int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type)
{
int ret;
+ size_t written = 0;
ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- s->init_num);
+ s->init_num, &written);
if (ret < 0)
return (-1);
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
*/
if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s,
(unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off],
- ret))
+ written))
return -1;
- if (ret == s->init_num) {
+ if (written == s->init_num) {
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data,
(size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s,
s->msg_callback_arg);
return (1);
}
- s->init_off += ret;
- s->init_num -= ret;
+ s->init_off += written;
+ s->init_num -= written;
return (0);
}
-int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
+int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype)
{
size_t msglen;
- if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt))
|| !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen)
|| msglen > INT_MAX)
return 0;
return 1;
}
-int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const char *sender, int slen)
+int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt)
{
- int i;
+ size_t finish_md_len;
+ const char *sender;
+ size_t slen;
+
+ if (s->server) {
+ sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
+ slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
+ } else {
+ sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
+ slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
+ }
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
- sender, slen,
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
- if (i <= 0) {
+ finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
+ sender, slen,
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md);
+ if (finish_md_len == 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = i;
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len;
- if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
if (!s->server) {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
+ OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
+ finish_md_len);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len;
} else {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
+ OPENSSL_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md,
+ finish_md_len);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len;
}
return 1;
static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s)
{
const char *sender;
- int slen;
+ size_t slen;
/*
* If no new cipher setup return immediately: other functions will set
* the appropriate error.
}
#endif
+/*
+ * Comparison function used in a call to qsort (see tls_collect_extensions()
+ * below.)
+ * The two arguments |p1| and |p2| are expected to be pointers to RAW_EXTENSIONs
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * 1 if the type for p1 is greater than p2
+ * 0 if the type for p1 and p2 are the same
+ * -1 if the type for p1 is less than p2
+ */
+static int compare_extensions(const void *p1, const void *p2)
+{
+ const RAW_EXTENSION *e1 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p1;
+ const RAW_EXTENSION *e2 = (const RAW_EXTENSION *)p2;
+
+ if (e1->type < e2->type)
+ return -1;
+ else if (e1->type > e2->type)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Gather a list of all the extensions. We don't actually process the content
+ * of the extensions yet, except to check their types.
+ *
+ * Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
+ * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
+ * This function returns 1 if all extensions are unique and we have parsed their
+ * types, and 0 if the extensions contain duplicates, could not be successfully
+ * parsed, or an internal error occurred.
+ */
+/*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): Refactor ServerHello extension parsing to use this and then
+ * remove tls1_check_duplicate_extensions()
+ */
+int tls_collect_extensions(PACKET *packet, RAW_EXTENSION **res,
+ size_t *numfound, int *ad)
+{
+ PACKET extensions = *packet;
+ size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *raw_extensions = NULL;
+
+ /* First pass: count the extensions. */
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&extensions) > 0) {
+ unsigned int type;
+ PACKET extension;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&extensions, &type) ||
+ !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ num_extensions++;
+ }
+
+ if (num_extensions > 0) {
+ raw_extensions = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*raw_extensions)
+ * num_extensions);
+ if (raw_extensions == NULL) {
+ *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Second pass: collect the extensions. */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(packet, &raw_extensions[i].type) ||
+ !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(packet,
+ &raw_extensions[i].data)) {
+ /* This should not happen. */
+ *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(packet) != 0) {
+ *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_COLLECT_EXTENSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
+ qsort(raw_extensions, num_extensions, sizeof(*raw_extensions),
+ compare_extensions);
+ for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+ if (raw_extensions[i - 1].type == raw_extensions[i].type) {
+ *ad = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *res = raw_extensions;
+ *numfound = num_extensions;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ OPENSSL_free(raw_extensions);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
- long remain;
+ size_t remain;
remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
/*
MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int al, i;
+ int al;
+ size_t md_len;
/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
}
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
- i = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
+ md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len;
- if ((unsigned long)i != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+ if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i) != 0) {
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+ md_len) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
goto f_err;
* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks
*/
if (s->server) {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = i;
+ OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+ md_len);
+ s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len;
} else {
- OPENSSL_assert(i <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, i);
- s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = i;
+ OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md,
+ md_len);
+ s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
}
return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING;
return 0;
}
- s->init_num = 1;
- s->init_off = 0;
-
return 1;
}
/* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */
int skip_message, i, recvd_type, al;
unsigned char *p;
- unsigned long l;
+ size_t l, readbytes;
p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type,
&p[s->init_num],
SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num,
- 0);
+ 0, &readbytes);
if (i <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
return 0;
* A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur
* in the middle of a handshake message.
*/
- if (s->init_num != 0 || i != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
+ if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER,
SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
- s->init_num = i - 1;
- s->s3->tmp.message_size = i;
+ s->init_num = readbytes - 1;
+ s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data;
+ s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes;
return 1;
} else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
- s->init_num += i;
+ s->init_num += readbytes;
}
skip_message = 0;
return 0;
}
-int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, unsigned long *len)
+int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len)
{
- long n;
+ size_t n, readbytes;
unsigned char *p;
int i;
n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num;
while (n > 0) {
i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL,
- &p[s->init_num], n, 0);
+ &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes);
if (i <= 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
*len = 0;
return 0;
}
- s->init_num += i;
- n -= i;
+ s->init_num += readbytes;
+ n -= readbytes;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
s->msg_callback_arg);
}
- /*
- * init_num should never be negative...should probably be declared
- * unsigned
- */
- if (s->init_num < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_BODY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *len = 0;
- return 0;
- }
- *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num;
+ *len = s->init_num;
return 1;
}
const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void);
} version_info;
-#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_2_VERSION
-# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_2_VERSION.
+#if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION
+# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION.
#endif
static const version_info tls_version_table[] = {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method},
+#else
+ {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL},
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
{TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method},
#else
*
* Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure.
*/
-int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s)
+int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello)
{
/*-
* With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with:
* handle version.
*/
int server_version = s->method->version;
- int client_version = s->client_version;
+ int client_version = hello->legacy_version;
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
int disabled = 0;
+ RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions;
+
+ s->client_version = client_version;
switch (server_version) {
default:
break;
}
+ suppversions = tls_get_extension_by_type(hello->pre_proc_exts,
+ hello->num_extensions,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions);
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(TLS1.3): We only look at this if our max protocol version is TLS1.3
+ * or above. Should we allow it for lower versions too?
+ */
+ if (suppversions != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && (s->max_proto_version == 0
+ || TLS1_3_VERSION <= s->max_proto_version)) {
+ unsigned int candidate_vers = 0;
+ unsigned int best_vers = 0;
+ const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL;
+ PACKET versionslist;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) {
+ /* Trailing or invalid data? */
+ return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
+ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
+ if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
+ candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+ if ((int)candidate_vers > s->client_version)
+ s->client_version = candidate_vers;
+ if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0)
+ continue;
+ for (vent = table;
+ vent->version != 0 && vent->version != (int)candidate_vers;
+ ++vent)
+ ;
+ if (vent->version != 0) {
+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
+
+ method = vent->smeth();
+ if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) {
+ best_vers = candidate_vers;
+ best_method = method;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) {
+ /* Trailing data? */
+ return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
+ }
+
+ if (best_vers > 0) {
+ s->version = best_vers;
+ s->method = best_method;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest
+ * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2
+ */
+ if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0)
+ client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+
+ /*
+ * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in
+ * the ClientHello.
+ */
for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
const SSL_METHOD *method;
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