int enc_err, rret, ret = -1;
int i;
size_t more, n;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
+ SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr;
SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *p;
sess = s->session;
do {
+ thisrr = &rr[num_recs];
+
/* check if we have the header */
if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer)
* because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using
* |num_recs| for the sake of consistency
*/
- rr[num_recs].type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
- rr[num_recs].rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
+ thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
+ thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION;
- rr[num_recs].length = sslv2len & 0x7fff;
+ thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff;
- if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
+ if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf)
- SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- if (rr[num_recs].length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
+ if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
/* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type)
|| !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version)
- || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &rr[num_recs].length)) {
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
- rr[num_recs].type = type;
- rr[num_recs].rec_version = version;
+ thisrr->type = type;
+ thisrr->rec_version = version;
/* Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we ignore this field */
if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)
&& !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
- if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
/*
* The record is using an incorrect version number,
* but what we've got appears to be an alert. We
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
- && rr[num_recs].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto f_err;
}
- if (rr[num_recs].length >
+ if (thisrr->length >
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
* Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the
* record
*/
- if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- more = rr[num_recs].length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
} else {
- more = rr[num_recs].length;
+ more = thisrr->length;
}
if (more > 0) {
/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER);
/*
- * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length,
- * or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length
- * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
+ * At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ * + thisrr->length, or s->packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH
+ * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->packet
*/
- if (rr[num_recs].rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
- rr[num_recs].input =
+ if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ thisrr->input =
&(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
} else {
- rr[num_recs].input =
+ thisrr->input =
&(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
}
/*
- * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' rr->input points
- * at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by either
- * the decryption or by the decompression When the data is 'copied' into
- * the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer
+ * ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'thisrr' thisrr->input
+ * points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied into
+ * thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression When
+ * the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, thisrr->input will
+ * be pointed at the new buffer
*/
/*
- * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length
- * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
+ * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
+ * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff.
*/
/* check is not needed I believe */
- if (rr[num_recs].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+ if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
- rr[num_recs].data = rr[num_recs].input;
- rr[num_recs].orig_len = rr[num_recs].length;
+ /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */
+ thisrr->data = thisrr->input;
+ thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length;
/* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */
- rr[num_recs].read = 0;
+ thisrr->read = 0;
num_recs++;
RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer);
RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer);
} while (num_recs < max_recs
- && rr[num_recs - 1].type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)
&& s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
&& (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx))
mac_size = (size_t)imac_size;
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
- if (rr[j].length < mac_size) {
+ thisrr = &rr[j];
+
+ if (thisrr->length < mac_size) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
}
- rr[j].length -= mac_size;
- mac = rr[j].data + rr[j].length;
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ thisrr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length;
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
goto f_err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
- printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr->length);
+ printf("dec %"OSSLzu"\n", rr[0].length);
{
size_t z;
- for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++)
- printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
+ for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++)
+ printf("%02X%c", rr[0].data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n');
}
printf("\n");
#endif
OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
+ thisrr = &rr[j];
/*
* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
* removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
* therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount
* of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
*/
- if (rr[j].orig_len < mac_size ||
+ if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size ||
/* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
- rr[j].orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
+ thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
goto f_err;
* contents of the padding bytes.
*/
mac = mac_tmp;
- ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, &rr[j], mac_size);
- rr[j].length -= mac_size;
+ ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size);
+ thisrr->length -= mac_size;
} else {
/*
* In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals
* |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for
* |mac_size| above.
*/
- rr[j].length -= mac_size;
- mac = &rr[j].data[rr[j].length];
+ thisrr->length -= mac_size;
+ mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length];
}
- i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, &rr[j], md, 0 /* not send */ );
+ i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ );
if (i == 0 || mac == NULL
|| CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
enc_err = -1;
- if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
+ if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size)
enc_err = -1;
}
}
}
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
- /* rr[j].length is now just compressed */
+ thisrr = &rr[j];
+
+ /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */
if (s->expand != NULL) {
- if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
+ if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, &rr[j])) {
+ if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
goto f_err;
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
size_t end;
- if (rr[j].length == 0) {
+ if (thisrr->length == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
/* Strip trailing padding */
- for (end = rr[j].length - 1; end > 0 && rr[j].data[end] == 0; end--)
+ for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
+ end--)
continue;
- rr[j].length = end;
- rr[j].type = rr[j].data[end];
- if (rr[j].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
- && rr[j].type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
- && rr[j].type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ thisrr->length = end;
+ thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
+ if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
+ && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
goto f_err;
}
}
- if (rr[j].length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
+ if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto f_err;
}
- rr[j].off = 0;
+ thisrr->off = 0;
/*-
* So at this point the following is true
- * rr[j].type is the type of record
- * rr[j].length == number of bytes in record
- * rr[j].off == offset to first valid byte
- * rr[j].data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
+ * thisrr->type is the type of record
+ * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record
+ * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte
+ * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-).
*/
/* just read a 0 length packet */
- if (rr[j].length == 0) {
+ if (thisrr->length == 0) {
RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer);
if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer)
> MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) {
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff