#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
-#endif
};
int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
{
size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
- if (FIPS_mode())
- slen -= 2;
-#endif
if (p)
memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
return (int)slen;
}
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = p;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
&& !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return p;
+ return orig;
ret+=2;
return NULL;
}
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
}
- if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
long lenmax;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/* Add Heartbeat extension */
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+ return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
s2n(1,ret);
/* Set mode:
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
{
int el;
ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
}
ret += el;
}
+#endif
+ /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+ *
+ * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
+ * extensions it MUST always appear last.
+ */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING)
+ {
+ int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+ /* The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
+ * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while
+ * the code in s3_clnt.c does not.
+ */
+ if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
+ hlen -= 5;
+ if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200)
+ {
+ hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
+ if (hlen >= 4)
+ hlen -= 4;
+ else
+ hlen = 0;
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+ s2n(hlen, ret);
+ memset(ret, 0, hlen);
+ ret += hlen;
+ }
+ }
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
+ return orig;
- s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
+unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
{
int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = p;
+ unsigned char *orig = buf;
+ unsigned char *ret = buf;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
int next_proto_neg_seen;
#endif
/* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return p;
+ return orig;
ret+=2;
if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
return NULL;
}
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL)
{
/* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
long lenmax;
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if(s->srtp_profile)
{
int el;
ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
- if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
s2n(el,ret);
}
ret+=el;
}
+#endif
if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
&& (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
/* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
{
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0)
+ return NULL;
s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
s2n(1,ret);
/* Set mode:
}
#endif
- if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
- return p;
+ if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
+ return orig;
- s2n(extdatalen,p);
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
return ret;
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
+ * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
+ * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
+ * SNI,
+ * elliptic_curves
+ * ec_point_formats
+ *
+ * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
+ * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
+ * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
+ * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
+ */
+static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) {
+ unsigned short type, size;
+ static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
+ 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
+ 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
+ 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
+ 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
+
+ 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
+ 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
+ 0x01, /* 1 point format */
+ 0x00, /* uncompressed */
+ };
+
+ /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
+ static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
+ 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
+ 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
+ 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
+ 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
+ 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
+ 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
+ };
+
+ if (data >= (d+n-2))
+ return;
+ data += 2;
+
+ if (data > (d+n-4))
+ return;
+ n2s(data,type);
+ n2s(data,size);
+
+ if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ return;
+
+ if (data+size > d+n)
+ return;
+ data += size;
+
+ if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
+ {
+ const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+ const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
+
+ if (data + len != d+n)
+ return;
+ if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
+ return;
+ }
+
+ s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
{
unsigned short type;
SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
+ ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
if (data >= (d+n-2))
goto ri_check;
n2s(data,len);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
fprintf(stderr,"\n");
#endif
}
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
- if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
+ if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 ||
+ ellipticcurvelist_length < 1)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
+ s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
{
if (size < 5)
#endif
/* session ticket processed earlier */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- {
+ {
if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
al))
return 0;
- }
+ }
+#endif
data+=size;
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
- s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
+ else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
{
unsigned char *sdata = data;
int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
- if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
+ if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 ||
+ ecpointformatlist_length < 1)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
- if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ if (!s->hit)
{
- *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
+ if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
+ {
+ *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
+ memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
}
- s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
- memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
#if 0
fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
unsigned char selected_len;
/* We must have requested it. */
- if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
{
*al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
return 0;
}
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- {
+ {
if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
al))
return 0;
- }
+ }
+#endif
data+=size;
}
HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
return 2;
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
}
EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
+ {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return 2;
+ }
slen += mlen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
p = sdec;
{
switch(hash_alg)
{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
- case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
- if (FIPS_mode())
- return NULL;
-#endif
- return EVP_md5();
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
return EVP_sha1();
unsigned int payload;
unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
- /* Read type and payload length first */
- hbtype = *p++;
- n2s(p, payload);
- pl = p;
-
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
&s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ /* Read type and payload length first */
+ if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard */
+ hbtype = *p++;
+ n2s(p, payload);
+ if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length)
+ return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */
+ pl = p;
+
if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
{
unsigned char *buffer, *bp;