,
+static int do_not_call_session_ticket_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char *key_name,
unsigned char *iv,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)
return 0;
}
+/* Parse the comma-separated list into TLS format. */
+static void parse_protos(const char *protos, unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen)
+{
+ size_t len, i, prefix;
+
+ len = strlen(protos);
+
+ /* Should never have reuse. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(*out == NULL);
+
+ /* Test values are small, so we omit length limit checks. */
+ *out = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1);
+ OPENSSL_assert(*out != NULL);
+ *outlen = len + 1;
+
+ /*
+ * foo => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o'
+ * foo,bar => '3', 'f', 'o', 'o', '3', 'b', 'a', 'r'
+ */
+ memcpy(*out + 1, protos, len);
+
+ prefix = 0;
+ i = prefix + 1;
+ while (i <= len) {
+ if ((*out)[i] == ',') {
+ OPENSSL_assert(i - 1 - prefix > 0);
+ (*out)[prefix] = i - 1 - prefix;
+ prefix = i;
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_assert(len - prefix > 0);
+ (*out)[prefix] = len - prefix;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The client SHOULD select the first protocol advertised by the server that it
+ * also supports. In the event that the client doesn't support any of server's
+ * protocols, or the server doesn't advertise any, it SHOULD select the first
+ * protocol that it supports.
+ */
+static int client_npn_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
+ const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen,
+ ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ /* Accept both OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED and OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED
+ || ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP);
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+static int server_npn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data,
+ unsigned int *len, void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ *data = ctx_data->npn_protocols;
+ *len = ctx_data->npn_protocols_len;
+ return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The server SHOULD select the most highly preferred protocol that it supports
+ * and that is also advertised by the client. In the event that the server
+ * supports no protocols that the client advertises, then the server SHALL
+ * respond with a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert.
+ */
+static int server_alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out,
+ unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned int inlen, void *arg)
+{
+ CTX_DATA *ctx_data = (CTX_DATA*)(arg);
+ int ret;
+
+ /* SSL_select_next_proto isn't const-correct... */
+ unsigned char *tmp_out;
+
+ /*
+ * The result points either to |in| or to |ctx_data->alpn_protocols|.
+ * The callback is allowed to point to |in| or to a long-lived buffer,
+ * so we can return directly without storing a copy.
+ */
+ ret = SSL_select_next_proto(&tmp_out, outlen,
+ ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+ ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len, in, inlen);
+
+ *out = tmp_out;
+ /* Unlike NPN, we don't tolerate a mismatch. */
+ return ret == OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED ? SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+ : SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+}
+
+
/*
* Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly
* in the server/client CONF.
*/
static void configure_handshake_ctx(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
SSL_CTX *client_ctx,
- const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+ const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx,
+ CTX_DATA *server_ctx_data,
+ CTX_DATA *server2_ctx_data,
+ CTX_DATA *client_ctx_data)
{
switch (test_ctx->client_verify_callback) {
case SSL_TEST_VERIFY_ACCEPT_ALL:
if (test_ctx->session_ticket_expected == SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_BROKEN) {
SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(server_ctx, broken_session_ticket_cb);
}
+
+ if (test_ctx->server_npn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(test_ctx->server_npn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server_ctx, server_npn_cb,
+ server_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (test_ctx->server2_npn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(test_ctx->server2_npn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ OPENSSL_assert(server2_ctx != NULL);
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(server2_ctx, server_npn_cb,
+ server2_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (test_ctx->client_npn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(test_ctx->client_npn_protocols,
+ &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols,
+ &client_ctx_data->npn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(client_ctx, client_npn_cb,
+ client_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (test_ctx->server_alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+ parse_protos(test_ctx->server_alpn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+ &server_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (test_ctx->server2_alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_assert(server2_ctx != NULL);
+ parse_protos(test_ctx->server2_alpn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols,
+ &server2_ctx_data->alpn_protocols_len);
+ SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(server2_ctx, server_alpn_cb, server2_ctx_data);
+ }
+ if (test_ctx->client_alpn_protocols != NULL) {
+ unsigned char *alpn_protos = NULL;
+ size_t alpn_protos_len;
+ parse_protos(test_ctx->client_alpn_protocols,
+ &alpn_protos, &alpn_protos_len);
+ /* Reversed return value convention... */
+ OPENSSL_assert(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(client_ctx, alpn_protos,
+ alpn_protos_len) == 0);
+ OPENSSL_free(alpn_protos);
+ }
}
-/*
- * Configure callbacks and other properties that can't be set directly
- * in the server/client CONF.
- */
+/* Configure per-SSL callbacks and other properties. */
static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client,
const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
{
return INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
-HANDSHAKE_RESULT do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
- SSL_CTX *client_ctx, const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
+/* Convert unsigned char buf's that shouldn't contain any NUL-bytes to char. */
+static char *dup_str(const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
+{
+ char *ret;
+
+ if(len == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* Assert that the string does not contain NUL-bytes. */
+ OPENSSL_assert(OPENSSL_strnlen((const char*)(in), len) == len);
+ ret = OPENSSL_strndup((const char*)(in), len);
+ OPENSSL_assert(ret != NULL);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+HANDSHAKE_RESULT *do_handshake(SSL_CTX *server_ctx, SSL_CTX *server2_ctx,
+ SSL_CTX *client_ctx, const SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx)
{
SSL *server, *client;
BIO *client_to_server, *server_to_client;
HANDSHAKE_EX_DATA server_ex_data, client_ex_data;
- HANDSHAKE_RESULT ret;
+ CTX_DATA client_ctx_data, server_ctx_data, server2_ctx_data;
+ HANDSHAKE_RESULT *ret = HANDSHAKE_RESULT_new();
int client_turn = 1;
peer_status_t client_status = PEER_RETRY, server_status = PEER_RETRY;
handshake_status_t status = HANDSHAKE_RETRY;
unsigned char* tick = NULL;
- size_t len = 0;
+ size_t tick_len = 0;
SSL_SESSION* sess = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *proto = NULL;
+ /* API dictates unsigned int rather than size_t. */
+ unsigned int proto_len = 0;
- configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, test_ctx);
+ memset(&server_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server_ctx_data));
+ memset(&server2_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(server2_ctx_data));
+ memset(&client_ctx_data, 0, sizeof(client_ctx_data));
+
+ configure_handshake_ctx(server_ctx, server2_ctx, client_ctx, test_ctx,
+ &server_ctx_data, &server2_ctx_data, &client_ctx_data);
server = SSL_new(server_ctx);
client = SSL_new(client_ctx);
memset(&server_ex_data, 0, sizeof(server_ex_data));
memset(&client_ex_data, 0, sizeof(client_ex_data));
- memset(&ret, 0, sizeof(ret));
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
client_to_server = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
server_to_client = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
switch (status) {
case HANDSHAKE_SUCCESS:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_SUCCESS;
goto err;
case CLIENT_ERROR:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_CLIENT_FAIL;
goto err;
case SERVER_ERROR:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_SERVER_FAIL;
goto err;
case INTERNAL_ERROR:
- ret.result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ ret->result = SSL_TEST_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
case HANDSHAKE_RETRY:
/* Continue. */
}
}
err:
- ret.server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent;
- ret.server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received;
- ret.client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent;
- ret.client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received;
- ret.server_protocol = SSL_version(server);
- ret.client_protocol = SSL_version(client);
- ret.servername = server_ex_data.servername;
+ ret->server_alert_sent = server_ex_data.alert_sent;
+ ret->server_alert_received = client_ex_data.alert_received;
+ ret->client_alert_sent = client_ex_data.alert_sent;
+ ret->client_alert_received = server_ex_data.alert_received;
+ ret->server_protocol = SSL_version(server);
+ ret->client_protocol = SSL_version(client);
+ ret->servername = server_ex_data.servername;
if ((sess = SSL_get0_session(client)) != NULL)
- SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &len);
- if (tick == NULL || len == 0)
- ret.session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO;
+ SSL_SESSION_get0_ticket(sess, &tick, &tick_len);
+ if (tick == NULL || tick_len == 0)
+ ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_NO;
else
- ret.session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES;
- ret.session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call;
+ ret->session_ticket = SSL_TEST_SESSION_TICKET_YES;
+ ret->session_ticket_do_not_call = server_ex_data.session_ticket_do_not_call;
+
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(client, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->client_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+ SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(server, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->server_npn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(client, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->client_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+
+ SSL_get0_alpn_selected(server, &proto, &proto_len);
+ ret->server_alpn_negotiated = dup_str(proto, proto_len);
+ ctx_data_free_data(&server_ctx_data);
+ ctx_data_free_data(&server2_ctx_data);
+ ctx_data_free_data(&client_ctx_data);
SSL_free(server);
SSL_free(client);
return ret;
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff