#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
-static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
- int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, int sslv2format);
+static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
+ PACKET *cipher_suites,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
+ int sslv2format, int *al);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
-
-static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
-{
- if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
- return (SSLv3_server_method());
- else
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
- ssl3_accept,
- ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method)
-#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
{
}
#endif
-int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
-{
- BUF_MEM *buf;
- unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL);
- void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
- int ret = -1;
- int new_state, state, skip = 0;
-
- RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0);
- ERR_clear_error();
- clear_sys_error();
-
- if (s->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
-
- /* init things to blank */
- s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
- if (!SSL_clear(s))
- return -1;
- }
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
- /*
- * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and
- * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during
- * handshakes anyway.
- */
- if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) {
- s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
- s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
- }
-#endif
-
- for (;;) {
- state = s->state;
-
- switch (s->state) {
- case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
- s->renegotiate = 1;
- /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
-
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
- case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
- case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
-
- s->server = 1;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
-
- if ((s->version >> 8 != 3) && s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, s->version, NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
- return -1;
- }
-
- s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
-
- if (s->init_buf == NULL) {
- if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) {
- BUF_MEM_free(buf);
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_buf = buf;
- }
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
- s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- /*
- * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too.
- */
- s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
-
- if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
- /*
- * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the
- * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
- */
- if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
- } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
- !(s->options &
- SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
- /*
- * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't
- * support secure renegotiation.
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
- SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- } else {
- /*
- * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a
- * HelloRequest
- */
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
-
- s->shutdown = 0;
- ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
-
- ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D;
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D:
- {
- int al;
- if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
- /*
- * callback indicates firther work to be done
- */
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- goto end;
- }
- if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- /*
- * This is not really an error but the only means to for
- * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
- */
- if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- s->renegotiate = 2;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->hit) {
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- }
-#else
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
-#endif
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
- /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
- /* normal PSK or SRP */
- if (!
- (s->s3->tmp.
- new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
-&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- } else {
- skip = 1;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- }
-#else
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
-
- /*
- * clear this, it may get reset by
- * send_server_key_exchange
- */
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0;
-
- /*
- * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a
- * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For
- * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if
- * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases,
- * the server certificate contains the server's public key for
- * key exchange.
- */
- if (0
- /*
- * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if
- * provided
- */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
- || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
-#endif
- || (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)
- || (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE)
- || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
- && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
- || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys
- [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) *
- 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
- )
- )
- )
- ) {
- ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- } else
- skip = 1;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
- if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
- /*
- * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert
- * during re-negotiation:
- */
- ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
- /*
- * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see
- * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in
- * RFC 2246):
- */
- ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
- /*
- * ... except when the application insists on
- * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts
- * this for SSL 3)
- */
- !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
- /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */
- (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP)
- /*
- * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests
- * are omitted
- */
- || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- /* no cert request */
- skip = 1;
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- }
- } else {
- s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
- ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
-
- /*
- * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending
- * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as
- * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely
- * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of
- * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush
- * unconditionally.
- */
-
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
- if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
-
- s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
- if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (ret == 2) {
- /*
- * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH
- * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is
- * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses
- * its key from the certificate for key exchange.
- */
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- if (!s->session->peer)
- break;
- if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- /*
- * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
- * extms we've done this already.
- */
- if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS)) {
- s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- }
- } else {
- int offset = 0;
- int dgst_num;
-
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- /*
- * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
- * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
- * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
- * step
- */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- }
- for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++)
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
- int dgst_size;
-
- s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
- EVP_MD_CTX_type
- (s->
- s3->handshake_dgst
- [dgst_num]),
- &(s->s3->
- tmp.cert_verify_md
- [offset]));
- dgst_size =
- EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
- if (dgst_size < 0) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- }
- offset += dgst_size;
- }
- }
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
- ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
- /*
- * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the
- * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be
- * cautious.
- * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
- * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
- * the client's Finished message is read.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
-
- ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->init_num = 0;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
- break;
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
- /*
- * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has
- * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make
- * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates.
- * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is
- * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until
- * the client's Finished message is read.
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
- s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
- ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- if (s->hit)
- s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
-#endif
- else
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
-#endif
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
-
- s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,
- SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
-
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
- SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
- {
- ret = -1;
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- goto end;
- }
-
- break;
-
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
- case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
- ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
- SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,
- SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
- s->method->
- ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
- if (ret <= 0)
- goto end;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
- if (s->hit) {
-#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#else
- if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
- } else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
-#endif
- } else
- s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
- s->init_num = 0;
- break;
-
- case SSL_ST_OK:
- /* clean a few things up */
- ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
-
- BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
- s->init_buf = NULL;
-
- /* remove buffering on output */
- ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
-
- s->init_num = 0;
-
- if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a
- * HelloRequest */
- s->renegotiate = 0;
- s->new_session = 0;
-
- ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
-
- s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
- /* s->server=1; */
- s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
-
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
- }
-
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
-
- case SSL_ST_ERR:
- default:
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
- ret = -1;
- goto end;
- /* break; */
- }
-
- if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
- if (s->debug) {
- if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
- goto end;
- }
-
- if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
- new_state = s->state;
- s->state = state;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
- s->state = new_state;
- }
- }
- skip = 0;
- }
- end:
- /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
-
- s->in_handshake--;
- if (cb != NULL)
- cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
- return (ret);
-}
-
-int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
+int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s)
{
-
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
+ return 1;
}
-int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
+enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1;
- unsigned int cookie_len;
- long n;
+ int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ unsigned int j, complen = 0;
unsigned long id;
- unsigned char *p, *d;
SSL_CIPHER *c;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- unsigned char *q = NULL;
SSL_COMP *comp = NULL;
#endif
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
int protverr = 1;
+ /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */
+ PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie;
+ int is_v2_record;
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet)
- goto retry_cert;
-
- /*
- * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are
- * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down
- * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we
- * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1.
- */
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
- }
- s->first_packet = 1;
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
- s->first_packet = 0;
- d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer);
+ PACKET_null_init(&cookie);
/* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */
- if (!s->read_hash && !s->enc_read_ctx
- && RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
- if (n < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
+ if (is_v2_record) {
+ unsigned int version;
+ unsigned int mt;
/*-
* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
* header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
* ... ...
*/
- if (p[0] != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt)
+ || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) {
/*
* Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record
* layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record
* in the first place
*/
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- if ((p[1] == 0x00) && (p[2] == 0x02)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) {
+ /* No protocol version supplied! */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (version == 0x0002) {
/* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
- } else if (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) {
/* SSLv3/TLS */
- s->client_version = (((int)p[1]) << 8) | (int)p[2];
+ s->client_version = version;
} else {
/* No idea what protocol this is */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
goto err;
}
} else {
/*
- * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte
- * for session id length
+ * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
+ * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
*/
- if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) {
+ if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
-
- /*
- * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may
- * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
- */
- s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1];
}
/* Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable */
if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if (s->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- if (s->client_version >= s->version
- && (((s->client_version >> 8) & 0xff) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)) {
+ if (s->client_version >= s->version) {
protverr = 0;
}
- } else if (((s->client_version >> 8) & 0xff) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ } else if (s->client_version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
switch(s->client_version) {
default:
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
}
/* Deliberately fall through */
case SSL3_VERSION:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
if(!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) {
s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
s->method = SSLv3_server_method();
protverr = 0;
break;
}
+#else
+ break;
+#endif
}
}
- } else if (((s->client_version >> 8) & 0xff) == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR &&
- (s->client_version <= s->version
- || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION)) {
+ } else if (s->client_version <= s->version
+ || s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
/*
* For DTLS we just check versions are potentially compatible. Version
* negotiation comes later.
}
if (protverr) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL);
if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) {
/*
* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version
goto f_err;
}
- if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) {
+ /* Parse the message and load client random. */
+ if (is_v2_record) {
/*
* Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello
* Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format.
* Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above.
*/
- unsigned int csl, sil, cl;
-
- p += 3;
- n2s(p, csl);
- n2s(p, sil);
- n2s(p, cl);
-
- if (csl + sil + cl + MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN != (unsigned int) n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len;
+ PACKET challenge;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
- if (csl == 0) {
- /* we need at least one cipher */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len)
+ /* No extensions. */
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
- if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, csl, &(ciphers), 1) == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Ignore any session id. We don't allow resumption in a backwards
- * compatible ClientHello
- */
- s->hit = 0;
-
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
-
/* Load the client random */
- i = (cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : cl;
+ challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE :
+ challenge_len;
memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, &(p[csl + sil]), i);
-
- /* Set p to end of packet to ensure we don't look for extensions */
- p = d + n;
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge,
+ s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE -
+ challenge_len, challenge_len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- /* No compression, so set i to 0 */
- i = 0;
+ PACKET_null_init(&compression);
+ PACKET_null_init(&extensions);
} else {
- /* If we get here we've got SSLv3+ in an SSLv3+ record */
-
- p += 2;
-
- /*
- * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just
- * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check
- * cookie length...
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
- unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
-
- session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ /* Regular ClientHello. */
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
-
- if (cookie_length == 0)
+ /*
+ * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one,
+ * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet.
+ * So check cookie length...
+ */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0)
return 1;
+ }
}
- /* load the client random */
- memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
-
- /* get the session-id */
- j = *(p++);
-
- if (p + j > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
}
+ /* Could be empty. */
+ extensions = *pkt;
+ }
- s->hit = 0;
+ s->hit = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello.
+ * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty.
+ *
+ * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
+ * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
+ * ignore resumption requests with flag
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
+ * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
+ * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
+ * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
+ * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
+ * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
+ * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
+ * ignored.
+ */
+ if (is_v2_record ||
+ (s->new_session &&
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id);
/*
- * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
- * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
- * ignore resumption requests with flag
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
- * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on
- * this for security won't even compile against older library versions).
- * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to
- * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains
- * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
- * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
- * ignored.
+ * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
+ * version.
+ * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
+ * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
+ * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
+ * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
+ * will abort the handshake with an error.
*/
- if ((s->new_session
- && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
+ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
+ /* previous session */
+ s->hit = 1;
+ } else if (i == -1) {
+ goto err;
} else {
- i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
- /*
- * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated
- * version.
- * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption
- * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but
- * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable.
- * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and
- * will abort the handshake with an error.
- */
- if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) {
- /* previous session */
- s->hit = 1;
- } else if (i == -1)
+ /* i == 0 */
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
goto err;
- else {
- /* i == 0 */
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
- goto err;
- }
}
+ }
- p += j;
-
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* cookie stuff */
- if (p + 1 > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- cookie_len = *(p++);
-
- if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
- * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
- * does not cause an overflow.
- */
- if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
- /* too much data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
-
- /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
- && cookie_len > 0) {
- memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
-
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
- if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
- cookie_len) == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* else cookie verification succeeded */
- }
- /* default verification */
- else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
- s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */
+ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
+ if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie),
+ PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- /* Set to -2 so if successful we return 2 */
- ret = -2;
- }
-
- p += cookie_len;
- if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
- /* Select version to use */
- if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
- } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
- goto f_err;
- } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
- s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
- s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
- } else {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
- s->version = s->client_version;
- al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
+ /* else cookie verification succeeded */
}
- s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
+ /* default verification */
+ } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
+ s->d1->cookie_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
}
+ s->d1->cookie_verified = 1;
}
-
- if (p + 2 > d + n) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
- goto f_err;
- }
- n2s(p, i);
-
- if (i == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
+ if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) {
+ /* Select version to use */
+ if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) {
+ s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method();
+ } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) {
+ s->version = DTLS1_VERSION;
+ s->method = DTLSv1_server_method();
+ } else {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ s->version = s->client_version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
+ }
- /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
- if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers), 0) == NULL) {
- goto err;
- }
- p += i;
+ if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers),
+ is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) {
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
- if (s->hit) {
- j = 0;
- id = s->session->cipher->id;
+ /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
+ if (s->hit) {
+ j = 0;
+ id = s->session->cipher->id;
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
+ fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n",
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers));
#endif
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
+ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
- i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
+ fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
+ i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
#endif
- if (c->id == id) {
- j = 1;
- break;
- }
+ if (c->id == id) {
+ j = 1;
+ break;
}
+ }
+ if (j == 0) {
/*
- * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
- * attack:
- * CVE-2010-4180.
+ * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
+ * to reuse it
*/
-#if 0
- if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
- && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) {
- /*
- * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used
- * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead
- * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't
- * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the
- * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though.
- */
- c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
- if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) {
- s->session->cipher = c;
- j = 1;
- }
- }
-#endif
- if (j == 0) {
- /*
- * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked
- * to reuse it
- */
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
- SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
- goto f_err;
- }
- }
-
- /* compression */
- i = *(p++);
- if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
- /* not enough data */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- q = p;
-#endif
- for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- if (p[j] == 0)
- break;
- }
+ }
- p += i;
- if (j >= i) {
- /* no compress */
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression);
+ for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) {
+ if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0)
+ break;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
+ if (j >= complen) {
+ /* no compress */
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
/* TLS extensions */
if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n)) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
(s));
if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
goto f_err;
}
s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
}
}
-#endif
/*
* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
- * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
+ * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression
* algorithms from the client, starting at q.
*/
s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL;
/* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
+ unsigned int k;
/* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
/* Can't disable compression */
if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
}
}
if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto f_err;
}
/* Look for resumed method in compression list */
- for (m = 0; m < i; m++) {
- if (q[m] == comp_id)
+ for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) {
+ if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id)
break;
}
- if (m >= i) {
+ if (k >= complen) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
goto f_err;
}
comp = NULL;
else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) {
/* See if we have a match */
- int m, nn, o, v, done = 0;
+ int m, nn, v, done = 0;
+ unsigned int o;
nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) {
comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m);
v = comp->id;
- for (o = 0; o < i; o++) {
- if (v == q[o]) {
+ for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) {
+ if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) {
done = 1;
break;
}
* using compression.
*/
if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
}
#endif
s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
if (ciphers == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
ciphers = NULL;
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
- /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
- retry_cert:
- if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
- int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
- if (rv == 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ statem_set_error(s);
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+
+}
+
+enum WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, enum WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+ int al;
+ SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
+ if (s->cert->cert_cb) {
+ int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return WORK_MORE_A;
+ }
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
- if (rv < 0) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
- return -1;
+ cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
+
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
+ goto f_err;
}
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher;
+ /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
+ if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
+ s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
+ ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0));
+ if (s->session->not_resumable)
+ /* do not send a session ticket */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Session-id reuse */
+ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
}
- c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
- if (c == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
+ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0))
+ goto f_err;
}
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
- /* check whether we should disable session resumption */
- if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL)
- s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s,
- ((c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE))
- != 0));
- if (s->session->not_resumable)
- /* do not send a session ticket */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- } else {
- /* Session-id reuse */
- s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
- }
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
- goto f_err;
- }
+ /*-
+ * we now have the following setup.
+ * client_random
+ * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
+ * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
+ * compression - basically ignored right now
+ * ssl version is set - sslv3
+ * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
+ * s->hit - session reuse flag
+ * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
+ */
- /*-
- * we now have the following setup.
- * client_random
- * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
- * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
- * compression - basically ignored right now
- * ssl version is set - sslv3
- * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
- * s->hit - session reuse flag
- * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use.
- */
+ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
+ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
- /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
- if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) {
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- goto err;
+ wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
+ int ret;
+ if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) {
+ /*
+ * callback indicates further work to be done
+ */
+ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+ if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) {
+ /*
+ * This is not really an error but the only means to for
+ * a client to detect whether srp is supported.
+ */
+ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ goto f_err;
}
}
+#endif
+ s->renegotiate = 2;
- if (ret < 0)
- ret = -ret;
- if (0) {
+ return WORK_FINISHED_STOP;
f_err:
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- }
-
- sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
- return ret < 0 ? -1 : ret;
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
}
-int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
+int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *buf;
unsigned char *p, *d;
int al = 0;
unsigned long l;
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
- buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- p = s->s3->server_random;
- if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-#endif
- /* Do the message type and length last */
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
+ /* Do the message type and length last */
+ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /* Random stuff */
- memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
+ *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
- /*-
- * There are several cases for the session ID to send
- * back in the server hello:
- * - For session reuse from the session cache,
- * we send back the old session ID.
- * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
- * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
- * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
- * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
- * session ID.
- * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
- * we send back a 0-length session ID.
- * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
- * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
- * to send back.
- */
- if (s->session->not_resumable ||
- (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
- && !s->hit))
- s->session->session_id_length = 0;
-
- sl = s->session->session_id_length;
- if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- *(p++) = sl;
- memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
- p += sl;
-
- /* put the cipher */
- i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
- p += i;
-
- /* put the compression method */
+ /*
+ * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in
+ * tls_process_client_hello()
+ */
+ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+ /*-
+ * There are several cases for the session ID to send
+ * back in the server hello:
+ * - For session reuse from the session cache,
+ * we send back the old session ID.
+ * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
+ * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
+ * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
+ * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
+ * session ID.
+ * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
+ * we send back a 0-length session ID.
+ * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
+ * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
+ * to send back.
+ */
+ if (s->session->not_resumable ||
+ (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
+ && !s->hit))
+ s->session->session_id_length = 0;
+
+ sl = s->session->session_id_length;
+ if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ *(p++) = sl;
+ memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
+ p += sl;
+
+ /* put the cipher */
+ i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p);
+ p += i;
+
+ /* put the compression method */
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
- *(p++) = 0;
+ *(p++) = 0;
#else
- if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
- *(p++) = 0;
- else
- *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
- if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- if ((p =
- ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
- &al)) == NULL) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
+ *(p++) = 0;
+ else
+ *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
#endif
- /* do the header */
- l = (p - d);
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
+
+ if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if ((p =
+ ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
+ &al)) == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
+ /* do the header */
+ l = (p - d);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
}
-int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
+int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s)
{
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ statem_set_error(s);
}
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
+ return 1;
}
-int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
unsigned char *q;
EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
- type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- cert = s->cert;
- buf = s->init_buf;
+ type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ cert = s->cert;
- r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
- n = 0;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
- rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
- if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
- rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher));
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- RSA_up_ref(rsa);
- cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
- }
- if (rsa == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- r[0] = rsa->n;
- r[1] = rsa->e;
- s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
- if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
- dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
- if (dhp == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- } else
- dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
- if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
- dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher));
- if (dhp == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
- DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
- goto f_err;
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
- dh = dhp;
- else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ buf = s->init_buf;
- s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
- if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
- dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
- dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
- if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
- r[0] = dh->p;
- r[1] = dh->g;
- r[2] = dh->pub_key;
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
- const EC_GROUP *group;
-
- ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
- /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
- int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
- if (nid != NID_undef)
- ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
- } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
- ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
- SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
- tmp.new_cipher),
- SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
- s3->tmp.new_cipher));
- }
- if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
+ n = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+ /*
+ * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
+ */
+ n += 2;
+ if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint)
+ n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
+ }
+ /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */
+ if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
+ } else
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+ if (type & SSL_kRSA) {
+ rsa = cert->rsa_tmp;
+ if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) {
+ rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+ cert->rsa_tmp = rsa;
+ }
+ if (rsa == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ r[0] = rsa->n;
+ r[1] = rsa->e;
+ s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+ if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
+ if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) {
+ dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s);
+ if (dhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ goto f_err;
}
+ } else
+ dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
+ if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
+ dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher));
+ if (dhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH,
+ DH_security_bits(dhp), 0, dhp)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto)
+ dh = dhp;
+ else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
- /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
- if (ecdhp == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
+ if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
+ dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
- ecdh = ecdhp;
- else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ } else {
+ dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
+ dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
+ if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
+ }
+ r[0] = dh->p;
+ r[1] = dh->g;
+ r[2] = dh->pub_key;
+ } else
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
- s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
- if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
- if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- }
+ ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
+ /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */
+ int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2);
+ if (nid != NID_undef)
+ ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
+ ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
+ SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->
+ tmp.new_cipher),
+ SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->
+ s3->tmp.new_cipher));
+ }
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
- if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
- (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
- if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
- (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
- goto err;
- }
+ /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
+ if (ecdhp == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
+ ecdh = ecdhp;
+ else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
- * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
- * non-zero.
- */
- if ((curve_id =
- tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
- == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
+ if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
+ if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
+ }
- /*
- * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
- * allocate memory accordingly.
- */
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, NULL);
-
- encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
- OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
- bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
+ (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
+ (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
+ goto err;
+ }
- encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
- POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named
+ * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is
+ * non-zero.
+ */
+ if ((curve_id =
+ tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
+ == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- if (encodedlen == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ /*
+ * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and
+ * allocate memory accordingly.
+ */
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ NULL, 0, NULL);
+
+ encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
+ OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char));
+ bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
- bn_ctx = NULL;
+ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
- * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
- * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
- * structure.
- */
- n = 4 + encodedlen;
+ if (encodedlen == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
- /*
- * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
- * can set these to NULLs
- */
- r[0] = NULL;
- r[1] = NULL;
- r[2] = NULL;
- r[3] = NULL;
- } else
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ bn_ctx = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in
+ * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four
+ * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
+ * structure.
+ */
+ n += 4 + encodedlen;
+
+ /*
+ * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we
+ * can set these to NULLs
+ */
+ r[0] = NULL;
+ r[1] = NULL;
+ r[2] = NULL;
+ r[3] = NULL;
+ } else
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /*
- * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint
- */
- n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- } else
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
- if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
- (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
- goto err;
- }
- r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
- r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
- r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
- r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
- } else
-#endif
- {
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
+ if (type & SSL_kSRP) {
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
+ (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
+ (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
+ goto err;
}
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
- nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
+ r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N;
+ r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g;
+ r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s;
+ r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
- n += 1 + nr[i];
- else
+ if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
+ n += 1 + nr[i];
+ else
#endif
- n += 2 + nr[i];
- }
+ n += 2 + nr[i];
+ }
- if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP))
- && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) {
- if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
- == NULL) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- goto f_err;
- }
- kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- } else {
- pkey = NULL;
- kn = 0;
+ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP))
+ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) {
+ if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md))
+ == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
}
+ kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ } else {
+ pkey = NULL;
+ kn = 0;
+ }
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
- goto err;
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (type & SSL_PSK) {
+ /* copy PSK identity hint */
+ if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) {
+ s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p);
+ strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint,
+ strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint));
+ p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint);
+ } else {
+ s2n(0, p);
}
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ }
+#endif
- for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
- if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
- *p = nr[i];
- p++;
- } else
+ if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) {
+ *p = nr[i];
+ p++;
+ } else
#endif
- s2n(nr[i], p);
- BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
- p += nr[i];
- }
+ s2n(nr[i], p);
+ BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
+ p += nr[i];
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
- /*
- * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
- * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
- * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
- * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
- */
- *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
- p += 1;
- *p = 0;
- p += 1;
- *p = curve_id;
- p += 1;
- *p = encodedlen;
- p += 1;
- memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
- OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- encodedPoint = NULL;
- p += encodedlen;
- }
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (type & SSL_kPSK) {
- /* copy PSK identity hint */
- s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
- strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
- strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
- p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- }
+ if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
+ /*
+ * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In
+ * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte
+ * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded
+ * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself
+ */
+ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = 0;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = curve_id;
+ p += 1;
+ *p = encodedlen;
+ p += 1;
+ memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen);
+ OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
+ encodedPoint = NULL;
+ p += encodedlen;
+ }
#endif
- /* not anonymous */
- if (pkey != NULL) {
- /*
- * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
- * points to the space at the end.
- */
+ /* not anonymous */
+ if (pkey != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p
+ * points to the space at the end.
+ */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- q = md_buf;
- j = 0;
- for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
- EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
- ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
- q += i;
- j += i;
- }
- if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
- &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(u, p);
- n += u + 2;
- } else
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ q = md_buf;
+ j = 0;
+ for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2)
+ ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i);
+ q += i;
+ j += i;
+ }
+ if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
+ &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s2n(u, p);
+ n += u + 2;
+ } else
#endif
- if (md) {
- /* send signature algorithm */
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
- /* Should never happen */
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p += 2;
+ if (md) {
+ /* send signature algorithm */
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
}
+ p += 2;
+ }
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
+ fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
- SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
- if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
- (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
- goto err;
- }
- s2n(i, p);
- n += i + 2;
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- n += 2;
- } else {
- /* Is this error check actually needed? */
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
+ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]),
+ SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
+ if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]),
+ (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP);
+ goto err;
}
- }
-
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
+ s2n(i, p);
+ n += i + 2;
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
+ n += 2;
+ } else {
+ /* Is this error check actually needed? */
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- return ssl_do_write(s);
+ return 1;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
}
-int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
+int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *p, *d;
int i, j, nl, off, n;
X509_NAME *name;
BUF_MEM *buf;
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
- buf = s->init_buf;
+ buf = s->init_buf;
- d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
- p++;
- n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
- d[0] = n;
- p += n;
- n++;
+ /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
+ p++;
+ n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
+ d[0] = n;
+ p += n;
+ n++;
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- const unsigned char *psigs;
- unsigned char *etmp = p;
- nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
- /* Skip over length for now */
- p += 2;
- nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
- /* Now fill in length */
- s2n(nl, etmp);
- p += nl;
- n += nl + 2;
- }
-
- off = n;
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ const unsigned char *psigs;
+ unsigned char *etmp = p;
+ nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs);
+ /* Skip over length for now */
p += 2;
- n += 2;
+ nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl);
+ /* Now fill in length */
+ s2n(nl, etmp);
+ p += nl;
+ n += nl + 2;
+ }
- sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
- nl = 0;
- if (sk != NULL) {
- for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
- name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
- j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
- (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
- ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
- s2n(j, p);
- i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
- n += 2 + j;
- nl += 2 + j;
+ off = n;
+ p += 2;
+ n += 2;
+
+ sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
+ nl = 0;
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
+ name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
+ j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean
+ (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
+ ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n;
+ s2n(j, p);
+ i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
+ n += 2 + j;
+ nl += 2 + j;
}
- /* else no CA names */
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
- s2n(nl, p);
-
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
+ }
+ /* else no CA names */
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off;
+ s2n(nl, p);
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
+ s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
+
+ return 1;
err:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
}
-int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
+enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int i, al, ok;
- long n;
+ int al;
+ unsigned int i;
unsigned long alg_k;
- unsigned char *p;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
RSA *rsa = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL;
#endif
-
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
+ PACKET enc_premaster;
+ unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL;
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
- SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
+ alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */
+ if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) {
+ unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ size_t psklen;
+ PACKET psk_identity;
- alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+ if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ } else if (psklen == 0) {
+ /*
+ * PSK related to the given identity not found
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
+ al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = BUF_memdup(psk, psklen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen;
+ }
+ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
+ /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) {
unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
int decrypt_len;
unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good;
*/
if (rsa == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
goto f_err;
if ((pkey == NULL) ||
(pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
}
- /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
- if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
- n2s(p, i);
- if (n != i + 2) {
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) {
+ /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
+ enc_premaster = *pkt;
+ } else {
+ PACKET orig = *pkt;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ /* Try SSLv3 behaviour for TLS. */
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG) {
+ enc_premaster = orig;
+ } else {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
- } else
- p -= 2;
- } else
- n = i;
+ }
+ }
}
/*
- * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure
- * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire
- * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The
- * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the
- * bound is sufficient to be safe.
+ * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to
+ * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret
+ * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because
+ * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway.
*/
- if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
- al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
+ if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
+ RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa));
+ if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto f_err;
}
*/
if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret,
- sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0)
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) {
goto err;
- decrypt_len =
- RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ }
+
+ decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster),
+ PACKET_data(&enc_premaster),
+ rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* constant time and are treated like any other decryption error.
*/
version_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0],
+ (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8));
version_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
+ (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff));
/*
* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) {
unsigned char workaround_good;
workaround_good =
- constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8));
workaround_good &=
- constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
+ constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1],
+ (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff));
version_good |= workaround_good;
}
* it is still sufficiently large to read from.
*/
for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) {
- p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j],
- rand_premaster_secret[j]);
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p,
- sizeof
- (rand_premaster_secret));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret));
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ rsa_decrypt[j] =
+ constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j],
+ rand_premaster_secret[j]);
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt,
+ sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+ rsa_decrypt = NULL;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
int idx = -1;
EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL;
- if (n > 1) {
- n2s(p, i);
- } else {
- if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
+ PACKET bookmark = *pkt;
+ unsigned char shared[(OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS + 7) / 8];
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto f_err;
}
i = 0;
}
- if (n && n != i + 2) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) {
if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
goto err;
} else {
- p -= 2;
- i = (int)n;
+ *pkt = bookmark;
+ i = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
}
}
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr)
if ((skey == NULL) ||
(skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
goto f_err;
}
dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh;
} else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
} else
dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
- if (n == 0L) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
/* Get pubkey from cert */
EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
if (clkey) {
}
if (dh_clnt == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(clkey);
pub = dh_clnt->pub_key;
- } else
- pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
+ } else {
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
+ /* We already checked we have enough data */
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ pub = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL);
+ }
if (pub == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
+ i = DH_compute_key(shared, pub, dh_srvr);
if (i <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
BN_clear_free(pub);
goto err;
}
else
BN_clear_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, i);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
- if (dh_clnt)
- return 2;
+ if (dh_clnt) {
+ s->no_cert_verify = 1;
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
+ }
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
- if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
- int ret = 1;
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
int field_size = 0;
const EC_KEY *tkey;
const EC_GROUP *group;
const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ unsigned char *shared;
/* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
!EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
/* Let's get client's public key */
if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if (n == 0L) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) {
/* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
- if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
+ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
goto f_err;
}
* checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group.
*/
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
goto f_err;
}
if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->
pkey.ec)) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
+ s->no_cert_verify = 1;
} else {
/*
* Get client's public key from encoded point in the
* ClientKeyExchange message.
*/
if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* Get encoded point length */
- i = *p;
- p += 1;
- if (n != 1 + i) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, data, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /*
- * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it
- * to the start
- */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
}
/* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
if (field_size <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
- NULL);
+ shared = OPENSSL_malloc((field_size + 7) / 8);
+ if (shared == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ i = ECDH_compute_key(shared, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint,
+ srvr_ecdh, NULL);
if (i <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
+ OPENSSL_free(shared);
goto err;
}
EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
- /* Compute the master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, i);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, shared, i, 1)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
- return (ret);
- } else
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
- if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) {
- unsigned char *t = NULL;
- unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
- unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
- int psk_err = 1;
- char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
-
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- if (n != i + 2) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /*
- * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback
- */
- memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
- memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i);
- psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1);
-
- if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- } else if (psk_len == 0) {
- /*
- * PSK related to the given identity not found
- */
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
- al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
- pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
- t = psk_or_pre_ms;
- memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
- s2n(psk_len, t);
- memset(t, 0, psk_len);
- t += psk_len;
- s2n(psk_len, t);
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
- s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
- if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
- s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
- if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
- s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto psk_err;
- }
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- pre_ms_len);
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
- al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto psk_err;
- }
- psk_err = 0;
- psk_err:
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
- if (psk_err != 0)
- goto f_err;
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
} else
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) {
- int param_len;
-
- n2s(p, i);
- param_len = i + 2;
- if (param_len > n) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
goto f_err;
}
- if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0
|| BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS);
goto f_err;
}
OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) < 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
-
- p += i;
} else
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
- int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
unsigned long alg_a;
int Ttag, Tclass;
long Tlen;
+ long sess_key_len;
/* Get our certificate private key */
alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
- pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
- else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
+ if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
ERR_clear_error();
}
/* Decrypt session key */
- if (ASN1_get_object
- ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass,
- n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
+ sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag,
+ &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED
+ || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE
|| Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
- start = p;
+ start = data;
inlen = Tlen;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt
(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
goto gerr;
}
/* Generate master secret */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- premaster_secret, 32);
- if (s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret,
+ sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
/* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl
(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
- ret = 2;
- else
- ret = 1;
+ s->no_cert_verify = 1;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
gerr:
EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
goto err;
} else {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
- return (1);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen);
+ s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL;
+#endif
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
+
+enum WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s,
+ enum WORK_STATE wst)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) {
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ unsigned char sctpauthkey[64];
+ char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)];
+ /*
+ * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP
+ * used.
+ */
+ snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL),
+ DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL);
+
+ if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer,
+ sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) {
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;;
+ }
+
+ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY,
+ sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey);
+ }
+ wst = WORK_MORE_B;
+ }
+
+ if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B)
+ /* Is this SCTP? */
+ && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))
+ /* Are we renegotiating? */
+ && s->renegotiate
+ /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */
+ && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->no_cert_verify)
+ && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+ s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
+ s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
+ BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
+ statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1);
+ return WORK_MORE_B;
+ } else {
+ statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0);
+ }
#endif
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (-1);
+
+ if (s->no_cert_verify) {
+ /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ if (!s->session->peer) {
+ /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
+ }
+ if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ /*
+ * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support
+ * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) {
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ int offset = 0;
+ int dgst_num;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert,
+ * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for
+ * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next
+ * step
+ */
+ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
+ int dgst_size;
+
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
+ EVP_MD_CTX_type
+ (s->
+ s3->handshake_dgst
+ [dgst_num]),
+ &(s->s3->
+ tmp.cert_verify_md
+ [offset]));
+ dgst_size =
+ EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
+ if (dgst_size < 0) {
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return WORK_ERROR;
+ }
+ offset += dgst_size;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE;
}
-int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
+enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- unsigned char *p;
- int al, ok, ret = 0;
- long n;
+ unsigned char *sig, *data;
+ int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
int type = 0, i, j;
+ unsigned int len;
X509 *peer;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
- /*
- * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received
- * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non
- * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even
- * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static
- * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the
- * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here.
- */
- if (s->session->peer == NULL) {
- ret = 1;
- goto end;
- }
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
- SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
- SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
peer = s->session->peer;
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto f_err;
}
- /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
/*
* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without
* length field
*/
- if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
- pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) {
- i = 64;
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 && pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ len = 64;
} else {
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
- int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey);
+ int rv;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey);
if (rv == -1) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
- p += 2;
- n -= 2;
}
- n2s(p, i);
- n -= 2;
- if (i > n) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
}
j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
- if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+ if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j)
+ || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
void *hdata;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
#endif
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
|| !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
- if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
- MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
+ MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len,
pkey->pkey.rsa);
if (i < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
goto f_err;
}
if (i == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.dsa);
if (j <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
- SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
+ SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, data, len, pkey->pkey.ec);
if (j <= 0) {
/* bad signature */
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else
#endif
- if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94
- || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
+ if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
unsigned char signature[64];
int idx;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
- if (i != 64) {
- fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i);
+ if (len != 64) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", len);
}
for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) {
- signature[63 - idx] = p[idx];
+ signature[63 - idx] = data[idx];
}
j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
32);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
if (j <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
goto f_err;
}
- ret = 1;
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING;
if (0) {
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
+ statem_set_error(s);
}
- end:
BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
- s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
}
-int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
+enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
+ int i, al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
X509 *x = NULL;
- unsigned long l, nc, llen, n;
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- unsigned char *d;
+ unsigned long l, llen;
+ const unsigned char *certstart;
+ unsigned char *certbytes;
STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
-
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
- -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
- if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
- (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
- al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- /*
- * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list
- */
- if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
- SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- goto f_err;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
- return (1);
- }
-
- if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
- al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
- goto f_err;
- }
- p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ PACKET spkt;
if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto done;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
}
- n2l3(p, llen);
- if (llen + 3 != n) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen)
+ || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
- n2l3(p, l);
- if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) {
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l)
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
- q = p;
- x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l);
+ certstart = certbytes;
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l);
if (x == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto done;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto f_err;
}
- if (p != (q + l)) {
+ if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto f_err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto done;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto f_err;
}
x = NULL;
- nc += l + 3;
}
if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
/* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
goto f_err;
}
/* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
/* No client certificate so digest cached records */
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto f_err;
}
i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
if (i <= 0) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto f_err;
}
if (i > 1) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i);
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto f_err;
}
pkey = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0));
if (pkey == NULL) {
al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
- /*
- * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we
- * arrive here.
- */
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
- if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto done;
- }
- }
- sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
- s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
+ sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free);
+ s->session->peer_chain = sk;
/*
* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own
* certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
*/
sk = NULL;
- ret = 1;
+ ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
goto done;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ statem_set_error(s);
done:
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
- return (ret);
+ return ret;
}
-int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
+int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
CERT_PKEY *cpk;
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
- cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
- if (cpk == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (0);
- }
+ cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
+ if (cpk == NULL) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return (0);
- }
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
+ if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
+ return 1;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
-/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
-int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
+int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
unsigned char *senc = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ unsigned char *p, *macstart;
+ const unsigned char *const_p;
+ int len, slen_full, slen;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned int hlen;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
+ unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+ unsigned char key_name[16];
+
+ /* get session encoding length */
+ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
+ /*
+ * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
+ * long
+ */
+ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
+ if (!senc) {
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
- unsigned char *p, *macstart;
- const unsigned char *const_p;
- int len, slen_full, slen;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned int hlen;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char key_name[16];
-
- /* get session encoding length */
- slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
- /*
- * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too
- * long
- */
- if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
- senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
- if (!senc) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- p = senc;
- if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
- goto err;
+ p = senc;
+ if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p))
+ goto err;
- /*
- * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
- */
- const_p = senc;
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
- if (sess == NULL)
- goto err;
- sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
+ /*
+ * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up
+ */
+ const_p = senc;
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
+ if (sess == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
- slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
- if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- goto err;
- }
- p = senc;
- if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
- SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- goto err;
- }
+ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
+ if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ p = senc;
+ if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
- /*-
- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- * follows handshake_header_length +
- * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
- * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
- * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
- * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
- SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
- EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
- goto err;
-
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /*
- * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
- * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
- */
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
- &hctx, 1) < 0)
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
- goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- EVP_sha256(), NULL))
- goto err;
- memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
- }
-
- /*
- * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
- * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
- * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
- */
- l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+ /*-
+ * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows handshake_header_length +
+ * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
+ * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
+ * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
+ * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
+ SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH +
+ EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
+ goto err;
- /* Skip ticket length for now */
- p += 2;
- /* Output key name */
- macstart = p;
- memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
- p += 16;
- /* output IV */
- memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
- p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- /* Encrypt session data */
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
- goto err;
- p += len;
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ /*
+ * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does
+ * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx.
+ */
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
+ &hctx, 1) < 0)
goto err;
- p += len;
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
+ } else {
+ if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0)
goto err;
- if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv))
goto err;
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-
- p += hlen;
- /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
- /* Total length */
- len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
- p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
- s2n(len - 6, p);
- if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL))
goto err;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
- OPENSSL_free(senc);
+ memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
}
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
+ /*
+ * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified
+ * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for
+ * new sessions will live as long as their sessions.
+ */
+ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
+
+ /* Skip ticket length for now */
+ p += 2;
+ /* Output key name */
+ macstart = p;
+ memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
+ p += 16;
+ /* output IV */
+ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
+ p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ /* Encrypt session data */
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen))
+ goto err;
+ p += len;
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len))
+ goto err;
+ p += len;
+
+ if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart))
+ goto err;
+ if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen))
+ goto err;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+
+ p += hlen;
+ /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
+ /* Total length */
+ len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s);
+ /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */
+ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4;
+ s2n(len - 6, p);
+ if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len))
+ goto err;
+ OPENSSL_free(senc);
+
+ return 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(senc);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
}
-int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
+int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
- if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
- unsigned char *p;
- /*-
- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
- * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
- * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
- * + (ocsp response)
- */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
-
- /* do the header */
- *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
- /* message length */
- l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
- /* status type */
- *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
- /* length of OCSP response */
- l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
- /* actual response */
- memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
- /* number of bytes to write */
- s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
- s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
- s->init_off = 0;
- }
-
- /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
- return (ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
+ unsigned char *p;
+ /*-
+ * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
+ * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
+ * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
+ * + (ocsp response)
+ */
+ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) {
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
+
+ /* do the header */
+ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
+ /* message length */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
+ /* status type */
+ *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
+ /* length of OCSP response */
+ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
+ /* actual response */
+ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
+ /* number of bytes to write */
+ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
+ s->init_off = 0;
+
+ return 1;
}
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
/*
- * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
+ * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
* It sets the next_proto member in s if found
*/
-int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
+enum MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
- int ok;
- int proto_len, padding_len;
- long n;
- const unsigned char *p;
-
- /*
- * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
- * extension in their ClientHello
- */
- if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
- SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* See the payload format below */
- n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
- SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
- SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
- SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
-
- if (!ok)
- return ((int)n);
-
- /*
- * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in
- * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by
- * ssl3_get_finished).
- */
- if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (n < 2) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
- }
-
- p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
+ PACKET next_proto, padding;
+ size_t next_proto_len;
/*-
* The payload looks like:
* uint8 padding_len;
* uint8 padding[padding_len];
*/
- proto_len = p[0];
- if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
- }
- padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
- if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) {
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto)
+ || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
}
- s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
- if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- s->state = SSL_ST_ERR;
- return 0;
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated,
+ &next_proto_len)) {
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
+ goto err;
}
- memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
- return 1;
-}
-# endif
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len;
+ return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
+err:
+ statem_set_error(s);
+ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
+}
#endif
#define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3
-STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, unsigned char *p,
- int num,
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,
+ PACKET *cipher_suites,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp,
- int sslv2format)
+ int sslv2format, int *al
+ )
{
const SSL_CIPHER *c;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
- int i, n;
+ int n;
+ /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */
+ unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN];
- if (s->s3)
- s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
+ s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0;
- if(sslv2format) {
- n = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN;
- } else {
- n = ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s, NULL, NULL);
+ n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
+ *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return NULL;
}
- if (n == 0 || (num % n) != 0) {
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST);
- return (NULL);
+ *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return NULL;
}
+
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) {
sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */
if(sk == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return NULL;
}
} else {
sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk);
}
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->ciphers_raw);
- s->cert->ciphers_raw = BUF_memdup(p, num);
- if (s->cert->ciphers_raw == NULL) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw,
+ &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
- s->cert->ciphers_rawlen = (size_t)num;
- for (i = 0; i < num; i += n) {
+ while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) {
+ /*
+ * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the
+ * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero
+ * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them.
+ */
+ if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0')
+ continue;
+
/* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */
- if (s->s3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
- (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
/* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */
if (s->renegotiate) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING);
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
goto err;
}
s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1;
- p += n;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n");
#endif
}
/* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */
- if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) &&
- (p[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
- (p[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
+ if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) &&
+ (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) {
/*
* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher
* version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected
if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
- if (s->s3)
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
- SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK;
goto err;
}
- p += n;
continue;
}
- if(sslv2format) {
- /*
- * We only support SSLv2 format ciphers in SSLv3+ using a
- * SSLv2 backward compatible ClientHello. In this case the first
- * byte is always 0 for SSLv3 compatible ciphers. Anything else
- * is an SSLv2 cipher and we ignore it
- */
- if(p[0] == 0)
- c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, &p[1]);
- else
- c = NULL;
- } else {
- c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, p);
- }
- p += n;
+ /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */
+ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher);
if (c != NULL) {
if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto err;
}
}
}
+ if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) {
+ *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
if (skp != NULL)
*skp = sk;
err:
if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL))
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk);
- return (NULL);
+ return NULL;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff