sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list),
&(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),
- meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
+ SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert);
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
return(s);
err:
if (s != NULL)
- {
- if (s->cert != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(s->cert);
- if (s->ctx != NULL)
- SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
- OPENSSL_free(s);
- }
+ SSL_free(s);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return(NULL);
}
r.ssl_version = ssl->version;
r.session_id_length = id_len;
memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len);
- /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a
- * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it
- * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be
- * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */
- if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) &&
- (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH))
- {
- memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0,
- SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len);
- r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH;
- }
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r);
OPENSSL_free(s->next_proto_negotiated);
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (s->srtp_profiles)
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
OPENSSL_free(s);
}
l=s->max_cert_list;
s->max_cert_list=larg;
return(l);
- case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1
- if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu())
- return 0;
-#endif
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- {
- s->d1->mtu = larg;
- return larg;
- }
- return 0;
case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT:
if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
return 0;
ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto err;
}
+ p += n;
continue;
}
return(NULL);
}
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE);
return NULL;
}
-#endif
if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0)
{
ret->quiet_shutdown=0;
/* ret->cipher=NULL;*/
-/* ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
+/*-
+ ret->s2->challenge=NULL;
ret->master_key=NULL;
- ret->key_arg=NULL;
ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */
ret->info_callback=NULL;
ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method,
&ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id,
- meth->version == SSL2_VERSION ? "SSLv2" : SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert);
+ SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert);
if (ret->cipher_list == NULL
|| sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0)
{
if (!ret->param)
goto err;
- if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL)
- {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES);
- goto err2;
- }
if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES);
a->comp_methods = NULL;
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
if (a->srtp_profiles)
sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles);
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
if (a->psk_identity_hint)
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
+ fprintf(stderr,"rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d ecdht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n",
rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp,have_ecdh_tmp,
rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa);
#endif
x = cpk->x509;
/* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1;
+#endif
ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ?
(x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1;
if (!(cpk->valid_flags & CERT_PKEY_SIGN))
if (i == 0)
{
- if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
- {
- /* assume it is the socket being closed */
+ if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
+ (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
- }
- else
- {
- if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) &&
- (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY))
- return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN);
- }
}
return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL);
}
return("TLSv1");
else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
return("SSLv3");
- else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)
- return("SSLv2");
else
return("unknown");
}
SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx)
{
+ CERT *ocert = ssl->cert;
if (ssl->ctx == ctx)
return ssl->ctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
if (ctx == NULL)
ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
#endif
- if (ssl->cert != NULL)
- ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert);
ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert);
+ if (ocert)
+ {
+ /* Preserve any already negotiated parameters */
+ if (ssl->server)
+ {
+ ssl->cert->peer_sigalgs = ocert->peer_sigalgs;
+ ssl->cert->peer_sigalgslen = ocert->peer_sigalgslen;
+ ocert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ ssl->cert->ciphers_raw = ocert->ciphers_raw;
+ ssl->cert->ciphers_rawlen = ocert->ciphers_rawlen;
+ ocert->ciphers_raw = NULL;
+ }
+ ssl_cert_free(ocert);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH),
+ * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system.
+ */
+ OPENSSL_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+
+ /*
+ * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX,
+ * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does
+ * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context),
+ * leave it unchanged.
+ */
+ if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) &&
+ (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) &&
+ (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0))
+ {
+ ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length;
+ memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx));
+ }
+
CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl->ctx != NULL)
SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */
ssl->ctx = ctx;
+
return(ssl->ctx);
}