-SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new()
- {
- SSL_SESSION *ss;
-
- ss=(SSL_SESSION *)Malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
- if (ss == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return(0);
- }
- memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION));
-
- ss->references=1;
- ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
- ss->time=time(NULL);
- return(ss);
- }
-
-int ssl_get_new_session(s, session)
-SSL *s;
-int session;
- {
- SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
-
- if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
-
- /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
- if (s->ctx->session_timeout != 0)
- ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
-
- if (s->session != NULL)
- {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session=NULL;
- }
-
- if (session)
- {
- if (s->version == SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION)
- {
- ss->ssl_version=2;
- ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
- else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
- {
- ss->ssl_version=3;
- ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
- else
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
- return(0);
- }
-
- for (;;)
- {
- SSL_SESSION *r;
-
- RAND_bytes(ss->session_id,ss->session_id_length);
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,
- (char *)ss);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- if (r == NULL) break;
- /* else - woops a session_id match */
- }
- }
- else
- {
- ss->session_id_length=0;
- }
-
- s->session=ss;
- ss->ssl_version=s->version;
-
- return(1);
- }
-
-int ssl_get_prev_session(s, len, session)
-SSL *s;
-int len;
-unsigned char *session;
- {
- SSL_SESSION *ret,data;
-
- /* conn_init();*/
- data.ssl_version=s->version;
- data.session_id_length=len;
- if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
- return(0);
- memcpy(data.session_id,session,len);;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,(char *)&data);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- if (ret == NULL)
- {
- int copy=1;
-
- s->ctx->sess_miss++;
- ret=NULL;
- if ((s->ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) &&
- ((ret=s->ctx->get_session_cb(s,session,len,©))
- != NULL))
- {
- s->ctx->sess_cb_hit++;
-
- /* The following should not return 1, otherwise,
- * things are very strange */
- SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret);
- /* auto free it */
- if (!copy)
- SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
- }
- if (ret == NULL) return(0);
- }
-
- if (ret->cipher == NULL)
- {
- char buf[5],*p;
- unsigned long l;
-
- p=buf;
- l=ret->cipher_id;
- l2n(l,p);
- if (ret->ssl_version == 3)
- ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2]));
- else
- ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1]));
- if (ret->cipher == NULL)
- return(0);
- }
-
- /* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got
- * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'Free' it we could
- * be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement
- * later - am I speaking rubbish?. */
- CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-
- if ((long)(ret->time+ret->timeout) < (long)time(NULL)) /* timeout */
- {
- s->ctx->sess_timeout++;
- /* remove it from the cache */
- SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,ret);
- SSL_SESSION_free(ret); /* again to actually Free it */
- return(0);
- }
-
- s->ctx->sess_hit++;
-
- /* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */
- /* again, just leave the session
- * if it is the same session, we have just incremented and
- * then decremented the reference count :-) */
- if (s->session != NULL)
- SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
- s->session=ret;
- return(1);
- }
-
-int SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx,c)
-SSL_CTX *ctx;
-SSL_SESSION *c;
- {
- SSL_SESSION *s;
-
- /* conn_init(); */
- CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,(char *)c);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- /* If the same session if is being 're-added', Free the old
- * one when the last person stops using it.
- * This will also work if it is alread in the cache.
- * The references will go up and then down :-) */
- if (s != NULL)
- {
- SSL_SESSION_free(s);
- return(0);
- }
- else
- return(1);
- }
-
-int SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx,c)
-SSL_CTX *ctx;
-SSL_SESSION *c;
- {
- SSL_SESSION *r;
- int ret=0;
-
- if ((c->session_id_length != 0) && (c != NULL))
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
- r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,(char *)c);
- if (r != NULL) ret=1;
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-
- if (ret)
- {
- r->not_resumable=1;
- if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
- ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,c);
- SSL_SESSION_free(r);
- }
- }
- else
- ret=0;
- return(ret);
- }
-
-void SSL_SESSION_free(ss)
-SSL_SESSION *ss;
- {
- int i;
-
- i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
- if (i > 0) return;
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl)
+/* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
+{
+ return (ssl->session);
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
+/* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ /*
+ * Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that
+ * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's non-null
+ * and when we up the reference count.
+ */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ sess = ssl->session;
+ if (sess)
+ sess->references++;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ return (sess);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp,
+ CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,
+ CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+}
+
+int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg));
+}
+
+void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx)
+{
+ return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx));
+}
+
+SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *ss;
+
+ ss = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ss));
+ if (ss == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ memset(ss, 0, sizeof(*ss));
+
+ ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */
+ ss->references = 1;
+ ss->timeout = 60 * 5 + 4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */
+ ss->time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
+ ss->prev = NULL;
+ ss->next = NULL;
+ ss->compress_meth = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ ss->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ ss->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ ss->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+# endif
+#endif
+ CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ss->psk_identity_hint = NULL;
+ ss->psk_identity = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ ss->srp_username = NULL;
+#endif
+ return (ss);
+}
+
+const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s,
+ unsigned int *len)
+{
+ if (len)
+ *len = s->session_id_length;
+ return s->session_id;
+}
+
+unsigned int SSL_SESSION_get_compress_id(const SSL_SESSION *s)
+{
+ return s->compress_meth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SSLv3/TLSv1 has 32 bytes (256 bits) of session ID space. As such, filling
+ * the ID with random junk repeatedly until we have no conflict is going to
+ * complete in one iteration pretty much "most" of the time (btw:
+ * understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations and we still can't avoid
+ * a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call it quits. Either the
+ * RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly very close to
+ * 2^256 SSL sessions to our server. How you might store that many sessions
+ * is perhaps a more interesting question ...
+ */
+
+#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+ unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+ unsigned int retry = 0;
+ do
+ if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+ (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)) ;
+ if (retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+ return 1;
+ /* else - woops a session_id match */
+ /*
+ * XXX We should also check the external cache -- but the probability of
+ * a collision is negligible, and we could not prevent the concurrent
+ * creation of sessions with identical IDs since we currently don't have
+ * means to atomically check whether a session ID already exists and make
+ * a reservation for it if it does not (this problem applies to the
+ * internal cache as well).
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
+{
+ /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
+
+ unsigned int tmp;
+ SSL_SESSION *ss = NULL;
+ GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
+
+ if ((ss = SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL)
+ return (0);
+
+ /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */
+ if (s->session_ctx->session_timeout == 0)
+ ss->timeout = SSL_get_default_timeout(s);
+ else
+ ss->timeout = s->session_ctx->session_timeout;
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = NULL;
+
+ if (session) {
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = SSL3_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = TLS1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == TLS1_1_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = TLS1_1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_BAD_VER;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else if (s->version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ ss->ssl_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+ ss->session_id_length = SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /*-
+ * If RFC5077 ticket, use empty session ID (as server).
+ * Note that:
+ * (a) ssl_get_prev_session() does lookahead into the
+ * ClientHello extensions to find the session ticket.
+ * When ssl_get_prev_session() fails, s3_srvr.c calls
+ * ssl_get_new_session() in ssl3_get_client_hello().
+ * At that point, it has not yet parsed the extensions,
+ * however, because of the lookahead, it already knows
+ * whether a ticket is expected or not.
+ *
+ * (b) s3_clnt.c calls ssl_get_new_session() before parsing
+ * ServerHello extensions, and before recording the session
+ * ID received from the server, so this block is a noop.
+ */
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
+ ss->session_id_length = 0;
+ goto sess_id_done;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (s->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->generate_session_id;
+ else if (s->session_ctx->generate_session_id)
+ cb = s->session_ctx->generate_session_id;
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ /* Choose a session ID */
+ tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+ if (!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) {
+ /* The callback failed */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. nor
+ * set it higher than it was.
+ */
+ if (!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) {
+ /* The callback set an illegal length */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+ ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+ /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+ if (SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
+ ss->session_id_length)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return (0);
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ sess_id_done:
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
+ ss->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (ss->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ } else {
+ ss->session_id_length = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ memcpy(ss->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length);
+ ss->sid_ctx_length = s->sid_ctx_length;
+ s->session = ss;
+ ss->ssl_version = s->version;
+ ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ return (1);
+}
+
+/*-
+ * ssl_get_prev attempts to find an SSL_SESSION to be used to resume this
+ * connection. It is only called by servers.
+ *
+ * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
+ * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
+ * extension, if any.
+ * len: the length of the session ID.
+ * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * -1: error
+ * 0: a session may have been found.
+ *
+ * Side effects:
+ * - If a session is found then s->session is pointed at it (after freeing an
+ * existing session if need be) and s->verify_result is set from the session.
+ * - Both for new and resumed sessions, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 1
+ * if the server should issue a new session ticket (to 0 otherwise).
+ */
+int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
+ const unsigned char *limit)
+{
+ /* This is used only by servers. */
+
+ SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL;
+ int fatal = 0;
+ int try_session_cache = 1;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ int r;
+#endif
+
+ if (len < 0 || len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (session_id + len > limit) {
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ try_session_cache = 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ /* sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected */
+ r = tls1_process_ticket(s, session_id, len, limit, &ret);
+ switch (r) {
+ case -1: /* Error during processing */
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ case 0: /* No ticket found */
+ case 1: /* Zero length ticket found */
+ break; /* Ok to carry on processing session id. */
+ case 2: /* Ticket found but not decrypted. */
+ case 3: /* Ticket decrypted, *ret has been set. */
+ try_session_cache = 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ abort();
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (try_session_cache &&
+ ret == NULL &&
+ !(s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) {
+ SSL_SESSION data;
+ data.ssl_version = s->version;
+ data.session_id_length = len;
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+ memcpy(data.session_id, session_id, len);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ ret = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(s->session_ctx->sessions, &data);
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_miss++;
+ }
+
+ if (try_session_cache &&
+ ret == NULL && s->session_ctx->get_session_cb != NULL) {
+ int copy = 1;
+
+ if ((ret = s->session_ctx->get_session_cb(s, session_id, len, ©))) {
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++;
+
+ /*
+ * Increment reference count now if the session callback asks us
+ * to do so (note that if the session structures returned by the
+ * callback are shared between threads, it must handle the
+ * reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], or things won't be
+ * thread-safe).
+ */
+ if (copy)
+ CRYPTO_add(&ret->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+
+ /*
+ * Add the externally cached session to the internal cache as
+ * well if and only if we are supposed to.
+ */
+ if (!
+ (s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode &
+ SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) {
+ /*
+ * The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are
+ * very strange
+ */
+ if (SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, ret))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Now ret is non-NULL and we own one of its reference counts. */
+
+ if (ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length
+ || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, ret->sid_ctx_length)) {
+ /*
+ * We have the session requested by the client, but we don't want to
+ * use it in this context.
+ */
+ goto err; /* treat like cache miss */
+ }
+
+ if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && s->sid_ctx_length == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We can't be sure if this session is being used out of context,
+ * which is especially important for SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The application
+ * should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context. For this error
+ * case, we generate an error instead of treating the event like a
+ * cache miss (otherwise it would be easy for applications to
+ * effectively disable the session cache by accident without anyone
+ * noticing).
+ */
+
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,
+ SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED);
+ fatal = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->cipher == NULL) {
+ unsigned char buf[5], *p;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ p = buf;
+ l = ret->cipher_id;
+ l2n(l, p);
+ if ((ret->ssl_version >> 8) >= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+ ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[2]));
+ else
+ ret->cipher = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &(buf[1]));
+ if (ret->cipher == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) { /* timeout */
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_timeout++;
+ if (try_session_cache) {
+ /* session was from the cache, so remove it */
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, ret);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = ret;
+ s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result;
+ return 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(ret);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (!try_session_cache) {
+ /*
+ * The session was from a ticket, so we should issue a ticket for
+ * the new session
+ */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ if (fatal)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION *s;
+
+ /*
+ * add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache even though
+ * it has two ways of access: each session is in a doubly linked list and
+ * an lhash
+ */
+ CRYPTO_add(&c->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+ /*
+ * if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later
+ */
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ s = lh_SSL_SESSION_insert(ctx->sessions, c);
+
+ /*
+ * s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. In this
+ * case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify
+ * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble.
+ */
+ if (s != NULL && s != c) {
+ /* We *are* in trouble ... */
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, s);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s);
+ /*
+ * ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache (we cannot
+ * handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical session ID in the
+ * same cache, which could happen e.g. when two threads concurrently
+ * obtain the same session from an external cache)
+ */
+ s = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */
+ if (s == NULL)
+ SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx, c);
+
+ if (s != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference
+ * count because it already takes into account the cache
+ */
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large
+ */
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) {
+ while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) >
+ SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) {
+ if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, ctx->session_cache_tail, 0))
+ break;
+ else
+ ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c)
+{
+ return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1);
+}
+
+static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
+{
+ SSL_SESSION *r;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) {
+ if (lck)
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if ((r = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ctx->sessions, c)) == c) {
+ ret = 1;
+ r = lh_SSL_SESSION_delete(ctx->sessions, c);
+ SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx, c);
+ }
+
+ if (lck)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ r->not_resumable = 1;
+ if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL)
+ ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx, r);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(r);
+ }
+ } else
+ ret = 0;
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (ss == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ i = CRYPTO_add(&ss->references, -1, CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
+#ifdef REF_PRINT
+ REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION", ss);
+#endif
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;