{
memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, 8);
}
+
+/*
+ * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that
+ * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an
+ * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and
+ * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever.
+ */
+#define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32
+
+/*-
+ * Call this to get a new input record.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ */
+/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
+int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
+ int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ short version;
+ unsigned mac_size;
+ size_t extra;
+ unsigned empty_record_count = 0;
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+ sess = s->session;
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
+ extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
+ else
+ extra = 0;
+ if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
+ /*
+ * An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER set after
+ * ssl3_setup_buffers() was done
+ */
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ again:
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)), 0);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+ p = s->packet;
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
+ rr->type = *(p++);
+ ssl_major = *(p++);
+ ssl_minor = *(p++);
+ version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
+ n2s(p, rr->length);
+
+ /* Lets check version */
+ if (!s->first_packet) {
+ if (version != s->version) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
+ && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
+ /*
+ * Send back error using their minor version number :-)
+ */
+ s->version = (unsigned short)version;
+ al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length >
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer))
+ - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+ }
+
+ /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ i = rr->length;
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking io */
+ /*
+ * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ * + rr->length
+ */
+ }
+
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
+ rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /*
+ * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
+ * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
+ * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
+ * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
+ * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+ */
+
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+ rr->data = rr->input;
+ rr->orig_len = rr->length;
+ /*
+ * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
+ * the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
+ */
+ if (SSL_USE_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) {
+ unsigned char *mac;
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+ if (rr->length < mac_size) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = rr->data + rr->length;
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
+ /*-
+ * enc_err is:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+ * 1: if the padding is valid
+ * -1: if the padding is invalid
+ */
+ if (enc_err == 0) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+ {
+ unsigned int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+ if ((sess != NULL) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+ (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) && !SSL_USE_ETM(s)) {
+ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
+ * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+ */
+ if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ /*
+ * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
+ * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
+ * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
+ * contents of the padding bytes.
+ */
+ mac = mac_tmp;
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
+ * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
+ * |mac_size| above.
+ */
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+ }
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (enc_err < 0) {
+ /*
+ * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+ * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
+ * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should
+ * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become
+ * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile)
+ */
+ al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* r->length is now just compressed */
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rr->off = 0;
+ /*-
+ * So at this point the following is true
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
+ * after use :-).
+ */
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+
+ /* just read a 0 length packet */
+ if (rr->length == 0) {
+ empty_record_count++;
+ if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
+ al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ return (1);
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&ssl->rlayer);
+ i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data,
+ (int)rr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ rr->length = i;
+ rr->data = rr->comp;
+#endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ int i;
+ SSL3_RECORD *wr;
+
+ wr = RECORD_LAYER_get_wrec(&ssl->rlayer);
+ i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data,
+ SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
+ wr->input, (int)wr->length);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return (0);
+ else
+ wr->length = i;
+
+ wr->input = wr->data;
+#endif
+ return (1);
+}
+
+int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
+{
+ int i, al;
+ int enc_err;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ unsigned int mac_size;
+ unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+ sess = s->session;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
+ * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ */
+ rr->input = &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
+
+ /*
+ * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
+ * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
+ * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
+ * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
+ * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+ */
+
+ /* check is not needed I believe */
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
+ rr->data = rr->input;
+ rr->orig_len = rr->length;
+
+ enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
+ /*-
+ * enc_err is:
+ * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
+ * 1: if the padding is valid
+ * -1: if the padding is invalid
+ */
+ if (enc_err == 0) {
+ /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
+ printf("dec %d\n", rr->length);
+ {
+ unsigned int z;
+ for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+#endif
+
+ /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
+ if ((sess != NULL) &&
+ (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
+ /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+ unsigned char *mac = NULL;
+ unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+ OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
+ * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
+ * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
+ * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
+ */
+ if (rr->orig_len < mac_size ||
+ /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
+ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+ rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+ /*
+ * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be
+ * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in
+ * constant time from within the record, without leaking the
+ * contents of the padding bytes.
+ */
+ mac = mac_tmp;
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size);
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
+ * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
+ * |mac_size| above.
+ */
+ rr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+ }
+
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ if (i < 0 || mac == NULL
+ || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
+ enc_err = -1;
+ }
+
+ if (enc_err < 0) {
+ /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* r->length is now just compressed */
+ if (s->expand != NULL) {
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,
+ SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) {
+ al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+ al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto f_err;
+ }
+
+ rr->off = 0;
+ /*-
+ * So at this point the following is true
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
+ * after use :-).
+ */
+
+ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ return (1);
+
+ f_err:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ err:
+ return (0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie,
+ * processed
+ */
+#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
+ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
+ &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
+
+/*-
+ * Call this to get a new input record.
+ * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
+ * or non-blocking IO.
+ * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
+ * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
+ */
+/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
+int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
+{
+ int ssl_major, ssl_minor;
+ int i, n;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ unsigned char *p = NULL;
+ unsigned short version;
+ DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
+ unsigned int is_next_epoch;
+
+ rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
+
+ /*
+ * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records.
+ * This is a non-blocking operation.
+ */
+ if (dtls1_process_buffered_records(s) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
+ if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* get something from the wire */
+ again:
+ /* check if we have the header */
+ if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
+ (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)), 0);
+ /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
+ if (n <= 0)
+ return (n); /* error or non-blocking */
+
+ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+ if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
+
+ p = s->packet;
+
+ if (s->msg_callback)
+ s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+
+ /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
+ rr->type = *(p++);
+ ssl_major = *(p++);
+ ssl_minor = *(p++);
+ version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor;
+
+ /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
+ n2s(p, rr->epoch);
+
+ memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
+ p += 6;
+
+ n2s(p, rr->length);
+
+ /* Lets check version */
+ if (!s->first_packet) {
+ if (version != s->version) {
+ /* unexpected version, silently discard */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) {
+ /* wrong version, silently discard record */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+ /* record too long, silently discard it */
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
+ }
+
+ /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
+
+ if (rr->length > s->packet_length - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
+ /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
+ i = rr->length;
+ n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
+ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
+ if (n != i) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * now n == rr->length, and s->packet_length ==
+ * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
+ */
+ }
+ s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
+
+ /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
+ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
+ if (bitmap == NULL) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
+ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) {
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. Don't check if
+ * we're listening and this message is a ClientHello. They can look
+ * as if they're replayed, since they arrive from different
+ * connections and would be dropped unnecessarily.
+ */
+ if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
+ s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&
+ s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
+ !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* just read a 0 length packet */
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ goto again;
+
+ /*
+ * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a
+ * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be
+ * processed at this time. However, do not buffer anything while
+ * listening.
+ */
+ if (is_next_epoch) {
+ if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) {
+ if (dtls1_buffer_record
+ (s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ /* Mark receipt of record. */
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap);
+ }
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0;
+ goto again;
+ }
+
+ if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) {
+ rr->length = 0;
+ s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
+ goto again; /* get another record */
+ }
+ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); /* Mark receipt of record. */
+
+ return (1);
+
+}
+
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff