Fix various style issues following feedback
[openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_lib.c
index 1ce14ee640056f6fe7700a86228a8a702b542caa..4b64541cb950c75519b9f4b86cc3a526fcda81d2 100644 (file)
@@ -221,11 +221,11 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
 
 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
 {
 
 MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
 {
-    int al;
+    int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
     size_t md_len;
 
     /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
     size_t md_len;
 
     /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
-    if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
+    if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
         al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
         goto f_err;
         al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
         goto f_err;
@@ -262,6 +262,34 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
     }
 
         s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
     }
 
+    /*
+     * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing
+     * of the initial server flight (if we are a client)
+     */
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+        if (s->server) {
+            if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                    SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+        } else {
+            if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+                    s->session->master_key, s->handshake_secret, 0,
+                    &s->session->master_key_length)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
+                    SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) {
+                SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_CANNOT_CHANGE_CIPHER);
+                goto f_err;
+            }
+            if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s, &al))
+                goto f_err;
+        }
+    }
+
     return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
  f_err:
     ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
     return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
  f_err:
     ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
@@ -280,12 +308,139 @@ int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
     return 1;
 }
 
     return 1;
 }
 
-unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk)
+/* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */
+static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain,
+                                   int *al)
+{
+    int len;
+    unsigned char *outbytes;
+
+    len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+    if (len < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes)
+            || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+            && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x,
+                                         chain, al))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */
+static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int *al)
 {
 {
+    int i, chain_count;
+    X509 *x;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+    STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+    X509_STORE *chain_store;
+    int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+    if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL)
+        return 1;
+
+    x = cpk->x509;
+
+    /*
+     * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx.
+     */
+    if (cpk->chain != NULL)
+        extra_certs = cpk->chain;
+    else
+        extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs;
+
+    if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs)
+        chain_store = NULL;
+    else if (s->cert->chain_store)
+        chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
+    else
+        chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
+    if (chain_store != NULL) {
+        X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
+
+        if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) {
+            X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        /*
+         * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we
+         * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately
+         * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying
+         * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can
+         */
+        (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
+        /* Don't leave errors in the queue */
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx);
+        i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0);
+        if (i != 1) {
+#if 0
+            /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK);
+#endif
+            X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain);
+        for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+
+            if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, &tmpal)) {
+                X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+                goto err;
+            }
+        }
+        X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+    } else {
+        i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0);
+        if (i != 1) {
+            SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, &tmpal))
+            goto err;
+        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) {
+            x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i);
+            if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, &tmpal))
+                goto err;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+
+ err:
+    *al = tmpal;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk,
+                                     int *al)
+{
+    int tmpal = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
     if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
     if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)
-            || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)
+            || !ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, &tmpal)
             || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
             || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+        *al = tmpal;
         return 0;
     }
     return 1;
         return 0;
     }
     return 1;
@@ -364,7 +519,7 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
     /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
     int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
     unsigned char *p;
     /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
     int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
     unsigned char *p;
-    size_t l, read;
+    size_t l, readbytes;
 
     p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 
 
     p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
 
@@ -373,7 +528,7 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
             i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
                                           &p[s->init_num],
                                           SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
             i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
                                           &p[s->init_num],
                                           SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
-                                          0, &read);
+                                          0, &readbytes);
             if (i <= 0) {
                 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
                 return 0;
             if (i <= 0) {
                 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
                 return 0;
@@ -383,22 +538,23 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
                  * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
                  * in the middle of a handshake message.
                  */
                  * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
                  * in the middle of a handshake message.
                  */
-                if (s->init_num != 0 || read != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
+                if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
                     al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                     SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
                            SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
                     goto f_err;
                 }
                 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
                     al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                     SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
                            SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
                     goto f_err;
                 }
                 s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
-                s->init_num = read - 1;
-                s->s3->tmp.message_size = read;
+                s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
+                s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
+                s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
                 return 1;
             } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
                 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
                 goto f_err;
             }
                 return 1;
             } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
                 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
                 goto f_err;
             }
-            s->init_num += read;
+            s->init_num += readbytes;
         }
 
         skip_message = 0;
         }
 
         skip_message = 0;
@@ -461,7 +617,7 @@ int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt)
 
 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
 {
 
 int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
 {
-    size_t n, read;
+    size_t n, readbytes;
     unsigned char *p;
     int i;
 
     unsigned char *p;
     int i;
 
@@ -475,14 +631,14 @@ int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
     n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
     while (n > 0) {
         i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
     n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
     while (n > 0) {
         i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
-                                      &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &read);
+                                      &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
         if (i <= 0) {
             s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
             *len = 0;
             return 0;
         }
         if (i <= 0) {
             s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
             *len = 0;
             return 0;
         }
-        s->init_num += read;
-        n -= read;
+        s->init_num += readbytes;
+        n -= readbytes;
     }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
     }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
@@ -874,7 +1030,7 @@ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound)
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
  */
  *
  * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
  */
-int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
+int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
 {
     /*-
      * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
 {
     /*-
      * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
@@ -886,13 +1042,21 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
      * handle version.
      */
     int server_version = s->method->version;
      * handle version.
      */
     int server_version = s->method->version;
-    int client_version = s->client_version;
+    int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
     const version_info *vent;
     const version_info *table;
     int disabled = 0;
     const version_info *vent;
     const version_info *table;
     int disabled = 0;
+    RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
+
+    s->client_version = client_version;
 
     switch (server_version) {
     default:
 
     switch (server_version) {
     default:
+        /*
+         * TODO(TLS1.3): This check will fail if someone attempts to do
+         * renegotiation in TLS1.3 at the moment. We need to ensure we disable
+         * renegotiation for TLS1.3
+         */
         if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
             return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
         /*
         if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0)
             return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION;
         /*
@@ -911,6 +1075,70 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
         break;
     }
 
         break;
     }
 
+    suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions];
+
+    if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+        unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
+        unsigned int best_vers = 0;
+        const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
+        PACKET versionslist;
+
+        suppversions->parsed = 1;
+
+        if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
+            /* Trailing or invalid data? */
+            return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+        }
+
+        while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
+            /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
+            if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
+                candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+            /*
+             * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
+             * wheter to ignore versions <TLS1.2 in supported_versions. At the
+             * moment we honour them if present. To be reviewed later
+             */
+            if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
+                continue;
+            for (vent = table;
+                 vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
+                 ++vent)
+                continue;
+            if (vent->version != 0 && vent->smeth != NULL) {
+                const SSL_METHOD *method;
+
+                method = vent->smeth();
+                if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
+                    best_vers = candidate_vers;
+                    best_method = method;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
+            /* Trailing data? */
+            return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+        }
+
+        if (best_vers > 0) {
+            s->version = best_vers;
+            s->method = best_method;
+            return 0;
+        }
+        return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
+     * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
+     */
+    if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
+        client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+
+    /*
+     * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
+     * the ClientHello.
+     */
     for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
         const SSL_METHOD *method;
 
     for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
         const SSL_METHOD *method;
 
@@ -943,6 +1171,10 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version)
     const version_info *vent;
     const version_info *table;
 
     const version_info *vent;
     const version_info *table;
 
+    /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
+    if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
+        version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+
     switch (s->method->version) {
     default:
         if (version != s->version)
     switch (s->method->version) {
     default:
         if (version != s->version)
@@ -1087,7 +1319,7 @@ int ssl_get_client_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
 
 /*
  * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
 
 /*
  * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for
- * the initial ClientHello.
+ * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field.
  *
  * @s: client SSL handle.
  *
  *
  * @s: client SSL handle.
  *
@@ -1102,6 +1334,12 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
     if (ret != 0)
         return ret;
 
     if (ret != 0)
         return ret;
 
-    s->client_version = s->version = ver_max;
+    s->version = ver_max;
+
+    /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */
+    if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION)
+        ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+
+    s->client_version = ver_max;
     return 0;
 }
     return 0;
 }