cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
s->in_handshake++;
- if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
- SSL_clear(s);
+ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) {
+ if(!SSL_clear(s))
+ return -1;
+ }
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
/*
} else
i = 1;
- if (i)
- ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
+ if (i && ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p,
+ sizeof(s->s3->client_random)) <= 0)
+ goto err;
/* Do the message type and length last */
d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
- /*-
- * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
- * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
- * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
- * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
- * choke if we initially report a higher version then
- * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
- * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
- * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
- * 1.0.
- *
- * Possible scenario with previous logic:
- * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
- * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
- * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
- * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
- * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
- * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
- * know that is maximum server supports.
- * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
- * containing version 1.0.
- *
- * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
- * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
- * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
- * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
- * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
- * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
- * the negotiated version.
- */
-#if 0
- *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
- *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
- s->client_version = s->version;
-#else
+ /*-
+ * version indicates the negotiated version: for example from
+ * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version
+ * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also
+ * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can
+ * choke if we initially report a higher version then
+ * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This
+ * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it
+ * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports
+ * 1.0.
+ *
+ * Possible scenario with previous logic:
+ * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2
+ * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0
+ * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2.
+ * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0.
+ * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate.
+ * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now
+ * know that is maximum server supports.
+ * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret
+ * containing version 1.0.
+ *
+ * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the
+ * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely
+ * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't
+ * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with
+ * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using
+ * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to
+ * the negotiated version.
+ */
*(p++) = s->client_version >> 8;
*(p++) = s->client_version & 0xff;
-#endif
/* Random stuff */
memcpy(p, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
#endif
l = p - d;
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l);
+ if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) {
-/* Workaround is now obsolete */
-#if 0
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG))
-#endif
- {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
- SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
- goto f_err;
- }
+ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,
+ SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
+ goto f_err;
}
s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
/*
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
DH *dh = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
param = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) {
- RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
- }
+ RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) {
- DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
- }
+ DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = NULL;
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
- if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) {
- EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
- s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
- }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+ EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp);
+ s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp = NULL;
#endif
} else {
s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp = dh;
dh = NULL;
- } else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) {
- al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
- goto f_err;
}
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
EC_GROUP *ngroup;
const EC_GROUP *group;
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509);
# endif
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
pkey =
X509_get_pubkey(s->session->
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto f_err;
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
/* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
- if (rsa != NULL)
- RSA_free(rsa);
+ RSA_free(rsa);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
- if (dh != NULL)
- DH_free(dh);
+ DH_free(dh);
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint);
- if (ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
+ EC_KEY_free(ecdh);
#endif
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (-1);
/* get the CA RDNs */
n2s(p, llen);
-#if 0
- {
- FILE *out;
- out = fopen("/tmp/vsign.der", "w");
- fwrite(p, 1, llen, out);
- fclose(out);
- }
-#endif
if ((unsigned long)(p - d + llen) != n) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) {
n2s(p, l);
if ((l + nc + 2) > llen) {
- if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
- goto cont; /* netscape bugs */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
q = p;
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, l)) == NULL) {
- /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)
- goto cont;
- else {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
if (q != (p + l)) {
nc += l + 2;
}
- if (0) {
- cont:
- ERR_clear_error();
- }
-
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 1;
s->s3->tmp.ctype_num = ctype_num;
*/
EVP_Digest(p, ticklen,
s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length,
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
EVP_sha256(), NULL);
-# else
- EVP_sha1(), NULL);
-# endif
ret = 1;
return (ret);
f_err:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL;
const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL;
int encoded_pt_len = 0;
BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
#endif
+ unsigned char *pms = NULL;
+ size_t pmslen = 0;
if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
p = ssl_handshake_start(s);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
RSA *rsa;
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+ pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
/*
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
- s->session->master_key_length = sizeof tmp_buf;
-
q = p;
/* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */
if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
p += 2;
- n = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf,
- tmp_buf, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ n = RSA_public_encrypt(pmslen, pms, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
# ifdef PKCS1_CHECK
if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1)
p[1]++;
s2n(n, q);
n += 2;
}
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
goto err;
}
- /*-
- * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- *
- * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- *
- * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
- * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- * Example:
- * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- * optional authenticator omitted.
- */
+ /*-
+ * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+ * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+ *
+ * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+ * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+ * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+ * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
+ * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
+ *
+ * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+ * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+ * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+ * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+ * Example:
+ * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+ * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
+ * optional authenticator omitted.
+ */
/* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
n += 2;
}
- tmp_buf[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- tmp_buf[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]), sizeof tmp_buf - 2) <= 0)
+ pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
+
+ pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
goto err;
- /*-
- * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- * kssl_ctx->length);
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
+ /*-
+ * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+ * kssl_ctx->length);
+ * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+ */
memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, pms, pmslen);
EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
outl += padl;
if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
memcpy(p, epms, outl);
p += outl;
n += outl + 2;
-
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- tmp_buf,
- sizeof tmp_buf);
-
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf);
OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
}
#endif
}
}
+ pmslen = DH_size(dh_clnt);
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
+
/*
* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but make sure to
* clear it out afterwards
*/
- n = DH_compute_key(p, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
+ n = DH_compute_key(pms, dh_srvr->pub_key, dh_clnt);
if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL)
DH_free(dh_srvr);
DH_free(dh_clnt);
goto err;
}
-
- /* generate master key from the result */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, n);
- /* clean up */
- memset(p, 0, n);
+ pmslen = n;
if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY)
n = 0;
}
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) {
const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL;
EC_KEY *tkey;
* ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
*/
if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) {
- /*-
- * XXX: For now, we do not support client
- * authentication using ECDH certificates.
- * To add such support, one needs to add
- * code that checks for appropriate
- * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
- * For example, the cert have an ECC
- * key on the same curve as the server's
- * and the key should be authorized for
- * key agreement.
- *
- * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
- * to skip sending the certificate verify
- * message.
- *
- * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
- * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
- * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
- * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
- */
+ /*-
+ * XXX: For now, we do not support client
+ * authentication using ECDH certificates.
+ * To add such support, one needs to add
+ * code that checks for appropriate
+ * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1.
+ * For example, the cert have an ECC
+ * key on the same curve as the server's
+ * and the key should be authorized for
+ * key agreement.
+ *
+ * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect
+ * to skip sending the certificate verify
+ * message.
+ *
+ * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) &&
+ * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type ==
+ * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...)
+ * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1;
+ */
}
if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- n = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, srvr_ecpoint,
- clnt_ecdh, NULL);
- if (n <= 0) {
+ pmslen = (field_size + 7) / 8;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
+ n = ECDH_compute_key(pms, pmslen, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL);
+ if (n <= 0 || pmslen != (size_t)n) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
goto err;
}
- /* generate master key from the result */
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- p, n);
-
- memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */
-
if (ecdh_clnt_cert) {
/* Send empty client key exch message */
n = 0;
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
}
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */
else if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
/* GOST key exchange message creation */
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
size_t msglen;
unsigned int md_len;
int keytype;
- unsigned char premaster_secret[32], shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
+ unsigned char shared_ukm[32], tmp[256];
EVP_MD_CTX *ukm_hash;
EVP_PKEY *pub_key;
+ pmslen = 32;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
+
/*
* Get server sertificate PKEY and create ctx from it
*/
EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
/* Generate session key */
- RAND_bytes(premaster_secret, 32);
+ if (RAND_bytes(pms, pmslen) <= 0) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ };
/*
* If we have client certificate, use its secret as peer key
*/
*/
*(p++) = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE | V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED;
msglen = 255;
- if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, premaster_secret, 32)
- < 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pkey_ctx, tmp, &msglen, pms, pmslen) < 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG);
goto err;
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- premaster_secret,
- 32);
EVP_PKEY_free(pub_key);
}
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
-
- if ((s->session->master_key_length =
- SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
- s->session->master_key)) <
- 0) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 2];
size_t identity_len;
unsigned char *t = NULL;
- unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4];
- unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
+ unsigned int psk_len = 0;
int psk_err = 1;
n = 0;
}
memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+ /* Allocate maximum size buffer */
+ pmslen = PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4;
+ pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
+ if (!pms)
+ goto memerr;
+
psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint,
identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
+ pms, pmslen);
if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
goto psk_err;
}
+ /* Change pmslen to real length */
+ pmslen = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1] = '\0';
identity_len = strlen(identity);
if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
goto psk_err;
}
/* create PSK pre_master_secret */
- pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len;
- t = psk_or_pre_ms;
- memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
+ t = pms;
+ memmove(pms + psk_len + 4, pms, psk_len);
s2n(psk_len, t);
memset(t, 0, psk_len);
t += psk_len;
goto psk_err;
}
- s->session->master_key_length =
- s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
- s->
- session->master_key,
- psk_or_pre_ms,
- pre_ms_len);
s2n(identity_len, p);
memcpy(p, identity, identity_len);
n = 2 + identity_len;
psk_err = 0;
psk_err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, sizeof(identity));
- OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
if (psk_err != 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
goto err;
}
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n);
+ if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
- return ssl_do_write(s);
+ n = ssl_do_write(s);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ /* Check for SRP */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) {
+ /*
+ * If everything written generate master key: no need to save PMS as
+ * SRP_generate_client_master_secret generates it internally.
+ */
+ if (n > 0) {
+ if ((s->session->master_key_length =
+ SRP_generate_client_master_secret(s,
+ s->session->master_key)) <
+ 0) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ } else
+#endif
+ /* If we haven't written everything save PMS */
+ if (n <= 0) {
+ s->cert->pms = pms;
+ s->cert->pmslen = pmslen;
+ } else {
+ /* If we don't have a PMS restore */
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ pms = s->cert->pms;
+ pmslen = s->cert->pmslen;
+ }
+ if (pms == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ s->session->master_key_length =
+ s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
+ s->
+ session->master_key,
+ pms, pmslen);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
+ OPENSSL_free(pms);
+ s->cert->pms = NULL;
+ if(s->session->master_key_length < 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ return n;
+ memerr:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+ if (pms) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen);
+ OPENSSL_free(pms);
+ s->cert->pms = NULL;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
if (encodedPoint != NULL)
OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
- if (clnt_ecdh != NULL)
- EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
+ EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh);
EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey);
#endif
return (-1);
}
s2n(u, p);
n = u + 4;
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
+ /*
+ * For extended master secret we've already digested cached
+ * records.
+ */
+ if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) {
+ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
+ s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
+ s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
+ } else if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
goto err;
} else
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
n = j + 2;
} else
#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type,
&(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n);
+ if(!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
/* This is the passed certificate */
idx = sc->peer_cert_type;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s) == 0) {
/* check failed */
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff