Fix ERR_R_... problems.
[openssl.git] / ssl / s2_clnt.c
index 47dd09c286f398922daf505534394f67b0f66395..6e1e296b968f1f2c2e21ce04c0c9dd7eda2c5879 100644 (file)
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
-#ifndef NO_SSL2
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 #include <openssl/buffer.h>
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
        unsigned char *buf;
        unsigned char *p;
        int i,j;
-       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk=NULL,*cl;
+       STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk=NULL,*cl, *prio, *allow;
 
        buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
        p=buf;
@@ -414,33 +414,49 @@ static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(sk,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
 
                /* get the array of ciphers we will accept */
-               cl=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s);
-
+               cl=SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+               sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(cl,ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+
+               /*
+                * If server preference flag set, choose the first
+                * (highest priority) cipher the server sends, otherwise
+                * client preference has priority.
+                */
+               if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
+                   {
+                   prio = sk;
+                   allow = cl;
+                   }
+               else
+                   {
+                   prio = cl;
+                   allow = sk;
+                   }
                /* In theory we could have ciphers sent back that we
                 * don't want to use but that does not matter since we
                 * will check against the list we originally sent and
                 * for performance reasons we should not bother to match
                 * the two lists up just to check. */
-               for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cl); i++)
+               for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++)
                        {
-                       if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,
-                                              sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cl,i)) >= 0)
+                       if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow,
+                                            sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i)) >= 0)
                                break;
                        }
 
-               if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cl))
+               if (i >= sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio))
                        {
                        ssl2_return_error(s,SSL2_PE_NO_CIPHER);
                        SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
                        return(-1);
                        }
-               s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cl,i);
+               s->session->cipher=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio,i);
 
 
                if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* can't happen*/
                        {
                        ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-                       SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+                       SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                        return(-1);
                        }
 
@@ -453,7 +469,7 @@ static int get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                /* can't happen */
                {
                ssl2_return_error(s, SSL2_PE_UNDEFINED_ERROR);
-               SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+               SSLerr(SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
                return(-1);
                }
                
@@ -921,6 +937,7 @@ int ssl2_set_certificate(SSL *s, int type, int len, unsigned char *data)
                goto err;
                }
        ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */
+       s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
 
        /* server's cert for this session */
        sc=ssl_sess_cert_new();
@@ -984,7 +1001,7 @@ end:
        EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
        return(i);
        }
-#else /* !NO_SSL2 */
+#else /* !OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 */
 
 # if PEDANTIC
 static void *dummy=&dummy;