-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
- else if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) {
- krb5_error_code krb5rc;
- KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
- /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */
- krb5_data *enc_ticket;
- krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
- const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
- unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
- unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
- int padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
-
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
- alg_k, SSL_kKRB5);
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- authp = NULL;
-# ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
- if (KRB5SENDAUTH)
- authp = &authenticator;
-# endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */
-
- krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err);
- enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
- if (enc == NULL)
- goto err;
-# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
- {
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
- if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
- fprintf(stderr, "kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n",
- kssl_err.text);
- }
-# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
-
- if (krb5rc) {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /*-
- * 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
- * in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
- *
- * Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
- * n = krb5_ap_req.length;
- * memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
- * if (krb5_ap_req.data)
- * kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
- *
- * Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
- * (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
- * Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
- * with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
- * Example:
- * KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
- * Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with
- * optional authenticator omitted.
- */
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */
- s2n(enc_ticket->length, p);
- memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
- p += enc_ticket->length;
- n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */
- if (authp && authp->length) {
- s2n(authp->length, p);
- memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
- p += authp->length;
- n += authp->length + 2;
-
- free(authp->data);
- authp->data = NULL;
- authp->length = 0;
- } else {
- s2n(0, p); /* null authenticator length */
- n += 2;
- }
-
- pmslen = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
- pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen);
- if (!pms)
- goto memerr;
-
- pms[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
- pms[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
- if (RAND_bytes(pms + 2, pmslen - 2) <= 0)
- goto err;
-
- /*-
- * 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed.
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
- * EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
- * kssl_ctx->length);
- * EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
- */
-
- memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); /* per RFC 1510 */
- EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
- EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, epms, &outl, pms, pmslen);
- EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(epms[outl]), &padl);
- outl += padl;
- if (outl > (int)sizeof epms) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
-
- /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */
- s2n(outl, p);
- memcpy(p, epms, outl);
- p += outl;
- n += outl + 2;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl);
- }
-#endif