-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- * must display the following acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-/* ====================================================================
- * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- *
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- *
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
- * software must display the following acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
- * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
- * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
- * openssl-core@openssl.org.
- *
- * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
- * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
- * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
- *
- * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
- * acknowledgment:
- * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
- * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
- * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
- * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
- * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
- * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
- * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
- * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- * ====================================================================
- *
- * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
- * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
- * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-# include <openssl/dh.h>
-# include <openssl/bn.h>
-#endif
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess);
-static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s);
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
+#include <openssl/ct.h>
SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_enc_data = {
tls1_enc,
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
0,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
tls1_generate_master_secret,
tls1_change_cipher_state,
tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
tls1_alert_code,
tls1_export_keying_material,
SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
+ ssl3_handshake_write
+};
+
+SSL3_ENC_METHOD const TLSv1_3_enc_data = {
+ tls13_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls13_setup_key_block,
+ tls13_generate_master_secret,
+ tls13_change_cipher_state,
+ tls13_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls13_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS | SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ tls_close_construct_packet,
ssl3_handshake_write
};
void tls1_free(SSL *s)
{
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.session_ticket);
ssl3_free(s);
}
unsigned int flags; /* Flags: currently just field type */
} tls_curve_info;
-# define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1
-# define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0
-
+/*
+ * Table of curve information.
+ * Do not delete entries or reorder this array! It is used as a lookup
+ * table: the index of each entry is one less than the TLS curve id.
+ */
static const tls_curve_info nid_list[] = {
{NID_sect163k1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163k1 (1) */
{NID_sect163r1, 80, TLS_CURVE_CHAR2}, /* sect163r1 (2) */
{NID_brainpoolP256r1, 128, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
{NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
{NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+ {NID_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
};
static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
/* The default curves */
static const unsigned char eccurves_default[] = {
- /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
- 0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
- 0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- 0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
- 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
-};
-
-static const unsigned char eccurves_all[] = {
- /* Prefer P-256 which has the fastest and most secure implementations. */
+ 0, 29, /* X25519 (29) */
0, 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- /* Other >= 256-bit prime curves. */
0, 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- 0, 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- 0, 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
0, 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- 0, 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- 0, 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- /* >= 256-bit binary curves. */
- 0, 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- 0, 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- 0, 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- 0, 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- 0, 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- 0, 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- /*
- * Remaining curves disabled by default but still permitted if set
- * via an explicit callback or parameters.
- */
- 0, 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- 0, 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- 0, 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- 0, 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- 0, 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- 0, 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- 0, 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- 0, 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- 0, 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- 0, 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- 0, 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- 0, 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- 0, 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- 0, 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- 0, 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
};
-
static const unsigned char suiteb_curves[] = {
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_256,
0, TLSEXT_curve_P_384
};
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id, unsigned int *pflags)
{
+ const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
/* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > OSSL_NELEM(nid_list)))
return 0;
- return nid_list[curve_id - 1].nid;
+ cinfo = nid_list + curve_id - 1;
+ if (pflags)
+ *pflags = cinfo->flags;
+ return cinfo->nid;
}
int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
{
- /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 and RFC 7027 */
- switch (nid) {
- case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
- return 1;
- case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
- return 2;
- case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
- return 3;
- case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
- return 4;
- case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
- return 5;
- case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
- return 6;
- case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
- return 7;
- case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
- return 8;
- case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
- return 9;
- case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
- return 10;
- case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
- return 11;
- case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
- return 12;
- case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
- return 13;
- case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
- return 14;
- case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
- return 15;
- case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
- return 16;
- case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
- return 17;
- case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
- return 18;
- case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
- return 19;
- case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
- return 20;
- case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
- return 21;
- case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
- return 22;
- case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
- return 23;
- case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
- return 24;
- case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
- return 25;
- case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- return 26;
- case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- return 27;
- case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- return 28;
- default:
- return 0;
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nid_list); i++) {
+ if (nid_list[i].nid == nid)
+ return (int)(i + 1);
}
+ return 0;
}
/*
* parsed form instead. (However, this would affect binary compatibility
* so cannot happen in the 1.0.x series.)
*/
-static int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess,
- const unsigned char **pcurves,
- size_t *num_curves)
+int tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int sess, const unsigned char **pcurves,
+ size_t *num_curves)
{
size_t pcurveslen = 0;
+
if (sess) {
- *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ *pcurves = s->session->ext.supportedgroups;
+ pcurveslen = s->session->ext.supportedgroups_len;
} else {
/* For Suite B mode only include P-256, P-384 */
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
pcurveslen = 2;
break;
default:
- *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ *pcurves = s->ext.supportedgroups;
+ pcurveslen = s->ext.supportedgroups_len;
}
if (!*pcurves) {
*pcurves = eccurves_default;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_GET_CURVELIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*num_curves = 0;
return 0;
- } else {
- *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
- return 1;
}
+ *num_curves = pcurveslen / 2;
+ return 1;
}
/* See if curve is allowed by security callback */
-static int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
+int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, const unsigned char *curve, int op)
{
const tls_curve_info *cinfo;
if (curve[0])
}
/*-
- * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared curve or NID_undef
+ * For nmatch >= 0, return the NID of the |nmatch|th shared group or NID_undef
* if there is no match.
* For nmatch == -1, return number of matches
- * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the curve to use for
+ * For nmatch == -2, return the NID of the group to use for
* an EC tmp key, or NID_undef if there is no match.
*/
-int tls1_shared_curve(SSL *s, int nmatch)
+int tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch)
{
const unsigned char *pref, *supp;
size_t num_pref, num_supp, i, j;
int k;
+
/* Can't do anything on client side */
if (s->server == 0)
return -1;
* these are acceptable due to previous checks.
*/
unsigned long cid = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id;
+
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; /* P-256 */
if (cid == TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384)
* Avoid truncation. tls1_get_curvelist takes an int
* but s->options is a long...
*/
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist
- (s, (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0, &supp,
- &num_supp))
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0,
+ &supp, &num_supp))
/* In practice, NID_undef == 0 but let's be precise. */
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist
- (s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
- &num_pref))
+ if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s,
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0,
+ &pref, &num_pref))
return nmatch == -1 ? 0 : NID_undef;
- /*
- * If the client didn't send the elliptic_curves extension all of them
- * are allowed.
- */
- if (num_supp == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) != 0) {
- supp = eccurves_all;
- num_supp = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
- } else if (num_pref == 0 &&
- (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) == 0) {
- pref = eccurves_all;
- num_pref = sizeof(eccurves_all) / 2;
- }
-
- k = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
+ for (k = 0, i = 0; i < num_pref; i++, pref += 2) {
const unsigned char *tsupp = supp;
+
for (j = 0; j < num_supp; j++, tsupp += 2) {
if (pref[0] == tsupp[0] && pref[1] == tsupp[1]) {
if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pref, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED))
continue;
if (nmatch == k) {
int id = (pref[0] << 8) | pref[1];
- return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id);
+
+ return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(id, NULL);
}
k++;
}
return NID_undef;
}
-int tls1_set_curves(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
- int *curves, size_t ncurves)
+int tls1_set_groups(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
+ int *groups, size_t ngroups)
{
- unsigned char *clist, *p;
+ unsigned char *glist, *p;
size_t i;
/*
- * Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works while curve
+ * Bitmap of groups included to detect duplicates: only works while group
* ids < 32
*/
unsigned long dup_list = 0;
- clist = OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * 2);
- if (clist == NULL)
+ glist = OPENSSL_malloc(ngroups * 2);
+ if (glist == NULL)
return 0;
- for (i = 0, p = clist; i < ncurves; i++) {
+ for (i = 0, p = glist; i < ngroups; i++) {
unsigned long idmask;
int id;
- id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */
+ id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(groups[i]);
idmask = 1L << id;
if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
- OPENSSL_free(clist);
+ OPENSSL_free(glist);
return 0;
}
dup_list |= idmask;
s2n(id, p);
}
OPENSSL_free(*pext);
- *pext = clist;
- *pextlen = ncurves * 2;
+ *pext = glist;
+ *pextlen = ngroups * 2;
return 1;
}
return 1;
}
-/* Set curves based on a colon separate list */
-int tls1_set_curves_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen,
- const char *str)
+/* Set groups based on a colon separate list */
+int tls1_set_groups_list(unsigned char **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str)
{
nid_cb_st ncb;
ncb.nidcnt = 0;
return 0;
if (pext == NULL)
return 1;
- return tls1_set_curves(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
+ return tls1_set_groups(pext, pextlen, ncb.nid_arr, ncb.nidcnt);
}
/* For an EC key set TLS id and required compression based on parameters */
static int tls1_set_ec_id(unsigned char *curve_id, unsigned char *comp_id,
EC_KEY *ec)
{
- int is_prime, id;
+ int id;
const EC_GROUP *grp;
- const EC_METHOD *meth;
if (!ec)
return 0;
/* Determine if it is a prime field */
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
if (!grp)
return 0;
- meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp);
- if (!meth)
- return 0;
- if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
- is_prime = 1;
- else
- is_prime = 0;
/* Determine curve ID */
id = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(id);
- /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve */
- if (id) {
- curve_id[0] = 0;
- curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
- } else {
- curve_id[0] = 0xff;
- if (is_prime)
- curve_id[1] = 0x01;
- else
- curve_id[1] = 0x02;
- }
+ /* If no id return error: we don't support arbitrary explicit curves */
+ if (id == 0)
+ return 0;
+ curve_id[0] = 0;
+ curve_id[1] = (unsigned char)id;
if (comp_id) {
if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
return 0;
- if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
- if (is_prime)
+ if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+ *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ } else {
+ if ((nid_list[id - 1].flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_PRIME)
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
else
*comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
- } else
- *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ }
}
return 1;
}
* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
* supported (see RFC4492).
*/
- if (comp_id && s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
- pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- num_formats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ if (comp_id && s->session->ext.ecpointformats) {
+ pformats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats;
+ num_formats = s->session->ext.ecpointformats_len;
for (i = 0; i < num_formats; i++, pformats++) {
if (*comp_id == *pformats)
break;
return 1;
}
-static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
- size_t *num_formats)
+void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
+ size_t *num_formats)
{
/*
* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default
*/
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
- *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- *num_formats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ if (s->ext.ecpointformats) {
+ *pformats = s->ext.ecpointformats;
+ *num_formats = s->ext.ecpointformats_len;
} else {
*pformats = ecformats_default;
/* For Suite B we don't support char2 fields */
* Check cert parameters compatible with extensions: currently just checks EC
* certificates have compatible curves and compression.
*/
-static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int set_ee_md)
+static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
{
unsigned char comp_id, curve_id[2];
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
return 0;
/*
* Special case for suite B. We *MUST* sign using SHA256+P-256 or
- * SHA384+P-384, adjust digest if necessary.
+ * SHA384+P-384.
*/
- if (set_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ if (check_ee_md && tls1_suiteb(s)) {
int check_md;
size_t i;
CERT *c = s->cert;
else
return 0; /* Should never happen */
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
- if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+ if (check_md == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
break;
if (i == c->shared_sigalgslen)
return 0;
- if (set_ee_md == 2) {
- if (check_md == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
- s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha256();
- else
- s->s3->tmp.md[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha384();
- }
}
return rv;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
/*
- * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatiblity
+ * tls1_check_ec_tmp_key - Check EC temporary key compatibility
* @s: SSL connection
* @cid: Cipher ID we're considering using
*
*/
int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long cid)
{
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- /* Allow any curve: not just those peer supports */
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL)
- return 1;
-# endif
/*
* If Suite B, AES128 MUST use P-256 and AES256 MUST use P-384, no other
* curves permitted.
return 1;
}
/* Need a shared curve */
- if (tls1_shared_curve(s, 0))
+ if (tls1_shared_group(s, 0))
return 1;
return 0;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-/*
- * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
- * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
- */
+/* Default sigalg schemes */
+static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
+#endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
-#else
-# define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
+
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
#endif
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
-#else
-# define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512
#endif
+};
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
-#else
-# define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+static const uint16_t suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
+};
#endif
-#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
-
-static const unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_X9_62_prime256v1},
+ {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_secp384r1},
+ {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_secp521r1},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1,
+ NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
+ NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_undef},
+#endif
+ {"rsa_pss_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pss_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pss_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1,
+ NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_undef},
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256,
+ NID_sha256, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
+ NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384,
+ NID_sha384, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512,
+ NID_sha512, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1,
+ NID_sha1, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, EVP_PKEY_DSA, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN,
+ NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_undef},
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256,
- TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX,
+ NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX,
+ NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef},
+ {NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411,
+ NID_id_GostR3411_94, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX,
+ NID_id_GostR3410_2001, SSL_PKEY_GOST01,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef}
#endif
};
+/* Legacy sigalgs for TLS < 1.2 RSA TLS signatures */
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP legacy_rsa_sigalg = {
+ "rsa_pkcs1_md5_sha1", 0,
+ NID_md5_sha1, SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX,
+ EVP_PKEY_RSA, SSL_PKEY_RSA,
+ NID_undef, NID_undef
+};
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-static const unsigned char suiteb_sigalgs[] = {
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+/*
+ * Default signature algorithm values used if signature algorithms not present.
+ * From RFC5246. Note: order must match certificate index order.
+ */
+static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_RSA */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1, /* SSL_PKEY_ECC */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
+ TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512 /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
};
-#endif
-size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
+
+/* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_lookup_sigalg(uint16_t sigalg)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
+
+ for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ i++, s++) {
+ if (s->sigalg == sigalg)
+ return s;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+/*
+ * Return a signature algorithm for TLS < 1.2 where the signature type
+ * is fixed by the certificate type.
+ */
+static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(const SSL *s, int idx)
+{
+ if (idx < 0 || idx >= (int)OSSL_NELEM(tls_default_sigalg))
+ return NULL;
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || idx != SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(tls_default_sigalg[idx]);
+
+ if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return lu;
+ }
+ return &legacy_rsa_sigalg;
+}
+/* Set peer sigalg based key type */
+int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+ int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey);
+
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx);
+ if (lu == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls_sigalg_get_sig(uint16_t sigalg)
+{
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *r = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sigalg);
+
+ return r != NULL ? r->sig : 0;
+}
+
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs)
{
/*
* If Suite B mode use Suite B sigalgs only, ignore any other
switch (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
- return sizeof(suiteb_sigalgs);
+ return OSSL_NELEM(suiteb_sigalgs);
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
*psigs = suiteb_sigalgs;
- return 2;
+ return 1;
case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
- *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 2;
- return 2;
+ *psigs = suiteb_sigalgs + 1;
+ return 1;
}
#endif
- /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
- if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
+ /*
+ * We use client_sigalgs (if not NULL) if we're a server
+ * and sending a certificate request or if we're a client and
+ * determining which shared algorithm to use.
+ */
+ if ((s->server == sent) && s->cert->client_sigalgs != NULL) {
*psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
} else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
} else {
*psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+ return OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sigalgs);
}
}
/*
* Check signature algorithm is consistent with sent supported signature
- * algorithms and if so return relevant digest.
+ * algorithms and if so set relevant digest and signature scheme in
+ * s.
*/
-int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **pmd, SSL *s,
- const unsigned char *sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
+ const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
+ const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+ char sigalgstr[2];
size_t sent_sigslen, i;
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+
/* Should never happen */
- if (sigalg == -1)
+ if (pkeyid == -1)
return -1;
- /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
- if (sigalg != (int)sig[1]) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* Disallow DSA for TLS 1.3 */
+ if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Only allow PSS for TLS 1.3 */
+ if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
+ }
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(sig);
+ /*
+ * Check sigalgs is known. Disallow SHA1 with TLS 1.3. Check key type is
+ * consistent with signature: RSA keys can be used for RSA-PSS
+ */
+ if (lu == NULL || (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && lu->hash == NID_sha1)
+ || (pkeyid != lu->sig
+ && (lu->sig != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS || pkeyid != EVP_PKEY_RSA))) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
- unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
- /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
- if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)))
- return 0;
- if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
- return 0;
- }
- /* If Suite B only P-384+SHA384 or P-256+SHA-256 allowed */
- if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- if (curve_id[0])
+ if (pkeyid == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
+ int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_ILLEGAL_POINT_COMPRESSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* For TLS 1.3 check curve matches signature algorithm */
+ if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ unsigned char curve_id[2], comp_id;
+
+ /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+ if (!tls1_set_ec_id(curve_id, &comp_id, ec))
+ return 0;
+ if (!s->server && !tls1_check_ec_key(s, curve_id, &comp_id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
return 0;
- if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_256) {
- if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha256) {
+ }
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ /* Check sigalg matches a permissible Suite B value */
+ if (sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
+ && sig != TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
- SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
+ SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
- } else if (curve_id[1] == TLSEXT_curve_P_384) {
- if (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha384) {
+ /*
+ * Suite B also requires P-256+SHA256 and P-384+SHA384:
+ * this matches the TLS 1.3 requirements so we can just
+ * check the curve is the expected TLS 1.3 value.
+ * If this fails an inappropriate digest is being used.
+ */
+ if (curve != lu->curve) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG,
SSL_R_ILLEGAL_SUITEB_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- } else
- return 0;
+ }
}
- } else if (tls1_suiteb(s))
+ } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
return 0;
+ }
#endif
/* Check signature matches a type we sent */
- sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
- for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
- if (sig[0] == sent_sigs[0] && sig[1] == sent_sigs[1])
+ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
+ if (sig == *sent_sigs)
break;
}
/* Allow fallback to SHA1 if not strict mode */
- if (i == sent_sigslen
- && (sig[0] != TLSEXT_hash_sha1
- || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
+ if (i == sent_sigslen && (lu->hash != NID_sha1
+ || s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
- *pmd = tls12_get_hash(sig[0]);
- if (*pmd == NULL) {
+ md = ssl_md(lu->hash_idx);
+ if (md == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
- /* Make sure security callback allows algorithm */
+ /*
+ * Make sure security callback allows algorithm. For historical reasons we
+ * have to pass the sigalg as a two byte char array.
+ */
+ sigalgstr[0] = (sig >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = sig & 0xff;
if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK,
- EVP_MD_size(*pmd) * 4, EVP_MD_type(*pmd),
- (void *)sig)) {
+ EVP_MD_size(md) * 4, EVP_MD_type(md),
+ (void *)sigalgstr)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS12_CHECK_PEER_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
return 0;
}
- /*
- * Store the digest used so applications can retrieve it if they wish.
- */
- s->s3->tmp.peer_md = *pmd;
+ /* Store the sigalg the peer uses */
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg = lu;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(const SSL *s, int *pnid)
+{
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ *pnid = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig;
return 1;
}
/*
- * Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
- * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
- * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
- * settings.
+ * Set a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
+ * supported, doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms, isn't supported
+ * by the enabled protocol versions or by the security level.
+ *
+ * This function should only be used for checking which ciphers are supported
+ * by the client.
+ *
+ * Call ssl_cipher_disabled() to check that it's enabled or not.
*/
void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
{
s->s3->tmp.mask_a = 0;
s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
- /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
- if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
- s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
- else
- s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl = 0;
- /* Disable TLS 1.0 ciphers if using SSL v3 */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
- s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl |= SSL_TLSV1;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
- /*
- * Disable static DH if we don't include any appropriate signature
- * algorithms.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aRSA)
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHr;
- if (s->s3->tmp.mask_a & SSL_aECDSA)
- s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_kECDHe;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ssl_get_client_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver, &s->s3->tmp.max_ver);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
s->s3->tmp.mask_k |= SSL_PSK;
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (!(s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP)) {
s->s3->tmp.mask_a |= SSL_aSRP;
#endif
}
+/*
+ * ssl_cipher_disabled - check that a cipher is disabled or not
+ * @s: SSL connection that you want to use the cipher on
+ * @c: cipher to check
+ * @op: Security check that you want to do
+ *
+ * Returns 1 when it's disabled, 0 when enabled.
+ */
int ssl_cipher_disabled(SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op)
{
- if (c->algorithm_ssl & s->s3->tmp.mask_ssl
- || c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
+ if (c->algorithm_mkey & s->s3->tmp.mask_k
|| c->algorithm_auth & s->s3->tmp.mask_a)
return 1;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.max_ver == 0)
+ return 1;
+ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((c->min_tls > s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
+ || (c->max_tls < s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
+ return 1;
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_GT(c->min_dtls, s->s3->tmp.max_ver)
+ || DTLS_VERSION_LT(c->max_dtls, s->s3->tmp.min_ver)))
+ return 1;
+
return !ssl_security(s, op, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c);
}
-static int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
+int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s)
{
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
return 0;
return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TICKET, 0, 0, NULL);
}
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned char *limit, int *al)
+int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
- int extdatalen = 0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
- int using_ecc = 0;
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- int i;
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
-
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
- const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
-
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
- if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
- using_ecc = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- ret += 2;
-
- if (ret >= limit)
- return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- /* Add RI if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate) {
- int el;
-
- if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
+ int al;
+ size_t i;
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
+ /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
+ s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
+ /* Clear certificate validity flags */
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
+ /*
+ * If peer sent no signature algorithms check to see if we support
+ * the default algorithm for each certificate type
+ */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL) {
+ const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
+ size_t sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, i);
+ size_t j;
- if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
+ if (lu == NULL)
+ continue;
+ /* Check default matches a type we sent */
+ for (j = 0; j < sent_sigslen; j++) {
+ if (lu->sigalg == sent_sigs[j]) {
+ s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
}
-
- ret += el;
+ return 1;
}
- /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION)
- goto done;
-
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- unsigned long size_str;
- long lenmax;
-
- /*-
- * check for enough space.
- * 4 for the servername type and entension length
- * 2 for servernamelist length
- * 1 for the hostname type
- * 2 for hostname length
- * + hostname length
- */
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
- || (size_str =
- strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
- return NULL;
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return 0;
+}
- /* extension type and length */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
- s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
+/*-
+ * Gets the ticket information supplied by the client if any.
+ *
+ * hello: The parsed ClientHello data
+ * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
+ * point to the resulting session.
+ *
+ * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
+ * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
+ * never be decrypted, nor will s->ext.ticket_expected be set to 1.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
+ * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
+ * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
+ * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
+ * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
+ * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
+ * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ * Sets s->ext.ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
+ * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
+ * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
+ * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
+ * s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
+ * Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
+ */
+TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
+ SSL_SESSION **ret)
+{
+ int retv;
+ size_t size;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *ticketext;
- /* length of servername list */
- s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
+ *ret = NULL;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 0;
- /* hostname type, length and hostname */
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- s2n(size_str, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
- ret += size_str;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* Add SRP username if there is one */
- if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the
- * Client Hello message */
+ /*
+ * If tickets disabled or not supported by the protocol version
+ * (e.g. TLSv1.3) behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
+ * resumption.
+ */
+ if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
+ return TICKET_NONE;
- int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
- if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
+ ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
+ if (!ticketext->present)
+ return TICKET_NONE;
- /*-
- * check for enough space.
- * 4 for the srp type type and entension length
- * 1 for the srp user identity
- * + srp user identity length
+ size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
+ if (size == 0) {
+ /*
+ * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
+ * one.
*/
- if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- /* fill in the extension */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret);
- s2n(login_len + 1, ret);
- (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len;
- memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
- ret += login_len;
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+ return TICKET_EMPTY;
}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (using_ecc) {
+ if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
/*
- * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message
+ * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
+ * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
+ * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
+ * calculate the master secret later.
*/
- long lenmax;
- const unsigned char *pcurves, *pformats;
- size_t num_curves, num_formats, curves_list_len;
- size_t i;
- unsigned char *etmp;
-
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (num_formats > (size_t)lenmax)
- return NULL;
- if (num_formats > 255) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
- /* The point format list has 1-byte length. */
- s2n(num_formats + 1, ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)num_formats;
- memcpy(ret, pformats, num_formats);
- ret += num_formats;
-
- /*
- * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message
- */
- pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves))
- return NULL;
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (num_curves > (size_t)lenmax / 2)
- return NULL;
- if (num_curves > 65532 / 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
- etmp = ret + 4;
- /* Copy curve ID if supported */
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++, pcurves += 2) {
- if (tls_curve_allowed(s, pcurves, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
- *etmp++ = pcurves[0];
- *etmp++ = pcurves[1];
- }
- }
-
- curves_list_len = etmp - ret - 4;
-
- s2n(curves_list_len + 2, ret);
- s2n(curves_list_len, ret);
- ret += curves_list_len;
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- int ticklen;
- if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
- ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
- else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
- ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
- s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
- if (s->session->tlsext_tick == NULL)
- return NULL;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
- s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
- } else
- ticklen = 0;
- if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
- s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
- goto skip_ext;
- /*
- * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
- * ticket
- */
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
- s2n(ticklen, ret);
- if (ticklen) {
- memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
- ret += ticklen;
- }
- }
- skip_ext:
-
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- size_t salglen;
- const unsigned char *salg;
- unsigned char *etmp;
- salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
- etmp = ret;
- /* Skip over lengths for now */
- ret += 4;
- salglen = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, ret, salg, salglen);
- /* Fill in lengths */
- s2n(salglen + 2, etmp);
- s2n(salglen, etmp);
- ret += salglen;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- int i;
- long extlen, idlen, itmp;
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
-
- idlen = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
- if (itmp <= 0)
- return NULL;
- idlen += itmp + 2;
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
- extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
- if (extlen < 0)
- return NULL;
- } else
- extlen = 0;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
- *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
- s2n(idlen, ret);
- for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
- /* save position of id len */
- unsigned char *q = ret;
- id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
- /* skip over id len */
- ret += 2;
- itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
- /* write id len */
- s2n(itmp, q);
- }
- s2n(extlen, ret);
- if (extlen > 0)
- i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* Add Heartbeat extension */
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
- s2n(1, ret);
- /*-
- * Set mode:
- * 1: peer may send requests
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
- */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- else
- *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
- /*
- * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support
- * for Next Protocol Negotiation
- */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-#endif
-
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
- s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
- s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
- ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
- int el;
-
- /* Returns 0 on success!! */
- if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
-#endif
- custom_ext_init(&s->cert->cli_ext);
- /* Add custom TLS Extensions to ClientHello */
- if (!custom_ext_add(s, 0, &ret, limit, al))
- return NULL;
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
-#endif
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
-
- /*
- * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this
- * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always
- * appear last.
- */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
- int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
- hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
- if (hlen >= 4)
- hlen -= 4;
- else
- hlen = 0;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
- s2n(hlen, ret);
- memset(ret, 0, hlen);
- ret += hlen;
- }
- }
-
- done:
-
- if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
- return orig;
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
-}
-
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
- unsigned char *limit, int *al)
-{
- int extdatalen = 0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- int next_proto_neg_seen;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
-#endif
-
- ret += 2;
- if (ret >= limit)
- return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
-
- if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
- int el;
-
- if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- ret += el;
- }
-
- /* Only add RI for SSLv3 */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
- goto done;
-
- if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1
- && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (using_ecc) {
- const unsigned char *plist;
- size_t plistlen;
- /*
- * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message
- */
- long lenmax;
-
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax)
- return NULL;
- if (plistlen > 255) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
- s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)plistlen;
- memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
- ret += plistlen;
-
- }
- /*
- * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
- * extension
- */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && tls_use_ticket(s)) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
- int el;
-
- /* Returns 0 on success!! */
- if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0)
- return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
- s2n(el, ret);
-
- if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81)
- && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
- const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
- 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */
- 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */
- 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
- 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
- 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
- 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
- };
- if (limit - ret < 36)
- return NULL;
- memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36);
- ret += 36;
-
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)) {
- if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret);
- s2n(1, ret);
- /*-
- * Set mode:
- * 1: peer may send requests
- * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
- */
- if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
- *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- else
- *(ret++) = SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
-
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
- const unsigned char *npa;
- unsigned int npalen;
- int r;
-
- r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
- s->
- ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
- s2n(npalen, ret);
- memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
- ret += npalen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (!custom_ext_add(s, 1, &ret, limit, al))
- return NULL;
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) {
- /*
- * Don't use encrypt_then_mac if AEAD or RC4 might want to disable
- * for other cases too.
- */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
- || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12)
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
- else {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) {
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
- const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
- unsigned len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
-
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
- s2n(3 + len, ret);
- s2n(1 + len, ret);
- *ret++ = len;
- memcpy(ret, selected, len);
- ret += len;
- }
-
- done:
-
- if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0)
- return orig;
-
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
- * ClientHello. data: the contents of the extension, not including the type
- * and length. data_len: the number of bytes in |data| al: a pointer to the
- * alert value to send in the event of a non-zero return. returns: 0 on
- * success.
- */
-static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
- unsigned int data_len;
- unsigned int proto_len;
- const unsigned char *selected;
- const unsigned char *data;
- unsigned char selected_len;
- int r;
-
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
- * length-prefixed strings.
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &data_len)
- || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != data_len
- || !PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, data_len))
- goto parse_error;
-
- do {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &proto_len)
- || proto_len == 0
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, proto_len))
- goto parse_error;
- } while (PACKET_remaining(pkt));
-
- r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, data_len,
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
- }
- return 0;
-
- parse_error:
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return -1;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-/*-
- * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
- * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
- * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
- * SNI,
- * elliptic_curves
- * ec_point_formats
- *
- * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
- * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
- * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
- * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
- */
-static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const PACKET *pkt)
-{
- unsigned int type, size;
- const unsigned char *eblock1, *eblock2;
- PACKET tmppkt;
-
- static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
- 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
- 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
- 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
- 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
-
- 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
- 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
- 0x01, /* 1 point format */
- 0x00, /* uncompressed */
- };
-
- /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
- static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
- 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
- 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
- 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
- 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
- 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
- 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
- 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
- };
-
- tmppkt = *pkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, 2)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&tmppkt, &size)
- || !PACKET_forward(&tmppkt, size))
- return;
-
- if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- return;
-
- if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len1)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock2, len2)
- || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
- return;
- if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
- return;
- if (memcmp(eblock2, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
- return;
- } else {
- const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&tmppkt, &eblock1, len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&tmppkt))
- return;
- if (memcmp(eblock1, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
- return;
- }
-
- s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
-}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
-static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
- unsigned int type;
- unsigned int size;
- unsigned int len;
- const unsigned char *data;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-
- s->servername_done = 0;
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
- ssl_check_for_safari(s, pkt);
-# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = NULL;
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- OPENSSL_free(s->srp_ctx.login);
- s->srp_ctx.login = NULL;
-#endif
-
- s->srtp_profile = NULL;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len))
- goto err;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len)
- goto err;
-
- while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
- PACKET subpkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_peek_bytes(pkt, &data, size))
- goto err;
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &subpkt, size))
- goto err;
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- }
-/*-
- * The servername extension is treated as follows:
- *
- * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
- * in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- * to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- * it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- * the value of the Host: field.
- * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
- * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername
- * extension.
- * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
- *
- */
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- const unsigned char *sdata;
- unsigned int servname_type;
- unsigned int dsize;
- PACKET ssubpkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
- goto err;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) > 3) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&ssubpkt, &servname_type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < len)
- goto err;
-
- if (s->servername_done == 0)
- switch (servname_type) {
- case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- goto err;
-
- if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
- OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ssubpkt,
- (unsigned char *)s->session
- ->tlsext_hostname,
- len)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
- if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- s->servername_done = 1;
-
- } else {
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &sdata, len)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
- && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
- && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname,
- (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
- }
-
- break;
-
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
- /* We shouldn't have any bytes left */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) != 0)
- goto err;
-
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &len)
- || s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL)
- return -1;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt, (unsigned char *)s->srp_ctx.login,
- len))
- goto err;
- s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0';
-
- if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt))
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
- || ecpointformatlist_length == 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
- ecpointformatlist_length;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- ecpointformatlist_length))
- goto err;
- } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ecpointformatlist_length)) {
- goto err;
- }
- /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
- unsigned int ellipticcurvelist_length;
-
- /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes and we must have at least 1 */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &ellipticcurvelist_length)
- || ellipticcurvelist_length == 0
- || (ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) != 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (!s->hit) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
- goto err;
-
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length =
- ellipticcurvelist_length;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&subpkt,
- s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist,
- ellipticcurvelist_length))
- goto err;
- } else if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, ellipticcurvelist_length)) {
- goto err;
- }
- /* We should have consumed all the bytes by now */
- if (PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- goto err;
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if (!PACKET_forward(&subpkt, size)
- || (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
- unsigned int dsize;
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || (dsize & 1) != 0
- || (dsize == 0)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt) != 0
- || !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
- goto err;
- }
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- PACKET ssubpkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt,
- (unsigned int *)&s->tlsext_status_type))
- goto err;
-
- if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
- const unsigned char *sdata;
- unsigned int dsize;
- /* Read in responder_id_list */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(&subpkt, &ssubpkt, dsize))
- goto err;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt)) {
- OCSP_RESPID *id;
- unsigned int idsize;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(&ssubpkt) < 4
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&ssubpkt, &idsize)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&ssubpkt, &data, idsize)) {
- goto err;
- }
- sdata = data;
- data += idsize;
- id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize);
- if (!id)
- goto err;
- if (data != sdata) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- goto err;
- }
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
- && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
- sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
- OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
- *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Read in request_extensions */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&subpkt, &dsize)
- || !PACKET_get_bytes(&subpkt, &data, dsize)
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- goto err;
- }
- sdata = data;
- if (dsize > 0) {
- sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
- X509_EXTENSION_free);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
- d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize);
- if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata))
- goto err;
- }
- }
- /*
- * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it.
- */
- else
- s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
- unsigned int hbtype;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&subpkt, &hbtype)
- || PACKET_remaining(&subpkt)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- switch (hbtype) {
- case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- break;
- case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- break;
- default:
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
- s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- /*-
- * We shouldn't accept this extension on a
- * renegotiation.
- *
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
- * anything like that, but this might change).
- *
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
- * Finished message could have been computed.)
- */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
-#endif
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &subpkt, al) != 0)
- return 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
- }
-
- /* session ticket processed earlier */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)
- && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &subpkt, al))
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-#endif
- /*
- * Note: extended master secret extension handled in
- * tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early()
- */
-
- /*
- * If this ClientHello extension was unhandled and this is a
- * nonresumed connection, check whether the extension is a custom
- * TLS Extension (has a custom_srv_ext_record), and if so call the
- * callback and record the extension number so that an appropriate
- * ServerHello may be later returned.
- */
- else if (!s->hit) {
- if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* Spurious data on the end */
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0)
- goto err;
-
- ri_check:
-
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */
-
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-err:
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
-}
-
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- int al = -1;
- custom_ext_init(&s->cert->srv_ext);
- if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
-/*
- * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
- * fill the length of the block.
- */
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(PACKET *pkt)
-{
- unsigned int len;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
- if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &len)
- || !PACKET_forward(pkt, len))
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-#endif
-
-static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int *al)
-{
- unsigned int length, type, size;
- int tlsext_servername = 0;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
-#endif
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
- SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
-#endif
-
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &length))
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != length) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- while (PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &type) && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &size)) {
- const unsigned char *data;
- PACKET spkt;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, size)
- || !PACKET_peek_bytes(&spkt, &data, size))
- goto ri_check;
-
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg);
-
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &spkt, al))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- } else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
- } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- tlsext_servername = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
- unsigned int ecpointformatlist_length;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &ecpointformatlist_length)
- || ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!s->hit) {
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist =
- OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
- ecpointformatlist_length;
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt,
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist,
- ecpointformatlist_length)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- }
- }
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
- if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
- !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size,
- s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
- {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!tls_use_ticket(s) || (size > 0)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
- /*
- * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status
- * request message.
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char selected_len;
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* The data must be valid */
- if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&spkt)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->
- ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data,
- size,
- s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) !=
- SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
- if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
-#endif
-
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
- unsigned len;
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /*-
- * The extension data consists of:
- * uint16 list_length
- * uint8 proto_length;
- * uint8 proto[proto_length];
- */
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&spkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len
- || !PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &len)
- || PACKET_remaining(&spkt) != len) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&spkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) {
- *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
- }
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) {
- unsigned int hbtype;
- if (!PACKET_get_1(&spkt, &hbtype)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- switch (hbtype) {
- case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- break;
- case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
- s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_DTLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
- break;
- default:
- *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
- else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
- if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &spkt, al))
- return 0;
- }
-#endif
-#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) {
- /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
- && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC;
- }
-#endif
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
- if (!s->hit)
- s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
- }
- /*
- * If this extension type was not otherwise handled, but matches a
- * custom_cli_ext_record, then send it to the c callback
- */
- else if (custom_ext_parse(s, 0, type, data, size, al) <= 0)
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
- *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- } else {
- *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
- ri_check:
-
- /*
- * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid
- * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello
- * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack.
- * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which
- * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on
- * initial connect only.
- */
- if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (s->hit) {
- /*
- * Check extended master secret extension is consistent with
- * original session.
- */
- if (!(s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS) !=
- !(s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
- *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SCAN_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EXTMS);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely
- * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
- /*
- * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely
- * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
-#endif
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-/* Initialise digests to default values */
-void ssl_set_default_md(SSL *s)
-{
- const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
- else
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX);
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN];
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX);
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX);
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX);
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = ssl_md(SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX);
-#endif
-}
-
-int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
-{
- int al;
- size_t i;
- /* Clear any shared sigtnature algorithms */
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
- s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0;
- /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
- s->s3->tmp.md[i] = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.valid_flags[i] = 0;
- }
-
- /* If sigalgs received process it. */
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs) {
- if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- /* Fatal error is no shared signature algorithms */
- if (!s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SET_SERVER_SIGALGS,
- SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- ssl_set_default_md(s);
- }
- return 1;
- err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
-}
-
-int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
- int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
- /*
- * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be
- * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has changed,
- * and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because this may
- * influence which certificate is sent
- */
- if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
- int r;
- CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
- certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
- if (certpkey == NULL) {
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- return 1;
- }
- /*
- * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate
- * et al can pick it up.
- */
- s->cert->key = certpkey;
- r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
- switch (r) {
- /* We don't want to send a status request response */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* status request response should be sent */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
- if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
- else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
- break;
- /* something bad happened */
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- goto err;
- }
- } else
- s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
-
- err:
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
-{
- int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- /*
- * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
- * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it
- * must contain uncompressed.
- */
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
- && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0)
- && ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe))
- || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
- /* we are using an ECC cipher */
- size_t i;
- unsigned char *list;
- int found_uncompressed = 0;
- list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
- if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
- found_uncompressed = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!found_uncompressed) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
- SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
-#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL
- && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret =
- s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
- s->
- initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
-
- /*
- * Ensure we get sensible values passed to tlsext_status_cb in the event
- * that we don't receive a status message
- */
- OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
-
- switch (ret) {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return -1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
- return 1;
-
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->servername_done = 0;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
-{
- int al = -1;
- if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
- return 1;
- if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, pkt, &al) <= 0) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*-
- * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
- * ClientHello and other operations depend on the result some extensions
- * need to be handled at the same time.
- *
- * Two extensions are currently handled, session ticket and extended master
- * secret.
- *
- * session_id: ClientHello session ID.
- * ext: ClientHello extensions (including length prefix)
- * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
- * point to the resulting session.
- *
- * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
- * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
- * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
- * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
- * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
- * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
- * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
- *
- * Side effects:
- * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
- * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
- * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
- * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
- * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
- * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
- *
- * For extended master secret flag is set if the extension is present.
- *
- */
-int tls_check_serverhello_tlsext_early(SSL *s, const PACKET *ext,
- const PACKET *session_id,
- SSL_SESSION **ret)
-{
- unsigned int i;
- PACKET local_ext = *ext;
- int retv = -1;
-
- int have_ticket = 0;
- int use_ticket = tls_use_ticket(s);
-
- *ret = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
-
- /*
- * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
- * resumption.
- */
- if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION))
- return 0;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &i)) {
- retv = 0;
- goto end;
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
- while (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) >= 4) {
- unsigned int type, size;
-
- if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &type)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2(&local_ext, &size)) {
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- if (PACKET_remaining(&local_ext) < size) {
- retv = 0;
- goto end;
- }
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket && use_ticket) {
- int r;
- const unsigned char *etick;
- /* Duplicate extension */
- if (have_ticket != 0) {
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- have_ticket = 1;
+ retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
+ hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
+ switch (retv) {
+ case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
- if (size == 0) {
- /*
- * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have
- * one.
- */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- retv = 1;
- continue;
- }
- if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
- /*
- * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than
- * generating the session from ticket now, trigger
- * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
- * calculate the master secret later.
- */
- retv = 2;
- continue;
- }
- if (!PACKET_get_bytes(&local_ext, &etick, size)) {
- /* Shouldn't ever happen */
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, etick, size, PACKET_data(session_id),
- PACKET_remaining(session_id), ret);
- switch (r) {
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- retv = 2;
- break;
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
- retv = r;
- break;
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- retv = 3;
- break;
- default: /* fatal error */
- retv = -1;
- break;
- }
- continue;
- } else {
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
- if (!PACKET_forward(&local_ext, size)) {
- retv = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- }
+ case TICKET_SUCCESS:
+ return TICKET_SUCCESS;
+
+ case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+ return TICKET_SUCCESS;
+
+ default:
+ return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
}
- if (have_ticket == 0)
- retv = 0;
-end:
- return retv;
}
/*-
* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
*
* etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
- * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
+ * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extension.
* sess_id: points at the session ID.
* sesslen: the length of the session ID.
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
- *
- * Returns:
- * -2: fatal error, malloc failure.
- * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
- * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
- * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
- * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
*/
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
- int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
- int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
+TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
+ size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
+ size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
+ int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
+ TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
+ size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
- if (eticklen < 48)
- return 2;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->session_ctx;
+
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
- return -2;
+ return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
+ int rv = tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
ctx, hctx, 0);
if (rv < 0)
- return -1;
- if (rv == 0)
- return 2;
+ goto err;
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto err;
+ }
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
/* Check key name matches */
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
- return 2;
- if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) != 0) {
+ ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
+ sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key),
EVP_sha256(), NULL) <= 0
- || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key,
- etick + 16) <= 0) {
+ || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->ext.tick_aes_key,
+ etick
+ + sizeof(tctx->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) {
goto err;
- }
+ }
}
/*
* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
* checks on ticket.
*/
mlen = HMAC_size(hctx);
- if (mlen < 0) {
+ if (mlen == 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
+ if (eticklen <=
+ TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
+ ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
/* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
if (HMAC_Update(hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0
- || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
+ || HMAC_Final(hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) {
goto err;
}
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- return 2;
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
- p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
- eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ p = etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
+ eticklen -= TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx);
sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (sdec == NULL
- || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) {
+ if (sdec == NULL || EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, sdec, &slen, p,
+ (int)eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
- return -1;
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
}
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- return 2;
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
- slen += mlen;
+ slen += declen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
p = sdec;
sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
if (sess) {
+ /* Some additional consistency checks */
+ if (p != sdec + slen || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ return 2;
+ }
/*
* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
* that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
if (renew_ticket)
- return 4;
+ return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
else
- return 3;
+ return TICKET_SUCCESS;
}
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
- return 2;
-err:
+ return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
+ err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
- return -1;
-}
-
-/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
-
-typedef struct {
- int nid;
- int id;
-} tls12_lookup;
-
-static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
- {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
- {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
- {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
- {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
-};
-
-static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
- {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
- {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
- {NID_id_GostR3410_2001, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001},
- {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256},
- {NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512}
-};
-
-static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
-{
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- if (table[i].nid == nid)
- return table[i].id;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
-{
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
- if ((table[i].id) == id)
- return table[i].nid;
- }
- return NID_undef;
-}
-
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk,
- const EVP_MD *md)
-{
- int sig_id, md_id;
- if (!md)
- return 0;
- md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
- if (md_id == -1)
- return 0;
- sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
- if (sig_id == -1)
- return 0;
- p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
- p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
- return 1;
-}
-
-int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
-{
- return tls12_find_id(EVP_PKEY_id(pk), tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
-}
-
-typedef struct {
- int nid;
- int secbits;
- int md_idx;
- unsigned char tlsext_hash;
-} tls12_hash_info;
-
-static const tls12_hash_info tls12_md_info[] = {
- {NID_md5, 64, SSL_MD_MD5_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
- {NID_sha1, 80, SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
- {NID_sha224, 112, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, 128, SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
- {NID_sha384, 192, SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, 256, SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_94, 128, SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr3411},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 128, SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_256},
- {NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 256, SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX, TLSEXT_hash_gostr34112012_512},
-};
-
-static const tls12_hash_info *tls12_get_hash_info(unsigned char hash_alg)
-{
- unsigned int i;
- if (hash_alg == 0)
- return NULL;
-
- for (i=0; i < OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md_info); i++)
- {
- if (tls12_md_info[i].tlsext_hash == hash_alg)
- return tls12_md_info + i;
- }
-
- return NULL;
-}
-
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
-{
- const tls12_hash_info *inf;
- if (hash_alg == TLSEXT_hash_md5 && FIPS_mode())
- return NULL;
- inf = tls12_get_hash_info(hash_alg);
- if (!inf)
- return NULL;
- return ssl_md(inf->md_idx);
+ return ret;
}
-static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(unsigned char sig_alg)
+static int tls12_get_pkey_idx(int sig_nid)
{
- switch (sig_alg) {
+ switch (sig_nid) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- return SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
+ /*
+ * For now return RSA key for PSS. When we support PSS only keys
+ * this will need to be updated.
+ */
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
+ return SSL_PKEY_RSA;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
return SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
return SSL_PKEY_ECC;
#endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2001:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
- case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256:
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
- case TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512:
+ case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512:
return SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
-# endif
+#endif
}
return -1;
}
-/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
-static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
- int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
-{
- int sign_nid = NID_undef, hash_nid = NID_undef;
- if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
- return;
- if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
- hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
- if (phash_nid)
- *phash_nid = hash_nid;
- }
- if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
- sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
- if (psign_nid)
- *psign_nid = sign_nid;
- }
- if (psignhash_nid) {
- if (sign_nid == NID_undef || hash_nid == NID_undef
- || OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid,
- sign_nid) <= 0)
- *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
- }
-}
-
/* Check to see if a signature algorithm is allowed */
-static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, const unsigned char *ptmp)
+static int tls12_sigalg_allowed(SSL *s, int op, uint16_t ptmp)
{
- /* See if we have an entry in the hash table and it is enabled */
- const tls12_hash_info *hinf = tls12_get_hash_info(ptmp[0]);
- if (hinf == NULL || ssl_md(hinf->md_idx) == NULL)
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(ptmp);
+ unsigned char sigalgstr[2];
+ int secbits;
+
+ /* See if sigalgs is recognised and if hash is enabled */
+ if (lu == NULL || ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
return 0;
/* See if public key algorithm allowed */
- if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(ptmp[1]) == -1)
+ if (tls12_get_pkey_idx(lu->sig) == -1)
return 0;
+ /* Security bits: half digest bits */
+ secbits = EVP_MD_size(ssl_md(lu->hash_idx)) * 4;
/* Finally see if security callback allows it */
- return ssl_security(s, op, hinf->secbits, hinf->nid, (void *)ptmp);
+ sigalgstr[0] = (ptmp >> 8) & 0xff;
+ sigalgstr[1] = ptmp & 0xff;
+ return ssl_security(s, op, secbits, lu->hash, (void *)sigalgstr);
}
/*
void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op)
{
- const unsigned char *sigalgs;
+ const uint16_t *sigalgs;
size_t i, sigalgslen;
int have_rsa = 0, have_dsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
/*
* RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. To keep
* down calls to security callback only check if we have to.
*/
- sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
- for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
- switch (sigalgs[1]) {
+ sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sigalgs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i ++, sigalgs++) {
+ switch (tls_sigalg_get_sig(*sigalgs)) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+ /* Any RSA-PSS signature algorithms also mean we allow RSA */
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS:
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+ if (!have_rsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
have_rsa = 1;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
- if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+ case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+ if (!have_dsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
have_dsa = 1;
break;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, sigalgs))
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+ if (!have_ecdsa && tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, op, *sigalgs))
have_ecdsa = 1;
break;
#endif
*pmask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
}
-size_t tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, unsigned char *out,
- const unsigned char *psig, size_t psiglen)
+int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen)
{
- unsigned char *tmpout = out;
size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i += 2, psig += 2) {
- if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, psig)) {
- *tmpout++ = psig[0];
- *tmpout++ = psig[1];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < psiglen; i++, psig++) {
+ if (tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED, *psig)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, *psig))
+ return 0;
}
}
- return tmpout - out;
+ return 1;
}
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
-static int tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
- const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
- const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
+static size_t tls12_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP **shsig,
+ const uint16_t *pref, size_t preflen,
+ const uint16_t *allow, size_t allowlen)
{
- const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
+ const uint16_t *ptmp, *atmp;
size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
- for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
+ for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i++, ptmp++) {
/* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
- if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, ptmp))
+ if (!tls12_sigalg_allowed(s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED, *ptmp))
continue;
- for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
- if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
+ for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j++, atmp++) {
+ if (*ptmp == *atmp) {
nmatch++;
if (shsig) {
- shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
- shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
- tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
- &shsig->sign_nid,
- &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
+ *shsig = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*ptmp);
shsig++;
}
break;
/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
- const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
+ const uint16_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
size_t nmatch;
- TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP **salgs = NULL;
CERT *c = s->cert;
unsigned int is_suiteb = tls1_suiteb(s);
conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
} else
- conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+ conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 0, &conf);
if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE || is_suiteb) {
pref = conf;
preflen = conflen;
}
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
if (nmatch) {
- salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+ salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(*salgs));
if (salgs == NULL)
return 0;
nmatch = tls12_shared_sigalgs(s, salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
-int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
+int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
CERT *c = s->cert;
+ unsigned int stmp;
+ size_t size, i;
+
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
return 1;
if (!c)
return 0;
+ size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+
+ /* Invalid data length */
+ if ((size & 1) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ size >>= 1;
+
OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(dsize);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(size
+ * sizeof(*s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs));
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs == NULL)
return 0;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = dsize;
- memcpy(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs, data, dsize);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen = size;
+ for (i = 0; i < size && PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &stmp); i++)
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs[i] = stmp;
+
+ if (i != size)
+ return 0;
+
return 1;
}
int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s)
{
- int idx;
size_t i;
- const EVP_MD *md;
- const EVP_MD **pmd = s->s3->tmp.md;
uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags;
CERT *c = s->cert;
- TLS_SIGALGS *sigptr;
+
if (!tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s))
return 0;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
- /*
- * Use first set signature preference to force message digest,
- * ignoring any peer preferences.
- */
- const unsigned char *sigs = NULL;
- if (s->server)
- sigs = c->conf_sigalgs;
- else
- sigs = c->client_sigalgs;
- if (sigs) {
- idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigs[1]);
- md = tls12_get_hash(sigs[0]);
- pmd[idx] = md;
- pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
- pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
- }
- }
- }
-#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ pvalid[i] = 0;
- for (i = 0, sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs;
- i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++, sigptr++) {
- idx = tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->rsign);
- if (idx > 0 && pmd[idx] == NULL) {
- md = tls12_get_hash(sigptr->rhash);
- pmd[idx] = md;
- pvalid[idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) {
- pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = md;
- }
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigptr = c->shared_sigalgs[i];
+ int idx = sigptr->sig_idx;
- }
- /*
- * In strict mode leave unset digests as NULL to indicate we can't use
- * the certificate for signing.
- */
- if (!(s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT)) {
- /*
- * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
- * supported it stays as NULL.
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] == NULL)
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] == NULL) {
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN] = EVP_sha1();
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC] = EVP_sha1();
- }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] == NULL)
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_ECC] = EVP_sha1();
-#endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
- if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] == NULL)
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST01] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_94);
- if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] == NULL)
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256);
- if (pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] == NULL)
- pmd[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512] = EVP_get_digestbynid(NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512);
-# endif
+ /* Ignore PKCS1 based sig algs in TLSv1.3 */
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && sigptr->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ continue;
+ /* If not disabled indicate we can explicitly sign */
+ if (pvalid[idx] == 0 && tls12_get_pkey_idx(sigptr->sig) != -1)
+ pvalid[sigptr->sig_idx] = CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
}
return 1;
}
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
- const unsigned char *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
- if (psig == NULL)
+ uint16_t *psig = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs;
+ size_t numsigalgs = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen;
+ if (psig == NULL || numsigalgs > INT_MAX)
return 0;
if (idx >= 0) {
- idx <<= 1;
- if (idx >= (int)s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen)
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
+
+ if (idx >= (int)numsigalgs)
return 0;
psig += idx;
- if (rhash)
- *rhash = psig[0];
- if (rsig)
- *rsig = psig[1];
- tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
+ if (rhash != NULL)
+ *rhash = (unsigned char)((*psig >> 8) & 0xff);
+ if (rsig != NULL)
+ *rsig = (unsigned char)(*psig & 0xff);
+ lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*psig);
+ if (psign != NULL)
+ *psign = lu != NULL ? lu->sig : NID_undef;
+ if (phash != NULL)
+ *phash = lu != NULL ? lu->hash : NID_undef;
+ if (psignhash != NULL)
+ *psignhash = lu != NULL ? lu->sigandhash : NID_undef;
}
- return s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+ return (int)numsigalgs;
}
int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
{
- TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
- if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *shsigalgs;
+ if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs == NULL
+ || idx < 0
+ || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen
+ || s->cert->shared_sigalgslen > INT_MAX)
return 0;
- shsigalgs += idx;
- if (phash)
- *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
- if (psign)
- *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
- if (psignhash)
- *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
- if (rsig)
- *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
- if (rhash)
- *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
- return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
-}
-
-#define MAX_SIGALGLEN (TLSEXT_hash_num * TLSEXT_signature_num * 2)
+ shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[idx];
+ if (phash != NULL)
+ *phash = shsigalgs->hash;
+ if (psign != NULL)
+ *psign = shsigalgs->sig;
+ if (psignhash != NULL)
+ *psignhash = shsigalgs->sigandhash;
+ if (rsig != NULL)
+ *rsig = (unsigned char)(shsigalgs->sigalg & 0xff);
+ if (rhash != NULL)
+ *rhash = (unsigned char)((shsigalgs->sigalg >> 8) & 0xff);
+ return (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
+}
+
+/* Maximum possible number of unique entries in sigalgs array */
+#define TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT (OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl) * 2)
typedef struct {
size_t sigalgcnt;
- int sigalgs[MAX_SIGALGLEN];
+ int sigalgs[TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT];
} sig_cb_st;
static void get_sigorhash(int *psig, int *phash, const char *str)
{
if (strcmp(str, "RSA") == 0) {
*psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+ } else if (strcmp(str, "RSA-PSS") == 0 || strcmp(str, "PSS") == 0) {
+ *psig = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS;
} else if (strcmp(str, "DSA") == 0) {
*psig = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
} else if (strcmp(str, "ECDSA") == 0) {
*phash = OBJ_ln2nid(str);
}
}
+/* Maximum length of a signature algorithm string component */
+#define TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN 40
static int sig_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
{
sig_cb_st *sarg = arg;
size_t i;
- char etmp[20], *p;
+ char etmp[TLS_MAX_SIGSTRING_LEN], *p;
int sig_alg = NID_undef, hash_alg = NID_undef;
if (elem == NULL)
return 0;
- if (sarg->sigalgcnt == MAX_SIGALGLEN)
+ if (sarg->sigalgcnt == TLS_MAX_SIGALGCNT)
return 0;
if (len > (int)(sizeof(etmp) - 1))
return 0;
memcpy(etmp, elem, len);
etmp[len] = 0;
p = strchr(etmp, '+');
- if (!p)
- return 0;
- *p = 0;
- p++;
- if (!*p)
- return 0;
-
- get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
- get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
+ /* See if we have a match for TLS 1.3 names */
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *s;
+
+ for (i = 0, s = sigalg_lookup_tbl; i < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ i++, s++) {
+ if (s->name != NULL && strcmp(etmp, s->name) == 0) {
+ sig_alg = s->sig;
+ hash_alg = s->hash;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ *p = 0;
+ p++;
+ if (*p == 0)
+ return 0;
+ get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, etmp);
+ get_sigorhash(&sig_alg, &hash_alg, p);
+ }
if (sig_alg == NID_undef || hash_alg == NID_undef)
return 0;
}
/*
- * Set suppored signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
+ * Set supported signature algorithms based on a colon separated list of the
* form sig+hash e.g. RSA+SHA512:DSA+SHA512
*/
int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client)
return tls1_set_sigalgs(c, sig.sigalgs, sig.sigalgcnt, client);
}
-int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
- int client)
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
{
- unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
- int rhash, rsign;
+ uint16_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
size_t i;
+
if (salglen & 1)
return 0;
- sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
+ sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc((salglen / 2) * sizeof(*sigalgs));
if (sigalgs == NULL)
return 0;
for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
- rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_md));
- rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, OSSL_NELEM(tls12_sig));
+ size_t j;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *curr;
+ int md_id = *psig_nids++;
+ int sig_id = *psig_nids++;
+
+ for (j = 0, curr = sigalg_lookup_tbl; j < OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl);
+ j++, curr++) {
+ if (curr->hash == md_id && curr->sig == sig_id) {
+ *sptr++ = curr->sigalg;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
- if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
+ if (j == OSSL_NELEM(sigalg_lookup_tbl))
goto err;
- *sptr++ = rhash;
- *sptr++ = rsign;
}
if (client) {
OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ c->client_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
} else {
OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen / 2;
}
return 1;
if (default_nid)
return sig_nid == default_nid ? 1 : 0;
for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
- if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i].signandhash_nid)
+ if (sig_nid == c->shared_sigalgs[i]->sigandhash)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* idx == -2 means checking client certificate chains */
if (idx == -2) {
cpk = c->key;
- idx = cpk - c->pkeys;
+ idx = (int)(cpk - c->pkeys);
} else
cpk = c->pkeys + idx;
pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags + idx;
/* If no cert or key, forget it */
if (!x || !pk)
goto end;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_DEBUG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL
- /* Allow any certificate to pass test */
- if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_BROKEN_PROTOCOL) {
- rv = CERT_PKEY_STRICT_FLAGS | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN |
- CERT_PKEY_VALID | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
- *pvalid = rv;
- return rv;
- }
-#endif
} else {
if (!x || !pk)
return 0;
*/
if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION && strict_mode) {
int default_nid;
- unsigned char rsign = 0;
+ int rsign = 0;
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs)
default_nid = 0;
/* If no sigalgs extension use defaults from RFC5246 */
else {
switch (idx) {
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC:
- case SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_rsa;
+ case SSL_PKEY_RSA:
+ rsign = EVP_PKEY_RSA;
default_nid = NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_dsa;
+ rsign = EVP_PKEY_DSA;
default_nid = NID_dsaWithSHA1;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_ECC:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa;
+ rsign = EVP_PKEY_EC;
default_nid = NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST01:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102001;
+ rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2001;
default_nid = NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_256;
+ rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256;
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256;
break;
case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512:
- rsign = TLSEXT_signature_gostr34102012_512;
+ rsign = NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512;
default_nid = NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512;
break;
*/
if (default_nid > 0 && c->conf_sigalgs) {
size_t j;
- const unsigned char *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
- for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j += 2, p += 2) {
- if (p[0] == TLSEXT_hash_sha1 && p[1] == rsign)
+ const uint16_t *p = c->conf_sigalgs;
+ for (j = 0; j < c->conf_sigalgslen; j++, p++) {
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(*p);
+
+ if (lu != NULL && lu->hash == NID_sha1 && lu->sig == rsign)
break;
}
if (j == c->conf_sigalgslen) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE | CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE;
skip_sigs:
/* Check cert parameters are consistent */
- if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, check_flags ? 1 : 2))
+ if (tls1_check_cert_param(s, x, 1))
rv |= CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM;
else if (!check_flags)
goto end;
break;
}
if (check_type) {
- const unsigned char *ctypes;
- int ctypelen;
- if (c->ctypes) {
- ctypes = c->ctypes;
- ctypelen = (int)c->ctype_num;
- } else {
- ctypes = (unsigned char *)s->s3->tmp.ctype;
- ctypelen = s->s3->tmp.ctype_num;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < ctypelen; i++) {
- if (ctypes[i] == check_type) {
+ const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3->tmp.ctype;
+ size_t j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; j++, ctypes++) {
+ if (*ctypes == check_type) {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
break;
}
}
if (!(rv & CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE) && !check_flags)
goto end;
- } else
+ } else {
rv |= CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE;
+ }
ca_dn = s->s3->tmp.ca_names;
end:
- if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
- if (*pvalid & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN)
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
- else if (s->s3->tmp.md[idx] != NULL)
- rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
- } else
+ if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ rv |= *pvalid & (CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN);
+ else
rv |= CERT_PKEY_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
/*
* chain is invalid.
*/
if (!check_flags) {
- if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID)
+ if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) {
*pvalid = rv;
- else {
- /* Preserve explicit sign flag, clear rest */
- *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ } else {
+ /* Preserve sign and explicit sign flag, clear rest */
+ *pvalid &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN | CERT_PKEY_SIGN;
return 0;
}
}
/* Set validity of certificates in an SSL structure */
void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
{
- tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC);
- tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN);
+ tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_RSA);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ECC);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST01);
return tls1_check_chain(s, x, pk, chain, -1);
}
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s)
{
else
dh_secbits = 80;
} else {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(cpk->privatekey);
+ if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ dh_secbits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey);
}
if (dh_secbits >= 128) {
DH *dhp = DH_new();
+ BIGNUM *p, *g;
if (dhp == NULL)
return NULL;
- dhp->g = BN_new();
- if (dhp->g != NULL)
- BN_set_word(dhp->g, 2);
+ g = BN_new();
+ if (g != NULL)
+ BN_set_word(g, 2);
if (dh_secbits >= 192)
- dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_8192(NULL);
else
- dhp->p = get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
- if (dhp->p == NULL || dhp->g == NULL) {
+ p = BN_get_rfc3526_prime_3072(NULL);
+ if (p == NULL || g == NULL || !DH_set0_pqg(dhp, p, NULL, g)) {
DH_free(dhp);
+ BN_free(p);
+ BN_free(g);
return NULL;
}
return dhp;
{
/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
int secbits = -1, md_nid = NID_undef, sig_nid;
+ /* Don't check signature if self signed */
+ if ((X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)
+ return 1;
sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
if (sig_nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(sig_nid, &md_nid, NULL)) {
const EVP_MD *md;
}
return 1;
}
+
+/*
+ * Choose an appropriate signature algorithm based on available certificates
+ * Sets chosen certificate and signature algorithm.
+ *
+ * For servers if we fail to find a required certificate it is a fatal error
+ * and an appropriate error code is set and the TLS alert set in *al.
+ *
+ * For clients al is set to NULL. If a certificate is not suitable it is not
+ * a fatal error: we will either try another certificate or not present one
+ * to the server. In this case no error is set.
+ */
+int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int *al)
+{
+ int idx = -1;
+ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = NULL;
+
+ s->s3->tmp.cert = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.sigalg = NULL;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ size_t i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int curve = -1, skip_ec = 0;
+#endif
+
+ /* Look for a certificate matching shared sigaglgs */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
+
+ /* Skip SHA1, DSA and RSA if not PSS */
+ if (lu->hash == NID_sha1 || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_DSA
+ || lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
+ continue;
+ if (ssl_md(lu->hash_idx) == NULL)
+ continue;
+ idx = lu->sig_idx;
+ if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
+ continue;
+ if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (curve == -1) {
+ EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
+
+ curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+ if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec)
+ != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
+ skip_ec = 1;
+ }
+ if (skip_ec || (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve))
+ continue;
+#else
+ continue;
+#endif
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
+ if (al == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
+ SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (s->server) {
+ /* Find index corresponding to ciphersuite */
+ idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
+ /* If no certificate for ciphersuite return */
+ if (idx == -1)
+ return 1;
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_GOST_EC) {
+ /* Work out which GOST certificate is avaiable */
+ if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) {
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512;
+ } else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) {
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256;
+ } else if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST01)) {
+ idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
+ } else {
+ if (al == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx)) {
+ if (al == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Find index for client certificate */
+ idx = s->cert->key - s->cert->pkeys;
+ if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
+ size_t i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ int curve;
+
+ /* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
+ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey);
+ curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
+ } else {
+ curve = -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Find highest preference signature algorithm matching
+ * cert type
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ lu = s->cert->shared_sigalgs[i];
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (lu->sig_idx == idx)
+ break;
+#else
+ if (lu->sig_idx == idx
+ && (curve == -1 || lu->curve == curve))
+ break;
+#endif
+ if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA && lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
+ if (al == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we have no sigalg use defaults
+ */
+ const uint16_t *sent_sigs;
+ size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+
+ if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
+ if (al == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &sent_sigs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i++, sent_sigs++) {
+ if (lu->sigalg == *sent_sigs)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == sent_sigslen) {
+ if (al == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if ((lu = tls1_get_legacy_sigalg(s, idx)) == NULL) {
+ if (al == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (idx == -1) {
+ if (al != NULL) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.cert = &s->cert->pkeys[idx];
+ s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert;
+ s->s3->tmp.sigalg = lu;
+ return 1;
+}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff