/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "record_local.h"
#include "internal/packet.h"
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SMALL_FOOTPRINT) || \
- !( defined(AES_ASM) && ( \
- defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
- defined(_M_AMD64) || defined(_M_X64) ) \
- )
-# undef EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
-# define EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK 0
-#endif
-
-void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL *s)
+void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
rl->s = s;
- RECORD_LAYER_set_first_record(&s->rlayer);
- SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
}
void RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
- rl->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
-
- /*
- * Do I need to clear read_ahead? As far as I can tell read_ahead did not
- * previously get reset by SSL_clear...so I'll keep it that way..but is
- * that right?
- */
-
- rl->packet = NULL;
- rl->packet_length = 0;
rl->wnum = 0;
memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment));
rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
rl->wpend_ret = 0;
rl->wpend_buf = NULL;
- SSL3_BUFFER_clear(&rl->rbuf);
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
- rl->numrpipes = 0;
- SSL3_RECORD_clear(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
-
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(rl);
- RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(rl);
+ if (rl->rrlmethod != NULL)
+ rl->rrlmethod->free(rl->rrl); /* Ignore return value */
+ if (rl->wrlmethod != NULL)
+ rl->wrlmethod->free(rl->wrl); /* Ignore return value */
+ BIO_free(rl->rrlnext);
+ rl->rrlmethod = NULL;
+ rl->wrlmethod = NULL;
+ rl->rrlnext = NULL;
+ rl->rrl = NULL;
+ rl->wrl = NULL;
if (rl->d)
DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl);
}
-void RECORD_LAYER_release(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
-{
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(&rl->rbuf))
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(rl->s);
- if (rl->numwpipes > 0)
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(rl->s);
- SSL3_RECORD_release(rl->rrec, SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
-}
-
/* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */
int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
- return SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->rbuf) != 0;
+ return rl->rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
}
/* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */
int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
- size_t curr_rec = 0, num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(rl);
- const SSL3_RECORD *rr = rl->rrec;
-
- while (curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]))
- curr_rec++;
-
- return curr_rec < num_recs;
+ return (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs)
+ || rl->rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(rl->rrl);
}
int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
- return (rl->numwpipes > 0)
- && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&rl->wbuf[rl->numwpipes - 1]) != 0;
+ return rl->wpend_tot > 0;
}
-void RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
{
- memset(rl->read_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->read_sequence));
+ uint32_t max_early_data;
+ SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the
+ * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early
+ * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data.
+ */
+ if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL
+ && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sess = s->psksession;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->server)
+ max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data;
+ else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED)
+ max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data;
+ else
+ max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data
+ ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data;
+
+ return max_early_data;
}
-void RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t length,
+ size_t overhead, int send)
{
- memset(rl->write_sequence, 0, sizeof(rl->write_sequence));
+ uint32_t max_early_data;
+
+ max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
+
+ if (max_early_data == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */
+ max_early_data += overhead;
+
+ if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) {
+ SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
+ SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->early_data_count += length;
+
+ return 1;
}
size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s)
{
size_t i, num = 0;
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
- if (s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)
+ if (sc == NULL)
return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer); i++) {
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(&s->rlayer.rrec[i])
- != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
- return 0;
- num += SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&s->rlayer.rrec[i]);
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
+ TLS_RECORD *rdata;
+ pitem *item, *iter;
+
+ iter = pqueue_iterator(sc->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data.q);
+ while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) {
+ rdata = item->data;
+ num += rdata->length;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sc->rlayer.num_recs; i++) {
+ if (sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ return num;
+ num += sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].length;
}
+ num += sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->app_data_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl);
+
return num;
}
void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len)
{
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_default_len(RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer), len);
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
+ sc->rlayer.default_read_buf_len = len;
}
const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s)
{
- switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
- case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
- return "read header";
- case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
- return "read body";
- case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
- return "read done";
- default:
- return "unknown";
- }
-}
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+ const char *lng;
-const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
-{
- switch (s->rlayer.rstate) {
- case SSL_ST_READ_HEADER:
- return "RH";
- case SSL_ST_READ_BODY:
- return "RB";
- case SSL_ST_READ_DONE:
- return "RD";
- default:
- return "unknown";
- }
-}
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return NULL;
-/*
- * Return values are as per SSL_read()
- */
-int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
- size_t *readbytes)
-{
- /*
- * If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
- * packet by another n bytes. The packet will be in the sub-array of
- * s->s3.rbuf.buf specified by s->packet and s->packet_length. (If
- * s->rlayer.read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf [plus
- * s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
- * if clearold == 1, move the packet to the start of the buffer; if
- * clearold == 0 then leave any old packets where they were
- */
- size_t len, left, align = 0;
- unsigned char *pkt;
- SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
+ if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
+ return "unknown";
- if (n == 0)
- return 0;
+ sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, NULL, &lng);
- rb = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
- if (rb->buf == NULL)
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
+ return lng;
+}
- left = rb->left;
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
- align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
-#endif
+const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s)
+{
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+ const char *shrt;
- if (!extend) {
- /* start with empty packet ... */
- if (left == 0)
- rb->offset = align;
- else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
- /*
- * check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload
- * alignment...
- */
- pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
- if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
- && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) {
- /*
- * Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field
- * is insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about
- * whether memmove will occur or not. Header values has no
- * effect on memmove arguments and therefore no buffer
- * overrun can be triggered.
- */
- memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
- rb->offset = align;
- }
- }
- s->rlayer.packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
- s->rlayer.packet_length = 0;
- /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
- }
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return NULL;
- len = s->rlayer.packet_length;
- pkt = rb->buf + align;
- /*
- * Move any available bytes to front of buffer: 'len' bytes already
- * pointed to by 'packet', 'left' extra ones at the end
- */
- if (s->rlayer.packet != pkt && clearold == 1) {
- memmove(pkt, s->rlayer.packet, len + left);
- s->rlayer.packet = pkt;
- rb->offset = len + align;
- }
+ if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL)
+ return "unknown";
- /*
- * For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets because the read
- * operation returns the whole packet at once (as long as it fits into
- * the buffer).
- */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (left == 0 && extend)
- return 0;
- if (left > 0 && n > left)
- n = left;
- }
+ sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, &shrt, NULL);
- /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
- if (left >= n) {
- s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
- rb->left = left - n;
- rb->offset += n;
- *readbytes = n;
- return 1;
- }
+ return shrt;
+}
- /* else we need to read more data */
+static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int type,
+ const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0)
+ return 0;
- if (n > rb->len - rb->offset) {
- /* does not happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */
+ if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
+ || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
+ && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
+ || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
return -1;
}
-
- /*
- * Ktls always reads full records.
- * Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
- */
- if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead
- && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /* ignore max parameter */
- max = n;
- } else {
- if (max < n)
- max = n;
- if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
- max = rb->len - rb->offset;
- }
-
- while (left < n) {
- size_t bioread = 0;
- int ret;
-
- /*
- * Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3.rbuf.buf and
- * need to read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if
- * possible)
- */
-
- clear_sys_error();
- if (s->rbio != NULL) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this function */
- ret = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
- if (ret >= 0)
- bioread = ret;
- if (ret <= 0
- && !BIO_should_retry(s->rbio)
- && BIO_eof(s->rbio)) {
- if (s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) {
- SSL_set_shutdown(s, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
- s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
- } else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING);
- }
- }
- } else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,
- SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
- ret = -1;
- }
-
- if (ret <= 0) {
- rb->left = left;
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- if (len + left == 0)
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
- return ret;
- }
- left += bioread;
- /*
- * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the
- * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to
- * byte oriented as in the TLS case.
- */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- if (n > left)
- n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
- }
- }
-
- /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
- rb->offset += n;
- rb->left = left - n;
- s->rlayer.packet_length += n;
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- *readbytes = n;
return 1;
}
* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if
* not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
*/
-int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
+int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len,
size_t *written)
{
const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
size_t tot;
size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes;
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
- size_t nw;
-#endif
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
int i;
- size_t tmpwrit;
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
+ OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
+ unsigned int recversion;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return -1;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
tot = s->rlayer.wnum;
* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out
* than the original len from a write which didn't complete for
* non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for
- * this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
+ * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be
* possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then
* promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and
* report the error in a way the user will notice
*/
if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum)
- || ((wb->left != 0) && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
- SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ || ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot != 0)
+ && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return -1;
}
if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING
- && !early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
+ && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
}
* into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish
* doing that first.
*/
- if (wb->left == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
- || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
+ if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE
+ || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0))
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
/*
* between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those
* messages yet.
*/
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
+ if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)
&& s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) {
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
/* SSLfatal() already called */
if (i < 0)
return i;
}
}
- /*
- * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
- * will happen with non blocking IO
- */
- if (wb->left != 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], s->rlayer.wpend_tot,
- &tmpwrit);
- if (i <= 0) {
- /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
- s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
+ i = tls_write_check_pending(s, type, buf, len);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return i;
+ } else if (i > 0) {
+ /* Retry needed */
+ i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->retry_write_records(s->rlayer.wrl));
+ if (i <= 0)
return i;
- }
- tot += tmpwrit; /* this might be last fragment */
- }
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK
- /*
- * Depending on platform multi-block can deliver several *times*
- * better performance. Downside is that it has to allocate
- * jumbo buffer to accommodate up to 8 records, but the
- * compromise is considered worthy.
- */
- if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- len >= 4 * (max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)) &&
- s->compress == NULL && s->msg_callback == NULL &&
- !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) &&
- (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) == 0) &&
- EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx)) &
- EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK) {
- unsigned char aad[13];
- EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param;
- size_t packlen;
- int packleni;
-
- /* minimize address aliasing conflicts */
- if ((max_send_fragment & 0xfff) == 0)
- max_send_fragment -= 512;
-
- if (tot == 0 || wb->buf == NULL) { /* allocate jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
-
- packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
- EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_MAX_BUFSIZE,
- (int)max_send_fragment, NULL);
-
- if (len >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
- packlen *= 8;
- else
- packlen *= 4;
-
- if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, 1, packlen)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- } else if (tot == len) { /* done? */
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- *written = tot;
- return 1;
- }
-
- n = (len - tot);
- for (;;) {
- if (n < 4 * max_send_fragment) {
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- break;
- }
-
- if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
- i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (i <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
- return i;
- }
- }
-
- if (n >= 8 * max_send_fragment)
- nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 8);
- else
- nw = max_send_fragment * (mb_param.interleave = 4);
-
- memcpy(aad, s->rlayer.write_sequence, 8);
- aad[8] = type;
- aad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8);
- aad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version);
- aad[11] = 0;
- aad[12] = 0;
- mb_param.out = NULL;
- mb_param.inp = aad;
- mb_param.len = nw;
-
- packleni = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
- EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD,
- sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param);
- packlen = (size_t)packleni;
- if (packleni <= 0 || packlen > wb->len) { /* never happens */
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- break;
- }
-
- mb_param.out = wb->buf;
- mb_param.inp = &buf[tot];
- mb_param.len = nw;
-
- if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(s->enc_write_ctx,
- EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT,
- sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param) <= 0)
- return -1;
-
- s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] += mb_param.interleave;
- if (s->rlayer.write_sequence[7] < mb_param.interleave) {
- int j = 6;
- while (j >= 0 && (++s->rlayer.write_sequence[j--]) == 0) ;
- }
+ tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
+ } /* else no retry required */
- wb->offset = 0;
- wb->left = packlen;
-
- s->rlayer.wpend_tot = nw;
- s->rlayer.wpend_buf = &buf[tot];
- s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
- s->rlayer.wpend_ret = nw;
+ if (tot == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize
+ * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later
+ */
+ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_ret = len;
+ }
- i = ssl3_write_pending(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, &tmpwrit);
- if (i <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- if (i < 0 && (!s->wbio || !BIO_should_retry(s->wbio))) {
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- }
- s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
- return i;
- }
- if (tmpwrit == n) {
- /* free jumbo buffer */
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
- *written = tot + tmpwrit;
- return 1;
- }
- n -= tmpwrit;
- tot += tmpwrit;
- }
- } else
-#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK) && EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK */
if (tot == len) { /* done? */
- if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
-
*written = tot;
return 1;
}
+ /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
+ if (s->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) {
+ i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
+ return i;
+ }
+ /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ }
+
n = (len - tot);
max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s);
- /*
- * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
- * 1 pipeline. Similarly if the cipher does not support pipelined
- * processing then we also only use 1 pipeline, or if we're not using
- * explicit IVs
- */
- maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
- if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) {
- /*
- * We should have prevented this when we set max_pipelines so we
- * shouldn't get here
- */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- if (maxpipes == 0
- || s->enc_write_ctx == NULL
- || !(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx))
- & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)
- || !SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s))
- maxpipes = 1;
- if (max_send_fragment == 0 || split_send_fragment == 0
- || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
+
+ if (max_send_fragment == 0
+ || split_send_fragment == 0
+ || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
/*
* We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send
* fragments so we shouldn't get here
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
+ /*
+ * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
+ * and record version number > TLS 1.0
+ */
+ recversion = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version;
+ if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
+ && !s->renegotiate
+ && TLS1_get_version(ssl) > TLS1_VERSION
+ && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
+ recversion = TLS1_VERSION;
+
for (;;) {
- size_t pipelens[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES], tmppipelen, remain;
- size_t numpipes, j;
+ size_t tmppipelen, remain;
+ size_t j, lensofar = 0;
- if (n == 0)
- numpipes = 1;
- else
- numpipes = ((n - 1) / split_send_fragment) + 1;
- if (numpipes > maxpipes)
- numpipes = maxpipes;
+ /*
+ * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data
+ * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go.
+ */
+ maxpipes = s->rlayer.wrlmethod->get_max_records(s->rlayer.wrl, type, n,
+ max_send_fragment,
+ &split_send_fragment);
+ /*
+ * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to
+ * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest
+ * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number
+ * configured by the user.
+ */
+ if (s->max_pipelines > 0 && maxpipes > s->max_pipelines)
+ maxpipes = s->max_pipelines;
+
+ if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES)
+ maxpipes = SSL_MAX_PIPELINES;
+
+ if (split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return -1;
+ }
- if (n / numpipes >= max_send_fragment) {
+ if (n / maxpipes >= split_send_fragment) {
/*
* We have enough data to completely fill all available
* pipelines
*/
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- pipelens[j] = max_send_fragment;
+ for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
+ tmpls[j].type = type;
+ tmpls[j].version = recversion;
+ tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + (j * split_send_fragment);
+ tmpls[j].buflen = split_send_fragment;
}
+ /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
+ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = maxpipes * split_send_fragment;
} else {
/* We can partially fill all available pipelines */
- tmppipelen = n / numpipes;
- remain = n % numpipes;
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- pipelens[j] = tmppipelen;
- if (j < remain)
- pipelens[j]++;
+ tmppipelen = n / maxpipes;
+ remain = n % maxpipes;
+ /*
+ * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few
+ * pipelines
+ */
+ if (remain > 0)
+ tmppipelen++;
+ for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) {
+ tmpls[j].type = type;
+ tmpls[j].version = recversion;
+ tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + lensofar;
+ tmpls[j].buflen = tmppipelen;
+ lensofar += tmppipelen;
+ if (j + 1 == remain)
+ tmppipelen--;
}
+ /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */
+ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = n;
}
- i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), pipelens, numpipes, 0,
- &tmpwrit);
+ i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s,
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(s->rlayer.wrl, tmpls, maxpipes));
if (i <= 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- /* XXX should we ssl3_release_write_buffer if i<0? */
s->rlayer.wnum = tot;
return i;
}
- if (tmpwrit == n ||
- (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
- (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
- /*
- * next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
- * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness:
- */
- s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 0;
-
- if (tmpwrit == n
- && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS) != 0
- && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
-
- *written = tot + tmpwrit;
+ if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == n
+ || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE) != 0)) {
+ *written = tot + s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
+ s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0;
return 1;
}
- n -= tmpwrit;
- tot += tmpwrit;
+ n -= s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
+ tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot;
}
}
-int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
- size_t *pipelens, size_t numpipes,
- int create_empty_fragment, size_t *written)
+int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int writing, int ret,
+ char *file, int line)
{
- WPACKET pkt[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
- SSL3_RECORD wr[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES];
- WPACKET *thispkt;
- SSL3_RECORD *thiswr;
- unsigned char *recordstart;
- int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
- size_t prefix_len = 0;
- int eivlen = 0;
- size_t align = 0;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- size_t totlen = 0, len, wpinited = 0;
- size_t j;
-
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++)
- totlen += pipelens[j];
- /*
- * first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This
- * will happen with non blocking IO
- */
- if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
- /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */
- return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
- }
-
- /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
- if (s->s3.alert_dispatch) {
- i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
- if (i <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- return i;
- }
- /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
- }
-
- if (s->rlayer.numwpipes < numpipes) {
- if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s, numpipes, 0)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if (totlen == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
- return 0;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
- sess = s->session;
-
- if ((sess == NULL) ||
- (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
- clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
- mac_size = 0;
+ if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) {
+ s->rwstate = writing ? SSL_WRITING : SSL_READING;
+ ret = -1;
} else {
- /* TODO(siz_t): Convert me */
- mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
- if (mac_size < 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself
- */
- if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3.empty_fragment_done) {
- /*
- * countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites (see
- * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
- */
-
- if (s->s3.need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
- /*
- * recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; this
- * prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment (these
- * 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later together with the actual
- * payload)
- */
- size_t tmppipelen = 0;
- int ret;
-
- ret = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, &tmppipelen, 1, 1, &prefix_len);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (prefix_len >
- (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
- /* insufficient space */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- s->s3.empty_fragment_done = 1;
- }
-
- if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
- /*
- * ktls doesn't modify the buffer, but to avoid a warning we need to
- * discard the const qualifier.
- * This doesn't leak memory because the buffers have been released when
- * switching to ktls.
- */
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_buf(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], (unsigned char *)buf);
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 0);
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_app_buffer(&s->rlayer.wbuf[0], 1);
- goto wpacket_init_complete;
- }
-
- if (create_empty_fragment) {
- wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
- /*
- * extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks, which would be
- * multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so if we want to align the real
- * payload, then we can just pretend we simply have two headers.
- */
- align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
-#endif
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], align, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- wpinited = 1;
- } else if (prefix_len) {
- wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[0];
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt[0],
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(&pkt[0], SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(wb)
- + prefix_len, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- wpinited = 1;
- } else {
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- thispkt = &pkt[j];
-
- wb = &s->rlayer.wbuf[j];
-#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD != 0
- align = (size_t)SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb) + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- align = SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1 - ((align - 1) % SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD);
-#endif
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_offset(wb, align);
- if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(thispkt, SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(wb),
- SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(wb), 0)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, align, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- wpinited++;
- }
- }
-
- /* Explicit IV length, block ciphers appropriate version flag */
- if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && !SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)) {
- int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
- if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */
- eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
- if (eivlen <= 1)
- eivlen = 0;
- } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
- /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
- eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- } else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
- eivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
- }
- }
-
- wpacket_init_complete:
-
- totlen = 0;
- /* Clear our SSL3_RECORD structures */
- memset(wr, 0, sizeof(wr));
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- unsigned int version = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION
- : s->version;
- unsigned char *compressdata = NULL;
- size_t maxcomplen;
- unsigned int rectype;
-
- thispkt = &pkt[j];
- thiswr = &wr[j];
-
- /*
- * In TLSv1.3, once encrypting, we always use application data for the
- * record type
- */
- if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
- && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
- && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
- || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT))
- rectype = SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA;
- else
- rectype = type;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, rectype);
-
- /*
- * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes
- * and record version number > TLS 1.0
- */
- if (SSL_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO
- && !s->renegotiate
- && TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION
- && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE)
- version = TLS1_VERSION;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_rec_version(thiswr, version);
-
- maxcomplen = pipelens[j];
- if (s->compress != NULL)
- maxcomplen += SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
-
- /*
- * When using offload kernel will write the header.
- * Otherwise write the header now
- */
- if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
- && (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, rectype)
- || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(thispkt, version)
- || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(thispkt)
- || (eivlen > 0
- && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, eivlen, NULL))
- || (maxcomplen > 0
- && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt, maxcomplen,
- &compressdata)))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* lets setup the record stuff. */
- SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, compressdata);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, pipelens[j]);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_input(thiswr, (unsigned char *)&buf[totlen]);
- totlen += pipelens[j];
-
- /*
- * we now 'read' from thiswr->input, thiswr->length bytes into
- * thiswr->data
- */
-
- /* first we compress */
- if (s->compress != NULL) {
- if (!ssl3_do_compress(s, thiswr)
- || !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, thiswr->length, NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
- SSL3_RECORD_reset_data(&wr[j]);
- } else {
- if (!WPACKET_memcpy(thispkt, thiswr->input, thiswr->length)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(&wr[j]);
- }
- }
-
- if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s)
- && !BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
- && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL
- && (s->statem.enc_write_state != ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS
- || type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
- size_t rlen, max_send_fragment;
-
- if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(thispkt, type)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, 1);
-
- /* Add TLS1.3 padding */
- max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s);
- rlen = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
- if (rlen < max_send_fragment) {
- size_t padding = 0;
- size_t max_padding = max_send_fragment - rlen;
- if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) {
- padding = s->record_padding_cb(s, type, rlen, s->record_padding_arg);
- } else if (s->block_padding > 0) {
- size_t mask = s->block_padding - 1;
- size_t remainder;
-
- /* optimize for power of 2 */
- if ((s->block_padding & mask) == 0)
- remainder = rlen & mask;
- else
- remainder = rlen % s->block_padding;
- /* don't want to add a block of padding if we don't have to */
- if (remainder == 0)
- padding = 0;
- else
- padding = s->block_padding - remainder;
- }
- if (padding > 0) {
- /* do not allow the record to exceed max plaintext length */
- if (padding > max_padding)
- padding = max_padding;
- if (!WPACKET_memset(thispkt, 0, padding)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, padding);
- }
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * we should still have the output to thiswr->data and the input from
- * wr->input. Length should be thiswr->length. thiswr->data still points
- * in the wb->buf
- */
-
- if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && !SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
- unsigned char *mac;
-
- if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Reserve some bytes for any growth that may occur during encryption.
- * This will be at most one cipher block or the tag length if using
- * AEAD. SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE covers either case.
- */
- if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
- if (!WPACKET_reserve_bytes(thispkt,
- SSL_RT_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCK_SIZE,
- NULL)
+ s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
+ if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) {
+ if (writing) {
/*
- * We also need next the amount of bytes written to this
- * sub-packet
+ * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it
+ * as fatal.
*/
- || !WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Get a pointer to the start of this record excluding header */
- recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_data(thiswr, recordstart);
- SSL3_RECORD_reset_input(thiswr);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(thiswr, len);
- }
- }
-
- if (s->statem.enc_write_state == ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS) {
- /*
- * We haven't actually negotiated the version yet, but we're trying to
- * send early data - so we need to use the tls13enc function.
- */
- if (tls13_enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL, mac_size) < 1) {
- if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- }
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (!BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)) {
- if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, wr, numpipes, 1, NULL,
- mac_size) < 1) {
- if (!ossl_statem_in_error(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- }
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- for (j = 0; j < numpipes; j++) {
- size_t origlen;
-
- thispkt = &pkt[j];
- thiswr = &wr[j];
-
- if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio))
- goto mac_done;
-
- /* Allocate bytes for the encryption overhead */
- if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &origlen)
- /* Encryption should never shrink the data! */
- || origlen > thiswr->length
- || (thiswr->length > origlen
- && !WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt,
- thiswr->length - origlen,
- NULL))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- if (SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) && mac_size != 0) {
- unsigned char *mac;
-
- if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(thispkt, mac_size, &mac)
- || !s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thiswr, mac, 1)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
+ ERR_new();
+ ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
+ ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, NULL);
+ ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL;
+ } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) != 0) {
+ SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+ s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY;
+ } else {
+ ERR_new();
+ ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
+ ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING, NULL);
}
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(thiswr, mac_size);
- }
-
- if (!WPACKET_get_length(thispkt, &len)
- || !WPACKET_close(thispkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (s->msg_callback) {
- recordstart = WPACKET_get_curr(thispkt) - len
- - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
- s->msg_callback(1, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, recordstart,
- SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s,
- s->msg_callback_arg);
+ } else if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL) {
+ int al = s->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_alert_code(s->rlayer.rrl);
- if (SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) {
- unsigned char ctype = type;
-
- s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
- &ctype, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) {
+ ERR_new();
+ ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0);
+ ossl_statem_fatal(s, al, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE, NULL);
}
- }
-
- if (!WPACKET_finish(thispkt)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* header is added by the kernel when using offload */
- SSL3_RECORD_add_length(&wr[j], SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH);
-
- if (create_empty_fragment) {
/*
- * we are in a recursive call; just return the length, don't write
- * out anything here
+ * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an
+ * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error
+ * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be
+ * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno.
*/
- if (j > 0) {
- /* We should never be pipelining an empty fragment!! */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- *written = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr);
- return 1;
}
-
- mac_done:
/*
- * we should now have thiswr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which
- * is thiswr->length long
+ * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal
+ * err and retry. Upper layers do not.
+ * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct,
+ * otherwise we need to convert the return value.
*/
- SSL3_RECORD_set_type(thiswr, type); /* not needed but helps for
- * debugging */
-
- /* now let's set up wb */
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&s->rlayer.wbuf[j],
- prefix_len + SSL3_RECORD_get_length(thiswr));
+ if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR || ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF)
+ ret = 0;
+ else if (ret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR)
+ ret = -1;
}
- /*
- * memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write
- * retries later
- */
- s->rlayer.wpend_tot = totlen;
- s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf;
- s->rlayer.wpend_type = type;
- s->rlayer.wpend_ret = totlen;
-
- /* we now just need to write the buffer */
- return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, totlen, written);
- err:
- for (j = 0; j < wpinited; j++)
- WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt[j]);
- return -1;
+ return ret;
}
-/* if s->s3.wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this
- *
- * Return values are as per SSL_write()
- */
-int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
- size_t *written)
+void ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rr)
{
- int i;
- SSL3_BUFFER *wb = s->rlayer.wbuf;
- size_t currbuf = 0;
- size_t tmpwrit = 0;
-
- if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len)
- || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)
- && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf))
- || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
- SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
- return -1;
- }
-
- for (;;) {
- /* Loop until we find a buffer we haven't written out yet */
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]) == 0
- && currbuf < s->rlayer.numwpipes - 1) {
- currbuf++;
- continue;
- }
- clear_sys_error();
- if (s->wbio != NULL) {
- s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
-
- /*
- * To prevent coalescing of control and data messages,
- * such as in buffer_write, we flush the BIO
- */
- if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
- i = BIO_flush(s->wbio);
- if (i <= 0)
- return i;
- }
-
- if (BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio)
- && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
- BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg(s->wbio, type);
- }
- /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */
- i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)
- &(SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(&wb[currbuf])
- [SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(&wb[currbuf])]),
- (unsigned int)SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf]));
- if (i >= 0)
- tmpwrit = i;
- } else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,
- SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
- i = -1;
- }
- if (i > 0 && tmpwrit == SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(&wb[currbuf])) {
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
- SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
- if (currbuf + 1 < s->rlayer.numwpipes)
- continue;
- s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
- *written = s->rlayer.wpend_ret;
- return 1;
- } else if (i <= 0) {
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
- /*
- * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in
- * using a datagram service
- */
- SSL3_BUFFER_set_left(&wb[currbuf], 0);
- }
- return i;
- }
- SSL3_BUFFER_add_offset(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
- SSL3_BUFFER_sub_left(&wb[currbuf], tmpwrit);
+ if (rr->rechandle != NULL) {
+ /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */
+ s->rlayer.rrlmethod->release_record(s->rlayer.rrl, rr->rechandle);
+ } else {
+ /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */
+ OPENSSL_free(rr->data);
}
+ s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
}
/*-
*
* This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
* Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec
- * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type|
+ * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type|
* argument is non NULL.
* Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
* them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
* Application data protocol
* none of our business
*/
-int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
+int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf,
size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes)
{
int i, j, ret;
- size_t n, curr_rec, num_recs, totalbytes;
- SSL3_RECORD *rr;
- SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf;
+ size_t n, curr_rec, totalbytes;
+ TLS_RECORD *rr;
void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
- int is_tls13 = SSL_IS_TLS13(s);
+ int is_tls13;
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl);
- rbuf = &s->rlayer.rbuf;
+ is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s);
- if (!SSL3_BUFFER_is_initialised(rbuf)) {
- /* Not initialized yet */
- if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) {
- /* SSLfatal() already called */
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
- && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek
- && (type !=
- SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ if ((type != 0
+ && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
+ && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
+ || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
* Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
*/
- if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(s)) {
+ if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(ssl)) {
/* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
/* SSLfatal() already called */
if (i < 0)
return i;
* rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read
* rr[i].length, - number of bytes.
*/
- rr = s->rlayer.rrec;
- num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
-
- do {
- /* get new records if necessary */
- if (num_recs == 0) {
- ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
+ /* get new records if necessary */
+ if (s->rlayer.curr_rec >= s->rlayer.num_recs) {
+ s->rlayer.curr_rec = s->rlayer.num_recs = 0;
+ do {
+ rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.num_recs];
+
+ ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s,
+ s->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(s->rlayer.rrl,
+ &rr->rechandle,
+ &rr->version, &rr->type,
+ &rr->data, &rr->length,
+ NULL, NULL));
if (ret <= 0) {
/* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
return ret;
}
- num_recs = RECORD_LAYER_get_numrpipes(&s->rlayer);
- if (num_recs == 0) {
- /* Shouldn't happen */
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /* Skip over any records we have already read */
- for (curr_rec = 0;
- curr_rec < num_recs && SSL3_RECORD_is_read(&rr[curr_rec]);
- curr_rec++) ;
- if (curr_rec == num_recs) {
- RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 0);
- num_recs = 0;
- curr_rec = 0;
- }
- } while (num_recs == 0);
- rr = &rr[curr_rec];
+ rr->off = 0;
+ s->rlayer.num_recs++;
+ } while (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(s->rlayer.rrl)
+ && s->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES);
+ }
+ rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.curr_rec];
if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0
- && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
- && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
+ && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA);
return -1;
}
* Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty
* record that isn't an alert.
*/
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_ALERT
- && SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) != 0)
+ if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0)
s->rlayer.alert_count = 0;
/* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
* reset by ssl3_get_finished */
- && (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
return -1;
}
* 'peek' mode)
*/
if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
+ s->rlayer.curr_rec++;
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
return 0;
}
- if (type == SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)
- || (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ if (type == rr->type
+ || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL
&& !is_tls13)) {
/*
* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are
* doing a handshake for the first time
*/
- if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
- (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
+ if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
return -1;
}
if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE
- && SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
+ && rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
&& s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
return -1;
}
if (recvd_type != NULL)
- *recvd_type = SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr);
+ *recvd_type = rr->type;
if (len == 0) {
/*
- * Mark a zero length record as read. This ensures multiple calls to
+ * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to
* SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause
* SSL_pending() to report data as being available.
*/
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ ssl_release_record(s, rr);
+
return 0;
}
totalbytes = 0;
+ curr_rec = s->rlayer.curr_rec;
do {
- if (len - totalbytes > SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
- n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr);
+ if (len - totalbytes > rr->length)
+ n = rr->length;
else
n = len - totalbytes;
buf += n;
if (peek) {
/* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ ssl_release_record(s, rr);
} else {
- SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
- SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0) {
- s->rlayer.rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_off(rr, 0);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- }
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT)
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(&(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
+ rr->length -= n;
+ rr->off += n;
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ ssl_release_record(s, rr);
}
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0
- || (peek && n == SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))) {
- curr_rec++;
+ if (rr->length == 0
+ || (peek && n == rr->length)) {
rr++;
+ curr_rec++;
}
totalbytes += n;
- } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && curr_rec < num_recs
- && totalbytes < len);
+ } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
+ && curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs
+ && totalbytes < len);
if (totalbytes == 0) {
/* We must have read empty records. Get more data */
goto start;
}
- if (!peek && curr_rec == num_recs
- && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
- && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0)
- ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
*readbytes = totalbytes;
return 1;
}
/*
* Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record
*/
- if (rr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) {
+ if (rr->version == SSL2_VERSION) {
/*
* Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2
* record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an
* initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to
* |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
}
- if (s->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
+ if (ssl->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION
&& (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) {
/*
* If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version
* with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello
* if we are a server.
*/
- s->version = rr->rec_version;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ s->version = rr->version;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
return -1;
}
* (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.)
*/
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr;
- unsigned char *alert_bytes = SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr)
- + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr);
+ unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data
+ + rr->off;
PACKET alert;
- if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr))
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length)
|| !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level)
|| !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr)
|| PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT);
return -1;
}
if (s->msg_callback)
- s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s,
+ s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, ssl,
s->msg_callback_arg);
if (s->info_callback != NULL)
cb = s->info_callback;
- else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
- cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
+ else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
+ cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback;
if (cb != NULL) {
j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
- cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
+ cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
}
- if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING
+ if ((!is_tls13 && alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)
|| (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) {
s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ ssl_release_record(s, rr);
s->rlayer.alert_count++;
if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE,
SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS);
return -1;
}
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
return 0;
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) {
- char tmp[16];
-
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr;
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
- BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%d", alert_descr);
- ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp);
+ SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
+ SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr,
+ "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr);
s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ ssl_release_record(s, rr);
SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session);
return 0;
} else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
* future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if
* the peer refused it where we carry on.
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
return -1;
} else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) {
/* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */
goto start;
}
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
return -1;
}
if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) {
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
BIO *rbio;
/*
* because we are unable to write any response due to having already
* sent close_notify.
*/
- if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ ssl_release_record(s, rr);
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0)
goto start;
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio);
BIO_set_retry_read(rbio);
return -1;
* above.
* No alert sent because we already sent close_notify
*/
- SSL3_RECORD_set_length(rr, 0);
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
+ ssl_release_record(s, rr);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT,
SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
return -1;
}
* "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data
* that we're just going to discard.
*/
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment);
unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment;
size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len;
n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) < n)
- n = SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr); /* available bytes */
+ if (rr->length < n)
+ n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
/* now move 'n' bytes: */
- memcpy(dest + *dest_len,
- SSL3_RECORD_get_data(rr) + SSL3_RECORD_get_off(rr), n);
- SSL3_RECORD_add_off(rr, n);
- SSL3_RECORD_sub_length(rr, n);
+ memcpy(dest + *dest_len, rr->data + rr->off, n);
+ rr->off += n;
+ rr->length -= n;
*dest_len += n;
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_length(rr) == 0)
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ if (rr->length == 0)
+ ssl_release_record(s, rr);
if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
goto start; /* fragment was too small */
}
- if (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr) == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
+ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
return -1;
}
/* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */
ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1);
- i = s->handshake_func(s);
+ i = s->handshake_func(ssl);
/* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */
if (i < 0)
return i;
return -1;
if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
- if (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0) {
- /* no read-ahead left? */
+ if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) {
BIO *bio;
/*
* In the case where we try to read application data, but we
* problems in the blocking world
*/
s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
- bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
+ bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
return -1;
goto start;
}
- switch (SSL3_RECORD_get_type(rr)) {
+ switch (rr->type) {
default:
/*
* TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but
* no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised
* record types, using up resources processing them.
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
return -1;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
* SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but
* that should not happen when type != rr->type
*/
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return -1;
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
/*
* decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next
* record.
*/
- if (!early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
- EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
+ if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length,
+ EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
return -1;
}
- SSL3_RECORD_set_read(rr);
+ ssl_release_record(s, rr);
goto start;
} else {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
- SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
return -1;
}
}
}
-void ssl3_record_sequence_update(unsigned char *seq)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) {
- ++seq[i];
- if (seq[i] != 0)
- break;
- }
-}
-
/*
* Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible
* format and false otherwise.
*/
int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
{
- return SSL3_RECORD_is_sslv2_record(&rl->rrec[0]);
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s))
+ return 0;
+ return rl->tlsrecs[0].version == SSL2_VERSION;
}
-/*
- * Returns the length in bytes of the current rrec
- */
-size_t RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(RECORD_LAYER *rl)
+static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper;
+static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p, int version,
+ int content_type, const void *buf,
+ size_t len, void *cbarg)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
+ if (s->msg_callback != NULL)
+ s->msg_callback(write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl,
+ s->msg_callback_arg);
+}
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper;
+static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg, int op, int bits, int nid,
+ void *other)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
+
+ return ssl_security(s, op, bits, nid, other);
+}
+
+static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper;
+static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg, int type, size_t len)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
+ return s->rlayer.record_padding_cb(ssl, type, len,
+ s->rlayer.record_padding_arg);
+}
+
+static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch[] = {
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper },
+ { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper },
+ { 0, NULL }
+};
+
+static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ int direction,
+ int level)
+{
+
+ if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
+ return &ossl_dtls_record_method;
+
+ return &ossl_tls_record_method;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+ /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */
+ if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION
+ && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) != 0
+ && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)))
+ return &ossl_ktls_record_method;
+#endif
+
+ /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */
+ return direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ ? s->rlayer.rrlmethod
+ : s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
+}
+
+static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int direction)
{
- return SSL3_RECORD_get_length(&rl->rrec[0]);
+ const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *thismethod;
+ OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *thisrl;
+
+ if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
+ thismethod = s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
+ thisrl = s->rlayer.rrl;
+ } else {
+ thismethod = s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
+ thisrl = s->rlayer.wrl;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
+ {
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
+ if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod == &ossl_ktls_record_method) {
+ /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */
+ SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && thismethod->set_first_handshake != NULL)
+ thismethod->set_first_handshake(thisrl, 1);
+
+ if (s->max_pipelines != 0 && thismethod->set_max_pipelines != NULL)
+ thismethod->set_max_pipelines(thisrl, s->max_pipelines);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version,
+ int direction, int level,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen,
+ int mactype, const EVP_MD *md,
+ const SSL_COMP *comp)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM options[5], *opts = options;
+ OSSL_PARAM settings[6], *set = settings;
+ const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD **thismethod;
+ OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **thisrl, *newrl = NULL;
+ BIO *thisbio;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+ const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth;
+ int use_etm, stream_mac = 0, tlstree = 0;
+ unsigned int maxfrag = (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE)
+ ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s)
+ : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
+ int use_early_data = 0;
+ uint32_t max_early_data;
+ COMP_METHOD *compm = (comp == NULL) ? NULL : comp->method;
+
+ meth = ssl_select_next_record_layer(s, direction, level);
+
+ if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
+ thismethod = &s->rlayer.rrlmethod;
+ thisrl = &s->rlayer.rrl;
+ thisbio = s->rbio;
+ } else {
+ thismethod = &s->rlayer.wrlmethod;
+ thisrl = &s->rlayer.wrl;
+ thisbio = s->wbio;
+ }
+
+ if (meth == NULL)
+ meth = *thismethod;
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */
+ *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS,
+ &s->options);
+ *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE,
+ &s->mode);
+ if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
+ *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN,
+ &s->rlayer.default_read_buf_len);
+ *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD,
+ &s->rlayer.read_ahead);
+ } else {
+ *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING,
+ &s->rlayer.block_padding);
+ }
+ *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */
+ if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
+ use_etm = SSL_READ_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
+ if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
+ stream_mac = 1;
+
+ if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
+ tlstree = 1;
+ } else {
+ use_etm = SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0;
+ if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) != 0)
+ stream_mac = 1;
+
+ if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0)
+ tlstree = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (use_etm)
+ *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM,
+ &use_etm);
+
+ if (stream_mac)
+ *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC,
+ &stream_mac);
+
+ if (tlstree)
+ *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE,
+ &tlstree);
+
+ /*
+ * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already
+ * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above
+ */
+ if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
+ && s->session != NULL
+ && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session))
+ maxfrag = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session);
+
+
+ if (maxfrag != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
+ *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN,
+ &maxfrag);
+
+ /*
+ * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received
+ * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early
+ * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force.
+ */
+ if (s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
+ use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY
+ || level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE);
+ } else if (!s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) {
+ use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY);
+ }
+ if (use_early_data) {
+ max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s);
+
+ if (max_early_data != 0)
+ *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA,
+ &max_early_data);
+ }
+
+ *set = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ for (;;) {
+ int rlret;
+ BIO *prev = NULL;
+ BIO *next = NULL;
+ unsigned int epoch = 0;
+ OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch)];
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) {
+ prev = s->rlayer.rrlnext;
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
+ epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer) + 1; /* new epoch */
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s))
+ next = BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem());
+ else
+ next = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+
+ if (next == NULL) {
+ BIO_free(prev);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->rlayer.rrlnext = next;
+ } else {
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE)
+ epoch = DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) + 1; /* new epoch */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for
+ * callbacks that we don't need.
+ */
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch); i++) {
+ switch (rlayer_dispatch[i].function_id) {
+ case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK:
+ if (s->msg_callback == NULL)
+ continue;
+ break;
+ case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING:
+ if (s->rlayer.record_padding_cb == NULL)
+ continue;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ rlayer_dispatch_tmp[j++] = rlayer_dispatch[i];
+ }
+
+ rlret = meth->new_record_layer(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, version,
+ s->server, direction, level, epoch,
+ key, keylen, iv, ivlen, mackey,
+ mackeylen, ciph, taglen, mactype, md,
+ compm, prev, thisbio, next, NULL, NULL,
+ settings, options, rlayer_dispatch_tmp,
+ s, &newrl);
+ BIO_free(prev);
+ switch (rlret) {
+ case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL:
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE);
+ return 0;
+
+ case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR:
+ if (*thismethod != meth && *thismethod != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out,
+ * so we fallback to the original method and try again
+ */
+ meth = *thismethod;
+ continue;
+ }
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER);
+ return 0;
+
+ case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS:
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* Should not happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when
+ * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that
+ * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for
+ * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we
+ * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free)
+ */
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ || direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ
+ || pqueue_peek(s->d1->sent_messages) == NULL) {
+ if (*thismethod != NULL && !(*thismethod)->free(*thisrl)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *thisrl = newrl;
+ *thismethod = meth;
+
+ return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s, direction);
+}
+
+int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers)
+{
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.rrlmethod != NULL)
+ || !ossl_assert(s->rlayer.wrlmethod != NULL))
+ return 0;
+ s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, s->version);
+ s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, s->version);
+
+ return 1;
}
projects / openssl.git / blobdiff