/*
- * Copyright 2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2018-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "../../ssl_local.h"
#include "../record_local.h"
#include "recmethod_local.h"
+#include "internal/ktls.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
+ /*
+ * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.
+ *
+ * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the
+ * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this
+ * function will fail.
+ */
+static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = s->rrlmethod->get0_rbuf(s->rrl);
+ PACKET pkt, subpkt;
+ int count = 0;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))
+ return -1;
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
+ /* Skip record type and version */
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Read until next record */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))
+ return -1;
+
+ count += 1;
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kernel cannot offload receive if a partial TLS record has been read.
+ * Check the read buffer for unprocessed records. If the buffer contains a
+ * partial record, fail and return 0. Otherwise, update the sequence
+ * number at *rec_seq for the count of unprocessed records and return 1.
+ */
+static int check_rx_read_ahead(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *rec_seq)
+{
+ int bit, count_unprocessed;
+
+ count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);
+ if (count_unprocessed < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */
+ while (count_unprocessed) {
+ for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */
+ ++rec_seq[bit];
+ if (rec_seq[bit] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ count_unprocessed--;
+
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
+# include "crypto/cryptodev.h"
+
+/*-
+ * Check if a given cipher is supported by the KTLS interface.
+ * The kernel might still fail the setsockopt() if no suitable
+ * provider is found, but this checks if the socket option
+ * supports the cipher suite used at all.
+ */
+int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+ size_t taglen)
+{
+
+ switch (s->version) {
+ case TLS1_VERSION:
+ case TLS1_1_VERSION:
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ case TLS1_3_VERSION:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+ case SSL_AES128GCM:
+ case SSL_AES256GCM:
+ return 1;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+ return 1;
+# endif
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ if (s->ext.use_etm)
+ return 0;
+ switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+ case SSL_SHA1:
+ case SSL_SHA256:
+ case SSL_SHA384:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Function to configure kernel TLS structure */
+int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+ void *rl_sequence, ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info,
+ int is_tx, unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *mac_key, size_t mac_secret_size)
+{
+ memset(crypto_info, 0, sizeof(*crypto_info));
+ switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc) {
+ case SSL_AES128GCM:
+ case SSL_AES256GCM:
+ crypto_info->cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16;
+ crypto_info->iv_len = ivlen;
+ break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+ crypto_info->cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
+ crypto_info->iv_len = ivlen;
+ break;
+# endif
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac) {
+ case SSL_SHA1:
+ crypto_info->auth_algorithm = CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA256:
+ crypto_info->auth_algorithm = CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA384:
+ crypto_info->auth_algorithm = CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ crypto_info->cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
+ crypto_info->iv_len = ivlen;
+ crypto_info->auth_key = mac_key;
+ crypto_info->auth_key_len = mac_secret_size;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+ crypto_info->cipher_key = key;
+ crypto_info->cipher_key_len = keylen;
+ crypto_info->iv = iv;
+ crypto_info->tls_vmajor = (s->version >> 8) & 0x000000ff;
+ crypto_info->tls_vminor = (s->version & 0x000000ff);
+# ifdef TCP_RXTLS_ENABLE
+ memcpy(crypto_info->rec_seq, rl_sequence, sizeof(crypto_info->rec_seq));
+ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->rec_seq))
+ return 0;
+# else
+ if (!is_tx)
+ return 0;
+# endif
+ return 1;
+};
+
+#endif /* __FreeBSD__ */
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX)
+
+/* Function to check supported ciphers in Linux */
+int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+ size_t taglen)
+{
+ switch (s->version) {
+ case TLS1_2_VERSION:
+ case TLS1_3_VERSION:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* check that cipher is AES_GCM_128, AES_GCM_256, AES_CCM_128
+ * or Chacha20-Poly1305
+ */
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_CCM_128
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "AES-128-CCM")) {
+ if (s->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION /* broken on 5.x kernels */
+ || taglen != EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ } else
+# endif
+ if (0
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_128
+ || EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "AES-128-GCM")
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_256
+ || EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "AES-256-GCM")
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ || EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "ChaCha20-Poly1305")
+# endif
+ ) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Function to configure kernel TLS structure */
+int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
+ void *rl_sequence, ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info,
+ int is_tx, unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
+ unsigned char *mac_key, size_t mac_secret_size)
+{
+ unsigned char geniv[EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN];
+ unsigned char *eiv = NULL;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
+ if (!is_tx)
+ return 0;
+# endif
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
+ || EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN == EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
+ || !ossl_assert(EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN
+ == EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
+ return 0;
+ if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(ivlen == EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN))
+ return 0;
+ if (is_tx) {
+ if (RAND_bytes_ex(sctx->libctx, geniv,
+ EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, 0) <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ memset(geniv, 0, EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN);
+ }
+ eiv = geniv;
+ } else {
+ if (!ossl_assert(ivlen == EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN
+ + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
+ return 0;
+ eiv = iv + TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ memset(crypto_info, 0, sizeof(*crypto_info));
+ switch (EVP_CIPHER_get_nid(c))
+ {
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_128
+ case NID_aes_128_gcm:
+ if (!ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE == EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
+ || !ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE == EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
+ return 0;
+ crypto_info->gcm128.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128;
+ crypto_info->gcm128.info.version = s->version;
+ crypto_info->tls_crypto_info_len = sizeof(crypto_info->gcm128);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.iv, eiv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.salt, iv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.key, key, keylen);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
+ TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_256
+ case NID_aes_256_gcm:
+ if (!ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE == EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
+ || !ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE == EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
+ return 0;
+ crypto_info->gcm256.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256;
+ crypto_info->gcm256.info.version = s->version;
+ crypto_info->tls_crypto_info_len = sizeof(crypto_info->gcm256);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.iv, eiv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.salt, iv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.key, key, keylen);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
+ TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->gcm256.rec_seq))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_CCM_128
+ case NID_aes_128_ccm:
+ if (!ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE == EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN)
+ || !ossl_assert(TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE == EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN))
+ return 0;
+ crypto_info->ccm128.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128;
+ crypto_info->ccm128.info.version = s->version;
+ crypto_info->tls_crypto_info_len = sizeof(crypto_info->ccm128);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.iv, eiv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.salt, iv, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.key, key, keylen);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
+ TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+# endif
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ case NID_chacha20_poly1305:
+ if (!ossl_assert(ivlen == TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IV_SIZE))
+ return 0;
+ crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.info.cipher_type = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
+ crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.info.version = s->version;
+ crypto_info->tls_crypto_info_len = sizeof(crypto_info->chacha20poly1305);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.iv, iv, ivlen);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.key, key, keylen);
+ memcpy(crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
+ TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
+ if (!is_tx
+ && !check_rx_read_ahead(s,
+ crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.rec_seq))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+# endif
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+}
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX */
/* TODO(RECLAYER): Handle OPENSSL_NO_COMP */
static int ktls_set_crypto_state(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, int level,
return OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS;
}
+static int ktls_read_n(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, size_t n, size_t max, int extend,
+ int clearold, size_t *readbytes)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = tls_default_read_n(rl, n, max, extend, clearold, readbytes);
+
+ if (ret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) {
+ switch (errno) {
+ case EBADMSG:
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
+ SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+ break;
+ case EMSGSIZE:
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
+ SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+ break;
+ case EINVAL:
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
+ SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static int ktls_cipher(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs,
int sending, SSL_MAC_BUF *mac, size_t macsize,
/* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
return 1;
}
-struct record_functions_st ossl_ktls_funcs = {
+static int ktls_validate_record_header(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec)
+{
+ if (rec->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ RLAYERfatal(rl, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ktls_post_process_record(OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL3_RECORD *rec,
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ if (rl->version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ return tls13_common_post_process_record(rl, rec, s);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static struct record_functions_st ossl_ktls_funcs = {
ktls_set_crypto_state,
+ ktls_read_n,
ktls_cipher,
- NULL
+ NULL,
+ tls_default_set_protocol_version,
+ ktls_validate_record_header,
+ ktls_post_process_record
+};
+
+static int
+ktls_new_record_layer(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq, int vers,
+ int role, int direction, int level, unsigned char *key,
+ size_t keylen, unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen,
+ unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen,
+ const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): This probably should not be an int */
+ int mactype,
+ const EVP_MD *md, const SSL_COMP *comp, BIO *transport,
+ BIO_ADDR *local, BIO_ADDR *peer,
+ const OSSL_PARAM *settings, const OSSL_PARAM *options,
+ OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **retrl,
+ /* TODO(RECLAYER): Remove me */
+ SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = tls_int_new_record_layer(libctx, propq, vers, role, direction, level,
+ key, keylen, iv, ivlen, mackey, mackeylen,
+ ciph, taglen, mactype, md, comp, transport,
+ local, peer, settings, options, retrl, s);
+
+ if (ret != OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS)
+ return ret;
+
+ (*retrl)->funcs = &ossl_ktls_funcs;
+
+ ret = (*retrl)->funcs->set_crypto_state(*retrl, level, key, keylen, iv,
+ ivlen, mackey, mackeylen, ciph,
+ taglen, mactype, md, comp, s);
+
+ if (ret != OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS) {
+ OPENSSL_free(*retrl);
+ *retrl = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * With KTLS we always try and read as much as possible and fill the
+ * buffer
+ */
+ (*retrl)->read_ahead = 1;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD ossl_ktls_record_method = {
+ ktls_new_record_layer,
+ tls_free,
+ tls_reset,
+ tls_unprocessed_read_pending,
+ tls_processed_read_pending,
+ tls_app_data_pending,
+ tls_write_pending,
+ tls_get_max_record_len,
+ tls_get_max_records,
+ tls_write_records,
+ tls_retry_write_records,
+ tls_read_record,
+ tls_release_record,
+ tls_get_alert_code,
+ tls_set1_bio,
+ tls_set_protocol_version,
+ tls_set_plain_alerts,
+ tls_set_first_handshake,
+
+ /*
+ * TODO(RECLAYER): Remove these. These function pointers are temporary hacks
+ * during the record layer refactoring. They need to be removed before the
+ * refactor is complete.
+ */
+ tls_default_read_n,
+ tls_get0_rbuf,
+ tls_get0_packet,
+ tls_set0_packet,
+ tls_get_packet_length,
+ tls_reset_packet_length
};
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