#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, size_t ticklen,
+ const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen,
SSL_SESSION **psess);
-static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
0,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
+ tls13_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls13_setup_key_block,
+ tls13_generate_master_secret,
+ tls13_change_cipher_state,
+ tls13_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
} tls_curve_info;
-/* Mask for curve type */
-# define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3
-# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
-# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
-# define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2
-
/*
* Table of curve information.
* Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
{NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
{NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
{NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- /* X25519 (29) */
- {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM},
+ {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
};
static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
};
-
static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
};
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
{
+ const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
return 0;
- return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
+ cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
+ if (pflags)
+ *pflags = cinfo->flags;
+ return cinfo->nid;
}
int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
- return i + 1;
+ return (int)(i + 1);
}
return 0;
}
* parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
* so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
*/
-static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
- const unsigned char **pcurves,
- size_t *num_curves)
+int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
+ size_t *num_curves)
{
size_t pcurveslen = 0;
if (sess) {
- *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
+ pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
} else {
/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
pcurveslen = 2;
break;
default:
- *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ *pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
+ pcurveslen = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist_length;
}
if (!*pcurves) {
*pcurves = eccurves_default;
}
/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
-static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
+int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
if (curve[0])
}
/*-
- * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
+ * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
* if there is no match.
* For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
- * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
* an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
*/
-int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
+int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
{
const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
/* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
if (!tls1_get_curvelist
- (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
- &num_pref))
+ (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref, &num_pref))
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
/*
supp = eccurves_all;
num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
} else if (num_pref == 0 &&
- (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
pref = eccurves_all;
num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
}
continue;
if (nmatch == k) {
int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
- return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
+ return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
}
k++;
}
return NID_undef;
}
-int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
- int *curves, size_t ncurves)
+int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+ int *groups, size_t ngroups)
{
- unsigned char *clist, *p;
+ unsigned char *glist, *p;
size_t i;
/*
- * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
+ * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
* ids < 32
*/
unsigned long dup_list = 0;
- clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
- if (clist == NULL)
+ glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
+ if (glist == NULL)
return 0;
- for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
+ for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
unsigned long idmask;
int id;
- id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
+ id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
idmask = 1L << id;
if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
- OPENSSL_free(clist);
+ OPENSSL_free(glist);
return 0;
}
dup_list |= idmask;
s2n(id, p);
}
OPENSSL_free(*pext);
- *pext = clist;
- *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
+ *pext = glist;
+ *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
return 1;
}
return 1;
}
-/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
-int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
- const char *str)
+/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
+int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
{
nid_cb_st ncb;
ncb.nidcnt = 0;
return 0;
if (pext == NULL)
return 1;
- return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
+ return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
}
/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
return 1;
}
-static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
- size_t *num_formats)
+void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+ size_t *num_formats)
{
/*
* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
return 1;
}
/* Need a shared curve */
- if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
+ if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
return 1;
return 0;
}
*/
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
+# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
#else
# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
+# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
#else
# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
+# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)/* */
#else
# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
#endif
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
#endif
};
}
/* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
- EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
- (void *)sig)) {
+ EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd), (void *)sig)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
return 1;
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
- || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
+ || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
return 1;
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
- || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
+ || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
return 1;
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
}
-static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
+int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
{
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 0;
return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
}
-static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
+static int compare_uint(const void *p1, const void *p2)
+{
unsigned int u1 = *((const unsigned int *)p1);
unsigned int u2 = *((const unsigned int *)p2);
if (u1 < u2)
* contain duplicates, could not be successfully parsed, or an internal error
* occurred.
*/
-static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet) {
+static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const PACKET *packet)
+{
PACKET extensions = *packet;
size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
unsigned int *extension_types = NULL;
return ret;
}
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned char *limit, int *al)
+int ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int *al)
{
- int extdatalen = 0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
+ const unsigned char *pcurves = NULL;
+ size_t num_curves = 0;
int using_ecc = 0;
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ int min_version, max_version, reason;
+
+ /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
+ if ((s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->version <= TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
int i;
unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+ || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
using_ecc = 1;
break;
}
}
}
+#else
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen! */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
#endif
- ret += 2;
-
- if (ret >= limit)
- return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
/* Add RI if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate) {
- int el;
-
- if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
-
- ret += el;
}
/* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
/* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- unsigned long size_str;
- long lenmax;
-
- /*-
- * check for enough space.
- * 4 for the servername type and extension length
- * 2 for servernamelist length
- * 1 for the hostname type
- * 2 for hostname length
- * + hostname length
- */
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
- || (size_str =
- strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
- return NULL;
-
- /* extension type and length */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
- s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
-
- /* length of servername list */
- s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
-
- /* hostname type, length and hostname */
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- s2n(size_str, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
- ret += size_str;
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->tlsext_hostname,
+ strlen(s->tlsext_hostname))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
/* Add SRP username if there is one */
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
- * Client Hello message */
-
- int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
+ /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+ /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
+ || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
+ strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
-
- /*-
- * check for enough space.
- * 4 for the srp type type and extension length
- * 1 for the srp user identity
- * + srp user identity length
- */
- if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- /* fill in the extension */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
- s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
- (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
- memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
- ret += login_len;
}
#endif
/*
* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
*/
- long lenmax;
- const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
- size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
+ const unsigned char *pformats, *pcurvestmp;
+ size_t num_formats;
size_t i;
- unsigned char *etmp;
tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
- return NULL;
- if (num_formats > 255) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
+ /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
- /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
- s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
- memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
- ret += num_formats;
-
/*
- * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
+ * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
*/
- pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
- return NULL;
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
- return NULL;
- if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */
+ pcurves = s->tlsext_supportedgroupslist;
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
+ pcurvestmp = pcurves;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
- etmp = ret + 4;
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
+ /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
/* Copy curve ID if supported */
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
- *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
- *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[0])
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, pcurvestmp[1])) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
}
-
- curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
-
- s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
- s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
- ret += curves_list_len;
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- int ticklen;
+ size_t ticklen;
if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
- if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
- return NULL;
+ if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
goto skip_ext;
- /*
- * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
- * ticket
- */
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
- s2n(ticklen, ret);
- if (ticklen) {
- memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
- ret += ticklen;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->tlsext_tick,
+ ticklen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
}
skip_ext:
if (SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
size_t salglen;
const unsigned char *salg;
- unsigned char *etmp;
+
salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
- etmp = ret;
- /* Skip over lengths for now */
- ret += 4;
- salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
- /* Fill in lengths */
- s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
- s2n(salglen, etmp);
- ret += salglen;
- }
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
+ /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
int i;
- long extlen, idlen, itmp;
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
- idlen = 0;
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
+ /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+ /* Sub-packet for the ids */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
+ unsigned char *idbytes;
+ int idlen;
+ OCSP_RESPID *id;
+
id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
- if (itmp <= 0)
- return NULL;
- idlen += itmp + 2;
+ idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+ if (idlen <= 0
+ /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
+ || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
-
if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
- extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
- if (extlen < 0)
- return NULL;
- } else
- extlen = 0;
+ unsigned char *extbytes;
+ int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
- *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
- s2n(idlen, ret);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
- /* save position of id len */
- unsigned char *q = ret;
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- /* skip over id len */
- ret += 2;
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
- /* write id len */
- s2n(itmp, q);
+ if (extlen < 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
+ || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &extbytes)
+ != extlen) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
- s2n(extlen, ret);
- if (extlen > 0)
- i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* Add Heartbeat extension */
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
- s2n(1, ret);
- /*-
- * Set mode:
- * 1: peer may send requests
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
- */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- else
- *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
}
#endif
* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
* for Next Protocol Negotiation
*/
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
#endif
* (see longer comment below)
*/
if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
- s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
- s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
- ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
+ /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
+ s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
s->s3->alpn_sent = 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
- int el;
-
- /* Returns 0 on success!! */
- if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s);
+ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
+ int i, ct;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ ct = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
+ for (i = 0; i < ct; i++) {
+ prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
+ if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ /* Add an empty use_mki value */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
- ret += el;
}
#endif
custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
/* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
- if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
- if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-#endif
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
-
- /*
- * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
- * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
- * appear last.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
- int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
- hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
- if (hlen >= 4)
- hlen -= 4;
- else
- hlen = 0;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
- s2n(hlen, ret);
- memset(ret, 0, hlen);
- ret += hlen;
- }
- }
-
- done:
-
- if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
- return orig;
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
-}
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned char *limit, int *al)
-{
- int extdatalen = 0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- int next_proto_neg_seen;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-#endif
-
- ret += 2;
- if (ret >= limit)
- return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
- int el;
-
- if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
- }
-
- /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
- goto done;
-
- if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
- && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (using_ecc) {
- const unsigned char *plist;
- size_t plistlen;
- /*
- * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
- */
- long lenmax;
-
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
- return NULL;
- if (plistlen > 255) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
- s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
- memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
- ret += plistlen;
-
- }
- /*
- * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
- * extension
- */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- } else {
- /* if we don't add the above TLSEXT, we can't add a session ticket later */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
- int el;
-
- /* Returns 0 on success!! */
- if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
- const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
- 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
- 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
- 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
- 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
- 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
- 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
- };
- if (limit - ret < 36)
- return NULL;
- memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
- ret += 36;
-
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
- s2n(1, ret);
- /*-
- * Set mode:
- * 1: peer may send requests
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
- */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- else
- *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
- const unsigned char *npa;
- unsigned int npalen;
- int r;
-
- r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
- s->
- ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
- s2n(npalen, ret);
- memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
- ret += npalen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
- return NULL;
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
- /*
- * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
- * for other cases too.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
- else {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
- }
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
- const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
- unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
- s2n(3 + len, ret);
- s2n(1 + len, ret);
- *ret++ = len;
- memcpy(ret, selected, len);
- ret += len;
- }
-
- done:
-
- if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
- return orig;
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Save the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
- * pkt: the contents of the ALPN extension, not including type and length.
- * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
- * returns: 1 on success, 0 on error.
- */
-static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
- PACKET protocol_list, save_protocol_list, protocol;
-
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &protocol_list)
- || PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) < 2) {
+ if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, pkt, al)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- save_protocol_list = protocol_list;
- do {
- /* Protocol names can't be empty. */
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&protocol_list, &protocol)
- || PACKET_remaining(&protocol) == 0) {
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
- } while (PACKET_remaining(&protocol_list) != 0);
-
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&save_protocol_list,
- &s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- &s->s3->alpn_proposed_len)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
}
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Process the ALPN extension in a ClientHello.
- * ret: a pointer to the TLSEXT return value: SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_*
- * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a failure.
- * returns 1 on success, 0
- */
-static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(SSL *s, int *ret, int *al)
-{
- const unsigned char *selected = NULL;
- unsigned char selected_len = 0;
-
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL && s->s3->alpn_proposed != NULL) {
- int r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed,
- s->s3->alpn_proposed_len,
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
-
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
- } else {
- *al = SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL;
- *ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+ if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/*-
- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
- * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |pkt|.
- * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
- * SNI,
- * elliptic_curves
- * ec_point_formats
- *
- * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
- * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
- * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
- * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
- */
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
-{
- unsigned int type;
- PACKET sni, tmppkt;
- size_t ext_len;
-
- static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
- 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
- 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
- 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
- 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
-
- 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
- 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
- 0x01, /* 1 point format */
- 0x00, /* uncompressed */
- /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
- 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
- 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
- 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
- 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
- 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
- };
-
- /* Length of the common prefix (first two extensions). */
- static const size_t kSafariCommonExtensionsLength = 18;
-
- tmppkt = *pkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&tmppkt, &sni)) {
- return;
- }
-
- if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- return;
-
- ext_len = TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION ?
- sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock) : kSafariCommonExtensionsLength;
-
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = PACKET_equal(&tmppkt, kSafariExtensionsBlock,
- ext_len);
-}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-/*
- * Parse ClientHello extensions and stash extension info in various parts of
- * the SSL object. Verify that there are no duplicate extensions.
- *
- * Behaviour upon resumption is extension-specific. If the extension has no
- * effect during resumption, it is parsed (to verify its format) but otherwise
- * ignored.
- *
- * Consumes the entire packet in |pkt|. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
- * Upon failure, sets |al| to the appropriate alert.
- */
-static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
- unsigned int type;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- PACKET extensions;
-
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- s->servername_done = 0;
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0;
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed);
- s->s3->alpn_proposed = NULL;
- s->s3->alpn_proposed_len = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
- s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
-#endif
-
- s->srtp_profile = NULL;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions))
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
+ }
- if (!tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
+ reason = ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
+ if (reason != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, reason);
return 0;
+ }
- /*
- * We parse all extensions to ensure the ClientHello is well-formed but,
- * unless an extension specifies otherwise, we ignore extensions upon
- * resumption.
- */
- while (PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type)) {
- PACKET extension;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension))
- return 0;
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
- PACKET_remaining(&extension),
- s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, al))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- }
-/*-
- * The servername extension is treated as follows:
- *
- * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
- * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- * the value of the Host: field.
- * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
- * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
- * extension.
- * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
- *
- */
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- unsigned int servname_type;
- PACKET sni, hostname;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &sni)
- /* ServerNameList must be at least 1 byte long. */
- || PACKET_remaining(&sni) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Although the server_name extension was intended to be
- * extensible to new name types, RFC 4366 defined the
- * syntax inextensibility and OpenSSL 1.0.x parses it as
- * such.
- * RFC 6066 corrected the mistake but adding new name types
- * is nevertheless no longer feasible, so act as if no other
- * SNI types can exist, to simplify parsing.
- *
- * Also note that the RFC permits only one SNI value per type,
- * i.e., we can only have a single hostname.
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&sni, &servname_type)
- || servname_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name
- || !PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&sni, &hostname)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (PACKET_remaining(&hostname) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&hostname)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!PACKET_strndup(&hostname, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- s->servername_done = 1;
- } else {
- /*
- * TODO(openssl-team): if the SNI doesn't match, we MUST
- * fall back to a full handshake.
- */
- s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
- && PACKET_equal(&hostname, s->session->tlsext_hostname,
- strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname));
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
- PACKET srp_I;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension, &srp_I))
- return 0;
-
- if (PACKET_contains_zero_byte(&srp_I))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * TODO(openssl-team): currently, we re-authenticate the user
- * upon resumption. Instead, we MUST ignore the login.
- */
- if (!PACKET_strndup(&srp_I, &s->srp_ctx.login)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- PACKET ec_point_format_list;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&extension,
- &ec_point_format_list)
- || PACKET_remaining(&ec_point_format_list) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
+ /* TLS1.3 specific extensions */
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && max_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ int currv;
+ size_t i, sharessent = 0;
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&ec_point_format_list,
- &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- &s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
- PACKET elliptic_curve_list;
-
- /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1. */
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension,
- &elliptic_curve_list)
- || PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0
- || (PACKET_remaining(&elliptic_curve_list) % 2) != 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (!PACKET_memdup(&elliptic_curve_list,
- &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
- &s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Should we add this extension for versions < TLS1.3? */
+ /* supported_versions extension */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, PACKET_data(&extension),
- PACKET_remaining(&extension),
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
- PACKET supported_sig_algs;
-
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &supported_sig_algs)
- || (PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) % 2) != 0
- || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (!tls1_save_sigalgs(s, PACKET_data(&supported_sig_algs),
- PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs))) {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension,
- (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type)) {
- return 0;
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- const unsigned char *ext_data;
- PACKET responder_id_list, exts;
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &responder_id_list))
- return 0;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&responder_id_list) > 0) {
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
- PACKET responder_id;
- const unsigned char *id_data;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&responder_id_list,
- &responder_id)
- || PACKET_remaining(&responder_id) == 0) {
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids == NULL
- && (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()) == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- id_data = PACKET_data(&responder_id);
- id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &id_data,
- PACKET_remaining(&responder_id));
- if (id == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (id_data != PACKET_end(&responder_id)) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* Read in request_extensions */
- if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&extension, &exts))
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to wheter
+ * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
+ * reviewed later.
+ */
+ for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
+ if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(&exts) > 0) {
- ext_data = PACKET_data(&exts);
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
- X509_EXTENSION_free);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
- d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &ext_data,
- PACKET_remaining(&exts));
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts == NULL
- || ext_data != PACKET_end(&exts)) {
- return 0;
- }
}
- } else
-#endif
- {
- /*
- * We don't know what to do with any other type so ignore it.
- */
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- }
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
- unsigned int hbtype;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&extension, &hbtype)
- || PACKET_remaining(&extension)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- switch (hbtype) {
- case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- break;
- case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- break;
- default:
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
}
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- /*-
- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
- * renegotiation.
- *
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotiation too in certain cases (when
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
- * anything like that, but this might change).
- *
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
- * Finished message could have been computed.)
- */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, al))
- return 0;
- }
- /* session ticket processed earlier */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
- && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, al))
- return 0;
+ /* key_share extension */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
+ /* Extension data sub-packet */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
- /*
- * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
- * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
- */
/*
- * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
- * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
- * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
- * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
- * ServerHello may be later returned.
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For
+ * now, just send one
*/
- else if (!s->hit) {
- if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, PACKET_data(&extension),
- PACKET_remaining(&extension), al) <= 0)
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves && sharessent < 1; i++, pcurves += 2) {
+ unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
+ unsigned int curve_id = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
+ size_t encodedlen;
+
+ if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
+ continue;
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) {
+ /* Shouldn't happen! */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
- }
- }
+ }
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- /* tls1_check_duplicate_extensions should ensure this never happens. */
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* Generate a key for this key_share */
+ curve_id = (pcurves[0] << 8) | pcurves[1];
+ key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_curve(curve_id);
+ if (key_share_key == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
- ri_check:
+ /* Encode the public key. */
+ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key,
+ &encodedPoint);
+ if (encodedlen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+ /* Create KeyShareEntry */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encodedPoint, encodedlen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're
+ * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now
+ * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey
+ */
+ s->s3->group_id = curve_id;
+ s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
+ sharessent++;
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
}
/*
- * This function currently has no state to clean up, so it returns directly.
- * If parsing fails at any point, the function returns early.
- * The SSL object may be left with partial data from extensions, but it must
- * then no longer be used, and clearing it up will free the leftovers.
+ * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
+ * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
+ * appear last.
*/
- return 1;
-}
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
+ unsigned char *padbytes;
+ size_t hlen;
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- int al = -1;
- custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
- if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
- }
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
+ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
+ hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+ if (hlen >= 4)
+ hlen -= 4;
+ else
+ hlen = 0;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
+ }
}
+
+ done:
return 1;
}
while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
- || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0)
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
-#endif
s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
PACKET spkt;
if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
- || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
+ || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
goto ri_check;
if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
- || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
+ || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
return 0;
}
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
/*
* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
* request message.
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- if (s->
- ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
- size,
- s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
+ size,
+ s->
+ ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
+ /*
+ * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
+ * a single Serverhello
+ */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
*al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
* uint8 proto[proto_length];
*/
if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
- || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
+ || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
- unsigned int hbtype;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- switch (hbtype) {
- case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- break;
- case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- break;
- default:
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
#endif
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
/* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) &&
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
&& s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
+ (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) {
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
if (!s->hit)
s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
- }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share
+ && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ unsigned int group_id;
+ PACKET encoded_pt;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (ckey == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &group_id)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) {
+ /*
+ * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
+ * key_share!
+ */
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(&spkt, &encoded_pt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ skey = ssl_generate_pkey(ckey);
+ if (skey == NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
/*
* If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
* custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
*/
- else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
+ } else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
return 0;
}
if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname =
+ OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
*al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
return 0;
* an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
* because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
* However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
- * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
- * initial connect only.
+ * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence
*/
if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
&& !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
return 0;
- }
+ }
}
return 1;
return 1;
}
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
- * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
- /*
- * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
- * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
-#endif
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
/* Initialise digests to default values */
void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
{
/* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
- SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+ SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto err;
}
return 0;
}
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
- int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
- /*
- * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
- * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
- * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
- * influence which certificate is sent
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int r;
- CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
- certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (certpkey == NULL) {
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
- * et al can pick it up.
- */
- s->cert->key = certpkey;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- switch (r) {
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* status request response should be sent */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* something bad happened */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
- if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello_late(s, &ret, &al)) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- err:
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
{
int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
}
}
ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
ret =
*/
OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
+ s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = 0;
switch (ret) {
case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
return 1;
}
-/*-
- * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
- * need to be handled at the same time.
+/*
+ * Given a list of extensions that we collected earlier, find one of a given
+ * type and return it.
+ *
+ * |exts| is the set of extensions previously collected.
+ * |numexts| is the number of extensions that we have.
+ * |type| the type of the extension that we are looking for.
*
- * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
- * secret.
+ * Returns a pointer to the found RAW_EXTENSION data, or NULL if not found.
+ */
+RAW_EXTENSION *tls_get_extension_by_type(RAW_EXTENSION *exts, size_t numexts,
+ unsigned int type)
+{
+ size_t loop;
+
+ for (loop = 0; loop < numexts; loop++) {
+ if (exts[loop].type == type)
+ return &exts[loop];
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
*
- * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
- * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
+ * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
* ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
*
* a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
* s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
* Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
- *
- * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
- *
*/
-int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
- const PACKET *session_id,
- SSL_SESSION **ret)
+int tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
+ SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
- unsigned int i;
- PACKET local_ext = *ext;
- int retv = -1;
-
- int have_ticket = 0;
- int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
+ int retv;
+ const unsigned char *etick;
+ size_t size;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
*ret = NULL;
s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
/*
- * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
+ * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
+ * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
* resumption.
*/
- if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
+ if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
return 0;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
- retv = 0;
- goto end;
+ ticketext = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
+ hello->num_extensions,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket);
+ if (ticketext == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ticketext->parsed = 1;
+
+ size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
+ if (size == 0) {
+ /*
+ * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
+ * one.
+ */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
+ /*
+ * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
+ * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
+ * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
+ * calculate the master secret later.
+ */
+ return 2;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ticketext->data, &etick, size)) {
+ /* Shouldn't ever happen */
+ return -1;
}
- while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
- unsigned int type, size;
+ retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, hello->session_id,
+ hello->session_id_len, ret);
+ switch (retv) {
+ case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 2;
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
- retv = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
- int r;
- const unsigned char *etick;
+ case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
+ return 3;
- /* Duplicate extension */
- if (have_ticket != 0) {
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- have_ticket = 1;
+ case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 3;
- if (size == 0) {
- /*
- * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
- * one.
- */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- retv = 1;
- continue;
- }
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
- /*
- * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
- * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
- * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
- * calculate the master secret later.
- */
- retv = 2;
- continue;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
- PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
- switch (r) {
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- retv = 2;
- break;
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
- retv = r;
- break;
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- retv = 3;
- break;
- default: /* fatal error */
- retv = -1;
- break;
- }
- continue;
- } else {
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
- if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- }
+ default: /* fatal error */
+ return -1;
}
- if (have_ticket == 0)
- retv = 0;
-end:
- return retv;
}
/*-
* 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
*/
static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
- int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
- int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
+ size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
+ size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1;
+ int slen, renew_ticket = 0, ret = -1, declen;
+ size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
- if (eticklen < 48)
- return 2;
+
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
- etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
+ etick + sizeof(tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name)) <=
+ 0) {
goto err;
- }
+ }
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
- if (mlen < 0) {
+ if (mlen == 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
+ if (eticklen <=
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
+ ret = 2;
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
- || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (sdec == NULL
- || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
+ if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
+ (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return -1;
}
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return 2;
}
- slen += mlen;
+ slen += declen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
p = sdec;
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return 2;
-err:
+ err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
return ret;
return NID_undef;
}
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
- const EVP_MD *md)
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(WPACKET *pkt, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
{
int sig_id, md_id;
- if (!md)
+
+ if (md == NULL)
return 0;
md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
if (md_id == -1)
sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
if (sig_id == -1)
return 0;
- p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
- p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, md_id) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, sig_id))
+ return 0;
+
return 1;
}
{NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
{NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
{NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
+ {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
+ TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
};
static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
if (hash_alg == 0)
return NULL;
- for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
- {
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++) {
if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
return tls12_md_info + i;
}
case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
-# endif
+#endif
}
return -1;
}
}
if (psignhash_nid) {
if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
- || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
- sign_nid) <= 0)
+ || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid) <= 0)
*psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
}
}
*pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
}
-size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
+int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
{
- unsigned char *tmpout = out;
size_t i;
+
for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
- *tmpout++ = psig[0];
- *tmpout++ = psig[1];
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[0])
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, psig[1]))
+ return 0;
}
}
- return tmpout - out;
+ return 1;
}
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
-static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
- const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
- const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
+static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
+ const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
+ const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
{
const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, size_t dsize)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
#endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] =
+ EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
-# endif
+ pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] =
+ EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
+#endif
}
return 1;
}
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
- if (psig == NULL)
+ size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+ if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
return 0;
if (idx >= 0) {
idx <<= 1;
*rsig = psig[1];
tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
}
- return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+ return (int)numsigalgs;
}
int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
- if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
+ if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
+ || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
return 0;
shsigalgs += idx;
if (phash)
*rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
if (rhash)
*rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
- return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
+ return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
}
#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
}
/*
- * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
+ * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
*/
int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
}
-int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
- int client)
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
{
unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
int rhash, rsign;
/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
if (idx == -2) {
cpk = c->key;
- idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+ idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
} else
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
}
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
{