Send an illegal parameter alert if the update type in a KeyUpdate is wrong

[openssl.git] / ssl / statem / statem_lib.c

diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
index 33206c6ea96c9e7f2bf8e5e4fe56b5d91e3f9d32..34871114b9167d833f3505bd1017b61e9818390f 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
@@ -249,8 +249,7 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
         goto err;
     }
 
-    if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
+    if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -271,7 +270,7 @@ int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
         }
     }
 
-    if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) {
+    if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         goto err;
     }
@@ -409,8 +408,7 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
 #ifdef SSL_DEBUG
     fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
 #endif
-    if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
-            || EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
+    if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) {
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
         goto f_err;
     }
@@ -445,7 +443,12 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
         goto f_err;
     }
 
-    if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) {
+    j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen);
+
+    if (j < 0) {
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+        goto f_err;
+    } else if (j == 0) {
         al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
         goto f_err;
@@ -580,14 +583,19 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
     }
 
     if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype)
-            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0
-            || (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
-                && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) {
+            || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
         SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
         goto err;
     }
 
+    if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED
+            && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) {
+        al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     /*
      * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need
      * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should