/*
- * Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
/*
* Message header + 2 bytes for protocol version + number of random bytes +
- * + number of bytes in legacy session id + 2 bytes for ciphersuite
- * + 1 byte for legacy compression + 2 bytes for extension block length
- * + 6 bytes for key_share extension + 4 bytes for cookie extension header
- * + the number of bytes in the cookie
+ * + 1 byte for legacy session id length + number of bytes in legacy session id
+ * + 2 bytes for ciphersuite + 1 byte for legacy compression
+ * + 2 bytes for extension block length + 6 bytes for key_share extension
+ * + 4 bytes for cookie extension header + the number of bytes in the cookie
*/
-#define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE \
+#define MAX_HRR_SIZE (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 \
+ SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH + 2 + 1 + 2 + 6 + 4 \
+ MAX_COOKIE_SIZE)
return 1;
}
+int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs_cert(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ PACKET supported_sig_algs;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &supported_sig_algs)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&supported_sig_algs) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 1)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS_CERT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
int tls_parse_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx)
{
return 0;
}
- if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs)) {
+ if (!s->hit && !tls1_save_sigalgs(s, &supported_sig_algs, 0)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
return 0;
}
- hmaclen = sizeof(s->session_ctx->ext.cookie_hmac_key);
+ hmaclen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(hctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(hctx, data,
- rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
- || EVP_DigestSignFinal(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestSign(hctx, hmac, &hmaclen, data,
+ rawlen - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0
|| hmaclen != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(hctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
for (id = 0; PACKET_remaining(&identities) != 0; id++) {
PACKET identity;
unsigned long ticket_agel;
+ size_t idlen;
if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&identities, &identity)
|| !PACKET_get_net_4(&identities, &ticket_agel)) {
return 0;
}
+ idlen = PACKET_remaining(&identity);
if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL
- && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity),
- PACKET_remaining(&identity),
+ && !s->psk_find_session_cb(s, PACKET_data(&identity), idlen,
&sess)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
+ if(sess == NULL
+ && s->psk_server_callback != NULL
+ && idlen <= PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ char *pskid = NULL;
+ unsigned char pskdata[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ unsigned int pskdatalen;
+
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&identity, &pskid)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pskdatalen = s->psk_server_callback(s, pskid, pskdata,
+ sizeof(pskdata));
+ OPENSSL_free(pskid);
+ if (pskdatalen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ } else if (pskdatalen > 0) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
+
+ /*
+ * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
+ * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
+ */
+ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sess = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (sess == NULL
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(sess, pskdata,
+ pskdatalen)
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(sess, cipher)
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(sess,
+ TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_PSK,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pskdata, pskdatalen);
+ }
+ }
+
if (sess != NULL) {
/* We found a PSK */
SSL_SESSION *sesstmp = ssl_session_dup(sess, 0);
return 0;
}
+int tls_parse_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH,
+ SSL_R_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH_ENCODING_ERR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Add the server's renegotiation binding
*/
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
- if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL
- || (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
+ if ((s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_STOC_COOKIE,
+ SSL_R_NO_COOKIE_CALLBACK_SET);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff