#include "ssl_locl.h"
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+ {
+ static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ if (((size_t)&ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx&(sizeof(ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx)-1))
+ ==0) /* check alignment, practically always true */
{
- static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx= -1;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret=ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) < 0)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if ((ret=ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx) < 0)
+ {
+ ret=ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx=X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(
+ 0,"SSL for verify callback",NULL,NULL,NULL);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ }
+ return ret;
+ }
+ else /* commonly eliminated */
+ {
CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
if (ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx < 0)
return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
}
+ }
-static void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
+void ssl_cert_set_default_md(CERT *cert)
{
/* Set digest values to defaults */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
- cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
+ cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
#endif
}
if (cpk->chain)
{
- rpk->chain = sk_X509_dup(cpk->chain);
+ rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
if (!rpk->chain)
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(rpk->chain); i++)
+ }
+ rpk->valid_flags = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL)
+ {
+ /* Just copy everything. */
+ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo =
+ OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
+ if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL)
{
- X509 *x = sk_X509_value(rpk->chain, i);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
}
+ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length =
+ cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length;
+ memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+ cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo,
+ cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length);
}
+#endif
}
ret->references=1;
* will be set during handshake.
*/
ssl_cert_set_default_md(ret);
- /* Sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
- ret->sigalgs = NULL;
- ret->sigalgslen = 0;
+ /* Peer sigalgs set to NULL as we get these from handshake too */
+ ret->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ ret->peer_sigalgslen = 0;
+ /* Configured sigalgs however we copy across */
+
+ if (cert->conf_sigalgs)
+ {
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+ if (!ret->conf_sigalgs)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs,
+ cert->conf_sigalgslen);
+ ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
+
+ if (cert->client_sigalgs)
+ {
+ ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen);
+ if (!ret->client_sigalgs)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
+ cert->client_sigalgslen);
+ ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
+ }
+ else
+ ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
+ /* Shared sigalgs also NULL */
+ ret->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ /* Copy any custom client certificate types */
+ if (cert->ctypes)
+ {
+ ret->ctypes = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->ctype_num);
+ if (!ret->ctypes)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->ctypes, cert->ctypes, cert->ctype_num);
+ ret->ctype_num = cert->ctype_num;
+ }
+
+ ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
+
+ ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+ ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+ if (cert->verify_store)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_add(&cert->verify_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+ }
+
+ if (cert->chain_store)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_add(&cert->chain_store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
+ }
+
+ ret->ciphers_raw = NULL;
return(ret);
EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
- if (rpk->x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(rpk->x509);
- if (rpk->privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(rpk->privatekey);
- if (rpk->chain)
- sk_X509_pop_free(rpk->chain, X509_free);
- }
-
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(ret);
return NULL;
}
+/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
+
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509)
+ {
+ X509_free(cpk->x509);
+ cpk->x509 = NULL;
+ }
+ if (cpk->privatekey)
+ {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+ cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+ }
+ if (cpk->chain)
+ {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ cpk->chain = NULL;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (cpk->serverinfo)
+ {
+ OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
+ cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
+ cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Clear all flags apart from explicit sign */
+ cpk->valid_flags &= CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN;
+ }
+ }
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
{
if (c->ecdh_tmp) EC_KEY_free(c->ecdh_tmp);
#endif
- for (i=0; i<SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
- {
- CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
- if (cpk->x509 != NULL)
- X509_free(cpk->x509);
- if (cpk->privatekey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
- if (cpk->chain)
- sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
-#if 0
- if (c->pkeys[i].publickey != NULL)
- EVP_PKEY_free(c->pkeys[i].publickey);
-#endif
- }
- if (c->sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+ if (c->peer_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->peer_sigalgs);
+ if (c->conf_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ if (c->client_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ if (c->shared_sigalgs)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+ if (c->ctypes)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->ctypes);
+ if (c->verify_store)
+ X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+ if (c->chain_store)
+ X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
+ if (c->ciphers_raw)
+ OPENSSL_free(c->ciphers_raw);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *c, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
- X509 *x;
- int i;
if (!chain)
return ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, NULL);
- dchain = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+ dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
if (!dchain)
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dchain); i++)
- {
- x = sk_X509_value(dchain, i);
- CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
- }
if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(c, dchain))
{
sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
return 1;
}
+int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+ {
+ int i;
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey)
+ {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x))
+ {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op)
+ {
+ int i, idx;
+ if (!c)
+ return 0;
+ if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST)
+ idx = 0;
+ else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT)
+ {
+ idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
+ if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ return 0;
+ for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey)
+ {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+ {
+ c->cert_cb = cb;
+ c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+ }
+
SESS_CERT *ssl_sess_cert_new(void)
{
SESS_CERT *ret;
return(1);
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+static void tlsa_free(void *parent,void *ptr,CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,int idx,long argl,void *argp)
+ {
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex = ptr;
+
+ if (ex!=NULL)
+ {
+ if (ex->tlsa_record!=NULL && ex->tlsa_record!=(void *)-1)
+ OPENSSL_free(ex->tlsa_record);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ex);
+ }
+ }
+
+int SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx(void)
+ {
+ static volatile int ssl_tlsa_idx= -1;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ if (((size_t)&ssl_tlsa_idx&(sizeof(ssl_tlsa_idx)-1))
+ ==0) /* check alignment, practically always true */
+ {
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ret=ssl_tlsa_idx) < 0)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ if ((ret=ssl_tlsa_idx) < 0)
+ {
+ ret=ssl_tlsa_idx=SSL_get_ex_new_index(
+ 0,"per-SSL TLSA",NULL,NULL,tlsa_free);
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+ else /* commonly eliminated */
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ if (ssl_tlsa_idx < 0)
+ {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (ssl_tlsa_idx < 0)
+ {
+ ssl_tlsa_idx=SSL_get_ex_new_index(
+ 0,"pre-SSL TLSA",NULL,NULL,tlsa_free);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+
+ return ssl_tlsa_idx;
+ }
+ }
+
+TLSA_EX_DATA *SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data(SSL *ssl)
+ {
+ int idx = SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx();
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex;
+
+ if ((ex=SSL_get_ex_data(ssl,idx)) == NULL)
+ {
+ ex = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TLSA_EX_DATA));
+ ex->tlsa_record = NULL;
+ ex->tlsa_witness = -1;
+ SSL_set_ex_data(ssl,idx,ex);
+ }
+
+ return ex;
+ }
+
+/*
+ * return value:
+ * -1: format or digest error
+ * 0: match
+ * 1: no match
+ */
+static int tlsa_cmp(const X509 *cert, const unsigned char *tlsa_record, unsigned int reclen)
+ {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned int len, selector, matching_type;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (reclen<3 || tlsa_record[0]>3) return -1;
+
+ selector = tlsa_record[1];
+ matching_type = tlsa_record[2];
+ tlsa_record += 3;
+ reclen -= 3;
+
+ switch (matching_type) {
+ case 0: /* exact match */
+ if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */
+ ret = EVP_Digest(tlsa_record,reclen,digest,&len,EVP_sha1(),NULL);
+ return ret ? memcmp(cert->sha1_hash,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
+ }
+ else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
+ ASN1_BIT_STRING *key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(cert);
+
+ if (key == NULL) return -1;
+ if (key->length != reclen) return 1;
+
+ return memcmp(key->data,tlsa_record,reclen)!=0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+
+ case 1: /* SHA256 */
+ case 2: /* SHA512 */
+ md = matching_type==1 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha512();
+
+ if (reclen!=EVP_MD_size(md)) return -1;
+
+ if (selector==0) { /* full certificate */
+ ret = X509_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
+ }
+ else if (selector==1) { /* SubjectPublicKeyInfo */
+ ret = X509_pubkey_digest(cert,md,digest,&len);
+ }
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ return ret ? memcmp(tlsa_record,digest,len)!=0 : -1;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+static int dane_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
+ {
+ SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ int depth=X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,depth);
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex;
+ const unsigned char *tlsa_record;
+ int tlsa_ret=-1, mask=1;
+
+
+ if ((ex=SSL_get_ex_data(s, SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx())) == NULL ||
+ (tlsa_record=ex->tlsa_record) == NULL ||
+ (tlsa_record==(void *)-1 && (ok=0,ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA)) || /* temporary code? */
+ /*
+ * X509_verify_cert initially starts throwing ok=0 upon
+ * failure to build certificate chain. As all certificate
+ * usages except for 3 require verifiable chain, ok=0 at
+ * non-zero depth is fatal. More specifically ok=0 at zero
+ * depth is allowed only for usage 3. Special note about
+ * usage 2. The chain is supposed to be filled by
+ * dane_get_issuer, or once again we should tolerate ok=0
+ * only in usage 3 case.
+ */
+ (!ok && depth!=0)) {
+ if (s->verify_callback) return s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
+ else return ok;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ unsigned int reclen, certificate_usage;
+
+ memcpy(&reclen,tlsa_record,sizeof(reclen));
+
+ if (reclen==0) break;
+
+ tlsa_record += sizeof(reclen);
+
+ if (!(ex->tlsa_mask&mask)) { /* not matched yet */
+ /*
+ * tlsa_record[0] Certificate Usage field
+ * tlsa_record[1] Selector field
+ * tlsa_record[2] Matching Type Field
+ * tlsa_record+3 Certificate Association data
+ */
+ certificate_usage = tlsa_record[0];
+
+ if (depth==0 || certificate_usage==0 || certificate_usage==2) {
+ tlsa_ret = tlsa_cmp(cert,tlsa_record,reclen);
+ if (tlsa_ret==0) {
+ ex->tlsa_witness = depth<<8|certificate_usage;
+ ex->tlsa_mask |= mask;
+ break;
+ }
+ else if (tlsa_ret==-1) {
+ ex->tlsa_witness = -1; /* something phishy? */
+ ex->tlsa_mask |= mask;
+ }
+ }
+
+ }
+ tlsa_record += reclen;
+ mask <<= 1;
+ }
+
+ if (depth==0) {
+ if (ex->tlsa_witness==-1) /* no match */
+ ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, ok=0;
+ else
+ ctx->error = X509_V_OK, ok=1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->verify_callback) return s->verify_callback(ok,ctx);
+ else return ok;
+ }
+
+static int dane_get_issuer(X509 **issuer,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,X509 *x)
+ {
+ SSL *s = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex=SSL_get_ex_data(s, SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx());
+
+ /* XXX TODO */
+
+ return ex->get_issuer(issuer,ctx,x);
+ }
+#endif
+
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s,STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
X509 *x;
int i;
+ X509_STORE *verify_store;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+ TLSA_EX_DATA *ex;
+#endif
+
+ if (s->cert->verify_store)
+ verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
+ else
+ verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0))
return(0);
x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
- if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,sk))
+ if(!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,verify_store,x,sk))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
}
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
#if 0
if (SSL_get_verify_depth(s) >= 0)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx, SSL_get_verify_depth(s));
*/
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), s->param);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DANE
+ if (!s->server &&
+ (ex=SSL_get_ex_data(s, SSL_get_TLSA_ex_data_idx()))!=NULL)
+ {
+ const unsigned char *tlsa_record = ex->tlsa_record;
+
+ /*
+ * See if there are usable certificates we can add
+ * to chain.
+ */
+ while (tlsa_record!=(void *)-1)
+ {
+ unsigned int reclen;
+
+ memcpy (&reclen,tlsa_record,sizeof(reclen));
+
+ if (reclen==0) break;
+
+ tlsa_record += sizeof(reclen);
+
+ if (tlsa_record[0]==2 &&
+ tlsa_record[1]==0 && /* full certificate */
+ tlsa_record[2]==0) /* itself */
+ {
+ ex->get_issuer = ctx.get_issuer;
+ ctx.get_issuer = dane_get_issuer;
+
+ break;
+ }
+ tlsa_record += reclen;
+ }
+
+ ex->tlsa_mask = 0;
+ ex->tlsa_witness = -1;
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, dane_verify_callback);
+ }
+ else
+#endif
if (s->verify_callback)
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, s->verify_callback);
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs;
+ X509_STORE *chain_store;
if (cpk)
x = cpk->x509;
else
x = NULL;
+ if (s->cert->chain_store)
+ chain_store = s->cert->chain_store;
+ else
+ chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store;
+
/* If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use
* parent ctx.
*/
{
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
- if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,s->ctx->cert_store,x,NULL))
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx,chain_store,x,NULL))
{
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN,ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return(0);
return 1;
}
+/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
+int ssl_build_cert_chain(CERT *c, X509_STORE *chain_store, int flags)
+ {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+ X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ int i, rv = 0;
+ unsigned long error;
+
+ if (!cpk->x509)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
+ {
+ chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (!chain_store)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x))
+ {
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+ ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509))
+ {
+ error = ERR_peek_last_error();
+ if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) != ERR_LIB_X509 ||
+ ERR_GET_REASON(error) != X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE)
+ goto err;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (c->chain_store)
+ chain_store = c->chain_store;
+
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
+ untrusted = cpk->chain;
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted))
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
+
+ i = X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR)
+ {
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = 1;
+ rv = 2;
+ }
+ if (i > 0)
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(&xs_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
+ i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(&xs_ctx);
+ ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:",
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
+ if (cpk->chain)
+ sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free);
+ /* Remove EE certificate from chain */
+ x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT)
+ {
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0)
+ {
+ /* See if last cert is self signed */
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
+ {
+ x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
+ X509_free(x);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ cpk->chain = chain;
+ if (rv == 0)
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
+ X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
+
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
+ {
+ X509_STORE **pstore;
+ if (chain)
+ pstore = &c->chain_store;
+ else
+ pstore = &c->verify_store;
+ if (*pstore)
+ X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
+ *pstore = store;
+ if (ref && store)
+ CRYPTO_add(&store->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff