Change Post Handshake auth so that it is opt-in

[openssl.git] / ssl / statem / extensions_clnt.c

diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
index 9bf2d1cb38fd2bcb2d2a5c6584977dd0c014511e..2d5b60a737c9dc3ca8f076f2d9f209f175647533 100644 (file)
--- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -530,21 +530,8 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
         return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
     }
 
-    /*
-     * TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list as to whether
-     * we should include versions <TLS1.2. For the moment we do. To be
-     * reviewed later.
-     */
     for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
-        /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
-        if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-            if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)) {
-                SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
-                         SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
-                         ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-                return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
-            }
-        } else if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
+        if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
             SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
                      SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
                      ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -744,7 +731,9 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
                                          unsigned int context, X509 *x,
                                          size_t chainidx)
 {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
     char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
     const unsigned char *id = NULL;
     size_t idlen = 0;
     SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
@@ -764,6 +753,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
         return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
     }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
     if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
         unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
         size_t psklen = 0;
@@ -815,6 +805,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
             OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
         }
     }
+#endif  /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
 
     SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
     s->psksession = psksess;
@@ -1202,23 +1193,8 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
                                                   X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
 {
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
-    if (!s->pha_forced) {
-        int i, n = 0;
-
-        /* check for cert, if present, we can do post-handshake auth */
-        if (s->cert == NULL)
-            return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
-
-        for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
-            if (s->cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL
-                    && s->cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
-                n++;
-        }
-
-        /* no identity certificates, so no extension */
-        if (n == 0)
-            return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
-    }
+    if (!s->pha_enabled)
+        return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
 
     /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
     if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
@@ -1675,7 +1651,15 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x,
         s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
     }
     if (!s->hit) {
-        /* If a new session then update it with the selected ALPN */
+        /*
+         * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
+         * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
+         */
+        if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
+            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN,
+                     ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+            return 0;
+        }
         s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
             OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len);
         if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
@@ -1776,24 +1760,20 @@ int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    /* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
-    if (version == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
-        version = TLS1_3_VERSION;
+    /*
+     * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
+     * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
+     */
+    if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+        SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+                 SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
+                 SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+        return 0;
+    }
 
     /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
-    if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) {
-        /*
-         * The only protocol version we support which has an HRR message is
-         * TLSv1.3, therefore we shouldn't be getting an HRR for anything else.
-         */
-        if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
-            SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
-                     SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS,
-                     SSL_R_BAD_HRR_VERSION);
-            return 0;
-        }
+    if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
         return 1;
-    }
 
     /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
     s->version = version;