+
+ struct {
+ long flags;
+ size_t read_mac_secret_size;
+ unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t write_mac_secret_size;
+ unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
+ /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */
+ int need_empty_fragments;
+ int empty_fragment_done;
+ /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */
+ BIO *handshake_buffer;
+ /*
+ * When handshake digest is determined, buffer is hashed and
+ * freed and MD_CTX for the required digest is stored here.
+ */
+ EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_dgst;
+ /*
+ * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed.
+ * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received.
+ * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert.
+ */
+ int change_cipher_spec;
+ int warn_alert;
+ int fatal_alert;
+ /*
+ * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close
+ * alert via the warning alert
+ */
+ int alert_dispatch;
+ unsigned char send_alert[2];
+ /*
+ * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there
+ * is no more data in the read or write buffers
+ */
+ int renegotiate;
+ int total_renegotiations;
+ int num_renegotiations;
+ int in_read_app_data;
+ struct {
+ /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */
+ unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+ size_t finish_md_len;
+ unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2];
+ size_t peer_finish_md_len;
+ size_t message_size;
+ int message_type;
+ /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */
+ const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher;
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* holds short lived DH/ECDH key */
+# endif
+ /* used for certificate requests */
+ int cert_req;
+ /* Certificate types in certificate request message. */
+ uint8_t *ctype;
+ size_t ctype_len;
+ /* Certificate authorities list peer sent */
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *peer_ca_names;
+ size_t key_block_length;
+ unsigned char *key_block;
+ const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc;
+ const EVP_MD *new_hash;
+ int new_mac_pkey_type;
+ size_t new_mac_secret_size;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ const SSL_COMP *new_compression;
+# else
+ char *new_compression;
+# endif
+ int cert_request;
+ /* Raw values of the cipher list from a client */
+ unsigned char *ciphers_raw;
+ size_t ciphers_rawlen;
+ /* Temporary storage for premaster secret */
+ unsigned char *pms;
+ size_t pmslen;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* Temporary storage for PSK key */
+ unsigned char *psk;
+ size_t psklen;
+# endif
+ /* Signature algorithm we actually use */
+ const struct sigalg_lookup_st *sigalg;
+ /* Pointer to certificate we use */
+ CERT_PKEY *cert;
+ /*
+ * signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature
+ * algorithms extension for server or as part of a certificate
+ * request for client.
+ * Keep track of the algorithms for TLS and X.509 usage separately.
+ */
+ uint16_t *peer_sigalgs;
+ uint16_t *peer_cert_sigalgs;
+ /* Size of above arrays */
+ size_t peer_sigalgslen;
+ size_t peer_cert_sigalgslen;
+ /* Sigalg peer actually uses */
+ const struct sigalg_lookup_st *peer_sigalg;
+ /*
+ * Set if corresponding CERT_PKEY can be used with current
+ * SSL session: e.g. appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc.
+ * If zero it can't be used at all.
+ */
+ uint32_t valid_flags[SSL_PKEY_NUM];
+ /*
+ * For servers the following masks are for the key and auth algorithms
+ * that are supported by the certs below. For clients they are masks of
+ * *disabled* algorithms based on the current session.
+ */
+ uint32_t mask_k;
+ uint32_t mask_a;
+ /*
+ * The following are used by the client to see if a cipher is allowed or
+ * not. It contains the minimum and maximum version the client's using
+ * based on what it knows so far.
+ */
+ int min_ver;
+ int max_ver;
+ } tmp;
+
+ /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */
+ unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t previous_client_finished_len;
+ unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t previous_server_finished_len;
+ int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+ /*
+ * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer.
+ */
+ int npn_seen;
+# endif
+
+ /*
+ * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to
+ * ALPN.)
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the
+ * ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol
+ * that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed.
+ */
+ unsigned char *alpn_selected;
+ size_t alpn_selected_len;
+ /* used by the server to know what options were proposed */
+ unsigned char *alpn_proposed;
+ size_t alpn_proposed_len;
+ /* used by the client to know if it actually sent alpn */
+ int alpn_sent;
+
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ /*
+ * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari
+ * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on
+ * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support.
+ */
+ char is_probably_safari;
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
+
+ /* For clients: peer temporary key */
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH)
+ /* The group_id for the DH/ECDH key */
+ uint16_t group_id;
+ EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp;
+# endif
+
+ } s3;
+